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"TOUT’ CE QUI- SERA PERDU PAR BERGSON 
SERA NON PAS GAGNE PAR SAINT THOMAS 
MAIS REGAGNE PAR SPENCER."
(C. P^guy, Oeuvres en Prose, 1909-1914, La Pléiade, 1959, pV 15)8.)
• MEMORANDUM
This thesis is entirely my own work and has at no time been 
submitted for another degree.
Signed:










2. The Development, of Bergson’s Religious Philosophy 18
5* Bergson's Reception in the Catholic Church before1920 59
4. Bergson's Influence on Catholic thought, 1920-1939 100
5. Bergson and the French Modernists 143
6* Bergson and Blondel: The Unification of Life inGod - 185
7* Jacques Maritain and Henri Bergson: The Questionof Intuition 222
8. The Aesthetic Theories of Bergson and Maritain 258
9* Peguy and Bergson: Literary Style 284
10. Bergson and Du Bos: Literary Criticism 323
11. Conclusion 3^5
Bibliography 575
«M ^  mm
ACKNOWLEDGE:,ÎGNTS 
This thesis is dedicated to my mother,
I should like to thank the following for their great help and encourageme: 
supervisor Prof. A.H.T. Levi, University of St, Andrews 
Dr. S.W. Taylor, University of Bristol 
Dom Illtyd Trethowan, Downside Abbey 
Mrs. Anne Merriman
Dr. John Coulson, University of Bristol 
Prof. Henri Gouhier, 21 Boulevard Plandrin, Paris 16.
Prof. Richard Griffiths, University of Cardiff 
Dr. A.E. PiIkington. University of Oxford
M, Auguste Ma>rtin, Centre C. Peguy, 11 rue du Tab our, Orleans 
Jean and Madge Mouton, 51 Colehem Court, London SW5 
Ian Brayley, S.J., Campion House, Oxford 





thanks are also owing to the librarians of the following: 
Institut Catholique, rue d’Assas, Paris 6 
Bibliothèque Jacques Doucet, 3 place du Pantheon, Paris 5 
Bibliothèque Nationale, 58 rue Richelieu, Paris 2 
Sorbonne, 17 rue Saint Jacques, Paris 5 
British Museum, Gt. Russell Street, London WCl 
Heythrop College, 11 Cavendish Square, London W1 
Downside Abbey, Stratton, Somerset
University of St. Andrews, Market Street, St. Andrews
University of Bristol, Queen's Road, Bristol 8
Bodleian Library and Taylor Institute, Oxford
University of London, Senate House and Birkbeck College, Gower Street, London WCl
- VI -
ABBREVIATIONS
All page references to Bergson's works listed hereafter are from Oeuvres (P.U.P., 1959). The abbreviations used for Bergson's individual books are as follows;
Essai or L'Essai
M,M. or (for absolute clarity) Matière et Mémoire
E.G.




Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (1889) |
Matière et Mémoire; Essai sur la • |relation du corps à l'esprit (Tspô)
L'Evolution Crë'atrice (1907)
Les deux sources de la morale et de 1la religion (1952;
La Pensée et le Mouvant (1954) ^
refers to the series Etudes bergsoniennes % and the volume number and date are given immediately afterwards f
refers to Henri Bergson: Ecrits et PatolesVols. I-IIÏ“(p.ü.F., 1957-1958) 1
Further details on Bergson's works are to be found in the Bibliography at the back.
Where only a page reference is given, the work referred to is the same as in the previous quotation.
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CIIAPTER ONE
IliTRODUGTION
At a cursory glance the subject-matter of this work may appear 
to be a random selection of four important Catholic authors who hap­
pened to be active at the time of Bergson's greatest fame and influence.
The question might then come to mind as to why these particular four had 
been chosen, for they seem unconnected in their field of work as well as 
in their aims and objectives. In this introductory passage I shall 
seek to justify my selection of authors for detailed study and hope 
to show how they promoted a renewal of interest in Bergson smong 
Catholics which led eventually to a reassessment of his work,
I began researching the whole range of Bergson's influence, with 
a particular bias towards the literary reactions, v/here I expected to 
reap a good harvest; but in spite of indications to the contrary I t
♦ soon disoovered that the number of men influenced by Bergson in a 
thoroughgoing and profound manner was strictly limited, whereas the 
number tainted 7/ith the 'Eergsonian spirit' - not often readily attri- %
butable to Bergson directly - was considerably larger.
Contemporary periodicals around 1910 were fascinated by Bergson's 
apparently huge success as a lecturer and thinker. A, Tarde and H,
Massis (pseudonym 'Agathon') took stock of Bergson's influence in yI
L'Esprit de la Nouvelle Sorbonne (Mercure de France, 1911) and in Les 
Jeunes Gens d'Aujourd'hui (id. 1915). These works are very general 
accounts of the literary vogues and fashions rather than a detailed 94,
analysis of leading ideas and their sources. The trend towards 
vagueness was to continue. In La Grands Pevue's "Enquête sur
J
Bergson' , Jacques Rivière wrote:
Pour ne parler que de 1'influence artistique de II. Bergson, je la crois nulle sur la prochaine generation LI, Bergson a formule, après coup, avec une magnifique précision certains principes sur lesquels s'étaient appuyés inconsciemment les symbolistes, du moins ceux de la deuxième génération. (p. 750)
But, on the other hand, Henri Clouard sees Bergson's influence as
all-pervasive:
La fraternité de l'oeuvre bergsmiienne avec la lit­térature est émouvante ... La philosophie intuitive de la durée s'accorde évidemment avec la valeur éclairante et pénétrante des puissances de la sensi­bilité et elle a contribué au climat dont la ligne va de Proust à Duliamel et même les poètes modernes qui veulent évoquer l'éternel dans l'instant. (Histoire de la littérature française du symbolisme à nos jours,No. I, Ed. À. Michel, 1947, p. 50j)
The trend towards generalities displayed in these contradictory
comments is continued by Gonaague True, who,in an emotional outburst,
sees Bergson's pernicious influence everywhere and yet, strangely
enough, nowhere in particular:
Notre roman est évide^nment bergsonien, voyez Romain Rolland !Notre théâtre, qui, aveo MM. Claudel, Henry Bataille, Ivlaeterlinck et quelques autresmet en scène non plus des passions dés­intéressées, mais des états passionnels à leur stade primitif et dans leur inconscience native, ne l'est moins. Bergsoniennesaussi notre poésie et notre éloquence dans les balbutiements profonds de Péguy, et bergsonienne enfin notre philosophie, qui s'écarte de toute idée claire comme du feu et ne se complaît, avec M. Bergson lui-même, que dans 1'inconsistant et 1'inachevé,("Belphégor et le monde bergsonien", L'Opinion. 26.4.19)*
The lack of precision which could lead one man to deny Bergson any 
real influence and another to see it everywhere is typical of the vague 
way in which writers were reviewing Bergson's influence at the time.
A series of short articles, edited by G. Picard and G.-L, Tau.tain. La Grande Revue, 1914, No. 83 (pp. 544-5'bl), No, 84 (pp. llL"12q; 296-330, 513-929).
-This was the first major problem encountered in my assessment of
Bergson’s impact. His influence in literature is essentially diffuse
and it is difficult to see in most cases whether Bergson was merely a
representative of his age, articulating its ideas and mirroring its
preoccupations, or whether he actually did provoke and inspire original
insights. A. Turquet-llilnes in Some modern French writers - a study
in Bergsonism (E. MacBride, New York, 1921 [_lst ed. I916J) absolutely
typifies the early approach and vaguely imagines that everything thought
and sensed in the literature of the early twentieth century is inspired
by the spirit of Bergsonism, which permeates all the cultural life of
the time. But nothing is proved conclusively in this book and a person
with a serious philosophical interest in Bergson can see evidence of a
betrayal, because Bergson had many precise and very technical ideas to
\offer and, although his way of thinking did give rise to a general out­
look or vision of life, this was nevertheless inspired by concrete and 
individual perceptions and arguments.
Even recent works often adopt the approach of seeking ’affinities' 
as opposed to exact influences: A.E, Pilkington's Bergson and his
influence (O.U.P., 1976) only includes Péguy as a directly influenced 
disciple and S.K. Kumar in Borgson and the stream of consciousnees novel 
(Blackie & Son Ltd., London, Glasgow, 1962) states his aims as follows:
My main purpose isi therefore,not to establish Bergson's direct influence on the novelists whom I discuss: I smirather concerned to bring out the parallelism between the notion of the stream of consciousness as it appears inthese, novelists and the Bergscnian theory of flux.(p. viii, Italics in original)
More particular influences uj’c defected by Florie Be]attre in 
"Le bergsonisme et la littérature' -.n Povie de l’enseignement des langue: 
vivantes of 1922 (No. 39), P* 294 *• on P. Claudel, J. Romains, C. Péguy,
%4 -
E. Clermont and Marcel'Proust, In Franzdsischer Geist iin gwanxi&rsten 
Jahrhundert  ^Ernst Curtlus considers that Bergsonism has influenced the 
ideas of A, Gide, A, Suares, R, Rolland, li, Proust and C, Péguy, In Iaddition, according to Curtius, Bergson stimulated modernist theological 1
thought;
Auch das religiose Leben erfâhrt die V/'irkongen der Bergsonschen Gedankenwelt, Die katholischen Modernisten finden in Bergsons Kritik des Rationa,lismus eine Legitimierung des raystischen Benkens und bemühen sich, auf die Lehren der neueii Philosophie eine neue Apologetik zu begrdnden. (p, 59)
I have followed up this line of thought in Chapter Five.
The best overall account of Bergson's influence in literature is 
to be found in Romeo Aihour's Henry Bergson et les lettres françaises 
(Lib. J. Corti, 1956), As regards the literary figures already men­
tioned, most have furnished scant evidence of real influence. And at
\best, Bergson's ideological relationship with Marcel Proust is one of 
affinities of thought, even though Proust became Bergson's nephew through, 
the latter's marriage, and even though Proust studied under Bergson at 
the Sorbonne betv/een 18-] and 1893*^  •
In Le Temps newspaper on 12th November 1913$ Proust stated thac he 
would not have been ashamed to admit any debt to Bergson, but the fact of 
the matter was, as he put it, that "mon oeuvre est dominée par la dis­
tinction entre la memdre involontaire et la mémoire volontaire, dis­
tinction qui, non seulement ne figure pas dans la philosophie de M.
Bergson, mais est même contredite par elle" (quoted in Souvenirs sur 
Marcel Proust by R. .Dreyfus - Grasset, 1926, p. 289). Despite valiant
1. 1st ed. 1919; quoted here from 1952 edition (A. Franoke, i.G. Bern).
2, See Henri Bergson: Essais et Témoignages, Eds. Béguin and Thévenas, Neuchaxel, 1943$ P» 125,
y*#
5efforts, A.E. Pilklngton (op. cit.) fails to prove convincingly any real
influence from Bergson, while Joyce Megay (Bergson et I'roust; Essai de
mise au point de la question de 1'influence de Bergson sur Proust, Yrin,
1976) cornes out very decisively on the side of Proust's lack of dependence.
The really significant influence, she contends, was one of Proust's other
teachers, Alphonse Darlu^.
Proust's persons.! contacts v/ith Bergson were "peu nombreux" (p. 149)
and Bergson is not even mentioned'in Proust's early correspondence. Prie.
Megay thus supports Proust's own protestations:
En consultant les Carnets et les Cahiers de Proust, conservésà la Bibliothèque Nationale, nous avons pu oonsbâter qu'iln'existe auciui indice d'un engouement même passager pour,la philosophie bergsonienne. Bien au contraire, chaque fois qu'il est question de Bergson dans les Cahiers, Proust déclare son opposition aux vues du philosophe. (p. 149)
At the time when Proust was being described often as a Bergsonian
novelist, he mentioned the philosopher more often in his correspondence
(1920-1922). He still denied any influence and pointed to a number of
dissimilarities between his own and Bergson's preoccupations. Neverthe-
2less, the consensus of opinion at that time' was that Proust must have admired
Bergson and drawn from him, and that, therefore, his denials were simply to
maintain his reputation and independence.
After reading several of Romain Holland's works, .including Jean 
Christophe^ 1 I failed to discern anything that was directly attributable 
to Bergson, although it is easy to see why others might imagine that
1. See also H. Bonnet's Alchonse Barlu 1849-1921, Le maître de philo- sophie de Marcel Proust (Nizet, I96ÏI,
2, There is a good bibliography of this in Mme. Megay's book.
3» 4 vole. L'Aube, Le Matin, L'Adolescent, La Révolte \_Lib, P.
Ollendorff, 1905-191^.
Holland's introspective sensitivity and romantic spirit are derived 
from the Bergsonism prevalent at the time he wrote. This is a good f
example of what André Gide meant in his Journal when he v/rote that "plus 
tard, on croira découvrir partout son influence sur notre époque, simple­
ment parce que lui-même est de son époque, et qu'il cède sans cesse au mouve- i
; ? ment. D'où son importance représentative" (Journal. Gallimard, 1948» p. 783)
Although Gide read some Bergson (see Journal, pp. 269, 843); he had difficulty 1
with the Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience and came to the
conclusion that "ce qui me déplaît dans la doctrine de Bergson c'est tout 
ce que je pense déjà sans qu'il le dise, et tout ce qu'il y a de flatteur*, 1
de caressant même, pour l'esprit" (p. 782),
Paul Claudel's Journal (2 vols., Gallimard, I968, I969) likewise evinces /
very slight interest in Bergson and certainly no more in him than in any A
other thinker to v/li'om Claudel's eclectic mind turned its attention. 
Bergson is quoted on several occasions: for example, "dormir, c'est se
désintéresser" (l, p. 458) and "Toute action, toute fabrication est un 
affaiblissement de la contemplation" (il, p. 72); but Bergson's ideas 
are also attacked: "Panta rei, d'ké%'aclite et des bergsoniens. leur
erreur est de considérer simplement le fait de 1'écoulement et non pas 
celui de l'origine et de la source, le mouvement étant toujours le moyen 
d'une fonction ..." (il, p. I6I). Bergson remains a source of ideas but 
does not claim the soul of Claudel; on the conti’ary, Claudel would like 
to lay claim to Bergson's soul and is only really interested in seeing 
how close Bergson is moving towards Catholicism^.
Claudel's own conversion could not possibly have owed anything to 
Bergson, whose first book was published in 1889, three years after Claudel
i
1. See e.g., p. 656.
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became a Catholic,and Claudel’s main themes and ideas owe little or 
nothing to Bergson. Claudel was in fact not of the generation most sus­
ceptible to Bergson's strongest influence; that Is, between 190.5 and
igis''.
In Le renouveau religieux d'après le roman français de 1886-1914 
(Les belles lettres, 1954)» Elizabeth Fraser echoes the common concep­
tion of the period that the symbolist poets owed a great dea-1 to Bergson, 
at least in their aesthetic theory:
... à l'instar de Bergson, ils [les symbolistes] ont compris ■que 'la vie psychique n'est pas une suite simple, mais un ensemble et un processus continu de faits simples', c'est donc la réverbération intime des stimulants venus du dehors qu'ils cherchent à communiquer intuitivement, l'écho profond, dans le jeu et dans 1'intensité variée de ces éléments (p. 6l).
However, on doser inspection of individual poets it is very diffi-- 
cult to see v/ho is included in this general categoiy. Emeric Fiser (Le 
symbole littéraire, J, Corti, 1941) indicates that Bergson and Mallarmé, 
even though they taught in the same lycée (Rollin) for a short time, did 
not know one another (see p. 38). He also holds to the thesis that syz,- 
bolist theory - including Proust's - antedated Bergson's philosophy and 
the influence v;as possibly in the other direction - from the symbolists to 
Bergson: "Nous découvrirons la filiation de cette pensée, aussi bien avec la
tendance symboliste qu'avec l'esthétique de Proust" (p. 13) . This idea is 
reinforced when Fiser insists that much symbolist theory is not in line ?rith 
Bergsoniam and yet eventually infiltrated his philosophy insidiously;
1. N.B., Conversion dates: F. Jamines 1905» J, and H. Maritain I9O6,C. Péguy I9O8, J. Lot'te I9O8, H. Valéry-Radc; I9IO, E. Psichai'i 1915» H. Massis 1913.
2. In favt there is even less evidence that Proust influenced Bergson than the other way round.
Nous verrons, d'abord comment le Bergsonisme .s'oppose au symbolisme, et ensuite, comment le symbolisme exclu par Bergson, triomphe dans sa philosophie (p, 15).
Among symbolists Paul Valéry also did not know Bergson’s work to 
any extent and had the most hazy conception as to what it contained.
This has been borne out by A.E. Pilkington (op. cit.) who researched 
the field thoroughly: "Valery appears to have had only a slight first­
hand acquaintance with Bergson's books" (p. 99). He only read L'Evolution
Créatrice in the 1920s and never read L'Essai or Matière et Mémoire.
Valéry wrote to Thibaudet in 1912:
Puis-je me permettre à présent de vous présenter quelquesremarques de fait? La plus importante concerne la réalité des rapports de ma pensée avec celle de M. Bergson. Or 1'influence de mon illustre et vénéré confrère sur moi n ’apu se produire. C'est une question de chronologie et debiographie. Mes idées se sont faites entre 1892 et '95*J'entends ma manière ou méthode de juger. En ce temps-là qui connaissait^ Bergson? D'ailleurs, je n'ai pas fait d'études phi1os ôphi que s ... (Pref, to R.P. Gillet's Paul Valéry et la Métaphysique, Flammarion, 1935» pp. 7-8*)7
Thus, as regards Bergson and Valéry there is not a strong case for 
direct influence. I then turned my attention briefly to Francis Jammes, 
the Catholic poet, and apart from very general similarities again drew a 
blank in terms of concrete evidence of influence^. Jammes' blithe spirit
is far removed from the tortuous logic of philosophy. If ideas loosely
connected with Bergson’s can be detected this is more by chance than 
intention and there is certainly no depth in the application.
It is in fact far more likely, as Roméo Arbour has it, that the 
symbolists influenced one another and had roots in the nineteenth centur;/ 
than that they assimilated Bergsonism, There had oJ.ready been at least
1, See Rose Ib’'son' Lee Sensations et la Sensibilité chez Francis Jammes (Lis. E. Droz, Geneva, 1954)*
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one pioneering generation of Régnier, Yerhaeren, Maeterlinck and
Laforgu.e, for example,before Bergson's emergence to femo. Arbour
concludes from this;
Si la doctrine de Bergson, qui viendra bient'ôl., peut souffrir un rapprochement avec le contenu de cette poésie, c'est dans la mesure où celle-ci a conservé quelque chose du legs de ses maîtres: poésie del'homme intérieur, recherche d'une réalité invisible
(p. 225).
In the most general terms it seems fair to say that some of the
symbolists' aims were inconsistent vfith Bergsonism, for they attempted
to immobilize the flux, to encapsulate the stream of consciousness in
fixed expressions and to transform movement into statuesque art forms.
Jules Romains might have been considered as a possible Bergsonian.
In 1912 he developed his poetic theory called 'unanimisme' and E, Henriot
suggests that "Bergson en a donné la, justification métaphysique" (A quoi
rêvent les jeunes gens, Champion, 1912, p. 36). Some of Romains' ideas
in poetry do indeed have a Bergsonian ring to them: for example:
L'a,lluj:e des passants n'est presque pas physiqueCe ne sont plus des mouvements, ce sont des rythnes ...(From La Vie Unanime, quoted in Arbour, p. 247}
But some of his other ideas a,re in direct contrast to the individualism 
of Bergsonism:
Je méprise mon coeur et ma vie intime;Le rêve de la ville est plus boa,u que le mien.
Je cesse d'exister tellement je suis tout.(ïbid., in Arbour, p. 252)
However, Romains' aesthetic theory ?/as fully developed by 1903» according
to Arbour, who adds that the traceable influences on it are Hugo, Goethe,
Baudelaire, Nietzsche and Yerhaeren.
Henri Bremond's aesthetic theory similarly owes little to Bergson.
His main work of this type, Frière et Poésie (Grasset, 1926), is dedicated
10
to Maurice Blondel and many of his ideas are derived from Blondel*s
philosophy^. Towards the end of the hook Bremond makes another
general acknowledgement and specifically snubs modern philosopiij^
outside Blondel;
Ces idées, qui ne sont pas neuves, mais que les philosophes, à l'exception de Maurice Blondel, n'ont peut-être pas encore abordées de front, demanderaient un développement infini (p. 215).
Consequently, I have deemed it better to examine the affinities between 
Blondel himself and Bergson, rather than those between Bergson and 
Bremond.
Perhaps it would prove more fruitful to seek Bergson's influence 
through the work of his pupils at the Lycée Henri IV and the College de 
Prance. The Tharaud brothers (Notre cher Péguy. Lib. Pion, 1926, 2 
vols.; reveal that certain well-knovm names I'egularly attended Bergson's 
lectures. There are several waves; the first around 1890-1897 at the 
Lycée Henri IV,which included A. Thibaudet, E. Lubac and B, Momet; 
the second around 1897**1900» which included J. Chevalier, P. Hazard,
A. Renaud et, E. C le nr, ont, R, Gilluuin and C, Péguy (who alone stayed 
on later); and the third, attending from 1900 onwards, with H* Massis, 
G. 8Orel, T. de Visan, J, and R. Maritain and E. Psichari among their 
number. Raissa Maritain later wrote: "Péguy, et Psichari, Jacques et
moi, nous formions un quatuor excellent, parce que des perspectives de 
vie spirituelle et certitudes ihtelleotuelles s'ouvraient à nouveau 
devant nous" (Les Grandes Amitiés I, D. de Brouwer, 1941» PP. 124-125),
The predomnance of Catholics (or later converts) among thi.s number
1. Some of these ideas aJso overlap with Bergson's. See the detailed comparison between Blondel and Bergson in Chapter Six.
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provided me with a key-to an area of Bergson's influence which had 
not been systematically analyzed in Prance or elsewhere. It soon 
became clear that the Cabholic world was in a ferment over Bergson's 
philosophy; the first powerful answer to the materialistic positivism 
of the nineteenth oeiitury. Bergson v/as by and large received hostilely 
at first, but certainly his work provoked a large-scale reaction’^.
The leading protagonists to emerge from this ferment were Charles 
Péguy and Jacques Maritain, both of whom knew each other and Bergson 
personally through the lectures. Péguy became Bergson's most ardent 
supporter, while Lfetritain felt it his first duty to point out the dif­
ferences between Bergsonism and Catholic orthodoxy - that is to say, Thomism, 
Upon further reading it became abundantly clear to me that Jacques Maritain 
has since been misjudged in being attacked as a rigid opponent of Bergsonism 
and all modern philosophy. That this is far from the truth can be seen 
in Chapters Seven and Eight. Maritain had in fact a remarkable affinity 
of spirit with Bergson, whom he greatly admired, and his later philosophy 
owes more to Bergson's method of obsenrvation and immediate.insight than 
to chains of logic and the doctrinal formulae of the past, althoi.;.gb of 
course this must be reconciled v/ith Maritain's first loyalty to dhomas 
Aquinas.
The Cahholic Church of the early twentieth century displayed two 
major tendencies in philosopliy (with internal divisions in. both csmps) - 
the orthodox Thomist approach to doctrine and the modernist or independent 
restatement of doctrine in the light of new ideas. Here again miscon­
ceptions abound. If Maritain can be regarded as the main upholder of
1. I have attempted to give details and chronology of this in Chapter Three.
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Catholic orthodoxy in Thomist terms, then Blondel can he viewed as 
the leading independent Catholic thinker - not a 'modernist' in the 
sense of calling all orthodoxies into question hut rather in the sense 
of setting out with a lack of premises or presuppositions to discover 
whether faith can he justified rationally to an agnostic. Because 
of his representative importance, as well as from the point of view of 
his position in relation to Bergsonism, I have examined Blondel alone 
in Chapter Six. But if Maritain and Blondel are leading figures then 
they should also he seen in perspective, and therefore the main strands 
of Catholic philosopliy are also further examined in a broader context^ '.
The idea of limiting the subject-matter to Catholic writers appeared
promising on another count. Such a study would be integrated because of
its very nature - all of the v/riters having not only an ideology in common
\but often mutual friendship or personal acquaintance. There is no compre­
hensive study of the field; the nearest approach being Etienne Gilson's 
Le philosophe et la théologie (Fayard, I96O) and then there is only a general 
chapter (3) on Bergsonism with no detailed comments on individuals. It 
was fascinating to trace the ramifications and outcome of the debate over 
Bergson between 1910 and 1920, for it led to some surprising conclusions, 
Bergson's influence gradually emerged'as a significant and telling force 
for change in the methods and language of Catholic philosophy. It also 
encouraged something of a change of heart for Jacques Maritain and led to 
a general reinterpretation of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine itself among certain 
of his disciples.
The important general works on Catholic philosophy of this period 
include Georges Van Riet's L'Epistémologie Thomiste (Bib, Phil, de Louvain,
1. See Chapters Three, Four and Five,
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1946) which limits its sights to the subtle but important arguments 
within the Thomist branch of Catholic thought; Roger Aubert's Le 
-problème de l'Acte de Foi (B. Yferny, Louvain, 3rd éd., 1958) which is 
not limited to a school of thought but to a particular theme within 'I
metaphysics; Jacques Chevalier's Histoire de la Pensée, Vol. IV 
(Flammarion, 1966), which examines broadly the scope of all philo­
sophical thought up to 1939 but from a specifically Catholic viewpoint, 
and A-B Sertillanges' Le christianisme et les philosophes.Vol. II 
(Aubier-Montaigne, 1941) which attempts to do the same but in a more 
cavalier fashion. In English there is the fairly comprehensive recent 
work by F.C. Copleston, S.J., in his History of Philosophy series - Vol.
IX, Maine de Biran to Sartre (Search Press, London, 1975)* None of these 
works relates Bergsonism to Catholic thought in a systematic or extensive 
way and in most Bergson's influence is restricted to a few obvious admirers.
Only Chevalier appears to have suspected that Bergson made a more wide- %
Jspread and decisive impression than had been realized before. •;
The two main mistakes to be made about Bergson's influenoe, therefore, 1are to make it too diffuse and lacking in precision or, alternatively, to >
limit it too severely. As time has gone by more writers have avoided 4
the problem by comparing Bergson's philosophy with a single writer's J
thcught. In this v/ay Bergson has been compared v/ith Ruskin (Ruskin et /
Bergson - F, Belattre, Clarendon Press, Oxon., 1947)» Plotinus (Henri |
Bergson et Plotin - L, Delaunay Siraudeau, Angers, 1919), R. Euoken (E. ■ :i
Hermann -.Eucken & Bergson, J. Clarke & Co., London, 1912), G. Péguy ^
(A, Henry - Bergson - maître de Péguy, Ed. Elzevir, 1948), (A, Béguin - 
Péguy et Bergson, L'Amitié Charles Péguy, Orléans, 1952), A. Thibaudet 
(L. Bopp - In Henri Bergson: Essais et Témoignages, Neuchatel, 1945)» 4
P. Valéry (J.C. O'Neill - In Mod. jang. Association, March 1951)»
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p. Teilhard de ChardIn■ (M. Barthélerry-Madaule Bergson et Teilhard de 
Chardin. Ed. du Seuil, 1963)» C. Bu Bos (B. Saida In Etudes .Borgsoniennes,
Vol. 9, P.U.P., 1970, pp* 159-200), M, Proust (j. Megay, op. sitr). and 
A.E. Pilld-ngton has compared Bergson with four thinkers, J. Benda, P. %
Valery, M. Proust and C, Péguy (Bergson an.d his influence. O.U.P., 1976),
XThis is in no way an exhaustive list ,
The next problem to solve was how to restrict any study of Bergson's
literary influence. Yfere such minor figures as E. Clermont, E. Psichari
and J. Lotte to be involved? After making a brief survey of the works
produced by these authors I decided to exclude them. The subject matter
of their works v/as hardly philosophical - not even in the sense in which
A. Camus, for example, is a philosophical novelist - and any comparison
with Bergson's philosophy would have appeared to be artificial, pretentious $
and externally imposed. It then occurred to me that the field of aesthetic
and literary theory could prove a more rewarding area of research, for in
this domain one is analyzing more abstract ideas and their implications.
Also, Bergson was greatly interested in artistic creativity and if he did
not write a full-length account on this nevertheless thei's are numerous
instances of his treatment of such matters. In addition, he held distinct
2and original views on the subject . Indeed, he is the artist's philosopher 
par excellence, and the msterial world v/as for him, as for the srtist, "un 
ensemble d'images" (Oeuvres, P.U.P., 1959» p. I61).
This idea became even more attractive later, as Maritain's ov/n |
1, See further the bibliography on Bergson and Catholicism ax the back.
2. This is outlined in L. Adolphe's La dialectique dé's"' images chez Bergson (p,>IT.F., 1951) and in the first half of R.Arbour's Henri Bergson et les lettres françaises (j. Corti, i1956). ' _ —  - _ _
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aesthetic theory actually shed light on the extent to which he bad
assimilated Bergson’s teachings. Moreover, a study of Péguy'3
literary theories and techniques has not been attempted in much
detail with regard to Bergson's influence, whereas studies of the
Bergsonian origins of his wider preoccupa.tions have been undertaken
more than once^.
The connected field of literary criticism was also v/orthy of
attention and two leading candidates for further research presented
themsâfves - Charles Du Bos and Albert Thibaudet. Both had moved
into Catholicism after much of their early work had been completed.
Both had undergone distinct Bergsonian influence. Thibaudet had even
written a two-volume work on Le Bergsonisme (î\W, 1923) î largely an
abstract account of Bergson's thought but also demonstrating Thibaudet's
\own enthusiasm for "La philosophie nouvelle" and including his ovm exten- 
tensions of Bergson's thought. Part of his aim is to "amorcer le dialogue 
sur des points de la philosophie que M. Bergson n'a pas touché' (p. 12), 
Thibaudet claimed to have learned certain things of importance from 
Bergson:
Résister aux enthousiasmes et antipathies spontanés, réagir contre tous les automatismes, et surtout contre le plus dangéreiuc, celui du mécanisme intellectuel que nous sommes donné à nous-mêmes, envisager chaque problème sous sa figure particulière, aveo un corps individuel que ne saurait habiller un vêtement fait en série, tenir à l'unité réelle de cette attitude plus qu'à l'unité factice des résultats (.Le Bergsonisme, p. 8),
1. See Chapter Nine,
2. In this he wrote of his own debt: "II n'est pas de.pensée contemporaine à laquelle je doive plus qu'à celle de II, Bergson. J’ai été autrefois son élève, et j'en tiens un certain nombre de directions d'esprit"
(p* 8).
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The case of Da Bos bore great similarities to Thibaudet's - 
but here Bergson had not only influenced the critic's ideas but 
had stimulated the ver^ r touchstone and starting-point of his 
criticism; his method or technique of analyzing a writer's work.
To have dedicated two chapters to individual literary critics would
have involved too much repetition and covered too much of the same
ground, and so I decided that.Du Bos had been more profoundly affected 
and that in an^  ^case the development of a method of criticism'inspired 
by Bergson was something worth scrutinizing in detail. Thibaudet had 
after all laid out his assessment of Bergson's philosophy and acknow­
ledged his ov/n debt in the clearest possible v,ny in I^e Bergsonisme, 
wherean Du Bos' reaction was more complex and obscure. Like Péguy, 
he had adapted and made use of the raw material of the philosophy for 
his oY/n purposes and'-- objectiges.
Du Bos would therefore suitably complete a work,the main purpose of 
which would be to highlight the ways in which Bergson’s ideas had been 
actively assimilated, adapted and re-used with new ends in view. The 
aim would not be to prove that Bergson’s ideas had been accepted pas­
sively and reiterated in this case or that, nor hov/ they had been added 
to a writer's intellectual armoury, but how they had been employed in 
other spheres of activity and been invested with new significance and 
intent.
The Catholic church, with its own firm viewpoints and tenets of faith
to defend through rational argument, would provide an ideal example of the
way in which ideas could be rejected for certain reasons and incorporated 
for others, and also, since Bergson's philosophy is interesting above all
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to a metaphysician or religious thinker^, the destiny of his ideas in 
the Catholic intellectual life of the early twentieth century is well 
worthy of observation.
Finally, in an account of the following type it is essential to . 
restrict oneself not only in terms of the breadth of the field to be 
studied-but also in terms of the time-scale to be envisaged. There 
are certain important figures who would certainly claim some attention 
if the time-scale were extended, because their work displays signs of 
Bergson's influence: I am thinking especially of Père Teilhard de
Chardin and Emmanuel Mounier, but these must be considered as men of a 
second generation on whom the influence of one person of a previous 
generation,such as Bergson, was no longer so direct nor so central.
There-is moreover already a lengthy tome called Bergson et Teilhard de 
Chardin by Ivîme. M, Barthéléiry-lîadaule (Ed, du Seuil, I963). The major 
work of such men as Teilhard and Mounier was published after 1939 and for 
this reason I have deliberately excluded them from the scope of this study. 
It might also have been interesting to follow up the career of Bergsonisra 
in more detail in the Louvain school after Maréchal, but that must like­
wise be precluded from this work, on similar gropnds.
1. The case for this is argued in the second chapter.
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cmPTER TWO
THE DEVELOPlVIFiBE OF BERGSON'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
Henri Louis Bergson was born in rue Lamartine in Paris on 18th
October 1859> the second son of a Polish Jew, Michel Bergson, and
Catherine née Levison, from Doncaster, England. His early schooling
took place at the Lycée Gpndorcet between 1668 and 1878. He showed |
his academic prowess at an early age by winning prizes in rhetoric (1875)»
philosophy (I876) and mathematics (l877)» On 21st July I876 Bergson was S
awarded the 'bachelier es lettres' - the 'bachelier es sciences' followed |
on 11th July 1877 and almost a year later (May 1878) he obtained the «
'licencié es lettres*. In August of that year he entered the Ecole
Hormale Supérieure in the 'faculté de lettres', finished second in the
\entrance examination behind Jean Jaurès, the future socialist writer and 
politician. Then he studied under such as Léon Ollé-Iaprune (Blondel's 
mentor) and Emile Boutroux, He completed the courses $here in August 1861 
and in the 'Agrégation de Philosophie' finished second, this time ahead 
of Jaurès and behind a certain Lesbazeilles.
On 20th September 1881 Bergson's application to teach philosopliy at 
Lycée St. Brièuo was declined; hovæver, he was accepted at Lycée d'Angers 
and remained there until 4th April 1882, when he was promoted to 'professeur 
de philosophie' at Ecole Supérieure d'Angers. ïïe then moved from school 
to school^ until reaching the Collège de France in I9O6,
1. From 28th September 1883 he v;a.s at Lycée Blaise Pascal de Clermont- Ferrand. He also took classes at the University of Clermont-Ferrand from 1884. Then in September 1888 he transi erred to the College P:ollin and later moved to Lycée Henri IV in Paris as 'professeur suppléant'. He became an official teacher on 14ch October I89O and remained' there nearly eight years until February 1398.
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Meanwhile in 1892 -Bergson married Mile. Louise Heuherger and his only- 
child, Jeanne, was hoiri a year later. In 1894 Bergson unsuccessfully 
applied for a post at the Sorbonne. He tried again in 1898 and this time 
his rejection rankled even more with his disciple, Charles Péguy, than 
with Bergson himself. nevertheless, in the previous year he had been 
appointed 'chargé de cours' at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. He then 
sought the chair of modern philosophy at the College de France but was 
rejected in favour of Gabriel Tarde. He was advised to apply for the 
chair in Greek and Latin philosophy instead and was duly appointed to it 
on 1st April 1900. Bergson remained at the College de France until 1921, 
although on 9th November I904 he reapplied for Gabriel Tarde's chair and 
was accepted and transferred. Because of this, Bergson was well versed in 
the whole histoiy of philosophical thought. It is most significant that 
between 1898 and 190% - the time he was preparing L'Evolution Creatrice 
(pub. 1907) “ he was preoccupied with Greek philosophy. In that work 
is to be found a severe attack on the static conceptualism of Aristotle 
(see pp. 747-769) and many ideas derived from Plotinus the neo-Platonist, 
After two masterpieces of philosop^ - L‘Essai (I889) and Matière et 
Mémore (1896) - the honours finally began to come to Bergson. On 14th 
December I9OI he was elected to the Académie des sciences morales et 
politiques. He later became its President (1913-1914)* He was also 
regularly attending the Société française de philosophie from I90I.. He 
became a 'chevalier' of the Legion d'honneur in 1902 and then an 'officier* 
in 1907 and 'commanditer' in 1919*
In the year 1909-1910 Bergson took Sabbatical leave to give lectures 
in England and to devote time to his studies. In 1911^the University of 
Oxford conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Science, He ].ecfured 
there in May on "La perception du changement" (see Mélanges, pp. 888-914),
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then at Birmingham on "Life and consciousness" (pp. 915-938), and, 
finally, in September he spoke at the University of London on "The 
nature of the soul" (pp. 944-959)*
Continuing to build an international reputation, in the early months 
of 1913 Bergson visited the United States, lecturing at Columbia, Princeton 
and Harvard . He returned to the States again in 191? and made his third 
and final visit between June and August I9I8,
During this period Bergson also travelled to Edinburgh to deliver 
the Gifford lectures on "The problem of personality" (Apri1-May 1914)
(Melanges. pp. IO5I-IO7I) and went to Madrid in May I916 for lectures on 
"I'ame humains" and "la personnalité" (Mélanges, pp. 1200-1215 and pp. 1215-
1235).
1914 a fateful year for Bergson, as for Europe at large. He
was elected to the Académie Française and became President of the Académie
des sciences morales et politiques, but,on the other side of the coin, had
2his three main works placed on the Papal Index .
From thé end of 1924 Bergson's health rapidly deteriorated through 
a type of rheumatism which finally condemned him to a wheelchair. In 
preparing Les Deux Sources (1932) he often had, as Floris Delattre recalls, 
the frustration of couiting "par minutes, plutôt que par he'ures, le temps 
dont je dispose pour mon travail" (Melanges, p. 1493 » 11.3*29). In 1921 he 
had to retire from teaching at the College de France and Edouard LoHoy^ replaced 
him. He was still active in other spheres, for in 1922 he became a member 
of the Conseil de l'Ordre and was elected to the League of Nations' committee
1. The Columbia lectures are outlined in Mélanges, pp..978-989.
2. For full text see Melanges, p. 1089.
3. See Chapter Five.
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of twelve for international intellectual co-operation and became its
President^. That same year, on 6th April, Bergson held a discussion
at home with Albert Einstein and in the same year his comments on Einstein's
2relativity theory emerged ,
In 1928 he v/as awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. His closest 
friends at the time were Jacques Chevalier, the Catholic Professor of 
Philosophy at the University of Grenoble, and B. Romeyer, Catholic■Pro­
fessor of Philosophy at Le Puy, who made visits every year between 1932 
and 1939 * Bergson said to Chevalier: "Je ne suis pas votre maître,
mais votre ami", and added that, "il y avait des affinités préexistantes 
entre nos pensées" (Entretiens avec H. Bergson, Lib, Pion, 1959$ P* 55
[30.12.23]).
Bergson read widely through the 1920s in the field of morality, 
religion and mysticism, in preparing for his Deux Sources (1932), after 
which he published very little nevf work, except a few textual revisions 
to old articles in the collection, La Pensée et le Mouvant (1934)* Bergson 
died in occupied France, a Jew by choice, in solidarity with his persecuted 
blood brothers, but a Catholic by inclination. Chevalier records these 
words of Bergson, on 4th April 1938: "Je reconnais que le catholicisme
est l’achèvement du judaïsme. Mais ici surgit un second obstacle, que 
je n'ai pu encore surmonter ... au moment où s'apprête, je le sens, une 
formidable vague d'antisémitisme, qui frappera mes coreligionnaires ...
Que ma conversion publique ... puisse être exploitée pour des fins apologétiques 
peu m'importe. Mais il me serait très pénible qu'elle puisse donner un
1. He was forced to resign in 1925*
2. The discussion is recorded in Melanges, pp. 1540-1347 « durée etSimultanéité is reproduced in Melanges, pp. 57-244*
3 . For further information see Chapter Four.
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argument aux pei'sécuteurs de ma race ..." (Entretiens, p. 282), Bergson
in fact called for a priest to adniinster the rite of extreme unction on
his deathbed, but he died before his arrival, on January 1941» aged
81^. Paul Valery delivered the news of Bergson’s death to the Académie
Française (9.1.4i)j while J. Chevalier persuaded the Head of State,
Maréchal Pétain, to send a telegram of sympathy to Bergson’s widow.
Bergson was buried in the village of Garohes, but a plaque in the Pantheon
commemorates his death with the words: "A Henri Bergson, philosophe dont
1 ’oeuvre et la vie ont honoré la France et la pensée humaine".
What Professer Henri Gouhier wrote in his introduction to Bergson's
Oeuvres (P.U.F., 1959? P* vii) is substantially true - namely, that Bergson’s |
philosophy "tient tout entière en quatre ouvrages: Essai sur les données
immédiates de la conscience. Matière et Mémoire. l'Evolution Créatrice et
Les deux sources de ïa morale et de la religion". However, Bergson did I
write two other full-length works, a large number of articles and maintained
a copious correspondence. All of these help to clarify some of the nis-
2understandings that have constantly prejudiced Bergson's reputation ,
It is interesting uo note that, while only eighteen years ape.nned 
the publication of Bergson's first three works, the public had to wait
1, This was a Père Lslievre. Bergson was not baptized, either, as evidenced by the letter from his widow to Emmannuel Mounier of 9.9*1941 (published in the Gazette de Lausanne of that date).
2. There is a detailed bibliography of Bergson’s works at the end.The complete published works can now be read in OeuvresMelanges (both edited by 4, Robinet and K. Gouhier) and in Henri Bergson: 4Ecrits et Paroles (P.U.F,, 1957-1958? 5 vols.) edited by A. Béguin and A. Thevenaz. There is further unpublished material in the Bibliothèque Jacques Boucet and Bibliothèque Victor Cousin in Paris. The former houses books from Bergson's o%^JLibrar;-, bequeathed by his daughter, as well as a growing "fonds Bergson": the latter is directed by LI, Jean Mabest and houses "un fends d'archives bergsoniennes", including D. Roustan’s lecture notes from Bergson's courses on Plotinus (1897-1898, I9OI-I902).
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25 years after E,C. for Bergson’s definitive views on ethical and y;
religious questions. ^
The Americans showed more interest than the Bribish in Bergson’s f
philosophy, perhaps because at first it was (wrongly) associated with |
1 5William James's pragmatism. The two men were also good friends".
Host translations of Bergson's works into English appeared simultaneously -i
in England and the States,but l'Evolution Créatrice first emerged in New ;
York (1911)* Every work Y/as translated by a different person or team.
Sometimes a considerable period elapsed between the first French publi- )
cation and the appearance of a translation: for example, the Essai was 1
not in English until I9IO - 21 years after its original publication. 4
On the other hand, betv/een I9IO and 1911, in the space of one year, 4
2 4three of Bergson's works became obtainable in English , This reflects I
\  Vthe time of Bergson's maximum popularity in France but only the beginnings i
of his influence in England, 1
In the "legs Jeanne Bergson" of the Bibliothèque Jacques Doucet it q
is possible to scrutinize the books which comprised Bergson's own. library. .4
It gives the impression of diversity but within a relatively limited field.
It shows Bergson's obvious penchant for abstract thought - whether in the i
field of politics, aesthetics, religion or philosophy itself, he is interested | 
in the principles of the matter and the theory behind the subject. He 
wants to research into the ultimate problems - the nature of time and
1. In 1911 Bergson wrote a preface called "Vérité et Réalité" to James’s book Pragmatism (19II). This appears in P.II., pp. I44O- 1450. He also wrote a preface to V/. James; Extraits de sa cor­respondance (Trans. F. Delattre and H. Le Breton, 192477" Bergson and James wrote to each other from 1902 untiI Jamenia death in Augus' 1910, They met each other in May I905 and again in October 1903. Bergson wrote to Th. Ribot (IO.7.O5) that James v/as "un philosophe üonG je ne dirai jamais assez combien je l'aime et je l'admire" (Mélanges, p. 657).





eternity, the existence of God and the meaning of hzunan life. But 
lb is true to say that a fascination with man and his activities pre­
dominates: man as a biological entity^, man as a creative artist and
inventor , man as a political animal, man as a thinker and man as a 
spiritual entity. Books on the last subject range from Je lis dans les 
destinées, la clairvoyance et ses médiums by P. Pcrthuny to l’Inspiration 
de la Bible by G. Pouget,. Bergson himself states his chief preoccupations^ 
in the following terms: "D'où venons-nous? Qpe sommes-nous? Où allons-
nous? Voilà des questions vitales ..." (Energie Spirituelle, p. 8I5).
His philosophy is not a purely academic exercise. As Jacques Chevalier • j 
says of Bergson: "la philosophie ne vaut que dans la mesure où elle
réfléchit notre destinée d’homme et nous aide à la réaliser. Tout le •
reste est stérile et vain, à quoi peuvent s’amuser un moment les intel­
ligences, mais qui ne saurait les faire vivre ni les faire subsister"
(Bergson, Lib. Pion, 1926, p. 242).
Bergson had correspondence with a number of Catholic writers. He
wrote more than once to one of his main opponents, Joseph de Tonquedec, ;
:whose article, "M. Bergson, est-il moniste?" (Eijudss, Feb. 1912, 
pp. 506-516), provoked a famous reply about Bergson's views on the nature 
of God (20.2.1912). Bergson received more support and aympathy from A.G. 
Sertillanges, O.P.^, to whom he wrote an appreciative letter about the article
1. A favourite author is L, Levy-Bruhl, the biologist.
2. Note .the references to, e.g., Molière in Le Hire and. to Corot and Turner in P.M. Many novelists and poets figure among his books, as well as works on aesthetic theory.
3. These letters appear'at-the end of Tonquedec's Sup.., .la philosophie bergsonienne (Beauchesne, 1936).
4« See Chapter Four.
"Le libre arbitre chez -saint Thomas et chez Bergson" (Vie Intellectuelle,
Vol. XLIX, No. 7, of 25.4,57, pp. 252-269). Bergson later met Père 
Sertillanges, who wrote in Avec Henri Bergson (N.H.F. Gallimard, 1941, 
pp. 5-6): "Une correspondance espacée, mais assez fréquente, et de
longues conversationsÿ dont la dernière remonte à quelques semaines 
avant sa mort, m ’ont permis de connaître avec une réelle intimité les 
idées personnelles du grand philosophe, j’entends celles qui ne s'expriment 
pas dans ses livres". Bergson knew Jacques Maritain jTrom I914 onwards, 
and read some of his philosophy. He was taken aback at lÆaritain's viru­
lent opposition to his ideas in La Philosophie bergsonienne (Beauchesne,
1914). Certain remarks in P.M. (e.g., p. I42O n. l) display his sensi­
tivity on this score^.
  Bergson met Maurife Blondel, the independent Catholic philosopher,
at the Société française de philosophie on 1st July 1909, when they dis-
2cussed-the differences between the discursive and intuitive intelligence . 
Another independent Catholic thinker, Blaise Homeyer , had Bergson's Le bon 
sens et les études classiques published in 1947 end Bergson wrote to him 
after Romeyer's book. Autour du problème de la philosophie chrétienne 1
(Archives de Phil., 1934). The letter is dated 24th March 1935 (Mélanges, j
p. 1507). Another letter, dated 7th August 1939 (p. 1589) concerns Romeyer's 4 
projected celebrations for Bergson's eightieth birthday. Bergson knew '■
4 :iEdouard LeRoy personally and LeRoy is mentioned by Bergson as early as -
1900 (see Melanges. p. 4I8). They became acquainted at the Société de [i
1. Further information given in Chapter Seven.
2. Described in Mélanges « p. 796. More inf ormation,in Chapter Six,
3. Details in Chapter Four.
4 . See Chapter Five.
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Psychologie on 2nd May 1901, v/hen Bergson lectured on "Le parallélisme 
psycho-physique".
Bergson's later confidant, Jacques Chevalier, wrote to him as early
as 14th March 1915 until at least 1954* Chevalier reveals in Entretiens
avec Henri Bergson (Plon, 1959) information about various meetings^.
Chevalier also published a short work entitled Bergson et le Père
Puuget (Plon, 1954)^ , showing Bergson's friendship and respect for this
Lasarist priest, of whom he said;
II n'y avait en lui aucune étroitesse d'esprit, aucune petitesse, rien que de grand, de généreux et d'ouvert.Il avait le sens du divin; ce sens qui, par contre, manque entièrement, il semble, à Loisy et dont avouent manquer d'excellents catholioues (p. I90,
13.4.1933).
Joseph Lotte, the novelist, was also fortunate enough to' converse 
\and correspond with Bergson. Their letters are exchanged between 1907 
and^ l.9 1 4 A conversation which Lotte later called Entretien was des­
cribed in a letter Lotte sent to Camille Quoniam on 21st April I9II 
(published in Etudes berksoniennes VIII. P.U.F., I968, pp. 57-41).
Lotte's friend, Charles Péguy, wrote to Bergson on numerous occasions 
from July 1902 untio his death in I9I4* This correspondence is assembled 
in Etudes bergsoniennes VIII by Auguste Martin. Bergson subscribed to 
Péguy'8 Cahiers de la Quinzaine between I9OO and 1914^.
Bergson's letters are mainly brief, explicit and courteous to the 
point of deference. He never engages in a prolonged dispute - whether
1. In 1917, 1925, 1952, 1935 and 1935*
2. Pouget, Guillaume, I847-I933.
3 * Considered in Chapter Five.
4. Their relationship is analysed in detail in Chapter Nine.
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philosophical, political or personal - throughout his correspondence, 
although he occasionally uses his influence to fui'tner someone's cause 
(as in the case of Jacques Chevalier's application to the Academj.e 
Française with La Notion du nécessaire chez Aristote), However, under 
normal circumstances, Bergson deliberately restricts himself to answering 
only direct questions, and that without embellishment. From his published 
material, we learn little about Bergson the man. It can be said,neverthe­
less, that Bergson was always prepared to give time to the least of his 
admirers or critics. But he guarded his own impartiality and indepen­
dence of mind with painstaking zeal, refusing to the end to become embroiled 
in any partisan movement which might conflict with the objective nature of 
his research or compromise the integrity of his character.
Bergson's philosophy did not at once set out to be an attempt to 
\,answer those leading questions of life; "D'où venons-nous? que sommes- 
nous? où allons-nous?" (Op. cit.). Nevertheless, once his philosophy 
was launched in a positive direction, Bergson, considered it his duty to 
resolve such issues if it were possible; "Voilà des questions vitales, 
devaJit lesquelles nous nous placerions tout de suite ai nous philosophions 
sans passer par les systèmes" (Energie Spirituelle, p. 8I5). Before the 
foundations could be laid the accumulation of the past had to be cleared. 
Thus, Bergson first sharpens his blade on the 'systems' of other philo- 
s ophers,
The main butt of his criticism at first is the nineteenth century 
positivism of A. Comte (1798-I857), E. Taine (1826-1895) and E. Renan 
(1823-1892). He set out to destroy two major misconcentions - that a 
man's actions were determined and that time could be measured quanti­
tatively. In L'Essai he upheld the reality of a free self only after 
dismissing the positivist theory of the predictability of choice; then he
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broached the question of an immaterial consciousness only after demolishing 
theories of the mind as part of the chemical composition of the brain.
The positive implications of both conclusions were developed in Mabiere 
et Mémoire, whete Bergson examines the relationship between mind and body 
and later again the wider implications of the subject are considered in 
E.G. - the interaction between spirit and matter in the whole of life. 
Finally,having established to his ovm. satisfaction the spiritual as the 
principle of life and 'progress’, he turned his mind to the problem of 
the origin and nature of that principle in Les Beux Sources.
The conclusions of each successive work were open-ended; that is 
to .say, they naturally uncovered and brought to light new problems re­
quiring further research and speculation. The asser'tion of an immaterial
consciousness automatically gave rise to the question of the mind-body
\relationship; this in turn demanded a solution to the relations between 
spirit and matter in general terms and the subject of God’s existence and 
nature arose spontaneously from that. All the separate parts of Bergson's 
philosophy are interrelated and connected together an.d each compound must 
be considered in the light of the whole. It is all of a piece. This 
inner consistency is in no v/ay repetition: it resembles the organic
growth and unfolding of a plant. The future state of affairs is never 
predictable or apparent at any particular point, but,as new ideas and 
conclusions emerge, their connection with and dependence upon the past 
is quite evident.
The fact that Bergson never at any time rejects his earlier dis­
coveries is of paramount importance. He makes constant use of previous 
findings to support each new hypothesis and to provide a base and spring­
board for new investigations. For example, the impossibility of the 
prediction of a, free act is described in L'Essai (1889, p. 12$) and yet
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in the introduction to P.M. (written in 1934) tba same argument holds;
Essayez, en effet, de vous représenter aujourd'hui l'action que vous accomplirez demain, même si voussavez ce que vous allez faire. Votre imaginationévoque peut-être le mouvement à exécuter; mais de ce que vous penserez et éprouverez en l'exécutant vous ne pouvez rien savoir aujourd'hui, parce que votre état d'âme comprendra demain toute la vie que vous aurez vécue jusque-là avec, en outre, ce qu'y ajoutera ce moment particulier (p. I26O-I261).
Similar arguments are also used to describe the function of the
brain in Matière et Mémoire (I896, p. 180) and Les Beux Sources (1932,
p. 1199)' However, the unity of Bergson's philosophy is not that of a
logical syllogism where the conclusion is in some sense contained within
the premise: the horizons are constantly expanding and the perspective
changing,
Bergson initially opposes the positivists because he regards their
methodology as fixed''4and over-restrictive. It is they who expect to
deduce a conclusion from a mathematical premise and consequently they
impose rigid, abstract and artificial principles upon the flux of life.
The logical rules applicable tc mathematical problems are not valid in
the realm of biology or even that of pliysics;
L'argument essentiel que je dirige contre le mécanisme en biologie est qu'il n'explique pas comment la vie déroule une histoire, c'est-à-dire une succession où il n'y a pas de répétition, où tout moment est unique et porte en lui la représentation de tout le passé (Letter to H. Hüffding in Ecri-fe et Paroles, III,pp. 456-457).
It is in L'Essai that Bergson demonstrates how the positivism which
systematizes knowledge by attributing ca^çal relationships to all areas
of life leads directly to a theory'- of nature as mechanism, the will as
determined and the mind as the mere product of atomic inter-reactions:
A vrai dire, ce n'est pas la nécessité de fonder la science, c'est bien plutôt une erreur 1'ordre psychologique qui a fait ériger ce principe abstrait de mécanique en loi
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imiverselle (p. 102).
This leads blindly and automatically to the following conclusions;
he déterminisme psychologique, sous sa forme la 
plus precise et la plus récente, implique une 
conception associationniste de l'esprit. On se 
représente l'état de conscience actuel comme 
nécessité par les états antérieurs (p. 10$).
From its position of materialism and determinism, positivism 
seemed to take a stand against all forms of liberty or true creativity - 
in short, to any spiritual influence in life. The law of mechanism was 
regarded as universally applicable. The noblest elements of the human 
personality were attributable to blind forces and the highest aims were 
the inevitable effects of certain causes.
For very similar reasons Bergson took issue with Ancient Greek philo­
sophy. He was teaching the Ancients at the College de France between 1898 
and 1904, and devoted part of E.G. (see pp. 733-773) to a long criticism 
of Aristotle and Plato. For him, Greek philosopliy, like positivism, 
is conceptual; its basic and erroneous assumption is that "il y a plus 
dans 1'immuable que dans le mouvant, et l'on passe du stable à l'instable 
par une simple diminution. Or, le contraire est vrai" (p.M., pp. I424- 
1425). V/hat is not usually recognized is that Bergson's criticisms of 
Greek philosophy are closely allied to his criticisms of positivism, 
because the common Greek conception of the world is again that of an 
ideological system externally imposed by the mind upon reality;
Les formes, que l'esprit isole et emmagasine dans des concepts, ne sont alors que des vu.es prises sur la 
réalité changeante. Elles sont des moments cueillis 
le long de la durée, et, précisément parce qu'on a 
coupé le fil qui les reliait au temps, elles ne durent plus.Elles tendent à se confondre avec leur propre définition, 
c'est-à-dire avec la reconstruction artificielle et l'expres­
sion symbolique qui est leur équivalent intellectuel.
Elles entrent dans l'éternité, si l'on veut; mais ce qu'elles ont d'éternel ne fait plus qu'un avec ce qu'elles ont d'irréel (E.C., p. 763).
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So Greek philosopliy is conceptual and posits tv/o worlds; one of 
Ideas or Forms which are eternal and unchanging; and the other of time 
passing which fails to hear meaning or have value because of its trans­
pierce, The whole impetus of Bergson's philosophy reverses this trend, 
viewing the world of fixed ideas as a shadow and the world of time passing 
as the real world. Any intellectual system is bound to be a static picture 
and it is from this neglect of real time in both Greek and positivist 
philosopliy that Bergson develops his ov/n view of time as the starting point 
of his whole work. A neglect of time leads to a failure to understand 
action, real histoiy and the uniqueness of each occurrence, "d'où 
résultait que l'Action était une Contemplation affaiblie, la durée 
une image trompeuse et mobile de l'éternité immobile, l'Ame une chute 
de l'Idée" (P.M.. pp. I424-I423).
At the heart o^'-Bergson’s philosophy, then, is a nev; emphasis on 
the real world lived of necessity in time:
Or, la durée est le plus indisputable des faits pour celui oui s'est renlacé en elle (Ecrits et Paroles.Vol. ifï, p. 456).
So much for Greek thought at present. The other influential philo­
sophy of Bergson's own time outside positivism was Kantianism. Bergson 
took Kant (1724-1804) to task over the question of time as well. According 
to him, Kant had detached time from life, regarding it as a category imposed 
subjectively upon life by the observer: ' it was no longer considered to be 
part of the fabric of real existence. Bergson took up his criticism in 
this way:.
L'erreur de Kant a été de prendre le temps pour un milieu homogène. Il ne parelt pas avoir remarqué que la durée réelle se compose de moments intérieurs les uns aux autres- et que lorsqu'elle revêt la forme d'un tout homogène, c'est qu'elle s'exprime en espace. Ainsi la distinction même qu'il établit entre l'espace et le temps revient, au fond, à confondre le temps avec l'espace, et la représentation
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symbolique du moi avec le moi lui-même (Essai, p. I31).
A second aspect of Kant's philosophy to which Bergson took exception 
was his characterization of all human knowledge as relative rather 
than absolute. If, as Bergson put it, "toutes nos intuitions sont 
sensibles, ou, en d'autres termes, infra-intellectuelles", then one's 
perception will only attain phenomena, things as they appear. But if 
we have an intuitive faculty which is "ultra-intellectuelle", then "elle 
n'atteindra plus simplement le fantôme d'une insaisissable chose en soi. 
C'est ... dans l'absolu encore qu'elle nous introduirait" (E.C., pp. 798-
799).
Apart from this last point, the misconceptions of the Ancient Greeks,
the positivists and Kant himself are alike - they all finish by denying
"à la durée toute action efficace" (E.C., p. 801). There is also another
\common factor; for Kant’s philosophy, in the same way as the Greeks' arid
the positivists', "est imbue, elle aussi, de la croyance à une science une
et intégrale, embrassant la totalité du réel" (E.C., pp. 793-796). The
same laws and principles are presumed to govern the different academic
disciples as well as the different realms of life. Bergson's first
philosophical priorities are therefore to emphasize the heterogeneity of
life and to separate time from the category of quantity. This is the
mission of L'Essai. Only after this does Bergson attempt - through the
faculty he calls 'intuition' - to reinstate absolute knowledge:
Ce fut l'analyse de la notion du temps, telle qu'elle intervient en mécanique ou en physique, qui bouleversa toutes mes idées (Mélanges, pp. 763-766. -Letter to William. James of 9*3*1908')'.
However, before examining exactly what Bergson's revelation entailed, 
one further observation remains regarding the positivism v/hich Bergscn ha*,'
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admired in his youth". It is absolutely necessary to realize that 
he made a clear distinction (consciously or unconsciously) between 
the positivist method and the positivist conclusions. Bergson 
actually admired the positivists* caution, their persistent experi­
mentation, their recourse to sense experience and their mistrust of the
2metaphysical theories implicit in the rationalist approach . In fact, 
Bergson based his ovm method on a very similar faith in empirical investi­
gation. In 1912 he v/rote:
La méthode philosophique, telle que je l’entends, est rigoureusement calquée sur 1 * expérience (intérieure et extérieure), et ne permet pas d'énoncer un.e conclu­sion qui dépasse de quoi que ce soit les considérations empiriques sur lesquelles elle se fonde ... je n' ... ai fait aucune place à ce qui était simplement opinion per­sonnelle, ou conviction capable de s * objectiver par cette méthode particulière (Mélanges, n. 964, Letter to J. de ïonquédec on 20,2.1912, in Sur la philosophie bergsonienne [Beauchesne, 1936, pp. 59-6OJ).
What repels Bergson is the linlcing together of unrelated conclusions
into a unified system of thought, which is then imposed on to the world;
for him, the best French philosophy is;
une philosophie qui serre de près les contours de la réalité extérieure, telle que le physicien se la représente, et de très près aussi celle de la réalité intérieure, telle qu'elle apparaît au psychologue.Par. là meme, elle répugne le plus souvent à prendre la forme d'un système. Elle rejette aussi bien le dogmatisme à outrance que le criticisme radical; sa
1, Spencer was "le philosophe auquel j'adhérais à peu près sans réserve" (Mélanges, Letter to W. James, 9.3*08, P» 765)*
2, Speaking of his ovm philosophy in Foi et Vie XIV (16.7.I9II), p. 421, Bergson states that "aucune philosophie ne se tient plus près de la science; aucune n'exige du philosophe un aussi grand effort pour se mettre au courant des procédés et des applications de la méthode scientifique. Aucune, surtout, n'attache plus de valeur et n'attribue plus de certitude à la science vraie". Even in analysing m}''stical experience Bergs en hoped that "nous ne disions rien qui ne pût 'être confirmé un jour par la biologie" (Les Beux Sources, p. 1193)*
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méthode est aussi éloignée de celle d'un Hegel que de celle d'un Kant (Mélanges, p. 1187, "La Philosophie française, 1st puh, Rev« de Paris of 15.5*1915, PP*236-256).
The best French philosophers for Bergson are Maine de Biran (I766-.
I824) and Félix Ravaisson (1815-1900),both of whom employed rigorously
%empirical methods. The key difference between them and the positivists, ■ 7
however, lies in their emphasis on introspection and self-analysis as a • |
valid part of the empirical method. Bergson said:
A Maine de Biran remonte le premier dessein de placer la philosophie à mi-chemin entre un empirisme qui ne reconnaît que des phénomènes, et un dogmatisme méta­physique qui prétend atteindre dans leur essence.les choses en soi. C'est bien dans la conscience, c'est dans l'intuition approfondie et pourtant incomplète que nous avons de notre nature que Maine de Biran a cru trouver l’intermédiaire cherché entre l'ètre et le paraître, entre le relatif et l'absolu (Mélanges, pp. 408-409, "Compte rendu des 'Principes de Méta­physique et de Psychologie de Paul Janet", 1897)*
It is this penetration of the 'moi intime' or 'moi profond' that 
Bergson also attempted. On the other hand, it is largely from Claude |
Bernard (1815-1878) that Bergson derived the spirit of scientific experi­
ment:
Le fait, plus ou moins clairement aperçu, suggère l'idée d'une explication? cette idée, le savant—  demande à l'expérience L la confirmer; mais, tout le temps que son expérience dirre, il doit se tenir prêt à abandonner son hypothèse ou à la remodeler sur les faits. La recherche scientifique est donc une dialogue entre l'esprit et la nature ("La philo­sophie de Claude Bernard", P.M.  ^p. I434).
Thus, Bergson's method is twofold: it aims at certainty and at
achieving factual knowledge in every area of life and is essentially 
experimental. while, on the other hand, it is also experiential, as 
Professor Henri Gouhier explains:
:
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Il y a une réalité au moins que nous saisissons tous du dedans, par intuition et non par simple analyse. C'est notre propre personne dans son écoulement à travers le temps. C'est notre moi qui dure (Bergson et le Christ des Evangiles, Fayard,1961, p. 4oT-
In the realms 01 pl^ ysics, biology and the natural sciences,
experiments lead to facts; but, in the realms of mind, the self
and metaphysics, experience leads to facts:
On pourrait maintenant dire un mot de l'entreprise tentée par l'auteur de l'Evolution Créatrice pour porter la métaphysique sur le terrain de l'expérience ...La philosophie ainsi entendue est susceptible de la meme précision que la science positive. Comme la science, elle pourra progresser sans cesse en ajoutant les uns ausc autres des résultats une fois acquises ("La philosophie", Ecrits et Paroles. II,
p. 425).
Bergson makes as little distinction as possible between 'facts' about
the external v/orld and the 'facts' of psychology. Sometimes the two
areas'even overlap in terms of the results achieved:
Si je pouvais arriver .,. pour les problèmes de la métaphysique en général à une certitude égale ou même simplement comparable à la certitude de la proposition de Pasteur: il n'y a pas de générationspontanée, cette certitude me suffirait parfaite­ment ("Le parallélisme psycho-physique", Ibid,,p. 146),
In Bergson's epistcmological method there are two ways of knowing.
One can either Iciow internally or externally. Both methods can render
absolute knowledge. The former technique is named 'intuition' and the
latter 'intelligence':
Intuition et intelligence représentent deux directions opposées dll travail conscient: l'intuition marche dansle sens même de la vie, 1'intelligence va en sens inverse, et se trouve ainsi tout naturellement réglée sur le mouvement de la matière (E.C,. p. 72l). -
Intelligence renders 'scientific' knowledge, which Bergson calls
knowledge of matter; intuition renders 'metaphysical' knowledge, by
3b -
which. Bergson means knowledge of all that is not material or mechanical -
such things as 'la durée réelle', 'l'élan vital', 'le moi profond' and,
finally, 'Dieu':
En principe la science positive porte sur la réalité même, pourvu qi.i'elie ne sorte pas de son domaine, qui est la matière inerte (B.C., pp. 67O-671)»
By way of contrast, "la métaphysique doit procéder par intuition
L 'intuition a pour objet la mobilité de la durée, et ... la durée ■
est d'essence psychologique" ("Introduction à la métaphysique"..P.M..
p. 1416).
In L'E/olution Créatrice the tv/o means to knowledge are at first 
called 'intelligence' and 'instinct'. Intelligence has developed in 
man, at the end of tlie evolutionary branch characterized by consciousness; 
instinct has developed best in insects and certain animals without con- 
soiousness but with adaptation to action suiting the needs of their lives, 
Man is significant not only as the high point of consciousness but because, 
through consciousness, he can rediscover the spirituality of life ('1'élan, 
vital');
Partout ailleurs que chez l'homme la conscience s'est vu acculer à une impasse; avec l'homme seul elle a poursuivi son chemin. L'homme continue donc indéfiniment le mouvement vital, quoiqu'il n'entraine pas avec lui tout ce que la vie portait en elle (E.C.. pp. 720-721).
It might appear that intelligence is therefore the major part of 
consciousness - "la conscience, chez l'homme, est surtout intelligence" 
(B.C., p. 721) ~ and j-c therefore the spiritual faculty par excellence.
Yet, although intelligence per se is spiritual and forms part of con­
sciousness, its maici functlo.n is to 'imderstand' matter in terms of 
projected activity in the world of matter. Bergson “vTote to géroc 
Petit:
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Je ne vais pas jasqu'à bannir l'intelligence de la métaphysique, ni à en faire dans la philosophie une source d'erreurs, Elle a sa place en philosophie et même en métaphysique, quand ce ne serait que parce que nous ne pouvons guère exprimer notre pensée sans la faire passer à travers le filtre intellectuel.D'autre part, dans le domaine de la matière, l'intel­ligence est capable d'atteindre l’absolu (Bergson et le Rationalisme, Riser, Prague, 1921, quoted pp. 46-47)*
The last sentence is ambiguous, however, Bergson meant by it that 
intelligence fully gi'asps external relations in material terns. Ke 
does not imply that intelligence can know things as they are in them­
selves, from the inside. In l'Evolution Créatrice it is crystal clear 
that the intelligence simply takes 'still photographs' of the external 
world in order to plan its future action;
La nature nous ayant destinés à utiliser et à maîtriser la matière, l'intelligence n'évolue avec facilité que dans l'espace et ne se sent à son aise que dans 1'inorganisé. Originellement, elle tend à la fabrication (P.ll., p. 1519)*
In addition, the intelligence "nous montre, dans la faculté de comprendre, 
une annexe de la faculté d'agir", and can only know by 'representing'
"les rapports de choses extérieures entre elles, enfin penser la matière" 
(both B.C., p. 489)* The weakness of intelligence in 1 * Evolution Créatrice 
is manifest; it Imows little about movement at first hand and it knows 
little of the uniqueness of each moment: it reconstructs reality according
to its preconceptions and Intentions.
Emotion captures and captivates the'inner man, while intelligence 
interests itself in externals and fails to seize the movement of life, 
or to understand the real nature of life. Intelligence works with 
'concepts' which are static representations: "Nous nous persuadons
sans peine qu'en juxcaposant des concepts à des concepts nous recom­
poserons le tout de l'objet avec ses parties et que nous obtiend^'onc 
un équivalent intellectuel This still-life picture is illusory
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because all life has mobility^.
It. has often been assumed that Bergson is anti-intellectual in 
2every sense of the word This is actually untrue. Mind must be 
regarded as a unity of consciousness, Bergson uses the word 'intelli­
gence* to denote a certain attitude of mind which is orientated towards 
action. The opposite attitude, which seeks to apprehend the movement 
of life, is called 'intuition', "II s'agit plus d'attitudes mentales 
que de facultés" (H. Gouhier, Bergson et le Christ des Evangiles, p, 38)* 
Although intelligence dominates man's consciousness normally, never­
theless intuition is always implicitly present in it; "La conscience, 
chez l'homme, est surtout intelligence. Elle aurait pu, elle aurait dû, 
semble-t-il, être aussi intuition" (E.C., p, 721). \7hile there are two . 
opposite directions of consciousness, they have a common home. The basic 
reason for the weakness of intuition is this: "II semble qu'à conquérir
la matière ... la conscience ait du épuiser le meilleur de sa force" (E.C., 
pp. 721-722). In mastering the material environment, the consciousness 
has become almost materialized, immobilized and spatial!zed itself.
But, wherever consciousness as freedom from matter exists, there intuition 
must exist as well:
L'intuition est là cependant, mais vague et surtout discontinue ... Mais elle se ranime, en somme, là où un intérêt vital est en jeu. Sur notre person­nalité, sur notre liberté, sur la.place que nous occu­pons dans l'ensemble de la nature, sur notre origine et peut-être aussi sur notre destinée, elle projette une lumière vacillante et faible (E.C., p. 722),
Intuition is one step hearer to the source of life than intelligence: 
L'intuition est l'esprit même et, en un. certain
1, E.G., see Essai, p. Matière et Mémoire, p. 305, P.M., p. 1420.
2. For further deuails see Chapter Three,
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sens, la vie même: l'intelligence s'y découpe parun processus imitateur de celui qui a engendré la matière (B.C., p, 722).
Intelligence is consciousness in relation to matter; it is situated
between the materiality of perception and the spirituality of pure
intuition. The kinship between intelligence and perception can be
deduced from comments like this:.
Notre perception, dont le rôle est d'éclairer nos actions, opère un sectionnement de la matière qui sera toujours trop net, toujours subordonné à des exigences pratiques ... Notre science, qui aspire à prendre la forme mathématique, accentue plus qu'il ne faut la spatialité de la matière ...(B.C., p. 670).
Intelligence is defined ultimately as "l'attention que l'esprit prête
à la matière" (P.M., p. I319)*
- If we reverse the normal process of intelligence which moves towards
'discourse', or articulation in material terms, we can regain pure spiri-
-tual-ity--by -intuition:-—  ..... - . . .-
On peut donner aux choses le nom qu'on veut, et je nevois pas grand inconvénient, je le répète, à ce quela connaissance de l'esprit par l'esprit s'appelle encore intelligence, si l'on y tient. Mais il faudra spécifier alors qu'il y a deux fonctions intellectuelles, inverses l'aune de l'autre, car l'esprit ne pense l'esprit qu'en remontant la pente des liabitudes contractées au contact de la matière ... (P.M,, p. 1319),
Intuition is definitively described in "Introduction à la Méta­
physique" as "la sympathie par laquelle on se transporte à l'intérieur 
d'uq objet pour coïncider avec ce qu'il a d'unique et par conséquent 
d 'inexprimable" (P.M,, p. 1595)» Intuition knows the absolute of 'la 
durée réelle', grasps absolute novelty and also seizes an integral unity. 
Complex unities like personality, essence or true nature, as well as
individual qualities, are grasped in a single, synthetic, spiritual vision
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by intuition. This is often compared to an emotional sympathy^ and 
the subject of emotion becomes verj" important in Les Deux Sources.
The polarity between intelligence and intuition renders them almost 
irreconcilable in l'Evolution Créatrice (190?) and-there, for the sake 
of impact and simplicity, Bergson makes these two attitudes of mind
over-distinct, HoY/ever, his writing there displays greater rigidity
of mind on his part compared with both the earlier and later more flexible 
approaches.
In his early essay on Lucretius' poetry (I883), he conceives of
the intelligence as a noble and ennobling faculty;
La science ... est l'objet même de la vie humaine, et les discordes, les guerres, les désastres publics, ne sont des maux que parce qu'ils arrachent l'intel­ligence à ses nobles préoccupations ... (Mélanges,
p. 271).
\This preoccupation must be disinterested knowledge rather than knowledge
related to action alone. Shortly afterwards, in Le bon sens et les etudes
classiques (l895)> Bergson regards 'le bon sens' as a disposition of the
intelligence:
Je voudrais montrer que le bon sens consiste en partie dans une disposition active de l'intelli­gence ... (Mélanges, p. 360),
A significant step is then taken, in the same essay, whereby Bergson
envisages tiTO types of intelligence:
L'éducation du bon sens ne consistera donc pas seulement à délivrer l'intelligence des idées toutes faites, mais à la détourner des idées trop simples, à l'arrêter sur la pente glissante des déductions et des généralisations ... (p. 370)•
In Le Rire (19OO), good sense, easily recognizable as a version of
intuition, is called "1'effort d'un esprit qui s'adapte et se réadapte
See, e.g., P.M.« p, 1395» B.C., p. 642.
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sans cesse, changeant d’idée quand il change d’objet. C’est une 
mobilité de 1’intelligence qui se règle sur la mobilité des choses.
C ’est la continuité mouvante de notre attention à la vie” (p. 475> 
my underlining),
In ’’L’Effort Intellectuel" of January 1902 (in Energie Spirituelle, 
pp. 950-957); Bergson says that, in the face of "un système complexe de 
représentations", the intelligence can take up one of tv/o stances: "I’une
de tension, l’autre de relâchement" (p. 950). The former is "une plus 
grande haoileté à subdiviser, coordonner et enchaîner les idées ..."
(p. 956), and its highest achievement is "une aptitude croissante à 
faire converger toutes les idées, toutes les images, tous les mots sur 
un seul point. Il s’agit d’obtenir la pièce unique dont tout le reste 
n ’est que la monnaie" (p. 95&)* Intuition seems to be very closely oon- 
nected to this manner of knowing. Of intuitive knowledge Bergson says in
P.M.: "la métaphysique est donc la science qui prétend se passer de 
symboles" (p. 1396). But in "L’Effort Intellectuelle" it is intelligence 
that does without symbols or images end is ’un schema dynamique’ (p. 958). 
Further, ’1’intellection vraie’ is capable, by itself, of realizing the 
reality of movement: "Ells consiste dans un mouvement de l’esprit qui
va et vient entre les perceptions ou les images, d’une part, et leur 
signification, de l’autre" (p. 942). The ’schéma dynamique’ is a unified 
and simple ’idea’ capable of scattering itself into many images, represen­
tations and concepts. The downward movement of intelligence is therefore 
into symbols and material expression(s)'^:
• Bans tout effort intellectuel il y a une multiplicité visible ou latente d’images qui se poussent et se pressent pour entrer dans un schéma,- (p. 955)*
1. See Chapter Eight - section on Bergson’s aesthetic theory.
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Mais l’imité vers-laquelle l’esprit marche alors n ’est pas une unité abstraite, sèche et vide.C’est l’unité d’une Vidée directrice’ commune à un grand nombre d'éléments organisés. C’est l’unité meme de la ~<n e (pp. 955”956).
In this instance we appear to be at one and the same time in the realms 
of intelligence and of life. But, according to L’Evolution Créatrice, 
intuition alone knows life! The fact is that,if the intelligence retraces 
its OT/n images and material expressions to their origin, it is capable of 
coinciding with the preliminary intuition. Intuition and intelligence 
are not distinct faculties in the mind; they are the mind itself directed 
towards different objects.
The most fascinating aspect of this study lies in "Introduction à 
la Métaphysique", for Bergson originally (in 1903) used the term 'sym­
pathie intellectuelle' (pp. I4O8, I42I) as equivalent to ’intuition'.
The original version'-later became 'sympathie' alone (1934)* In the 
1903 edition, an absolute could be grasped "au moyen de cette symnathie 
intellectuelle qu’on appelle intuition. Cela est une difficulté extreme.
Il faut que l’esprit se violente" (P.li.. p. 1558? italics in original).
To make for specious clarity (and later confusion), Bergson simplified 
this in 1954 to say that the absolute is known ’intuitivement' (p. I42I). 
However, in both versions, this effort of mind gives "des concepts fluides, 
capables de suivre la réaBité dans toutes ses sinuosités et de s’adopter le 
mouvement même de la vie intérieure des choses" (P.M., p. I422).
'iVhat can be concluded from this study? First, that Bergson’s ’con­
science’ was not alwej's divided irreconcilably into two parts and, secondly, 
that intelligence and intuition, rather than, being faculties, are attitudes 
of mind. Intelligence, at its lowest level, moves from concepts to 
general ideas; intuition usually moves from simple discoveries - indi­
vidual truths about life - to concepts; "II suit de là qu’un absolu ne
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saurait être donné que'dans une intuition, tandis que tout le reste 
relève de l’analyse" (P.îî., p, 1595). In conclusion, Bergs-.i re­
established true knowledge of absolutes by contrasting the positivist 
and Kantian ’intelligence’ with intuition, which is really intelligence 
rightly used:
En critiquant, comme je l’ai fait, l’intelligence, j’ai paru prêter à un anti-intellectualisme qui n’est pas du tout mon fait, car, ainsi que vous l’avez montré, je n'ai fait que restaurer, sous le nom d'intuition, la véritable intelligence, qui n ’est pas celle qui discourt mais celle qui voit (Bergson to J. Chevalier, Entretiens avec Bergson, Conversation of 5*10.1955, Pion, 1959).
It is of vital importance to understand the implications of Bergson’s
method with regard to the philosophy of religion. A great many areas of
knowledge are now empiricallyanalyzable and a great many thought to be
\.entrenched in the material world have become ’metaphysical’.
The starting-point of Bergson’s philosophy - the self - is itself 
largely immaterial, and yet it is the reality about which we can be most 
assured:
L’existence done nous sommes le plus assurés et que nous connaissons le mieux est incontestablement la nôtre, car ... nous nous percevons nous-mêmes intérieurement, profondément (E.C., p, 495).
It could be objected that Bergson has made the whole of reality a purely 
psychological experience. Certainly, knowledge is immaterial. Bergson 
boldly asserts that "la vie est en réalité d’ordre psychologique" ( E . C . , 
p. 715)^ ,. Elsewhere, he claims that consciousness is "oo-extensive a 
la vie" and is therefore "capable, en se retournant brusquement contre la
1. T h e  i d e a  i s  e x p l o r e d  a t  l e n g t h  i n  Jeanne Delhomme’s D u r é e  e t  V i e  d a n s  l a  u h i l o s o u h i e  d e  B e r g s o n  ( E t u d e s  bergso n i e n n e s
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poussée vitale qu'elle sent derrière elle, d'en obtenir une vision 
intégrale, quoique sans doute évanouissante" (E.C,, p. 492, italics 
in original),
Qnly in Les Deux Sources is Bergson’s method altered somewhat, 
for there he not only appeals to his own experience but also to the 
experience of others - and a select group at that - the mystics.
Nevertheless, Bergson still attempts to demonstrate the reality of 
God by the proof of inner experience. Professor H. Gouhier told me 
in Paris that he thought this was in fact a new departure but only as 
"une différence de technique" rather than a new method as such (Con­
versation of 13.12,74)• It is essential to realize that Bergson 
did not advocate completely passive meditation as a pathway to truth.
Oh the contrary, intelligent reasoning and intuitive grasping are com-
\plementary and both require the continuous effort of the will.
Thé’ intelligence works by arduous preparation and preliminary research; 
"comme toute science", by "une lente accumulation de vérités progressive­
ment démontrées" (Mélanges, p. 375)* The intelligent man did not possess 
great gifts at birth, except potentially. To realise this potential:
II s’était comme ramassé en lui-même ... il avait __tendu tous les ressorts de son âme, fixe sur un ^seul point son attention jusque-là distraite, lancé un appel à tout ce qu'il y avait en lui de puissance de vouloir et de s’émouvoir, et ,,, par un de ces transferts intérieurs de force ... ayant pour ainsi dire fait monter du coeur à la fcete la masse a'énergie ainsi accumulée, il s’était fait ce qu'il avait voulu être, un homme intelligent. Plus puissant est cet effort de concentration, plus profonde et plus complète l’intelligence ("De l'Intelligence",Mélanges, p. 555).
Tension, attention, concentration and action are ail bywords in 
Bergsonism and denote the involvement, nr.t r>:aly of the will,but of the 
whole person in the effort to discover, uncover and know. In the realm
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of 'metaphysics’ the effort might be more arduous, because it is 
’uimatural’ and runs against the grain: the intelligence more
normally revie?/s the past and systematically orders it. On the 
other hand:
Pour que notre conscience cofnoidat avec quelque chose de son principe, il faudrait qu’elle se détachât du tout fait et s’attachât au se faisant.Il faudrait que, se retoujjant et se tordant sur elle-même, la faculté de voir ne fit plus qu’un avec l’acte de vouloir. Effort douloureux, que nous ne pouvons donner brusquement en violentant la nature, mais non pas soutenir au delà de quelques instants ... (E.C., pp. 696-69?).
Furthermore, it is the movement of the will which renders distant
memories present to our consciousness, and in this way the will shows #:f
itself to be a vital part of the process of self-knowledge. Its
■operation is variously called ’creuser’ (Essai, p. 90); ’ausculter’ 4
(P.M., p. 1537, c.f^note on p. I4O8), ’viser’ (P.M., p. I362) or 
’pénétrer’ (P.M., p. I365).
The will, then, plays a leading role in Bergson’s philosophical %
method. It is capable of directing the consciousness, either ih con­
centrating on one object or in turning consciousness on to itself in 
order to realize one's own movement through ’la durée réelle’ and take 
cognizance of it. What is more, the will is also capable of expressing 3
the freedom - the spiritual nature - of the personality in overcoming 
unconscious or automatic action or thought (see I 'Essai,.pp. 108-112),
However, most important of all, the will plays the paramount role in effect­
ing an intuition, and therefore renders ’metaphysical’ knowledge possible:
... si la métaphj'‘sique est possible, elle ne peut 'être qu'un effort pour remonter la pente naturelle du travail de la pensée-, pour se placer tout de suite, par une dilatation de l’esprit, dans la chose qu'on étudie, enfin pour aller de la réalité aux oon- cep es, et non plus des concepts à la réalité (P.M.,pp. 1415-1416).
. :ï
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But what is this reality which Bergson calls 'metaphysical'?
He himself defines it obscurely very often, as in this example :
"une croissance globale et indivisée, invention graduelle, durée ..." 4
(■P.M., p. 1535). But it is this 'durée' which forms the subject-
matter of the first half of L'Essai, and to understand it is crucial
to an understanding of Bergson's philosophy.
Firstly, 'la durée réelle' is not homogeneous, measurable and
divisible. Bergson told H. Gouhier:
Je m'aperçus, à mon grand étonnement que le temps scientifique ne dure pas, qu'il n'y aurait rien à changer à notre connaissance scientifique des choses si la totalité du réel était déployée toutd’un coup dans 1'instantané, et que la sciencepositive consiste essentiellement dans 1'élimina­tion de la durée (in Bergson et le Christ des Evangiles, p. I6). |
  On the positive•side, in L'Essai, "la durée" appears te be "comme
une-multiplicité toute qualitative, une hétérogénéité absolue d'éléments 
qui viennent se fondre les uns dans les autres" (p. 149). At this early 
stage 'la durée' is already described in relation to consciousness: "la
durée et le mouvement sont des synthèses mentales, et non pas des choses"
(p. 8O). This movement is then sho?m to be distinct from spatial quantity 
or matter, and, as a result, is termed 'spiritual': "... 3c changement pur,
la durée réelle, est chose spirituelle ou imprégnée de spiritualité" (P.M.,
p. 1274).
Because the mind partakes of movement and cannot be reduced to a 
series of .'states' (see L'Essai, p. I30), it in turn is 'spiritual'.
Thus Bergson forms a dichotomy in nature between the 'spiritual', which 
implies indivisible movement, and the material, which includes the brain, 
the external world and anything reducible to numerical quantity and exten­
sion. He examines the question of determinism and liberty from this angle:
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Lors ... qu’on demande si une action future pourrait être prévue, on identifie inconsciemment le temps dont il est question dans les sciences exactes, et qui se réduit à un nombre, avec la durée réelle, dont l'appa­rente quantité est véritablement une qualité et qu'on ne saurait raccourcir d'un instant sans modifier la nature des faits qui la remplissent (L'Essai, p. I30).
The proof of determinism therefore rests upon a crude notion of the
mind either as a collection of atoms, undergoing the same law of cause
and effect (by material contact) pervading the physical Universe,or as
a series of mental 'states', each bearing upon the others and all jostling
for supremacy in determining the will. The first idea is dismissed perem-
torily,but as to the second theory - psychological determinism - Bergson
demolishes its validity by demonstrating the unity and interpenetration
of all mental processes and the independence of the mind fràm the law
of causality generally:
... la suggestion deviendrait persuasion si le moi tout entier se l'assimilait; la passion, même sou­daine, ne présentait plus le même caractère fatal s'il s'y reflétait ... toute l'histoire de la per­sonne ... C'est de l'âme toute entière, en effet, que la décision libre émane; et l'acte sera d'autant plus libre que la série dynamique à laquelle il se rattache tendra davantage à s'identifier avec le moi fondamental (L'Essai, p. 110)„
In upholding the fact of free will, Bergson shows that the self
is consequently spiritual. In a free act:
c'est le moi d'en bas qui remonte à la surface Il s'opérait donc, dans les profondeurs de ce moi, et au-dessous de ces arguments très raisonnablement juxtaposés, un bouillonnement et par là même une tension croissante de sentiments et d'idées, non point inconscients sans doute, mais auxquels nous ne voulions pas prendre garde (L'Essai, p. 112).
The unity of the self is made even plainer in Matière et Mémoire of 
I896, where the mind and memory combine to form the 'moi profond'. This 
self is distinct from the brain, the perception and the body:
L'erreur capitale, l'erreur qui finik par nous
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masquer la connaissance du corps aussi bien que celle de l'esprit, est celle qui consiste à ne voir qu'une différence d'intensité, au lieu d'une différence de nature, entre la perception pure et le souvenir (Matière et Mémoire, p. 214).
Bergson roundly asserts a fundamental dualism.in nature: "Ce
livre affirme la réalité de l'esprit, la réalité de la matière 
Il est donc nettement dualiste" (p. I61). The separation is accen­
tuated rather than diminished by an account of the relations between 
the two. For example, perception and habitual memory ~ ostensibly 
involved in both worlds, are rather arbitrarily placed in the bracket 
of 'matter': "Percevoir signifie immobiliser" (p. 342), while habit
memory is "fixée dans l'organisme", and "n'est point autre chose que 
1'ensemble des mécanismes intelligemment montés qui assurent une réplique
convenable aux diverses appelations possibles" (p. 292). On the other
\side, memory proper is not faded perception, because the brain cells
do not preserve the past: " ... nous trouvons que le mécanisme
cérébral conditionne le souvenir d'une certaine manière, mais ne suffit 
pas du tout à en assurer la sur-vivance" (p, 222). Memory dominates the 
self as a whole and very little of the personality remains in the domain 
of habit and perception. Bergson goes so far as to say that perception 
becomes memory as soon as its action has taken place: "Votre perception,
si instantanée soit-elle, consiste donc en une incalculable multitude 
d 'éléments remémorés, et, à vrai dire, toute perception est déjà mémoire.
Nous ne percevions, pratiquemment. que le passé" (p. 291, italics in original), : 
Although Bergson does not explain exactly how material impressions 
are converted into 'spirit' or memory, the conclusions to emerge from 
Matière et Mémdre reinforce those of L'Essai. Mind, memory and per­
sonality are spiritual because they are Indivisible (Matière et Mémoire, ' 
p» 305)> are in flux (p. 331)> and are free from the law of cause and
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effect (pp. 345» 356). These three elements are united by consciousness.
In L'Evolution Créatrice Bergson examines consciousness in the widest 
application - its work in creation and evolution. He calls this 'l'élan 
vital' (p. 569 ff.) or, more frequently, simply 'la vie' (p. 489 et al.). |
The 'élan vital' is not an entirely new departure; it is cognate with
consciousness (p. 589, c.f. "La Conscience et la Vie", Energie Spirituelle. J
. ' ip. 824). They both possess movement as a common factor: "Entre la
mobilité et la conscience il y a un rapport évident" (E.C., p. ,588). I-î
In fact, "c'est dire que l'organisme le plus humble et conscient dans ?
la mesure où il se mettt librement" (p. 589)* The earlier solidarity |
between movement and spirituality is maintained. Whenever one looks 
at immobility - pure materiality - in evolution, it is clear that there 
the "élan vital" has spent itself: "la fixité, chez l'animal, apparaît
le plus souvent comme’une torpeur où l'espèce serait tombée, comme un .:'fIrefus d'évolver plus loin dans un certain sens ..." (p. 588). There %
€
is, then, a similarity in all Bergson's first three works between "la
durée", "la conscience" and "lo mouvement". They all belong to the
realm of spirit.
It is in L'Evolution Créatrice that the question of God first
arises. It is clear from Bergson's earlier philosophy that 'le
changement' or 'la durée réelle' is the fundamental stuff of life:
"Le réel n'est que changement, autrement dit que le changement c'est
la substance". Bergson boldly proceeds:
Le changement se suffit à elle-mème, c'est-à-dire qu'à ijne chose qui est mue il n'est nul besoin d’un moteur: que dans le changement pur il y achangement sans chose qui change, sans mobile ("La perception du changement", P.LI., p. I38I). •—
The implications of this statement for religion at first sight appear
to be unpromising. If change and time are the structure of the Universe,
j
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the 'unmoved mover' of Aristotle and Aquinas is inconceivable. If |
change and time need no support then they appear to have usu-^ 'ped the 
role of God in creation,
On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that God can be imagined j
as working in and through 'la durée réelle', and this is in fact Bergson's j
isuggestion. But this then raises the question of God's transcendence. -4
Can a God who only works in and through time, and,indeed, ?/ho is identi-
fied with time, stand above it in eternity or be independent of it in 5
■1his actions? Bergson does not attempt to answer this question imme- I
diately, but proceeds at his own pace. He draws a primary conclusion J
related to this problem in L'Evolution Créatrice, which is that time ('la j
durée') might have a direction and therefore an; intelligent source or goal, f
not foreseeable beforehand by intelligence, but comprehensible afterwards. 3
Bergson's 'finalism' sees the motion in the Universe not as a journey 
towards a fixed goal, bur from an already existing source. This is ex- -
plained in biological terms, since Bergson is careful to stay close to -4
the evidence of life in evolution; he speaks of the eye as being drawn 4
1 1by the light . In this same way, the 'élan vital' attempts to draw w
slife back to its source, î;
Mme. R-îiI, Mossé-Bastide suggests that this idea of soul 'falling' 1
into bodies by some fatal attraction, and then aspiring to be pure soul 
again, is one of Plotinus' magisterial concepts, known as the idea of 
'procession'. She adds the proviso that, with Bergson, the 'elan 
vital' positively attacks matter as an obstacle (see E.C., p. 579)» 
but still aspires to be spirit again. But her general conclusion is 
this:
1. B.C., p. 554*
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Autrement dit, Bergson accepte l'idée platonicienne d'une Ame du monde, expliquant par sa descente dans l'univers sensible, l'haimonie de l'ensemble(Bergson et Plotin, P.Ü.F., 1959» p. ?)«
Bergson himself actually explains this doctrine of.Plotinus in 
l'Energie Spirituelle (pp. 887-888), Lime, Mosse-Bastide sees an 
alternative expression of the same idea in the notion of the One be­
coming the many. This is to be found in Plotinus' VIth Enneades.and 
its counterpart is Bergson's 'schéma dynamique' (in Energie Spirituelle, 
p. 946 ff). Her conclusion is that "Vie et pensée sont donc toujours, 
et conformément au schéma plotinien de la 'procession', un passage de 
l'unité à la multiplicité" (Op. cit., p. S).
The problem, however, has been stated too much in terms of a thing 
which creates, remaining outside and aloof from the world, and a thing
which is created; "Tout est obscur dans l'idée de création si l'on pense
à des choses qui seraient créées et une chose qui crée" (B.C.,-p. 705)* 
Because 'la durée réelle' is, in essence, spiritual, it is therefore of 
one substance with God, But more than this: matter, in Bergson's system,
is spirit hardened and solidified into immobility, and not a radically 
different substance at all. That is why, even in materiality, the 
'élan' is still present;
He serait-ce pas qu'au-dossous du besoin de stabilité que la vie manifeste, dans cet arrêt ou plutôt dans ce tournoiement sur place qu'est la conservation d'une espèce, il y a quelque exigence d'un# mouvement en avant, un reste de poussée, un élan vital? (Les Beux Sources. p. IO69).
At this point, God appears still to be limited to 'la durée réelle' 
and its action, and the question as to whether there jj>__.room for a Creator 
outside 'la durée réelle' still renains to be answered. YThile accepting 
that time and flux are in the nature of all being, Bergson will not fall
"1. f
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into the trap of identifying God Himself with *la durée', hut only 
with its source:
Je'parle de Dieu comme de la source d'où sortent, tour à tour, par un effet de sa liberté, les 'cou­rants' ou 'élans' dont chacun formera un monde; il en reste donc distinct et ce n'est pas de lui qu'on peut dire que le plus souvent il tourne court ou qu'il soit à la merci de la matérialité qu'il ^a du se donner (Reply to J. de Tonquédec, Mélanges,
p, 766-767)
In L'Evoluti&n Créatrice, Bergson substantiates this point. The 
Creator is described as "un immense réservoir de vie", from which "doivent
s ’élancer sans cesse des jets, dont chacun, retombant, est un monde"
(b.c., p.705). The continuation of spiritual energy in life is there­
fore the evolutionary process,, which attempts to re-olevate matter to its
source of life. Bergson is concerned with the spiritualisation of all of\life, not, as with Plotinus or as in Llanichaeism, the separation of spirit 
from matter.
Another vitally important point to grasp with reference to Bergson's 
God is that he is not in evolution himself; the world is evolving through 
his action: he is seen as an absolute - not a conceptual absolute - but 
an absolute of life; a life of which this life is the sluggish, dilatory 
reflection, often inert or turgid, sometimes struggling feebly, occasionally 
reaching a state of activity and detachment from itself in consciousness. 
V/hen 'l'élan vital' does reach a state of activity, it begins to parti­
cipate in God's life, God is therefore the concentration or fullness 
of life, which in this world is only refracted as action, movement, 
creation, change and, above all, liberty. God, in L'Evolution Créatrice.
1. See Tonquédec'8 article, "Bergson, est-il moniste?", Etudes, Vol. 136 (1912), pp. 3O6-5I6.
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is the
centre d'où les mondes jailliraient comme les fusées d'un immense bouquet - pourvu toutefois que je ne donne pas ce centre pour une chose♦ mais pour une continuité de jaillissement. Dieu, ainsi défini, n'a rien de tout fait; il est vie incessante, action, liberté ... (E.C,, p. ?06),
In general terms:
tout se passe comme .si un large courant de con­science avait pénétré dans la matière ... Il 4a entraîné la matière à 1'organisation, mais son mouvement en a été à la fois infiniment ralenti et infiniment divisé (E.C., p. 649)*
The fact of God's transcendence must therefore be proved, without 
positing a God of entirely different substance or nature from his creation.
God differs from His creation, not by substance or nature but by degree 
(of intensity, vigour, purity, etc.). So the absolute "se révèle très 
près de nous, et, dans une certaine mesure, en nous. Il est d'essence 
psychologique ... Il vit en nous" (E.C., p. 749). T.n Les Deux Sources, 
mystical experience is seen as "une participation de l'essence divine"
(p. 1200).
If God is seen primarily as a Creator in E.C. (I9O5); Bergson develops 
his theology further in Les Deux Sources, without perceptibly changing his 
mind on the evolutionary process, which he summarizes in familiar terms 
(pp. 1069-1076) within the old framework of '1'élan vital'. But Bergson 
does venture new theories on God as he is in himself, and not just in 
creation. The old 'durée' and 'élan vital' have now become 'l'émotion 
créatrice', (Les Deux Sources, p. IO56), which highlights a change of 
emphasis. God is personal and altruistic. Traces of 'l'élan vital' 
are still in evidence; e.'g. ^ "les vrais mystiques s'oyypent simplement 
au flot qui les envahit" (Les Deux Sources, p, 1059), but its purpose has 
changed somewhat from the creation of species to "action, creation, amour"
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(p. 1166). The emphasis is on the latter trait. In fact, it is the 
burden of H. Sunden's La Théorie bergsonienne de la religion (p.U.F.,
1947) to demonstrate that Bergs on'g God "apparaît presque coraine une 
emotion" (p. 282), Bergson does not deny this, but, instead, expands 
upon it: "Création signifie, avant tout, emotion" (Les Deux Sources. é
p* 1013): "I4 y a des émotions qui sont génératrices de pensée; et -a
l'invention, quoique d'ordre intellectuel, peut avoir de la sensibilité 
par substance" (p. lOll). Nevertheless, Bergson is at pains to separate 
the emotion which motivates the Universe from the superficial idea of 
'feelings':
Une émotion est un ébranlement affectif de l'âme, mais autre chose est une agitation de la surface, autre chose un soulèvement des profondeurs. Dans le premier cas, l’effet se disperse, dans le second il reste indivise. Dans l'un, c'est une oscillation des parties san^ déplacement du tout; dans l'autre, ie tout est poussé en avant (p, 1025),
Love is an emotion which is "un état d'âme" (p. 1026).
Love stands in direct contrast to an intellectual sense of duty
dictated by reason alone;
Autre chose est un ideal simplement présenté aux hommes par des sages dignes d'admiration, autre chose celui qui fut lancé à travers le monde dans •un message chargé d'amour, oui appelait l'amour
(p. 1041). 'iThe work of God in creation is described now simply as "une entreprise 4
de Dieu pour créer des créateurs, pour s'adjoindre des êtres dignes de 
son amour" (p, 1192),
God is now not restricted to the. circular process of '1'élan vital' 
but is attained in a simple, vertical movement: "les grands mystiques
déclarent avoir le sentiment d'un courant qui irait de., leur âme à Dieu 
et qui redescendrait de Dieu au genre humajn" (p. 1020). Perhaps the 
clearest expression of this lies in the idea of ‘un appel', which, from
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the human side, appears as ’une aspiration*: "l'efficacité de l'appel
tient à la puissance de 1'émotion qui fut jadis provoquée, qui l'est 
encore ou qui pouvait l'oure ..." (p. IO46). This 'appel' causes man 
to 'briser le cercle' (p. IO38) and to take a creative 'bond en avant'
(p, 1038). The circle to be broken is not only the opposition of matter, 
but also the circle of 'closed' morality which limits all love and aspira­
tion to one's own interests or those of one's own group. The call of 
God enables men to transcend social customs and the status quo by a 
creative action which achieves something entirely new and unexpected.
Each of these actions "fut une création, et la porte restera toujours 
ouverte à des créations nouvelles. Le progrès qui fut décisif pour 
la matière de la justice ... consista dans la substitution d'une ré­
publique universelle, comprenant tous les hommes, à celle qui s'arrêtait 
aux frontières de la-cité, et qui s'en tenait dans la cité elle-même aux 
hommes libres" (pp. 1039-1040)•
The new departure in Les Deux Sources is that God is sought and 
found through an attitude of generous love, and himself actively seeks 
men in this same way. On. the other hand, 'la durée' and 'l'élan vital' 
penetrate all men and material things indiscriminately and indifferently.
The individual becomes of pre-eminent significance in Les Deux Sources.
The mystic is distinguished from other men not just in seeing more to 
life than the material world but also in his shimning of crass materialism; 
he is a man like the rest in possessing a spiritual self, but unlike them
' I
1. Bergson rightly, recognizes this as a new departure for him:"Nous dépassons ainsi, sans doute, les conclusions.:.de l'Evo?ution 4Créatrice" (p. 1193)* He explains that, at this stage, "le |courant vital qui traverse la matière, et qui en est sansdoute la raison d'èlre, nous le prenions simplement pour i
donné" (pp. 1193-1194)• |
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in possessing "un supplement d'âme" (p. 1239) derived from God himself.
God is understood specifically in terras of love;
Des êtres ont été appelés à ].'existence qui étaientdestinés à aimer et à être aimés, l'énergie créatrice devant se définir par l'amour. Distincts de.Dieu, qui est cette énergie meme,ils ne pouvaient surgir que dans un univers, et c'est pourquoi l'univers a 
surgi (p. 1194).
- So in Les Deux Sources new ideas of God establish his nature as
personal, loving, transcendent and these are added to the previously
established traits - creative, free and dynamic.
The exact role of Jesus Christ in the world is sidestepped by
Bergson. lie maintains that if the Universe "est une machine à faire
des dieux" (p. 1245) then Christ can raise himself to divinity; but
then so can all men:
Du point de vue'd'où nous nous plaçons et d'où apparaît la divinité de tous les hommes, il importe"peu'que le Christ s'appelle ou ne s'appelle pas un homme ... Disons simplement que, si les grands mystiques sont bien tels que nous les avons décrits, ils se trouvent être des imitateurs et des continuateurs originaux, mais incomplets, de ce que fut complètement le Christ des Evangiles (pp. 1176-1179)*
Pierre Mesnard confronts this problem in a dialogue. His 'Marcel'
says:
Le Christ n'étant pas défini expressément comme Dieu, tous les attributs absolus de l'Eglise s'en trouvent ébranlés, par exemple, l'unicité de sa mission, et l'infailljfabilité de sa doctrine ...("Catholicisme et bergsonisme”, Revue Apologétique,
Ifay 1933, p. 554).
L'Abbé Magnin, in a discussion with Bergson on the subject of mystical 
experience and fs;ith in Christ, commented:
L'aide si nécessaire à la Ti^ -avre humanité est en Jésus, principe de vie effort à tous,
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to which Bergson replied;
Jésus est bien, en effet, le sur-mystique, et jetrouve bien belles les pages que vous venez deme lire sur l'union vitale des mystiques avec lui (Rivistica de filosofia neo-scolastica, Rome, 1933»No. 1, p. 112).
Now it appears strange that Bergson can accept Jesus as a super-
mystic who communicates directly, with God and yet also as someone with
whom other mystics communicate and think they have found God. Christ’s
place in creation still has to be defined. The solution of H. Gouhier
is that Christ is an absolute in human tei-ms: "Le sermon sur la montagne
ouvre l'âme à l'amour sans objet; on# ne saurait concevoir un au-delà
du Christ dans une inversion plus totale que cela" (Op . cit., p, 166).
He it is whose communion with God is complete; "l'union est totale, et
par conséquent définitive" (Les Deux Sources, p. 1172).
However, Christ"^ s position still appears relative and not an absolute:
particularly when it is realized that the above quotation does not refer
especially to him, but to the possibility of union for any man. Etienne
Berne's fears are not easily allayed:
Qui nous dit que demain un génie religieux ne se manifestera pas porteur d'un message plus généreux et plus rayonnant? ("Spiritualité bergsonienne, spiritualité chrétienne", Etudes carmélitaines,October 1932, p. 184).
Even if Christ cannot conceivably be surpassed, v/hy should he be a
unique object of devotion for Christians and mystics? What could make
him the only way to the Father (John 14, v. 6)? In what consists his
special relationship with God (John 5, v. 20)? How can one know God in
knowing him (John 8, v. 19)? Wnat gives him the power to bestow life
and forgive sins (John 11, v. 25; p, v. 2?)?
It might also be argued by the orthodox Catholics that Bergson
emphasizes man's religious aspirations but maintains a guarded silence
■”
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about revelation and grace. Irenee Chevalier (in Ecrits et Paroles, |
p. 113) argues that "Bergson ne dit pas un mot de grâce’’. On close 
inspection, however, it is not this simple. Bergson often describes 
mystical experience in terms of God’s action. For example, he |
"livrerait à qui saurait l'interroger le secret de la création" (p. 1174). {
But it must be remembered that Bergson could not have remained faithful 
to his own method of research had he moved from God to man; from reve­
lation to observation; from dogma to experience; from theology to 
philosophy. His researches are firmly rooted in the mind's own efforts 
to interpret facts and experiences. His method is of necessity entirely 
human in orientation. He only tackles mysticism from the angle of man's f
search for God and experience of God. This does not mean that he rules 4
out the possibility of God's search for man.
Even the mysticks calling is conceived only in human terms; in
terms of the individual's-vision, action ajid effect-on society:
Be tout temps ont surgi des hommes exceptionnels en lesquels cette morale s'incarnait ... C'est à eux que l'on s'est toujours reporté pour avoir cette moralité complète, qu'on ferait mieux d'appeler absolue (p. IOO3).
On the other hand, insofar as he takes us back tb the situation 
of a man seeking God, not through dogma, theories or tradition, but 
face to face in the experiences to which all dogma and theories have 
recourse, Bergson did a valuable work in clearing the mind of second­
hand ideas, prejudices and presuppositions.
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CIMPTER THREE
BERGSON'S RECEPTION IF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH BEFORE 1920
There were two points of high relief in the history of Bergson's 
relations with the Catholic Church; the first ivas on 1st June 1914» 
when Bergson's first three major works^ were placed on the Papal Index 
of prohibited books; the second occurred on 9th September 1941» when 
Bergson's final testament was published in the Gazette de Ijausanne, 
having been passed from his widow to Emmanuel Mounter, directeur of '
Esprit. It revealed that Bergson's adherence to the Catholic Church
4was far from tenuous, and, when coupled with the fact that he called a 4
1, L'Essai. j.LI.I, and E.C.
priest, C, Leliègre, to his deathbed, stands in stark contrast to the y
apparent hostility between Bergson and the Catholics in 1914* The text
of this testament is as follows:
Mes reflexions m'ont amené de plus en plus près du catholicisme où je vois l'achèvement complet du judaïsme. Je me serais converti si je n'avais vu se préparer depuis des années la formidable vague d'antisémitisme qui va déferler sur le monde.J'ai voulu rester parmi cavûz qui seront demain des persécutés. Liais j'espère qu'un prêtre catholique voudra bien, si le cardinal-archevêque de Paris l'y autorise, venir dire des prières à mes obsèques.■Au cas où cette autorisation ne serait pas accordée, il faudrait s’adresser à un rabbin mais sans luicacher et sans cacher à personne mon adhésion morale 'îau catholicisme, ainsi que le désir exprimé par moi d'abord d'avoir les prières d'un prêtre catholique (quoted in "Caractéristiques religieuses du spiritua­lisme de Bergson" by Biaise Romeyer, Bergson et le Bergsonisme, Beauchesne, 1947» p. 29).
The earlier decision over whether or not to condemn Bergson's works 
to the Index,which stands in stark contrast to the above testimony, was 
taken on 1st June I914 by Pope Pius X and was then countersigned on the
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3rd by Cardinal Della Volpe and Thomas Esser, O.P. (the secretary of 
the Commission and the Papal theologian).
After the publication of this decision in the official Vatican 
journal, Acta Apostolicae Sedis^, the news was reprinted in La Semaine 
Religieuse de Paris of 20th June 1914 under the heading "Décret de la 
Sacrée Congrégation de l'Index" with the warning: "En conséquence,
personne ne peut à l'avenir éditer, lire ou garder ces ouvrages sans 
encourir les peines édictées par l'Index" (p. 922).
What were the events leading up to this 'mise à l'Index' and 
which elements in Bergson's philosophy were regarded as invidious to 
Catholic faith and doctrine? First, it is interesting to note that , 
just five days after the condemnation, the journal bearing the news,
2La Semaine Religieusê de Paris, announced a reprinting of Albert Farges' 
book, • La Philosophie-d'Henri Bergson, Exposé et Critique . This provides 
an important clue as to the nature of adverse Catholic reactions to 
Bergson at the time. Mgr. Farges was an influential figure in the 
Church. He was present at Bergson's 'soutenance de thèse' in 1689^.
Mgr. Farges was also a personal friend of the Cardinal d'Etat, Merry
1. Of 12th June 1914, pp, 514-515•
2. Farges, Albert, 1848-1926. Prof. at Institut Catholique, directeurof Séminaire de Saint Sulpice. He also taught in Major Seminaries at Bourges and Nantes, then directed the Séminaire Universitaire d'Angers. Other main work: La Crise de la Certitude, 190?.
3. Maison Bonne Presse, 1st edition, 1912. Chapters 1 and 9 appearedinitially as articles in La Re^ /ue néo-scolastinue de nhilosophie(Louvain), No, 19, 1912, and La Revue pratique d'Acologétique, April 1909.;
Together with Mgr. d'Hulst, Principal of the Institau Catholique, Paris, and Felix Ravaisson, the philosopher.
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Del Val^; who himself "has been blamed for an extreme doctrinal rigorism"
(The New Catholic Encyclopaedia, McGraw-Hill Co., Hew York, 1967, p. 69$).
Merry Del Val expressed his sympathy with Farges* many criticisms of Bergson's •
2philosophy in a letter reproduced in Foi et Vie . He delivers his appro- 1
i
bation of Farges* viewpoint "au nom du Saint Père", and the text runs as 'i
follows:
En presence des fausses theories de cette philosophie nouvelle qui voudrait ébranler les grands principes, . tles vérités acquises de la philosophie traditionelle, une voix autorisée devait s'élever pour démasquer et réfuter ces erreurs, par combattre ce venin du modernisme philosophique, d'autant plus funeste et plus dangereux qu'il est plus voilé, plus subtil# et plus séduisant. C'est ce que vous venez de faire, avec toute la compétence que l'on vous connaît, dans un travail de critique sereine, impartiale et objec­tive. Le Saint Père vous en félicite, et vous avez ainsi ajouté à la série de vos ouvrages philosophiques, une oeuvre destinée à. faire du bien aux âmes, spéciale- iment à la jeunesse, en les préservant des dangers de ces doctrines erronées, en les ramenant à la vérité et les aidant à s'orienter vers les lumières si sûres —  — de la philosophie traditionplle (p. 654)*
From the censorious tone of this letter towards 'la philosophie i
nouvelle', Bonifas concludes: "C'est done le thomisme contre le
bergsonisme" (p. 655). But, in point of fact, the pro-modernist
periodical. Foi et Vie, took up a faintly sympathetic stance with regard
to Bergson's work, yet it was almost alone amongst Catholic publications,
Bonifas began his article with these words:
Or, au moment même où il semble que- le divorce
1. Merry Del Val, Rafaël, 1865-1950» Ordained 1888, bent into the papal diplomatic service as Chamberlain. From 1899 presided over Academia dei Hobili Ecclesiastici. Titular Bishop of Hicaea I9OO. Made Cardinal by Pius XI in I905, A full-length, biographg^ nas been written by J.P. Abbing (Catholic Truth Society, 1957).
2. In the article "Catholicisme et Bergsonisme" by H. Bonifas, ib.11,1914 pp. 654-656.
-it
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However, Bonifas is careful to avoid too much controversy: "Cela
dit, nous sentons très bien que c'est Mgr. Merry Bel Val qui a raison"
(p, 654). This sentence could well be a cover, as it is out of keeping 
with the other sentiments expressed in the article.
Two other articles on Bergson in Foi et Vie pursue the idea that
he is effecting a happy reconciliation between science and religion.
This idea of reconciliation was of the utmost significance at this time,
for since the time of Darwin in the natural sciences and Comte in philo-
\.sopliy'the champions of scientific knowledge had pointed out the severe 
contrast between the seemingly secure and absolute kno\;lcdge obtained 
by scientists and the uncertain and conflicting speculations of theo­
logians and metaphysicians. From this idea it was a short step to 
presame that science could provide all necessary knowledge about life, 
whereas metaphysics furnished nothing of practical value or concrete 
certainty.
Both articles are by A. Holland, the editor in chief: the first
on L'Evolution Créatrice (l6th September 190?) and the other significant!; 
entitled "Les réalités que la science n'atteint pas" (Nos. I4 and 15 of
1911). The rapport between Bergsonism and modernism was strengthened by 
Foi et Vie when Bergson was invited to give a conference on "L'Arae et le 
Corps" on 28th April I912.' Bergson almost certainly failed to see the 
theological implications of this step.
que nous constatons depuis longtemps entre la science et la foi, va trouver enfin une solution; une réconciliation, dans une philosophie renouvelée, et une métaphysique rajeunie, une église s'émeut., par l'intermédiaire de ses prêtres exprimer ses craintes, et dans la personne de son pape arrête d'un geste hautain tout essor du système nouveau
(p. 654). !*
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Although other periodicals had covertly modernist leanings^,
these were rarely rallied to Bergson’s cause. Les Annales de philo-
2soohie chrétienne, edited by Lucien Laberthonnière , actually opposed
’5Bergson vehemently, and Maurice Blondel^, the co-editor, wrote to 
Laberthonnière :
En somme, il y a entr©' nou© une opposition philosophique très profonde ... Car, tandis que Bergson tend à s'affranchir de l'analyse intellectuelle, toute subordonnée à des instincts utilitaires, pour se rejeter vers "la sympathie intuitive", je cherche dans l'action le prolongement naturel, l'application et l'enrichissement progressif de la pensée (Correspondance philosophiquet M. Blondel,L. Laberthonnière, Ed. du Seuil, I96I, p. 192, Letter 
of 11.11.1905).
The Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuse^, directed by
2the modernist priest, Alfred Loisy , vras also indifferent to Bergson's
fate, although La ReWe du clergé français was more accommodating.
Its editor, J. Bricout, in his article, "M. Bergson à l'Index" (15.8.I914),
praises Bergson for his demolition of previous materialistic philosophies
and even approves some of his positive assertions:
On doit ... reconnaître que Bergson a puissamment contribué à remettre en honneur les idées principales du spiritualisme traditionnel: il a combattu le. déterminisme, l'évolutionnisme matérialiste et antifinaliste, l'idéalisme anglais, le kantisme, il a fait reprendre, à la philosophie le contact avec le réel, il n'a pas craint d'invoquer en faveur du libre arbitre la preuve de l'expérience interne, il a hautement affirmé que les diverses formes de l'ètre
1. The modernist movement in France is considered in relation toBergson in Chapter Five.
2. See Chapter Five for further information.
3. Chapter Six is devoted to Blondel.
4 . This review was condemned by Cardinal Richard in 190? (seeChapter Five).
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ne peuvent être ramenées à la mécanique des atomes, il a proclamé la suprématie de l'homme sur le règne de l'animalité et l'existence d'un "Principe de 
Création' (p. 45l)«
However, Bricout is at pains not to appear to dispute the Pope's deci­
sion over Bergson, and concedes that "M. Bergson so trompe sur des 
points où la doctrine chrétienne est engagée et ,,, il paraît d'autant 
plus dangereux pour bon nombre d'esprits qu'il est mieux intentionné 
et plus accrédité" (p. 452). In addition, Bricout holds that the God 
of L'Evolution Créatrice bears little resemblance bo the Christian God,
It is clear that the prevailing attitude of the Catholic establisliment 
towards modern trends in philosophy is universally condemnatory.
Another contributor to La Revue du Clergé.français,E. Lenoble,. 
takes up Bricout's last point in an article entitled "Henri Bergson; 
Chronique Philosophiquë' (January I9O.8). Lenoble asks himself what 
constitutes, for Bergson, the principle of life. - He decides that for 
Bergson it is 'la conscience'; not human consciousness, but a 'total' 
consciousness. He concludes that this is an extremely obscure idea, 
and £0 "la vérité est que Bergson nous laisse dans l'obscurité la plus 
grande au sujet de la nature radicale de l'être" (pp. 204-205). If, 
moreover, being is to be reduced to becoming or change, Bergson's "force 
universelle ... ne peut savoir par quelles phases elle passera, l'essence 
de la durée étant de créer du nouveau et de l'imprévisible" (p. 206), 
Lenoble concludes on an even more critical note than Bricout, maintain­
ing that Bergson's philosophy has little validity for a Catholic, because 
his God is a blind force, or, at best, an incomprehensible manifestation 
of 'la conscience' in life.
The tone of Lenoble‘s second article in the same journal, on 15th 
March 1912, dealing with "L'Intuition philosophique", becomes even mere
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hostile and insensitive. This time, Lenoble takes issue with Bergson's 
conception of the intelligence: "Conime [Bergson] enlève à l'être la
réalité, M. Bergson enlève à l’intelligence la vérité" (p. 723) and, 
although Lenoble recognizes that Bergson's 'intelligence' is'really 
"un faux intellectualisme et une pseudo-analyse" (pp. 723-724), he 
fails to recognize the rational aspect of Bergson's 'intuition' or 
the fact that it is a philosophy dependent upon reflection.
Thus, by and large the journals with modernist leanings not only 
failed to support Bergson, but moreover tainted 'his philosophy with 
heterodoxy and heresy. Bergson's terminology was treated at face 
value and criticized bluntly and in a crudely simplistic way.. Even 
the liberal periodical, La Quinzaine, which published Edouard LeRoy's^ 
article, "Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?" (16*5.1905), showed no apparent in­
terest in Bergson. \Having said that, it is nevertheless true that
2the paper's founder and editor, Georges Ponsegrive , did later come to
realize the importance of Bergson's thought in a book entitled L'Evolution
des Idées dans la France contemporaine (Bloud et Gay, 1920), where he
devotes a long section to him. Even here, though, the tone is far from
laudatory and the insights shallow:
Le mysticisme de M. Bergson n'est qu'un mysticisme égoïste au lieu d'être un mysticisme théiste ... Il y a seulement entre M. Bergson et Plotin cette différence que le réel dont nous a parlé jusqu'ici M. Bergson n'est pas un Dieu transcendant (p. 142).
On religious matters in general Bergson is held to be highly suspect. 
However, Fonsegrive does manage to glimpse the significance of Beràson's.
1, Sec Ehapt-er Five.
2. For biography see Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée. No, 11, 1928.
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’intuition', which was to play an important part in Catholic thought 
later on:
l'on peut, par exemple, ne pas condamner à l'abctraction et’reconnaître cependant tout ce qu'il y a de fécond dans l'intuition (p. 154-)*
Fonsegrive fails to elaborate much upon this and moves on to conclude
somewhat sympathetically that Bergson's religious philosophy is still
in an embryonic stage:
Je crois ... que sa philosophie reserve sur ce point beaucoup de surprises ... M. Bergson n'a pas encore aborde le problème moral ni le problème religieux.•Bans l'Evolution Créatrice il s'est place résolument au sein même de la nature. Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il n'y ait pas rencontré le créateur (p. 153).
As might be expected, some of the most swingeing criticisms of 
Bergson came from neo-Thomist philosophers. A distinction has to be 
made,•however, betwebn the high-Thomist school and the more independent 
Thomist philosophers, for, as will later be seen, some of Bergson's 
greatest supporters came from the ranks of the latter group. For 
the time being it is necessary to analyze the nature of and reasons for 
the opposition to Bergson among high Thomists. How had it transpired 
that Aquinas had come to be held in such reverence that he was then the 
yardstick by which all other philosophies were judged and found v/anting?
From the sixteenth century St. Augustine had exerted the most con­
siderable influence on the religious philosophies of France. The ele­
vation of St, Thomas Aquinas was largely a nineteenth oe^ itury phenomenon. 
The constitution of the Vatican Council which declared papal infallibility 
for 'ex cathedra' pronouncements on doctrine had also accepted as true 
Aquinas' account of the relationship between reason and faith (on 24th 
April 1370V, iTine years later, on 4th August 1679, leo XIII promoted 
Thomas to the position of official theologian of the Catholic Church
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t h r o u g h  t h e  e n c y c l i c a l ■A e t - e r n i  P a t r i s . T h o m i s t  s t u d i e s  w e r e  i n s t i t u t e d
i n  a l l  s e m i n a r i e s  a n d  t h e  . f u r t h e r a n c e  a n d  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  T h o m i s t  d o c t r i n e s  
w e r e  e n c o u r a g e d  a m o n g  t h e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  o f  t h e  C h u r c h ,  P i u s  X  maintained 
the i m p e t u s  o f  T h o m i s t  s t u d i e s  w i t h  h i s  m o t u  p r o p r i o  named P o e t o r i s  a n g e l i  
Of 29th J u n e  1914 a n d  h i s  C a n o n  N o .  I 366 o f  t h e  C o d e  o f  C a n o n  L a w  i n  p r a i s e  
o f  S t .  T h o m a s .
T o  p r o m o t e  t h e  n e w  l e a r n i n g ,  L a  R e v u e  n e o - s c o l a s t i q u e  d e  n h i l o s o n h i e
(Louvain) was brought into being by Mgr. Désiré Mercier in 1894, while La
R e \ n i e  T h o m i s t e  began i n  1893 a , n d  t h e  J e s u i t  p e r i o d i c a l ,  E t u d e s , w a s  s t a r t e d
in 1897^» Mgr. Mercier was appointed, in 1882, 'Professeur de philosophie
2selon saint Thomas' ab the University of Louvain . In 1889 he foun.ded 
the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at the same University,which con­
siderably expanded the scope and influence of Thomist studies.
Mercier's influence as a Thomist scholar was paramount at the turn
3_of-lhe. century^— He-had .written—three major works on Thomas doctrines .
Not only did Mercier write on Thomas, but he inevitably cast a certain 
interpretation on Thomist doctrine, dwelling particularly on Thomas's 
idea of the supremacy of the intelligence in the human personality. 
Intelligence, for Mercier, vouchsafed the objectivity of knowledge 
through the faculties of abstraction and judgement. The only means 
of certain knowledge was through abstraction from sense data and a subseque:
1. Other neo-scolastic periodicals of this time include Annales de Philosophie chrétienne (I85O onwards), Revue de Philosophie (TOCO) and the Revue de^ sciences philosophiques et théo1ogîques (Kain, Belgium, I907).
2. In time the Louvain school of neo-Thoraism became heavily influenced by Kantian thought.
0, La théorie de connaissance certaine (1385), Du fondement de, Ja oertl- tude (T889T  and La théorie générale de la certitude '(Ts99, 1900 cuid 1966) (Ail Peetersj Louvain and Alcan, Paris),
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validation of the resultant concepts by analytical logic. As to sense 
experience, this was regarded with a certain suspicion,, as G. Van Riet 
explains: "Mgr, Mercier n'est jamais parvenu# à légitimer les jugements
d'expérience, aussi les passe-t-il aisément sous silence" (L'Bpistémoloris 
Thomiste, Bibliothèque Philosophique de Louvain, 1946, p. I46). On the 
other hand;
c'est de Kleutgen que [Mercier] apprit à ... subordonner toute certitude, meme celle des faits internes et externes, à la certitude proprement intellectuelle des vérités analy­tiques. Comme ses contemporains de Rome, les professeurs de l'Université grégorienne, Mgr,Mercier s'orientait donc, semble-t-il vers une conception abstraite de l'évidence; comme eux, il prenait la science aristotélienne pour le type de la connaissance certaine (p. I40).
This contrasts starkly with Bergson's diametrically opposed con­
clusions, discussed barlier, that experience of self and of the world 
alone give certain knowledge, whilst the intelligence abstracts itself 
from the reality of movement and time passing. Obviously, any neo- 
Thomist taking his lead from Mercier's interpretation would find himself 
automatically opposed to Bergson on two counts: first, Bergson's con­
clusions about the world and about God were bound to be based on sense 
experience - dubious evidence at best for them; and, second, Bergson's 
critique of the intelligence undermined the very faculty a high Thomist 
regarded as alone capable of making objectively true judgements. As 
Van Riet emphasizes; for Mercier, "la certitude relève du seul jugement 
intellectuel" (p. 158)» whereas "il n'y a pas de certitude d'expérience,
distincte de la certitude d'évidence qui caractérise les jugements idéaux - t k 3ou bien Jîè est intellectuel; sa contradictoire est aJors manifestement 
impossible".(p, I6I, italics in original). Sense perception only inter­
venes in this system as an instrumental cause for che acquisition of
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concepts; only a subsequent analysis of these concepts and their logical-
felatiàns can give rise to a tnie judgement as to their nature.
The primacy of intellect over will and over sense perception was 
also upheld in the argument about faith and reason at this time. The 
objects of faith were ultimately available and conformable to reason.
Roger Aubert argues that this is, the case for St, Thomas but that, 
vfhereas in St. Thomas the intelligence is placed in possession of 
supernatural prihciples, even so the kind of knowledge attained by 
intelligence of itself is only "comme une première ébauche de la vision 
béatifique" (le problème de l'Acte de Foi, Warny (Louvain), 3-d éd.,
1958; P* 47). For St. Thomas, the limits and weakness of the intelli­
gence were ever-present to his mind as a reminder of man's fallen state. 
Thomas's argument can be seen as a compromise, too, for certain pre­
conditions must be pi'esent in the attainment of knowledge; a modicum 
of faith, the^ssent of the will and the right guidance of the dis­
cursive intellect. Augustine's maxim, 'Credo ut intelligam', is never
contradicted. Knowledge is a concordance where all things work together 
for good: "La foi, assentiment au vrai, est formellement un acte d'intelli­
gence. Mais ceci maintenu, il reconnaît par contre à la volonté une 
part aussi large et aussi intrinsèque, que possible: non seulement l'amour 
enveloppe du dehors l'adhésion du oro^ rant pour la rendre méritoire 
mais cette adhésion elle-même est oeuvre d'amour"^ (Aubert, p. 54)*
The equilibrium of such a delicate balance proved to be easy to 
upset. Pius IX's encyclical Qui Pluribus (9th November I846) tended
1. E . g . ,  s e e  R e  V e r i t a t e , q .  I4 a . i . :  " E t  s i c  etiam m o v e m i u ’ a d  oredendumd i c t i s  i n  q u a n t u m  n o b i s  r e p r o m i t t i t u r , s i  c r e d i d e r i m u s , praemi.um v i t a e  a e t e r n a e ;  e t  h o c  p r a e n o  m o v e t u r  volutes ad a s s e n t i e n d u r a  h i s  q u a e  d i c u n t u r  q u a m v i s  i n t e l l e c t u s  n o n  m o ^ ' e t u r  per a l i q u i d  i n t e l l i g u m " .
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to stress the role of reason to the detriment of the will - a measure
to counteract the effect of rationalist scepticism over reason's power
to grasp metaphysical truths.
The 'high' neo-Thomist interpretation of this in 1896 is repre-
1 /sented well by II-B. Schwalm , who argued (in "L’Acte de Foi est-il
raisonnable?", Revue Thomiste, 1896, Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 36-63) that
"L'acte de Foi procède de la raison spéculative" (p. 38). He is
obviously opposed to the notion of 'blind faith'. However, to avoid
overstepping himself, he makes the condition that the attainments of
.the intellect do not extend to "la notion positive de l'Absolu (de
Dieu), l'aspect original et propre de sa Déité" (p. 47)» whereas the
intelligence can discover signs and pointers to God; "11 y a les signes
sensibles d'une gravitation universelle qui emporte toute nature au-
dessus d'elle-même ." (p. 47). Schwalm's target for attack is here
2'idealism', considered as stemming from Kant . In the category of 
'Kantian' he %vrongly places Blondel and all "methods of immanence" 
which, according to him, deny to reason the possibility of demonstrating 
God's existence^. This approach to methods and doctrines of immanence 
set a precedent for other Catholics in responding to Bergson's philosophy.
Thus, the Church needed to defend the rights and capacities of the 
unaided intellect first against Kant and 'idealism', and also the scientific 
positivists, who used intelligence to demonstrate the 'unreasonable' nature
1. Schwalm, Salvador, 1360-1908, entered Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs 15*9*1879 1under'name Marie-Benoît, Contributed various articles to Science Socialeas well as the Revue Thomlste. See A. Gardeil - Le Père Schwalm (l911).
2. See "Les illusions de l'idéalisme et leurs dangers....pour la foi"(Revue Thomiste, Vol. IV, No, 2, 1396, pp. 413-441).
3. Blondel's method 'détruit, par un» rorron faussée de l'immanence, toute possibilité d'arriver au vrai' (p, 423)*
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of faith and offered alternative explanations of the Universe v/hi oh 
excluded or disregarded a],l supernatural explanations. So it was 1
that any attack on bhe intelligence was often conceived inside the 
Church as an attack on the possibility of metaphysical knowledge.
And, therefore, Bergson's attack on the 'positivist' conception of 
intelligence was construed by some as an attack on the intelligence 
as such.
The years I9O8-I909 marked the zenith of Bergson's influence and 
popularity. By I9II, Y/.H, Helm in The Daily Hews (30th October) des­
cribed Bergson's lectures on 'La Nature de l'Ame' at London University 
as "a philosophic furore", At the College de France in the period <
immediately after the publication of L'Evolution Créatrice (1907)
Bergson's lecture hall v^ as filled an hour before he arrived (see L.P.
Quint, "Bergson et Aroust" in Bergson, Essais et Témoignages, p. 358).
700 people turned up in a room seating 375 (see M. Barthélémy-Madaule's 
Bergson, Ed. du Seuil, I967, p. 2l), The Tharaud brothers situated the 
upsurge in popularity slightly earlier:
On ne sait brop pourquoi, aux environs de I905, la philosophie des Donnéed immédiates de la conscience était devenue à la mode dans les salons ' parisiens. Avec étonnement, M. Leroy-Beaulieu, célèbre économiste, qui faisait ses lecjons dans la meme salle que LI. Bergson et immédiatement avant lui, voyait son amphithéâtre, ordinairement presque vide, se peupler par miracle d'une foule inattendue ... (Notre cher Péguy, Pion, Vol. I.1926, p. 263).
The intensification of the Catholic attack on Bergson coincided with 
this upsurge in popularity. Albert Leclère^, following up his researches
1, Author of Essai critique sur le droit d'affirmer (1901) and Le mysticisme catholique et l'âme de Dante TÎ906).'
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on neo-Kantianism in the ('hurch, published Pragmatisme, modemisme,
protestantisme (Bloud et Oie,, 1909), a section of which (pp. 63-79)
was devoted to Bergson, viewing him as the culmination point of neo-
Kantianism. C. Coignet also bore out this point of view in his De Kant
à Bergson (Alcan, 1911). Leon Cristiani^ published Le problème de Dieu
et le pragmatisme in 1909 (Bloud et Oie.). The link with pragmatism was
possibly started in the United States, where the philosophy of 7/. James
was associated with Bergson's. G. Sauvage wrote of The new philosophy
in France in The Catholic University Bulletin in April I906 (Vol. XII,
No, 2) in pragmatist terms:
In a word, for the primacy of thought, (Bergson's philosopliy) aims to substitute the primacy of life and action ,.. Reasoning cannot embrace the richness of reality nor the fullness of life (pp. I48-I49).
Bergson's critique oAthe intelligence is called a "criticism and not 
refutation; for the new philosophy a system is not refuted, but outgrown" 
(p. 149).
And Albert Leclere regards Bergson as Kantian since;
depuis Kant, la tendance la plus originale de la philosophie moderne est celle qui travaille à établir le primat de la raison pratique sur la raison théorique, à extorquer à la première, en tout ou en partie, ce qu'on désespère de conquérir en se servant de la seconde (Op. cit., p. 5).
He is also so enamoured with -che idea of Bergson as a pragmatist that he 
blandly states that, "le chef d'oeuvre métaphysique du pragmatisme est, 
sans hésitation possible, la philosophie de M. Henri Bergson, bien 
qu'encore inachevée" (p. 63). Both Kant and Bergson, he argues, grant
1. (1875-1951)j ordained 1902. Studied for doctorate in Rome. Professorof History, Facultés Cacholiques, Lyon; then Doyen, Faculx-e des Lettres until retirement in 1949♦
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Le pragmatisme bergsonien, le plus parfait de tous, est identiquement une philosophie de l'immanence. Immanente à la pensée est la science du monde phénoménal, faite exclusivement ou à peu près pouj- l'action matérielle ... Dieu est dans le monde, la pensée n'est que dans le monde, et toute l'oeuvre de la pensée, la scientifique, qui est artificielle, et l'autre, qui atteint l'absolu, s'origine en nous, demeure en nous qui plongeons dans un monde dont la source et la fin sont en lui-même (pp. 75-76),
mere "relativité de la connaissance au sujet" (p. 68, n, l). The %
absurdity of such a parti-pris lies in the fact that it ignores Bergson’s u
intuition, which renders both absolute and metaphysictL. knowledge,
Furthermore, Bergson opposed Kant on the very grounds that Kant makes ï
all knowledge relative and subjective". Leclere's point of emphasizing |
Bergson's 'pragmatism' completely fails to understand the nature of his
metaphysical theories. For Leclere, these metapliysical arguments are
negligible besides the 'pragmatic' ones: "La théorie bergsonienne de
la science est la seule qui soit pleinement pragma ciste, en dépit de sa
carence métaphysique; elle l'est avec plus de ri^ur que les théories
anglo-américaines similaires"((p. 68), Yet, as already seen, Bergson's
'carence métaphysique' constitutes a major part of his philosophy. À
All of Leolère's conclusions about Bergson's philosophy are vitiated
by this identification with Kant. If Bergson is a Kantian philosopher,
then he must support Kant's theory of mind:
bien vite on nous avertit que tout ce que l'esprit ajoute au donné brut qui vient battre le rivage de la conscience est l'oeuvre de celle-ci, un ensemble d'artifices inventés et disposés par l'esprit dans le but de penser l'univers ...(p. 68),
According to this logic, if Bergson is an 'empiricist' and 'pragmatist'
he must also be a 'materialist' and 'positivist':
a
1. See Chapter Two.
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L e c l e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  g u i l t y  o f  e x a c t l y  t h a t  m i s t a k e n  u s e  o f  t h e  
i n t e l l e c t  w h i c h  B e r g s o n  a t t a c k s ,  f o r  h e  a p p r o a c h e s  B e r g s o n  w i t h  p r e ­
j u d i c e s  a n d  p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , d e t e r m i n e d  t o  a l i g n  B e r g s c r l s m  w i t h  p a s r t  
c o n c e p t s  a n d  p r e v i o u s  s y s t e m s .  H e  b e c o m e s  i n c a p a b l e  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
B e r g s o n  a s  a n  o p p o n e n t  o f  K a n t  a n d  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t s ^
G e o r g e s  D u m e s n i l ^ ,  i n  L a  S o n h i s t i q u e  c o n t e m p o r a i n e  ( B e a u c h e s n e ,
1912), s i m i l a r l y  c o n s i d e r s  B e r g s o n  a s  a  K a n t i a n  p h e n o m e n a l i s t  ( s e e  p .  41) 
a n d  o n c e  a g a i n  h e  s l i d e s  d o w n  t h e .  s l o p e  o f  ' i m m a n e n t i s m ’ v i a  ’ s u b j e c t i v i s m ’
t o  ’m a t e r i a l i s m ’ , p l a c i n g  B e r g s o n  i n  t h e  c a m p  o f  w h i c h  h e  i s  t h e  g r e a t e s t
e n e m y :
B e r g s o n ,  a r r i v a n t  à  l a  z o n e  d e  1 ' e n t e n d é m e n t  e n  v o y a n t  l ’ i m p e r f e c t i o n ,  r e d e s c e n d  a u - d e s s o u s ,  r e ­p l o n g e  d a n s  l a  v i e  i n d i s t i n c t e .  E n  s ' a r r ê t a n t  c o u r t  d e v a n t  1 ' e n t e n d e m e n t , i l  s ' e s t  c o u p é  l a  r o u t e  v e r s  l a  v i e  s u p é r i e u r e  d e  l a  r a i s o n  h u m a i n ee t  t o u t e s  l e s  f o r m e s  e n  n o u s  d e  l a  v i e  d i v i n e  ( p .  3 4 ) »
T h e  c o n f u s i o n  o f  B e r g s o n i s r a  w i t h  K a n t  a n d  p r a g m a t i s m  p e r s i s t s  i n  
o t h e r s '  w o r k s  p u b l i s h e d  a t  t h e  t i m e  -  n o t a b l y  L é o n  C r i s t i a n i ' s  L e  p r o b l è m e  
d e  D i e u  e t  l e  p r a g m a t i s m e  ( B l c u d  e t  O i e . ,  I 9O 8) a n d  R e n é  B e r t h e l o t ' s  U n  
r o m a n t i s m e  u t i l i t a i r e :  L e  p r a g m a t i s m e  c h e z  B e r g s o n  ( A l c a n ,  1 9 1 3 ) ^ *
C r i s t i a n i ,  w h i l e  m a k i n g  a  s e n s i b l e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  F r e n c h  a n d  A n g l o -
7.S a x o n  p r a g m a t i s m ,  a n d  w h i l e  g r a s p i n g  t h a t  B e r g s o n  p o s i t s  a b s o l u t e  k n o w l e d g e ^ ,
1 .  G .  D u m e s n i l  ( 1 8 5 5 - 1 9 1 6 ) ,  P r o f .  a t  L y c é e s  H e n r i  I V  a n d  S .  L o u i s ,  P a r i s .  C h a r g é  d e  C o u r s  i n  F a c u l t é  d e s  L e t t r e s  a t  T o u l o u s e ,  t h e n  P r o f .  F a c u l t é  d e s  L e t t r e s  a t  G r e n o b l e .  F o u n d e d  t h e  A m i t i é  d e  F r a n c e  I 906 ( - 1 9 1 4 ) .
2 .  T h i s  i s  V o l u m e  2  o f  a  w o r k  c a l l e d  U n  r o m a n t i s m e  u t i l i t a i r e .  E t u d es u r  l e  m o u v e m e n t  p r a g m a t i d b e  ( 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 2 2 ) .  T h e  t h i r d  v o l u m e  i s ,  i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  c a l l e d  L e  p r a g m a t i s m e  r e l i g i e u x  c h e z  7 / i l l i a m  J a m e s  . e t  c h e z  l e s  c a t h o l i o u e s  m o d e r n i s t e s .
3 . " T a n d i s  q u e  V ,  J a m e s  e t  S c h i l l e r  . . .  c o n c l u e n t  q p . e  l e  c r i t é r i u m  d eb o u t e  v é r i t é  e s t  l ' u t i l i t é  p r a t i q u e ,  I L  B e r g s o n  r e g a r d e  a u  c o n t r a i r e  l a  t e n d a n c e  à  l ' a c t i o n  c o m m e  l a  s o u r c e  d e  u o u t e s  l e s  i l l u s i o n s  d e  l a  p e n s é e  s p é c u l a i r e ,  e t  l a  b a s e  d e  t o u t  r e l a t i v i s m e "  ( p p .  7 - 8 ) .
LI
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nevertheless interprets Bergson's critique of 'intelligence' as an
assault upon the Thomist doctrine of the intelligibility of the faith i
and its objects. He also tends to align Bergsonism with Kant once more,
Berthelot's work is reviewed in La Revue philosophique de la France
Iet de 1'Etranger. No. 77, 1914 (pp* 624-654) by Lionel Bauriac, who com- |
ment8 as follows:
M* Berthelot aurait pu faire dater le romantisme |philosophique du moment où, avec le noumène de Kant, l'agnosticisme pénètre dans la philosophie, Kant porte le dernier coup à la philosophie des idéesclaires. En ce sens il continue Leibniz. M. RenéBerthelot préfère dériver sinon le bergsonisme, du moins ce qu'on pourrait lui proposer de nommer la 'mentalité bergsonienne', d'une disposition d'esprit en son fond identique à Schelling (p. 624).
V/hether Kant or Schelling is regarded as Bergson's mentor, it is strange 
that the differences between Bergson and other philosophers are not high- 
lighted. The supposed rapprochmment between Kant and Bergson may be 
acceptable insofar as they were both interested in the problem of know­
ledge and the relationship between space, time and the external world, 
but their conclusions are in no way alike. Bergson v/rote to the same 
L. Dauriac, and, after politely accepting a degree of similarity between 
Kant's and his own preoccupations, he drew attention to the fundamental 
discrepancies:
Quant au rapprochement avec Kant, il s'accorde avec un gague sentiment que j'ai# toujours eu moi-même d'une parenté .entre le second chapitre de mes Données Immédiates et 1'Esthétique transcendentale; je crois cependant que ce que j'appelle intuition est toute autre chose que l'intuition kantienne, meme lorsqu'il s'agit de 'l'intuition de la durée'. D'autre part,Kant met le Temps et l'Espace sur' la meme ligne, et considère comme évident que tout ce qu'on dira de l'Espace s'applique aussi bien au Temps ou vice versa J'estime que c'est là une illusion, née de ce quloir substitue le temps spatiaiisé au Temps réel ...(Mélanges. p. 968, letter dctei 26,5,1912).
The differences between Bergson and Kant are by no means elusive.
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Bergson attacks Kant by name on many occasions^. Bergson and Kant
can only really be compared in terms of their disparity. Bergson
rejects Kant's spatial concept of time, his limitation of knowledge
to phenomenal Imov/ledge, his disbelief in free action and his belief
in the unity and all-embracing nature of science. Given this, it seems
incomprehensible that Bergson could be viewed as a disciple of Kant, and
yet this idea was widespread before 1920. Various neo-Thomist philosophers
accepted the idea without question and were consequently placed in an anoma-
2lous position, attributing to Bergson all the 'defects’ of Kant .
In turning to R. Garrigou-Lagrange, J. de Tonquedec, J. Maritain 
and A, Farges, we join the mainstream of neo-Thomist thought at this time.
The extent to which Bergson is identified vdth other 'modern errors' and 
'misguided' philosophies is quite remarkable. Garrigou-Ijagrange shows an 
inveterate tendency %o superficial classification. In his book, Le Sens 
Commun. La philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques (Beauchesne, 
1909)» Bergson's philosophy is not only described as 'kantien' and 'pheno­
menalist e' (pp. 19-20), but is variously labelled 'évolutionniste' (p. I5 ff),
'pragmatists' (p. 19 et al.), 'nominalists' (p. I9), 'moderniste' i,p. 222) 
and 'néo-positiviste' (p. 149)* These terms are all the more reprehensible 
for their spurious inaccuracy and lack of justification. Père de Tonquedec 
is similarly liberal with his philosophical etiquettes. In his estimation, 
Bergson is a 'moderniste' (Sur la philosonhie bergsonienne. Beauchesne, 1956, 
p. 12) and a 'moniste' (p. 51), while this philosophy is one of 'immanence'
1. Notably in L'Essai, pd. 62-65, 155 in M.M., p. 551, n. 2, 558 and 1in pp. 795-802."
2, The fear of and distaste for Kane's philosophy among some Catholics and flirtation with his ideas and techniques among others is perhaps comparable with the ambivalent present-day Catholic attitude towards Marxism.
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(p. 52) and amounts to a new spiritualism (p. 138). Lhat both critics
f,re agreed upon is that Bergson presents a formidable opposition to
Thomist. philosophy. Tonquedec puts the case like this:
La scolastique n ’est-elle pas I'usage le plus consequent et le plus intrépide de cette intelligence spéculative, dont M. Bergson a tant médit? N ’est-elle pas la croyance robuste aux substances et aux essences déterminées que le philosophe nous montre dissoutes dans la fluidité du devenir? (in article; "Bergsonisme et scolastique", Revu.e critique des idées et des
livres, 25.12.1913LpP- 65I-67OJ, p. 652).
1Garrigou-Lagrange seems determined to purge from the purity of
Thomas’s philosophy all taint of Bergsonism; so much so that he equates
Bergson's philosophy with the heresy denounced in the 26th proposition of
the anti-modernist encyclical. Lamentibili (of- 3rd July I907), which runs
as'follows; "Dogmata fidei retienda sunt tantummodo .juxta- sensum nraticm,
\id est tanquam norma'praeceptiva agendi, non vero tanquen norma credendi"
'-(quoted in Le Sens Commun, p. 17, n. 2). Prom this- standpoint-; Garrigcu-
Lagrange proceeds to revievf all the aspects of Bergsonism he considers to
be damaging to Thomist doctrine. He singles out the 'nominalism' implicit
in both LeRoy's and Bergson's work for especial blame. By this he means
a denial of absolute Imowledge or existence outside the subject's awareness
Ce nominalisme, qui réduit en fin de compte la connaissance intellectuelle à la connaissance sensible], doit aboutir fatalement à la négation de la valeur ontologique des dogmes, autant et plus que le conceptualisme kantien (p. 19).
The basic injustice of such an assessment of Bergson is fully borne 
out in Garrigou-Lagrange's ensuing logic; for he next sees a necessary 
connection betv/een nominalism and crass materialism and goes on to accuse
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., 1877-1964• Studied underAmbroise Gardeil a,t Saulchoir, Belgium, Taught theology at Angelic College, Rome,
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Bergson of this further heresy;
Le nominalisme bergsonien n'est seulement la negation de la raison qu'il subordonne à la conscience; il paraît être aussi la négation de cette conscience qui se subordonnerait à son tour à la vie animale et végétative; tout se ramènerait à la biologie(p. 63).
And yet the whole motivation and impetus of Bergson's philosophy is 
anti-materialist. Perhaps Garrigou-Lagrange is here following the tech­
nique used, in Lamentibili ,^ which similarly sees logical connections between 
all kinds of theories and modes of thought from 'pragmatism' to 'agnosticism'; 
from 'protestantism' to 'atheism'. Lamentibili also makes a target of 
general movements rather than analysing single ideas in detail.
However, it is Garrigou-Lagrange's main contention that Bergson 
refutes the intelligibility of the external world by reducing Being to 
Becoming. For him,\ this is tantamount to reducing Being to non-being.
The fundamental law of the real is 'le principe d'identité' (p. I31), 
which states that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time.
If, then, in Bergson's system, "rien n'est, tout devient" (p. I52), 
then being is non-existent: "nier que l'être qui est, sans être par
soi, ait une raison d'être (ce qu'il faut pour être), c'est l'identifier 
avec ce qui n'est pas: nier qu'il ait une raison d'ètre extrinsèque,
c'est l'identifier avec ce qui est par soi" (p. 177)-. The logic here 
is difficult to grasp, but,vfith regard to Bergson, one could counter that 
'devenir' in this sense does not mean the same as 'to come into existence' 
or to 'bring into existence', but simply 'to change'. In Bergson's world
1, He may have been involved in writing this, but it is virtually impossible to prove it.
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there is no such thing as non-being^.
Garrigou-Lagrange derides 'intuition' as 'des jeux d'enfants' (p. 129).
Its role in synthesizing instinct and intelligence is d.gnored. The
Bergsonian 'intelligence' is also written off insensitively as 'sensualiste'
(p. 44)* The senses are likened to Bergson's intelligence in their function:
"les sens ne voyaient que des éléments matériels", whereas "l'idée montre
quelque chose d'immatériel" (p. 46), Just hovr intelligence differs frcn
sense perception does not arise and the relations between intelligence as
a part of consciousness and sense objects as part of the material world
are also not discussed,
Garrigou-Lagrange lastly arrives at a consideration of Bergson's
'God', Since he is identified exactly with 'L'élan vital', and is
involved in the world of time passing, Garrigou-Lagrange decides that
\B e r g s o n  t a k e s  '■
le premier pas vers le panthéisme: Dieu ne peutexister que s'il crée, il ne se distingue pas dela création elle-même. Non seulement Dieu ne seconpoit plus sans le monde, mais il est absorbé par le monde (p. 232),
At this point it would be wise to dre\7 attention fco the rapproche­
ment between neo-Thomist -v/riters - who are not always in harmony - over 
Bergson's belittling of the functions and capacities of the intelligence.
It is around this issue above all that the criticisms cf Joseph de Tonquedec. 
revolve, Tonquédec, S.J, (I868-I961), holds that Bergson's consciousness 
is of one substance with the material world and is seen as an attribute 
of or effluence from it. For Tonquédec, St, Thomas's 'intelligence' 
is the faculty v/hich stands above or apart from the material Universe and 
judges of it; "Ce que notre.raison postule au delà de l'univers expérimental,
1, See the argument in E.G., pp. 728-747*
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pour le trouver intelligible, doit être nécessairement d'une autre 
nature que cet univers" (p. 28) ("Gomment interpréter -‘ordre du 
monde", written in I9O8, in Sur la ohilosonhie bergsonienne, p, 28).
If one admits and recognizes that "la conscience n ’est pas un attribut 
des choses, mais qu’elle réside au delà d’elles et à leur source, tout 
gagne en clarté et en cohérence" (p. 27).
This point is hard to appreciate, for to make the intelligence 
separate from other living matter seems odd to begin with, but to leave 
obscure and unexplained its links with the rest of life - as well as its 
origin and nature - does little to clarify anything. Nevertheless, be­
cause Bergson’s ’intelligence’ is presumed to have a biological origin, 
Tonquedec can only understand his philosophy as ’monism’; that is, as 
reducing all things in life to a single principle:
Dans le monde àbtuel, les formes variées de la vie n'empêchent pas l'unité de l'élan vital. La création nous l'avons lu, n'est, dans son essence, qu'accroissement ("M, Bergson est-il moniste?".Etudes. Vol. 130, 1912, [pp. 506-516], p. 512),
\Vhat Tonquédec deduces from the fact that spiritual and material
life have a common source is that, consequently, God cannot transcend his
own creation:
L'élan vital ... n'est qu'un nom collectif pour signifier les jets qu'il forme sans cesse de sa propre substance. Telle était mon exégèse. Elle amenait la pensée de II, Bergson à une conclusion moniste. Une autre interprétation est-elle possible? (p. 51)•
But this form of argument is one-sided; for it could well be 
maintained that the whole of life has a spiritual source and that 
spirit transcends the material through its liberty and consciousness.
This is in fact Bergson's conclusion in L'Hssai sur 1er données 
immédiates de la conscience.
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On the other hand, Tonquedec did question Bergson directly on
12th May 1906 on this question of God's transcendence ; realizing
that the question is in fact left unresolved in L'Evolution Créatrice.
The reply he received has nov/ become famous. Bergson stated that his
establishment of liberty and free will as facts led naturally to
... l'idée d'un Dieu créateur et libre, générateur à la fois de la matière et de la vie, et dont l'effort de création se continue,.du coté de la vie, par l'évolution des espèces et par la constitution des personnalités humaines. De tout cela se dégage, par conséquent, la réfutation du monisme et du panthéisme en général (quoted p. 6o),
If it is granted that Bergson's protestations on this matter are
accepted by Tonquédec, then the one serious disagreement between them
concerns the powers of the intelligence. Tonquédec does take up this
point before 1920, as already seen,but he mounts his most concentrated
attack in "La Clef (^ Cs Deux Sources" in Etudes of 5th and 20th December
1932 (articles later included in his book). He holds that
toute philosophie qui détrône 1'intelligence aboutit à introniser à sa place quelque autre activité ou à la noyer dans un bloc d'activités étrangères, déclarées ses égales. Les facultés sensibles, en particulier, trouvent là l'occasion de regagner un rang dont la suprématie de l'intelligence les déboutait (Sur la philosophie bergsonienne, p. 128),
Any denial or denigration of the intelligence, according to Tonquédec,
brings in its train the "despotisme du caprice individuel" (p. 129),
In Bergson's case, he adds, the senses are given free reign to determine
what is true, because
ce qui déborde le cerveau ... ce sont surtout des images. les images de la rêverie et du rêve; ce peuvent être parfois des perceptions sensibles qui 'pansent en contrebande', quand les mécanismes inhibitifs fonctionnent mal (p. 127).
If il is the images of memory and mind which deteimine tne reality of a
spiritual life -images derived from prior sense perception - then, Tonquédec
- 82 -
persists, this reverses Thoma,s Aquinas’ proof of the spirit in man, as, 
in his case,
ce qui faisait ... la preuve de la spiritualité, c’était l'opération intellectuelle qui, dans le concept ou 1'inférence, aboutit à produire de l'immatériel pur ... (p. 123, italics in original).
Tonquédec's greater contemporary, Jacques Marinain, realized that 
Bergson's philosophy represented a clean break with the past. He recog­
nized that Bergson's attack on the positivists, the Kantian and on Ancient 
philosophy was more than just a verbal dissociation. He applauded the 
success of Bergson's venture as a victory in terms of superior logic;
Ivl, Bergson a 1''immense mérite d'avoir lutté seul (seul dans l'Université) pendant longtemps, contre le matérialisme soi-disant positif et con'ti*e le relativisme kantien qui se partageaient le monde officiel ... (p. 98).
Maritain rejoiced that Bergson had defeated his opposition on their oY/n
ground.
And yet Maritain's criticism of Bergson was virulent, even though 
he represented Bergson's philosophy far more fairly end accurately than 
most. He was not attacking Garrigou-Lagrange's man of straw. In his 
clear-headed way he savr the two pre-eminent aspects of the new philosophy 
as the replacement of Being with time and movement, and the replacement of 
St, Thomas's abstractive intelligence with an 'intuition' of an empirical 
nature. According to Maritain, Bergson "interdit à l'intelligence la con­
naissance de notre réalité foncière, connaissance intuitive de l'existence, 
connaissance rationnelle de notre moi" (pp. 129-138). For Maritain, 
neither the 'intelligence' nor the 'intuition' of Bergson went far enough 
to attain metaphysical knowledge - that is, knov/ledge^ g^f ^ essence; Maritain 
explains that such knowledge is necessarily an intellectual Intuition, which 
w orks
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en tirant du singulier ... l'universel qui y existait en puissance, et qui n'existera à part, en acte, que dans l'esprit où il est connu immatériellemant (p. j6ô).
Maritain*s criticism was .more complex than most, as he brought to bear
a more detailed employment of Thomas Aquinas' categories and concepts
than most other critics. He distinguished his ov/n idea of intuition,
which is intellectuaj, from Bergson's intuition, whose scope was restricted
to knowledge of sense objects.
For Maritain, the proper object of intelligence is Being, while
for Bergson it is practical action: '"l'intelligence n'a pas pu s'adapter
à notre pratique, elle no peut s'adapter qu'à l'être" (p. I40), The
further consequences of this are examined in Chapter Seven.
Bergson also confused "le flux du temps et la durée das substances"
(p. 293)? his 'beiii*g' or 'substance' is "comme un résidu transitoire au
devenir et de l'action ..." (intro., p. LV). This idea that time ('la
durée') is substance vitiates metaphysical research, because
si la science des phénomènes enveloppe et dissimule elle-même dans son ordere propre et dans son objet formel une étoffe méta­physique, cette étoffe ne peut être que le temps (p. LV).
For Maritain, knowledge of God and of the world of spirit 1» extra-temporal
knowledge; it is essentially knowledge of eternity:
Le temps va de sa propre pente vers- ].a dissolution, non vers l'invention, et tout progrès est, nétaphvsiquement, un effort de redressement contre le temps (p. LXXVIl).
Thus, true spirituality or knowledge of God
n'est pas à chercher dans le temps - ni dans l'instant, ni dans le flux, ni dans la concentration du temps - mais dans l'intemporel ... (p. LXkXY),
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Maritain is Bergson's most formidable opponent in the Catholic 
Church, partly because he had an intimate understanding of and certain 
sympathy with Bergson's positions, and, second, because he dealt with 
each point individually and in detail. He refused constantly to 
categorize and generalize and some of his oto positions are well 
thought out and are genuinely and directly matched to Bergson's argu­
ments and sometimes arise from consideration of those very arguments.
The tv7o major points of Maritain's criticism are echoed by Albert 
Farges, who sees the central idea in Bergson's cosmology as "fondée 
sur ce principe qui 'place l'essence du réel dans la fluidité meme' ..." 
("La cosmologie de Bergson", Rewe du clergé français « Vol. LXXVIII, 
15.3.1913 [pp. 74O-741], p. 740). Bergson's work, once again, is seen 
as a contrast to and contradiction of St. Thomas's philosophy: "Saint
Thomas avait déjà, éprès Aristote et Platon, appelé cette doctrine une 
philosophie du non-être ..." (p, 740). vVhich doctrine is envisaged?
For Farges, it is that in vdiich "le devenir est la seule réalité", and 
where "le plus sort du moins, le tout sort du néant, l'être est une 
abstraction, l'être infini est le plus vide de toutes les abstractions..." 
(p. 740). Farges imagines that Bergson's God resembles that of Renan, 
for, in both instances, "Dieu est en train de se faire; il est la caté­
gorie de l'idéal" (p. 741).
Farges, like Maritain, takes the other major idea in Bergson's philo­
sophy to be a new conception of the intelligence. This, in his eyes, con* 
stitutes an anti-intellectualism:
Que deviendrait le dogme de l'existence d'un Dieu personnel dans un système anti-intellectualiste qui a commencé par ruiner, avec la notion d'être, la notion meme de Vérité, et; qui n'admet plus aucun principe éternel et nécessaire, pas même le principe de contradiction? (p. 1 ) *
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Farges shows his acquaintance with Maritain's critique throughout in
1particular by quoting from an article :
nous conclurons avec H, Maritain: 'Une philo­sophie qui blasphème l'intelligence ne sera jamais catholique' (p. 74l).
However, unlike Maritain, Farges does not cast away from Bergson the
taint of Kant or of positivism. . Farges not only adopts Maritain's
criticisms; he adopts many others as well. Those features of Catholic
criticism which Maritain rejects or ignores Farges exploits to the full:
2especially the association of Bergson with Kant and other philosophers , 
.and the attribution to Bergson of false doctrines such as 'monism' (La 
philosophie de M. Bergson, p. 468) and 'pantheism' (p. 471)•
It is to be borne in mind that this book of Farges received the 
official approval of Merry Del Yal, Archbishop of Paris, and of the Pope 
himself (see earlioù^. Yet Farges, in this same book, shows an extreme 
hostility to Bergson's work verging on fanaticism.
Something else to emerge from Farges' book is that Farges' admira­
tion for Thomas Aquinas goes hand in hand with an admiration for Aristotle:
Pour nous et tous les disciples d'Aristote et de Saint Thomas, l'esprit philosophique prend son point de départ dans les données positives . de la science expérimentale et fait effort pour la continuer et l'approfondir en. l'universalisant
(p. 474).
The assumption that Aristotle is the greatest influence on Thomas is common
1. "L'Evolutionnisme bergsonien" (Revue de Philosophie, September- October I9II).
2. e.g., "II. Bergson restait encore, en secret, le prisonnier de Kant, puisqu'il aboutit, comme Kant, quoique par d'autres voies, à la négation de la valeur métaphysique de 1'intelligence humaine. Pour lui, comme pour Kant, la critique de la Raison pure est définitive" (La Philosouhie de M. Bergson. Librairie Berche et Tralin, 1912,p7 480j.
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to all the Thomists we have so far discussed but,in Farges* book,
Bergson is sometimes compared, not with Thomas’s adaptations of
Aristotle, but with Aristotle himself; as though Thomas Aquinas and
Aristotle are interchangeable;
Aristote ... distingue d*abord le mouvement du mobile ou du sujet en mouvement; substance et accident. Puis, dans le mouvement, qui est un passage de la puissance à l’acte, il distingue aussitôt deux états opposés de laréalité; l’état potentiel et l’état actuel:clé de voûte de toute sa métaphysique'Tp* 46?).
It is Aristotle who disproves Bergson's identification of movement and
substance; it is he who gives a true account of the relation between
matter and spirit. In addition, Aristotle moves towards a pluralistic-
understanding of the Universe, while Bergson "s'oriente vers Is monisme
universel où l’unité ne se fait que par l’identification et la confusion
des parties ..." (p,\468).
Yet, even though this attitude appears to have been acceptable in
official circles, it is by no means soundly fe-ased. By 1920 the Aristotelian
interpretation of Thomas vfas being questioned by a few men. For instance,
Jacques Chevalier wrote an open letter to the editor of Les Lettres on 1st
April 1920, in which he criticized Maritain’s assertions about Aristotle
as against Bergson:
M, Maritain affirme qu’Aristote a cru en la création et en l'immortalité personnelle.Malheureusement, son affirmation est beaucoup plus tranchante que ses preuves ... Or, quoi qu'en dise II, Maritain, il faut bien reconnaître qu'Aristote n'a pas soupçonné la notion, même rationnelle. de création, c'est-à-dire de dé­pendance totale du monde à 1'égard de Dieu.Les textes sont là, irréfutables ... (p. 89).
Furthermore, Chevalier agreed with Bergson that,
en fait, l'idée de création est absolument étrangère à la mentalité grecque; elle est toute entière d'origine judéo-chrétienne ... (p. 90).
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Maritain does contest this point of view and argues that Aristotle did 
not rule out the possibility of personal immortality or of creation 
in time (pp. 94-98)• Ee behaves as though it were St. Thomas under 
attack and not Aristotle, Garrigou-Lagrange also, gives as much cre­
dence to Aristotle as to St. Thomas in the work mentioned (e.g., pp. 144» 
159» 160), One cannot doubt that Aristotle was seen as Thomas's mentor.
He is consequently invested with as much authority as Thomas himself.
This very fact provides a further good reason why Bergson was so mis­
understood and so maligned, for Bergson's ovm readtion against Aristotle 
is trenchant and clear-cut^. In brief, Bergson saw Aristotle's God as 
an intellectual construction - the idea of ideas - and as a fixed immobility
incapable of action in the world. Yet certain neo-Thomists, as E. Gilson 
2makes clear , confronted Bergson with just such a conception:
Tels qu’ils le Concevaient, Dieu n'avait pas l'immutabilité dynamique d'un acte d'être, mais celle, toute statique, d'une essence dont la perfection consiste seulement à rester éternellement ce qu'elle est (p. 168).
The whole notion of St. Thomas as confirmer and supporter of the 
theses of Aristotle is ill-conceived. Thomas in no way merely para­
phrased Aristotle, nor was Aristotle the only great influence on Thomas,
It must be realized that, although St. Thomas adopted Aristotelianism as 
an instrument for the expression of his system, he was no blind disciple 
of the Philosopher. It is now known that he also had access to neo­
platonism through Boethius, Proclus, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, 
Maximus, John Scotus Erigena and the Greek Fathers. In straightforward 
theology he is keen to accord with the findings of Augustine, In his book
1. See Bergson's criticisms of Aristotle in E.G., pp. 761-769*
2. In Le ohilosonhe et la théologie. A. Fayard, I96O.
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Aquinas (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1955» P* 83), F. Gopli-ston aak.es the 
point that Aquinas, "while retaining the Aristoteiean analyses of suh- .|
stance and accident, form and matter, act and potency, placed the emphasis I
in his metaphysics, not on 'essence', on what a thing is,but on existence, 4
considered as the act of existing". ■
The beginnings of a changing attitude towards Thomas Aquinas coincide 4
with the beginnings of a,new appreciation of Bergson, and with more de- 1
tailed study of Bergson's 'intuition'. Two important works in this res- ?
pect were Joseph Segond's^ L'Intuition bergsonienne (Alcan, 1913) and 
T.-L, Penido's^ La Méthode Intuitive de LI. Bergson (Atar, Geneva, 1918)^. 4
Owing to the detail of the analysis and the profundity of thought, the |
conclusions of both men are less superficial than in many other cases. 4
J. 8egond recognizes that Bergson uses intuition in order to complement 1
' iintelligence rather than to oppose it. Without intuition, intelligence ;
1anks-something vital; "L'intelligence nous est apparue ... comme une 9
sorte d'intuition solidifiée et sans mémoire de la durée qui se material:se" 4
(p. 116). Nevertheless, conversely, intelligence is equally vital to 4
intuition - it collates and orders the material of an intuition; there- J
fore, Segond goes on, "nous ne saurions formuler entre le bergsonisme et i
l'intellectualisme une opposition radicale" (p. II6), Segond sees affinities 4
1. Prof. de Philosophie, University of Lyon. In 1929 succeeded Blondelat Aix-en-Provence. Works on Racine, Descartes and Spinoza. AlsoLa Prière ( 19I I ) ,  L'Imagination ( 1 9 2 2 ) .
2. Pénido, T.-L. (O.P.). Professeur de Philosophie at University ofFreiburg, Switzerland, 1929-1938, Published in Bibliothèque Thomiste. Major works: Le r8le de 1's.nalogie en théologie do/rmstique" "(Vr^  ^ "iyjl).,La Conscience Religieuse (Téqui, 1937)\" Dieu dans le bergsonisme (lesciée. 19367: '  • * ■
3. There was also a work by the biographer and philosopher, René Gillouin,La Philosophie de LL Henri Bergson (Grasset,1911}, which tentatively suggests that intuition could be viewed as a function of intelligence (p,, 33) but the argument is not sympathetic even so.
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between Bergson and LÎ. Blondel (pp. 125 ff.) rather than between
Bergson and V/illiam James.
Penido equivocates over the value of Bergson's 'intuition',
drawing attention to certain inconsistencies in Berogson's explanation
of it, mainly arising from the vagueness of his metaphors and images:
Tantôt (l'intuition) semble être introspection,, tantôt effort de volonté, d'imagination ou de réflexion; ailleurs c'est une sympathie intel­lectuelle, une inspiration ou bien encore un sentiment. Parfois, elle se fait très humble: simplement 'perception élargie' ... Soudain, prise d'orgueil, elle devient l'apanage d’une élite d'artistes ... C'est chose tout à fait ésotérique ... (p. 119).
Yet Pénido ascribes overwhelming importance to intuition in Bergson's
system: "Be 1'intuition dépend la vie même du bergsonisme’..." (p. 120).
1 2Pénido discusses intuition in terms of perception , introspection , sjoi-
pathetic effort (p. 160), and, finally, in terms of thought in general.
He concludes, after St. Thomas, that essence (immateriality) alone is
grasped by the mind, and intellectually at that: "Sans le concours de
l'intelligence, l'intuition est impossible" (p. 176). However, Pénido
does realize that Bergson's major intuitions are an apprehension "toute
trempée de dialectique" (p. 184), G^ nd he acknowledges the importance of
positive data in Bergson's system: "îÆ. Bergson insiste beaucoup sur
l'absolue insuffisance d'une métaphysique dépourvue :1e bases scientifiques"
(p. I84). He takes these facts into account and finally arrives at the then
radical view that 'intelligence' may have a dual function;
A coté du morcellement pratique attribué aux sens par les bergsoniens, on reconnaît cependant l'existence d'une perception esthétique: pourquoi
1. 'Vue directe, immédiate et absolue d'une réalité concrète" (p. 124)*
2. Intuition is: "une perception intérieure" (p. I36).
refuser à 1'intelligence un double role, un double usage, pratique et désintéressé ... (p. 210).
Without writing direct criticisms of Bergson's work, other men 
quietly assimilated and incorporated Bergson's doctrines into, their 
own body of ideas and in this way began to introduce certain key berg- 
sonian themes and ideas into common currency through their own personal 
writings.
Charles Péguy's work is examined in detail later, but his philo­
sophical output v/as very much an adaptation of Bergson's ideas to social, 
•political and theological questions, as well as to purely philosophical 
ones, . His treatises on Bergson come nearest to a direct appraisal in 
the form of articles in IQli: the Note sur IT. Bergson et la nhilosoohie
bergsonienne  ^ (Cahiers de la Quinzaine, Série XV, Cahier 8) and the Note
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Conjointe sur II. Descartes et la chilosonhie cartésienne (1st pub. Gallimard, 3 
193-5 )'• The Note Conjointe was written directly-after Bergs on's-works had 
been placed on the Index.
Péguy defends Bergson against 'intellectualists' who underplay the 
role of the emotions a,nd will in understanding life. He then reinstates 
Bergson's philosophy as 'intellectual' in a wider sense: "il y a un intel­
lectualisme du pathétique, ou de tous les autres" (Oeuvres, II, p. I514).
Péguy opposes the intellectualism which places ideas in categories only 
in association with other ideas. For him, Bergson rediscovers the true 
intellect that probes and unearths new ideas.
Péguy rages at the inappropriateness of much neo-Thomist criticism 
of Bergson: "Tout ce qui sera perdu par Bergson sera non pas gagné par
1. A short version of this article first appeared in La. Grande on 25th March 1914 (ho. 84).
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saint Thomas mais regagne par Spencer" (il, p, Above all,
Bergson is the man who recreated and reintroduced spiritual values 
into life: thus, Pegu^  ^ is indignant that "1'homme qui a réintroduit
■ la vie spirituelle dans le monde ait contre lui, et à ce point, les 
politiciens de la vie spirituelle, voilà ce que je nomme un retournement 
et une gageure, et un scandale voulu et une bataille à 1'envers" (il, 
p. 1409)» Gratitude is entirely absent from Catholic reactions, Péguy 
rails. Bergson "a contre lui ceuic qu'il a perdus. Et il a contre lui 
ceux qu'il a sauvés" (il, p. I4O9).
Péguy's article then leads on to a whole theological system based 
around Bergson's ideas of 'le tout fait' and the 'se faisant'^. Its 
impetus comes from the conviction that Bergson "nous fait littéralement 
retrouver le point de chrétienté^ le point de vue et le point d'"Stre de 
chrétienté" (il, p. ^$20). Péguy's defence of Bergson v;as therefore 
in the manner of a crusade and logic is less in evidence than sincerity 
and ardour.
2Pierre Rousselof, on the other hand, managed to combine a lucid and 
cogent account of St. Thomas's views on 'intelligence' with certain modern 
and especially bergsonian - theories about intelligence and intuition. 
Without being so bold as to proffer approbation of Bergson's teaching, he 
gives tacit approval by making extensive use of Bergson's discoveries in 
his ovm work.
1. Discussed later.
2, Rousselot, Pierre (1878-1915)" October 1895 joined Jesuit Order. I9O8 priest at Theological College at Hastings, England, Doctoral theses I9O8 - the work mentioned and Pour l'Histoire du nrvblène de l'amour tiu moyen a-^ e (Uunster, I9O8; Vrin, 1953)'.' 1909 entereaInstitut Catholique, Paris, as suppléant to Professor of dogmatic theology. Acceeded to the chair Ï9IO. Sabbatical year 1912-1^ 1,). Killed in action at Eparges, 25.4.1915*
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Rousselot makes two drama,tic innovations: first, he separates
Thomas's 'intelligence' into two parts - 'ratio' and 'intellectus';
the former is discursive and organizing and works on material already
given; the latter .is an immediate apprehension of objects external to
itself. Secondly, Rousselot envisages 'intellectus' as an organ of
•vision' or perception, rather than simply of abstraction. He writes
of St. Thomas that:
plusieurs de ceux qui vinrent après lui comprenant mal la notion de 'saisis' et de possession intel­lectuelle, négligèrent l'essentielle différence de l'intuition et du discours (L'Intellectualisme de saint Thomas, Beauchesne, I924 [ist éd. Alcan,1900], p. J2).
This separation is derived from Platonic teaching and not from Aristotle^.
Rousselot explains 'ratio' by reference to Bergson's 'these maîtresse' 
that "l'intelligence''^  essentiellement, déforme et mutile l'ètre qu'elle 
soit sens de l'irréel" (intro., p. V). He calls this "une idée aujourd'hui 
si commune qu'elle a passé dans la littérature courante et dans la con­
versation" (Id. ).
Rousselot rarely mentions Bergson by name, but he often uses very 
similar vocabulary and ideas. Here is an example from his article,
"Les Yeux de la Foi" (Recherches de Sciences Religieuses, llay-June I9IO,
Ho# 5, pp. 241-259); which encountered much opposition in Catholic
1, See p. 56 of this work.
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circlès^:
Je puis avoir lu Hamlet dix fois, et n'avoir pas compris Hamlet. Je reprends le livre et voici qu'un mot ... suscite en moi, tout d'un coup, l'intuition du caractère comme d'un ensemble intelligible, d'une réalité qui se . 
tient (p. 253).
It is hard to believe that Rousselot is not thinking of this passage in
"Introduction à la Métaphysique" (P.M., p. 1394)s
Le romancier pourra multiplier les traits de caractère, faire parler et agir son héros autant qu'il lui plaira; tout cela ne vaudra pas le sentiment simple et indivisible que j'éprouverais si je coïncidais un instant avec le personnage lui-mème. Alors, comme de la source, me paraîtraient couler naturellement , les actions, les gestes et les paroles ... Le rT personnage me serait donné tout d'un coup dansson intégralité ...
Another passage^dravm from this article puts the question of direct 
influence from Bergson beyond doubt. This concerns the free act, which 
♦ Rousselot describes as, not merely "la decision prise, mais la décision 
qui se prend" (Recherches July-August I9IO [pp. 444-475], p, 449),
and he elaborates:
1. See, e.g,, the following articles; I,I. Ligeard, "La crédibilité de la révélation" (Revue des sciences religieuses. I914, pp. 40-57) and S. Harent, "Foi" in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, Vol. VI, Col. 260-275. Certain of Rousselot's ideas were condemned ('tuto dooeri non potest') by a Congregation in Rome -in August 1920 and were forbidden to be promulgated in Jesuit theological colleges. The infor­mation was communicated by Père Ledochowski, General of the Jesuit Order. Rousselot's article "Intellectualisme" in the Dictionnaire Apologétique also met with difficulties and ÏÏ. Da Lubac maintains that it was "quelque peu mutilé par les censeurs" (Blondel - Teilhord de Chardin - Corres­pondance , Beauchesne, I965, p. 5^? Ho. 6j. There is an article on Rousselot in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique XIV, Col, 134-138* by J. Lebreton and the whole volume of Revue des Scienées religieuses of 1965 is dedicated to a 'Memorial Pierre Rousselot' on the 58th anniversary of his death. Rousselot had been first secretary of this review, A, Valensin intended to publish Rousselot's collected works, but the project has not been realized.
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C’est là l’histoire de nos actes libres: le’jugement pratique' et 'L'élection volontaire', distincts pour la raison réfléchissante, mais fondus dans un m6ne éclair de la durée réelle, s'y causent réciproquement; chacun d'eux suscite l'autre comme condition de sa réalisation (p. 449; my underlining).
Neither in these tv/o articles nor in his book does Rousselot allude to
Bergson by name. However, in an article called "Métaphysique thomiste
et critique de la connaissance" in -la Revue néo-scolastique. Ho. 17, IRIO
(pp. 476-509), he mentions both Bergson and LeRoy (pp. 476, 490-491).
More surprisingly, in the fact of all contemporary opinion, Rousselot
detects a parallelism between Bergson's and St. Thomas's 'critique de
la connaissance' (p. 476) on the following grounds;
La philosophie nouvelle est donc, avant ' tout, une critique de la catégorie de la chose: tous les représentants s'appliquent,avec plus ou moqns d'ingéniosité, de mesure et de bonliGur, à en faire ressortir l'utilarisme, l'anthropomorphisme, la relativité. - Or, la " critique de la connaissance que St. Thomas a esquissée... est, elle aussi, avant tout, une critique de la catégorie de la chose, en prenant le terme chose exactement dans le même sens.Pour le saint Docteur, non seulement l'objet propre et proportionné de notre intellection terrestre est la 'chose' matérielle, mais encore l'idée primordiale d''ètre concret';A ... nous souries incapables d'envisager directe-ment ces êtres, et ... nous ne les connaissons qu'en les figurant à l'image de ces choses matérielles que nous concevons ici-bas (p. 477 « italics in original).
The intellect, according to Rousselot, is a spiritual capacity in 
man which seizes the spiritual essence of life. This can only be repre­
sented in the mind in terms of material images or concepts:
l'intelligence est le sens du divin, parce qu'elle est capable d'étreindre Dieu en cette sorte; et pour s'en faire une idée correcte, il faut comprendre que son réle est de capter des êtres, non de fabriquer des concepts ou d'ajuster des énoncés (L'Intellectualisme de Bt. Thomas. 2, p. XI).
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Owing to its fatal propensity to revert to material forms, the 
intelligence in man is an inaccurate and feeble spiritual gift which 
is, nevertheless, truly angelic and only realized by argols in its full­
ness. The spiritualized intellect is also one with the nature of God:
"la dernière perfection de la vie appartient à Dieu, en qui comprendre, 
c'est être, si bien que l'idée de Dieu, c'est l'essence divine elle-même ..." 
(p, lO), Clearly, it can be.deduced from this that mind is spiritual and 
as such partakes of Godhead, just as in Bergson's philosophy 'la, durée 
réelle' and ' la mémoire pure ' are similarly of one substance with "l'élan 
vital",
Rousselot further distinguishes the two functions of intelligence by 
reference to their abilities. The 'ratio' manipulates matter and verbalizes 
(materializes) ideas, and, above all, immobilizes real existence;
Abstraire, c'es't mépriser le fluent et postuler la permanence; c'est donc, cristalliser ce qui se répand, concentrer le diffus, glacer ce qui coule, c'est solidifier (p. VI).
The 'intellectus', by way of contrast, is capable of 'intuition'. This 
word, absent from St. Thomas, must have been borrowed from Bergson, who 
brought it into philosophical usage at the time. Intuition is the con­
densation of many ideas in a single sensation or perception. Intuition 
does not thereby generalize or categorize; it reduces to a concentrated 
unity:
L'universalité plus grande des formes idéales, par où connaissent les Anges supérieurs, au lieu d'amener l'indistinction et le vague, est con­dition de pénétration plus subtile dans l'origi­nalité des êtres. Elle est, disions-nous, non pas généralisation, mais condensation ... (p. 18).
Rousselot's intuition is further described as being analogous to 
eyes and feet: "1'intelligence est de soi analogue, non seulement aux -
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yeux des "êtres corporels, mais, si l’on peut dire, aux organes de 
préhension, nains, pattes, tentacules ..." (p. 24). This tallies ' s
with Bergson’s metaphors like 'saisir’ ( E . G . , p. 646), 's’insérer'
( P . M . , p. 1393) and 'posséder' ( P . M . , p. I4OI). The correspondence 
of vocabulary is even more marked in Rousselot's description of intui­
tion as total union:
le nom d'intellection peut sembler bien terrestre et bien p&le; vision qui est métaphorique, a trouvé généralement plus de faveur. Mais le mot est sans importance: qu'on dise union, possession intime, coin- |cidence consciente ... le point capital est que, pour St. Thomas, la faculté qui nous fait capables de cette action transcendante, est identiquement celle qui, selon un autre mode d'agir, forme nos concepts et combine nos déductions d'ici-bas (pp. 36-37» italics in original).
\ ^This seems to be exactly what Bergson suggests in "L'Introduction a la
Métaphysique" (written 1903')^ . He additionally talks of intuition as
perception (P.M., pp. 1399-1400), as 'sympathie intellectuelle' ( P . M . ,
p. 1557» p. 1395) and as 'coincidence' (P.M., p. I4OI).
Y/hereas 'intellectus' and 'ratio' belong to the same faculty, this
faculty is not entirely distinct from the will. There true knowledge
is gained,love and obedience are involved:
l'obéissance, oeuvre propre d'amour, ne pourra tendre qu'à 1'intellection. L'acte de s'unir, dans tous les sens, sera connaître (p. 5l)«
Thus, in Rousselot's, as in Bergson's, system, the concept is a
material substitute for a pure idea. However, for Rousselot, the human 
intelligence is only capable of knowing the essence of sensible things
1. To gain 'intuition', "il faut procéder ... à un renversement du travill habituel de l'intelligence. P e n s e r  consiste ordinairement à aller les concepts aux choses, et non pas des choses a,ux concepts" IPMl., p. 1483
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(see p. 79) and is incapable of knowing the particular in its existence. 
Things are not known J.n themselves hut as they appear to the senses and 
mind:
notre intelligence, quand elle veut signifier quelque etre comme subsistant, le signifie comme concrétisé; quond elle veut signifier un être simple, elle ne le signifie pas comme un être, mais comme une détermination ou manière d'être (pp. 84-8$).
This is in contradistinction to Bergson, for whom the visible or intelli­
gible attributes of a thing are that thing in itself and undistorted.
For this reason, Bergson's intuition attains absolute knowledge^.
Rousselot hesitates over this point, for, while recognizing that St.
Thomas adamantly refused "une valeur intellectuelle ... à ce que (l'homme) 
atteint uniquement par ees facultés sensibles, c'est-à-dire au singulier 
matériel", Rousselot'-himself considers that "on peut, enfin, rechercher 
jusque dans ses apports du sensible dont finalement l'intellect est juge, 
tout ce qui peut aider à la représentation et à l'évaluation de ce qui est"
(pp. llO-lll), This, Rousselot contends, is the solution St. Thomas ahoulc
have adopted.
2M.I). Roland-Gosselin , O.P., also evinces great interest in Bergson's 
'intuitive' faculty in "L'Intuition bergsonienne et 1'intelligence" (Revue 
des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, I913). Having distinguished 
Bergson's intuition from perception and from instinct, he likens it to 
aesthetic understanding (see p. 394)* However, he is not happy with the
1. In "Introduction à la Métaphysique" (p.Ti.> p. I424): "la connaissance intuitive ... s'installe dans le mouvant et adopte la vie même des choses. Cette intuition atteint un absolu".
2. Rolland-Cosselin, M.D, (O.P.), 1883-1934* 1908-192? taugnt atSaulchoir, Bel-gium. Translated De Ente et essentia (v'it-h ]nti'c. ) by Thomas Aquins.s. Wrote Essai d'une étude critique de la connaissance (19J2). ...........
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restrictions aesthetic intuition places upon intuition as a whole,
and is consequently compelled to attempt a réintégrabion of intuition
and intelligence:
M, Bergson, en effet, pour donner quelque consis­tance à son intuition, tente de réintégrer en elle l'intelligence qu’il semblait avoir à jamais exclut de toute connaissance spéculative(p. 396).
Roland-Gossélin, as a Thomistj does not admit the possibility of an
intuition of a specific thing in its concrete existence, but he cautiously
countenannces the possibility of a direct intuition of the self - 'le moi
qui dure' (p. 403). He excludes intelligence from this type of intuition,
because Bergson seems to imply this:
Ces descriptions extérieures vous laissent certainement entrevoir que, dans l'intention de M. Bergson, l'intuition immédiate du moi en sa mobilité\et sa.durée originelle, n'est pas oeuvre de 1'’intelligence (p. 404).
Roland-Gosselin remains rather sceptical of the validity of Bergson's
'intuition' overall. For one thing, his inability to reconcile intuition
with intelligence "rend impossible I'acte de foi qu'il nous demande"
(pp. 418-411)* However, essentially, Roland-Gosselin returns a verdict
of not proven on Bergson's intuition with the corollary that Bergson's
abortive effort "aura tout au plus ce résultat de persuader aux philosophes
qu'ils acceptent avec plus de sang-froid les limites de notre pensée ..."
(p, 411). Of the Dominicans, P. Roland-Gosselin is perhaps the most
sympathetic to Bergson but in general their stance is a hostile one.
Y/’riters whose main work and influence came after I92O, such as Joseph
Maréchal and Edouard LeRoy, are considered later, but it is true to say
that at this early stage, in general, the Catholic debate about Bergson
centi'Gd upon the neo-Thomist writers, The argument then and later was
fought out not between Thomists and Bergsonians but between Thomists of
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d i f f e r e n t  d i s p o s i t i o n s .  T o n q u e d e c  a n d  G a r r i g o i i - L a g r a n g e  r e p r e s e n t  o n e  
s c h o o l  o f  t h o u g h t ;  R o u s s e l o t  a n d  R o l a n d - G o s s e l i n  a n o b i o r ,  w i t h  v a r i o u s  
p a r t i e s  i n  b e t w e e n .  T h e  w i d e n i n g  r i f t  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  s c h o o l s  b e c o m e s  
a c c e n t u a t e d  a n d  i n t e n s i f i e d  a f t e r  1 9 2 0  a n d  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  g r a d u a l l y  
m o v e s  t o w a r d s  t h e  m o r e  l i b e r a l  w i n g .
W i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  k n o w l e d g e ,  i t  c a n  b e  c a t e g o r i c a l l y  
a s s e r t e d  f r o m  t h i s  s t u d y  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  p r i m a r i l y  r e v o l v e s  a r o u n d  
B e r g s o n ' s  d i v i s i o n  o f  m i n d  i n t o  t v / o  d i s t i n c t  f u n c t i o n s ,  ' i n t e l l i g e n c e ' 
a n d  ' i n t u i t i o n '  -  t h e  a b s t r a c t i v e ,  d i s c u r s i v e  p r o c e s s  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  
p e r c e i v i n g  a n d  a p p r e h e n d i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e  " I n t r o ­
d u c t i o n  à  l a  m é t a p h y s i q u e "  c a n n o t  b e  o v e r e s t i m a t e d .  R o u s s e l o t  b o l d l y  
a l i g n e d  t h e s e  f a c u l t i e s  w i t h  A q u i n a s ' s  ' r a t i o a n d  ' i n t e l l i g e n c e ’ a n d ,  a p a r t  
f r o m  c r e a t i n g  a  n e w  f o c a l  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  d e b a t e ,  h e  r a i s e d  f r o m  o b s c u r i t y  a n d  
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  A q u i n a s ’ s  e p i s t e m o l o g y .
I t  a l s o  n e e d s  t o  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  B e r g s o n ' s  o p p o n e n t s  i n  t h e  
C h u r c h  g a v e  a n  e x a g g e r a t e d  d e g r e e  o f  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  i m a g e r y  a n d  s y m b o l i s m  
o f  L ' E v o l u t i o n  C r é a t r i c e , i m p l y i n g  t h a t  t h i s  p o w e r  o f  a r t i s t i c  v i s i o n  m u s t  
p r e c l u d e  a  p o w e r  o f  s y s t e m a t i c ,  a b s t r a c t  r e a s o n i n g  i n  B e r g s o n .  I n  a d d i ­
t i o n ,  t h e  o r i g i n a l i t y  o f  t h e  t h o u g h t  i n  t h i s  w o r k  w a s  l a r g e l y  m i s s e d  a n d  
w a s  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  t a k e n  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  B e r g s o n ' s  o t h e r  w o r k s ,  a n d  s o  
L ' E v o l u t i o n  C r é a t r i c e  a l s o  g a v e  r i s e  t o  m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a n d  f a n c i f u l  
c o n o l u s i o p s .  A g a i n ,  R o u s s e l o t ,  b y  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  
d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  a n d  b y  s t u d y i n g  c l o s e l y  t h e  e a r l i e r  w o r k s , m a d e  d i s ­
c o v e r i e s  o f  u s e f u l n e s s  a n d  i n s p i r a t i o n .  T h e s e  h a d  t h e  w e i g h t  o f  e v i d e n c e  
b e h i n d  t h e m  a n d  i n  t i m e  m a d e  a  g r e a t e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  C a t h o l i c  t h o u g h t  
t h a n  a n y  n u m b e r  o f  g e n e r a l i z e d  a n d  i n s e n s i t i v e  a t t a c k s  o n  B e r g s o n ,
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■ c h a p t e r  F o m  
B E R G S O N 'S I I T O Ï Ï E N C F .  ON C A T H O L I C  T H O U G H T ,  1920-1939
It was clear by 1920 that the ideal of a fixed Thomist orthodoxy
was quite elusive. Suoh men as Mgr. Mercier (Professor of Thomist
Philosophy at Louvain from 1882), R. Garrigou-Lagrange and J. de
Tonquedec had all tried to find dogmatic statements capable of giving
final definition to their quest for proof of the Catholic faith in
logical and rational arguments. They wanted a faith not only based
on reason but one which could be shown to be demonstrably and undeniably
true. Bergson's philosophy’- presented an immediate challenge to this
approach, not because it undermined the possibility of achieving absolute
knowledge,but because it attacked the notion that this Icnowledge could be
found through discursive theories. Such theories could never adequately
describe or explain experience; the inner witness alone could give validity
to experience: '
Les philosophes s'accordent ... à distinguer deux manières profondément différentes de con­naître une chose, La première implique qu'ontourne autour do cette chose; la seconde entreen elle ... De la première connaissance on dira qu'elle s'arrête au relatif; de la seconde qu'elle atteint l'absolu (P.M.. p. 1393).
Bergson calls the firs I: type of knowledge "analyse”, whereby something 
looks different from different external points of view and can be des­
cribed and interpreted in any number of ?fays. The second type he calls
"intuition", whereby one "sympathise avec les états et ... je m'insère
en eux par un effort d'imagination" (id.). The obvious problem with 
this route towards certainty is that it makes certainty a subjective 
conviction and not an objective 'fact', as the high Thomists wgv.II Iiave 
preferred.
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Bergson was not of course the only, nor even the major, influence 
on Catholic thought at this time, which was eager for intellectual res­
pectability among professional philosophers. The German idealists were 
greatly admired by Blondel and his disciples, Kant was respected by J. 
Maréchal and the Louvain school and there was a growing movement of 
Augustinian thought, represented by such as Blaise Romeyer and A.G. 
Sertillange8. Most Catholics nominally gave precedence to St, Thomas 
Aquinas, but his standing was no longer unchallenged or unique, and, more 
important, various new interpretations of Aquinas’s thought were emerging 
from the time of Rousselot onwards. After 1920 it was the spirit rather 
than the letter of Aquinas's writings which was sought after. The 
Catholic philosophers who emulated Aquinas’s own spirit of free and 
eclectic scholarship inevitably knew and read Bergson’s work (as will 
be. seen), for he was'the leading French philosopher of the age, and, 
moreover, his writings had spearheaded the revival of the ’spiritualist’ 
movement in philosophy. Both Bergson and the Catholics had a common 
enemy in positivism and materialism. Thus, as Etienne Gilson said: 
l’on examine de près la carrière intellectuelle de ceux qui con­
tribuèrent à cette renaissance du thomisme authentique, on constatera 
qu'il n'en est pas un qui, à un moment ou un autre, n'ait subi l'influence 
de Bergson" (Le Philosophe et la Théologie, p. 174)•
In this chapter the changes in neo-Thomist thought will be examined 
through the work of a few leading Thomists and then the more liberal and 
independent Catholic thinkers will be considered inasfar as they adapted 
Bergson's teachings to their own ends.
It is important to note just how much the interests of Catholic 
philosophers of this period do converge - around the question of .Mntuicivx'
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1 2 i n  e p i s t e m o l o g y  , a n d  a r o u n d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  r e a s o n  a n d  f a i t h  .
A  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o n  t h e s e  s u b j e c t s  ( a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  f o r m e r )  i s  n o t
m y o p i c  o r  u n j u s t i f i e d  t h e r e f o r e ,  a n d  r e l a t e s  d i r e c t l y  t o  B e r g s o n ' s  o w n
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p r e o c c u p a t i o n s .  I n  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  m a i n  t h e m e s  I  w i l l
e n d e a v o u r  t o  d r a w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  v a r i o u s
p h i l o s o p h e r s .
A c c o r d i n g  t o  T h o m i s t  o r t h o d o x y  b e f o r e  1 9 2 0 ,  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  i s  a b o v e
a l l  a n  a b s t r a c t i n g  f a c u l t y  a n d  n o t  a  p e r c e i v i n g  f a c u l t y .  C e r t a i n t y  a b o u t
t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  p e r c e p t i o n  c o m e s  o n l y  a f t e r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  j u d g e m e n t  o n  t h e
c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  ' i n t e l l e c t u a l  i n t u i t i o n ' .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  f o r  s u c h  T h o m i s t s
" i l  n ' y  a  p a s  d e  c e r t i t u d e  d ' e x p é r i e n c e  d i s t i n c t e  d e  l a  c e r t i t u d e  d ' é v i d e n c e
q u i  c a r a c t é r i s e  l e s  j u g e m e n t s  i d é a u x  . . . "  ( L ' E p i s t é m o l o g i e  T h o m i s t e . G .  T a n
R i e t ,  p .  l 6 l ) .  I f  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  o n l y  g r a s p s  a b s t r a c t s ,  t h e n  f a c t s  o f  e x ~
"vp e r i e n c e  -  t h a t  i s ,  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h i n g s  i n  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  a n d  t e m p o r a l  
e x i s t e n c e  -  a r e  o u t s i d e  o n e ' s  I m o w l e d g e .
T h i s  d o c t r i n e ,  p r o p o u n d e d  b y  M e r c i e r ,  w a s  i n i t i a l l y  a c c e p t e d  a n d  a d o p t e d  
b y  m e n .  l i k e  J .  M a r i  t a i n ,  M g r .  L .  N o ë l  ( a t  L o u v a i n ) ^  a n d  M a u r i c e  d ' H u l s t  ( a t  
t h e  I n s t i t u t  C a t h o l i q u e )  a n d  e v e n  E t i e n n e  G i l s o n .  A l l  o f  t h e s e  t h i n k e r s  
l a t e r  f o u n d  s u c h  a  d o c t r i n e  t o o  n a r r o w  a n d  r i g i d  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  a l l  
s e n s e  e x p e r i e n c e .  T h e  c h a n g e  c a m e  w h e n  v a r i o u s  p h i l o s o p h e r s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
r e a l i z e d  t h a t  t h e  w o r d  ' i n t u i t i o n '  c o u l d  b e  a p p l i e d  t o  a  v a r i e t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t
1 .  S e e  G .  V a n  R i e t ' s  L ' E p i s t e m o l o g i e  T h o m i s t e  ( B i b .  P h i l ,  d e  L o u v a i n ,1946) and also Jt-H. Nicolas' article, "Le problème de l'intuition intellectuelle tient dans la philosophie moderne une place primordiale" (Revue Thomiste, No„ 1, 1947, P* 113).
2 .  T h i s  i s  t h e  m a i n  s u b j e c t  o f  R o g e r  A u b e r t ' s  b o o k ,  L e  p r o b l è m e  d e  l ' A c t e  d e  F o i  ( E .  7 / a r n y ,  L o u v a i n ,  3 r d  é d . ,  1 9 5 8 ) .  T o  s o m e  e x t e n t  h e  l o o k s  i n :  B e r g s o n ' s  i n f l u e n c e .  M a n y  i n t e l l e c t u a l  C a t h o l i c s  w a n t e d  t o  k e e p  t h e i r  f a i t h  b y  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  i t s  r a t i o n a l i t y  a n d  r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ,
3 . P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t  S u p é r i e u r  f r o m  1 8 7 8 ,
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experiences and that the consciousness received knowledge in various
w a y s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  k n o w l e d g e .  I n  s h o r t ,  t h e r e  m u s t  b e
more than one type of intuition. ?.Tiat of our immediate consciousness ,
of our own inner self? V/as this subject to the same conditions as our
k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d ?  E .  P e i l l a u b e ^  f i r s t  v o i c e d  t h e  o p i n i o n
2that consciousness had an immediate experience of the self in act ,
T h e  i n t u i t i o n  o f  t h e  s e l f  b y  s e l f  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  n o t  a b s t r a c t  b u t  e x i s t e n t i a l  
B u t  B e r g s o n  h a d  d i s c o v e r e d  t h i s  v e r y  t h i n g  i n  h i s  f i r s t  w o r k , E s s a i  s u r  l e s  
d o n n é e s  i m m é d i a t e s  d e  l a  c o n s c i e n c e , w h i c h  w a s  p u b l i s h e d  i n  1 8 8 9 ,  s i x  y e a r s  
b e f o r e  P e i l l a u b e ' s  w o r k .  T h e  s e l f  a s  e x i s t i n g  i n  t i m e  h e  n a m e d  ' l a  d u r é e  
r é e l l e '1
La durée se présente ainsi à la conscience immédiate, et elle conserve cette forme tant qu'elle ne cède pas la place à une représentation symbolique, tirée de l'étendue ... . Au-dessous de la durée homogène, symbole extensif de la 'durée vraie,une psychologie attentive deméle une durée dont les moments hétérogènes se pénètrent; au dessous de la multiplicité qualitative; au-dessous du moi aux états bien définis, un moi où succession implique fusion et organisation (L'Essai, p. 85).
T h i s  n e w  d e p a r t u r e  l e d  t o  m u c h  e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  ' i n t u i t i o n  d u  m o i '  b y
o t h e r s ,  n o t a b l y  R o l a n d - G o s s e l i n  a n d  M a r i t a i n ,  b o t h  o f  w h o m  a c k n o w l e d g e d
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  B e r g s o n  o n  t h e i r  r e s e a r c h e s  .
Then Maritain, at about the time of Les degrés du savoir (1932)
conceived of the possibility of an aesthetic intuition of beauty which
1. 1864-1934» Professeur at Institut Catholique I896-I912 and its Dean thereafter.
2. In his Théorie des concepts; existence, origine, valeur (Lethielleux, 1895)Ï "Dans l'intuition synthétique de la conscience, nous saisissons le moi dans l'acte et l'acte dans le moi ... Grâceà nos opérations, nous sommes donc immédiatement présents à nous- mêmes, et nous nous saisissons directement dans une intuition"
(p. 554)-
3. See Chapters Three and Seven.
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he called 'preconscious• in the sense that it was present in the mind
prior to the abstracting process^. Here was another intuition which
v;as direct and pre-conceptual. Maritain also wondered about man’s ,
knowledge of God. Was this in any sense abstractive or could it be
2immediate and existential?
It was not by chance that Bergson analyzed both the aesthetic intui­
tion of beauty and the existential knowledge of God. He asserted that 
spiritual realities were directly knovra and in fact defined intuition in 
general as "la vision directe de l’esprit par l’esprit" (P.M,, p. 1274)î
(l'intuition) voudrait saisir dans les choses ... leur participation à la spiritualité,nous dirions à la divinité.
Thus, the idea of intuition as pre-conceptual knowledge eventually came 
to be sub-divided into various categories according to its objeot(s).
The most interesting'consequence of this was that these subdivisions 
were then 'rediscovered' in Aquinas's own philosophy. Bruce Wuellner 
reflects this trend in A dictionary of scholastic philosophy (Bruce Pub­
lishing Co., Milwaukee, U.S.A., I966) by listing under 'intuition' six 
different types of knowledge and under 'contuition' the knowledge of God 
(or spiritual reality in and through some aspect of creation).
Alongside this preoccupation with intuitive knowledge went another 
line of research in epistemology, which concerned the function of the will 
in the act of knowledge. This essentially Kantian or August inian 
bias nevertheless owed something to Bergson. Joseph Maréchal
1 .  T h i s  i s  d i s c u s s e d  a t  l e n g t h  i n  C h a p t e r  E i g h t .
2 .  T h i s  s u b j e c t  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  c h a p t e r  o n  M a r i t a i n ' s  p h i l o s o p h y( c h a p t e r  S e v e n ) .
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ip ( 1 8 7 8 - 1 9 4 4 ) ^  w a s  t h e  l e a d i n g  e x p o n e n t  o f  t h e  n e w  t h e o r y .  F o r  M a r é c h a l
t h e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  n o  l o n g e r  a  p a s s i v e  m i r r o r  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  o u t s i d e  w o r l d
i n  a n  a b s t r a c t  p i c t u r e  -  i t  i s  a n  a c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t e r  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  .
i t  r e c e i v e s .  T h e  d y n a m i s m  o f  t h e  w i l l  i s  i n v o l v e d  i n  o u r  g r a s p  o f
r e a l i t y  -  w e  s e e  t h i n g s  a s  t h e y  a f f e c t  u s  a n d  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  o u r  a i m s
a n d  o b j e c t i v e s .  T h e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  " u n e  a c t i v i t é ,  o r i e n t é e
d a n s  s o n  f o n d  l e  p l u s  i n t i m e  v e r s  u n  t e r m e  d e r n i e r  . . .  v e r s  l ' E t r e  a b s o l u ,
V r a i  e t  B i e n  a b s o l u s "  ( E t u d e s  s u r  l a  p s y c h .  d e s  m y s t i q u e s , p .  1 2 0 ) :
D e v a n t  l e  m o n d e  e x t é r i e u r  q u i  s ' o f f r e  à  s o n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  l ' h o m m e  n e  s e  c o m p o r t e  j a m a i s  c o m m eu n  r é c e p t e u r  i n e r t e .  D è s  l e  p r e m i e r  c o n t a c t  c o n s c i e n ta v e c  l a  r é a l i t é ,  i l  a n a l y s e  e t  i l  t r i e .  D a n s  u n e  u n i t é  o b j e c t i v e  i n d i v i s é e ,  l e s  s e n s  e t  l ' e n t e n d e m e n t  f o n t  u n  d é c o u p a g e ,  i s o l e n t  d e s  p h é n o m è n e s ,  d é g a g e n t  r  d e s  r e l a t i o n s ,  s a i s i s s e n t  d e s  a s p e c t s  c a r a c t é r i s t i q u e s .E t  t o u t e  c e t t e  d i s s e c t i o n  . . .  s ' o p è r e  . . .  d e  m a n i è r e  à  . . r é d u i r e ,  d a n s  l a  p l u s  l a r g e  m e s u r e  p o s s i b l e ,  l ' o r i g i n a l i t é  d e  l ' o b j e t  p e r ç u  e n  u n e  s o m m e  d ' é l é m e n t s  d é j à  r e c o n n u s
1. There are fairly full biographies of Maréchal in Mélanges, J. Maréchal îVol. I, Oeuvres (D. de Brouwer, 1950) and in Auguste Grégoire's 'Le Père Joseph Maréchal - In Meraoriam' (Nouvelle Revue Théologique,1945* P» 87). The Mélanges volume also includes an account of Maréchal's works. Maréchal was educated at the Collège du Sacré-Coeur, :!Charleroi, and entered the Jesuit Order in 1895* being destined Tfor biological studies. In 1905 he accordingly became Docteur iès Sciences Naturelles, His first serious theological studies Dwere between 1905 and 1909 and in 1908 he published his first 4philosophical article, "A propos, du sentiment de présence chez les profanes et les mystiques" (Revue des questions scientifiques,Vol. 64, I9O8, pp. 527-563, and Vol. 65, pp. 219-249 and'376-42^ .  -Between 1912 and 1914 he published other articles later to appear andachieve a wider readership in Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques (Alcan, 1924), Maréchal's other masterpiece, Les cahiers sur le point de départ de la métanhysique, was never completed. The first three volumes were published between 1922 and 1923* the fourth was not finished and the fifth emerged somewhat mutilated after "seize mois de remaniements et de retouches" (as Maréchal himself put it in a quotation in the introduction to Mélanges, p. 12). These corrections were not so much Maréchal's own as those of his advisors, who feared that the Kantian slant of the work would meet with Papal disapproval. Between 1938 and 1935 Maréchal became a member of the Société philosophique de Louvain lontil poor health prevented him from teacl ing. In 1938 the Royal Academy of Belgium awarded him the 10 yearly piuze in philosophy. After some years of ill-health Maréchal died in 1944*
'ï
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et classes (p. 24).
Not only does Bergson similarly assert the intellect's organizing and
classifying ability, but, like Maréchal, he also speaks of the way
intelligence works in tei*ms of the known, the familiar; and how it
is unwilling or unable to recognize something really new (which is
irreducible to classification;)
Notre intelligence ... a pour fonction essentielle d'éclairer notre conduite, de préparer notre action sur les choses, de prévoir, pour une situation donnée, les événements favorables otk défavorables qui pourront s'ensuivre (B.C., p. 519).
Comme la connsaissance usuelle, la science ne retient des choses que l'aspect répétition. Si le tout estoriginel, elle s'arrange pour l'analyser en élémentsou en aspects qui soient à peu près la reproduction du passé (E.C., p. 519).
Maréchal considered that, science ignores the particular object 
in time, analyzing dnly the general laws of its behaviour and he added,
"Sur ce point - qui n'est guère contestable - noua pouvons renvoyer à '4
la magistrale et décisive démonstration qu'en a donnée M. Bergson"
(Etudes, p. 26). This reference tb Bergson's L'Essai (l889)' is followed 
by a distinction between qualitative and quantitative judgements. Science 
analyses its subject-matter in quantitative terms (p. 27). Such an
emphasis favours a deterministic view of the Universe. Real life proves 4%
this view to be false;
Dans le vivant, l'idéal géométrique du déterminisme devient évidemment chimérique, puisque le caractère expérimental le plus décisif de la vie, c'est que les.phénomènes qu'elle domine ne sont pas totalement prédéterminés en fonction de l'espace ... (Etudes, p. 29).
In essence this is an exact replica of the argiment Bergson employs,
in L'Essai and later in the book &!aréchal does acluiowledge Bergson's
inspiration in this regard (p. I76).
In the second chapter of Etudes Maréchal analyses 'le sentiment de
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présence'. He defines presence as "la réalité immédif^ -tement perçue"
(p. 70)• He criticizes the empiricist associationist viewpoint, as
does Bergson in L'Essai, and then explains that the feeling of presence
is not abstract knowledge;
La perception ou le sosie de la perception, peuvent apparaître au milieu des conditions qui n'offrent ni les éléments d'un raisonnement même implicite, ni les antécédents compliqués d'une 'réalisation' objective résultante (p. 89).
Our judgement of reality is secondary to our awareness of reality as
presence. Philosophers normally consider reality as something involving
the mind or feelings,or even the will, but the real is primordial. It is
doubt, the unreal, fantasy and the subjective representation in the mind
which require explanation. Judging something, as real involves adding
something to basic awareness:
Au lieu de oherbher comment le réel sortirait de l'irréel, l'affirmation du doute, l'objectif du subjectif, voyons s'il ne serait plus simple et .,. plus logique de poser en fait primitif le réel, l'affirmation et l’objectif (p. IIO).
This reversal of the terras of the problem means that intelligence distorts
our primitive awareness - "Les représentations libres commencent à s'opposer
nettement à la sensation et à la perception" (p. II4, italics in original).
Then Maréchal cornes right to the point:
Le sentiment empirique de présence, la perception d'une réalité spatialisée, est un cas particulier d'intuition ... (p, II7, my underlining).
He defines intuition as "L'assimilation directe d'une faculté connaissants
à son objet" (p. 117). In short, the mind can become other than itself
in the act of knowing - it becomes what is known. Just how strikingly .
similar this is to Bergson's .'intuition': is quite apparent, for Bergson
speaks of 'intuition' as "coincidence" (P.M., p.1)94; end as "pénétration"
(p. 1402) and adds that "philosopher consiste précisément à se placer, par
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un effort d'intuition, à l'intérieur de cette réalité concrète ...
(P.M., p. 1430). ;
Sense intuition is by no means the highest or most complete form 
of intuition for Maréchal, for the human mind is always.in quest of its 
ultimate goal; he calls it "une faculté en quête de son intuition" (Etudes, 
p, 121). This goal might be the unification of disparate elements or might 
be the assimilation of being,but in the end the sense of reality finds its 
satisfaction and fulfilment in 'le phénomène mystique fondamental; le sentiment 
direct de la présence de Dieu, ou même l'intuition de M.eu présent' (p, I24). 
The final point about intuition is paradoxical: it surpasses the limits k
of human psychology and yet at the same time commands its whole pers­
pective (see p. 179). I
  The intuitive approach to life can be improved or sharpened by an ;
integration of the elements of consciousness and the attainment of unity \
or singlemindedness (see Etudes, p. 437). This is not "une simplifica-
I Ition", as' Maréchal ’svrote at first , but "une raréfaction", as in the later
revision (Etudes. p. 437). A quality of mind is achieved rather than a 3
2quantity of ideas and feelings, etc. .
What is noteworthy in Maréchal's Etudes is his use of Blondelian, 
Bergsonian and Kantian terms in preference to conventional Thomist ones. ^
The psychological approach (which Bergson adopted) supplants the old 'objec­
tive' rationalist approach. In Le point de depart de la métaphysique,
Cahier Y - "Le Thomisme devant la philosophie critique" (D. de B., 2nd 1
éd., 1949 [1st 1926]), Maréchal deliberately states the problem of knowledge j
1, In the article "Réflexions sur l'étude comparée des mysticismes" (Revue des questions scientifiques. July-October 1926, see p, 34).
2, The latter can be identifiée with the discursive intellect, although this is not explicitly stated here.
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in Kantian terms and then ostensibly attempts to solve it from a Thomist 
standpoint. But he takes on Kant and modern philosopjiy on its own terms.
Cahier VI, a positive statement of Maréchal's own position, was never 
written and Cahier IV never completed^. All this makes an objective 
assessment of Maréchal*s position difficult.
In negative terms he opposed a static view of the intelligence as 
a rationalism which juxtaposed concepts in a fixed schema. Like Bergson, 
he-wished to reinstate the reality of movement and emphasized the dynamism 
of intelligence as Bergson did. He regarded mind as something more fluid 
than a set of faculties and argued that the intelligence and the will in 
fact interpenetrate. Bergson also regarded the consciousness or the inner 
life as a unity in flux. All this is clear enough from a study of Maréchal's 
Etudes, however. In Le point de depart he also concentrates on the possi­
bility of "la sciendé objective d’un absolu" (Cahier V, p. 570).
He separates three phases.of the process of knowing: precognitive
experience, conceptual representation and, finally, the affirmation of 
judgement, which is not, however, the conclusion of logical reasoning alone. 
Because the problem is stated in Kantian terms the psychological evidence 
is all-important. Maréchal insists first that the mind’s intuitive powers 
only attain phenomena as regards individual existence, but attain noumena D
(things as they are existing) through a transcendental perception of Being 
or Absolute Existence:
l’objet direct de connaissance, chez l'homme, est phénoménal (sensible, ou relatif à du sensible) par son élément de représentation, nouménal par sa signification objective intégrale (p. 574)•
This 'transcendental' knowledge is "la plénitude du vrai envisagé dans son 
1, See Note 1, p. 6,
' '4
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contenu; en d'autres ten&3s; l'être possédé intelligiblement avec 
toute l'ampleur et toute la perfection possibles" (Mélanges -• "Le 
dynamisme intellectuel dans la connaissance objective", p, 68)*.
The fullness of truth is what the will desires and this ^ives an
Vimpetus to the mind to go beyond phenomena to seek "la connaissance %
1divine des objets" (be point de depart, p. 595)» The fullness of
truth is not therefore known through sense perception alone; it has
the character of "une intuition intellectuelle de l'être" (Mélanges. 
p. 88), The intellecb is conformed to Being - "adaequatio rei et intellectus"
(Mélanges, p* 76). This, for Maréchal, has to mean Being beyond sense 
perception alone.
The judgement - 'une fonction d'unité' (Le point de départ, p. 296) - 
■affirms one's tentative representation of reality. This affirmation is 
called the "fonction''" objective du jugement" (p. 299) and is in fact a 
"substitut inférieur de l'intuition intellectuelle" (p. 3O4) but is
2"logiquement préalable" when it confirms the identity between "des 4
synthèses empiriques" and "l'unité de l'être" (Etudes, p. 6).
The latter analysis has little in common with Bergsonism, for
Maréchal here moves away from reliance on the evidence of experience to -4
positing a clearcut distinction betv/eenempirical and transcendental intui­
tions and in fact rules that "expérience et métaphysique sont orientées 
en sens inverse: la première vers le fait brut, la seconde vers l'absolu
ontologique" ("Au seuil de la métaphysique: abstraction ou intuition?",
1, 1st published \n Revue nêo-scolastique de philosophie  ^Vol. 28,
1927, pp. 137-165%
2, Etudes, p. 70.
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Melanges, p. 118)^. Nevertheless, Maréchal did concede ground to 
Bergson as well as to Kant in admitting that the apprehending intellect 
(intuition) made judgements about the existence and nature of things 
prior to the work of the discursive intellect and this was a major 
concession. He also regarded the mind as a unity of thought, will 
and emotion; insisted on its natural grasp of reality (a built-in tendency) 
and reinstated the psychological approach to philosophy over against the 
static ontological one.
It is largely outside the scope of this work to examine the post­
war thinking of the Louvain school of neo-Thomism, but one example may 
suffice to show how Maréchal's innovations - conceived as a reaction 
primarily to Kant and secondly to Bergson - were taken up and extended 
by J. Defever, S.J. (Professeurde Philosophie at Louvain). Defever had 
La Preuve réelle de "Dieu published in 1953 (Desclée de Brouwer). He ack­
nowledges his debt to Maiéchal at the outset: "on aura vite fait de
voir que hous nous inspirons largement de lui" (p. Il), but Bergson is also
a strong stimulus:
Depuis Ockham déjà, depuis Kant surtout, depuis Bergson plus que jamais, on a accumulé contre (la philosophie de saint Thomas) des objections qui reviennent toujours à • dire ceci: la notion de Dieu n ’est qu’un idéal abstraitet inconsistant, pour ne pas dire contradictoire, une simple projection des fonctions heuristiques et régulatrices de l'entendement (p. 7» my underlining).
The attack on reasoning about abstractions leads Defever to point
out that his proof of God's existence "part du réel, ne perd pas le réel
en cours de route et aboutit à l'existence du Dieu réel" (p. 7)» He does
1. Maréchal only solves the Kantian problem of knowledge by arguing that the intellect is directed, in spits of itself, towards transcendental knowledge. It is the reality of this orientation that Blondel attempted to prove in L'Action (l889).
112 -
-in fact (though not explicitly) make a distinction between abstract
reasoning and reasoning about abstractions, nliereas the first is
indispensable and can be in touch with reality, the latter is a trap
into which many philosophers fall; it is the abstraction operated by
the mind which reduces "toute la riche réalité qui s'offre à nous, pour
ne garder alors qu'un sujet à priori conceptuel et idéal, dont le monde -
un monde tout aussi conceptuel - se déduirait comme un absolu" (p. 19).
Defever favours a continuai oscillation or movement between the concept
and its object in the manner of Bergson's "va-et-vieht" mentioned in
"L'Effort Intellectuel" (P.M.. p. 942). Contact with the existent is
desirable at all times; otherwise the mind's object becomes a mere
representation. The power to abstract itself from its object constitutes
'the intellect's greatest virtue and yet its gravest peril. The virtue
\. lies in the ability to transcend the particular and quantitative to
'-aeize the 'essence' and the peril in the-tendency of mind to detach
itself from sense data.
Everything that is icnown is known through intimate liaison with
the world outside:
Nous ne passons de l'inconscience à la conscience que par et dans nos activités; or, celles-ci ne pouvant être parfaitement immanentes .. .• portent nécessairement sur une chose sensible; nous ne pouvons nous connaître qu’à travers l'objet sensible de notre activité (p. 13)*
Defever comments that "l'exigence thomiste rejoint sur ce point celle des
existentialistes" (p. 15)» although in fact it is closer to Blondel. For
Defever, as for Blondel and Bergson, experience surpasses sense perception
alone. Consciousness is never submerged in the perception of material
objects: "elle implique toujours.en outre, la conscience d'avoir conscience
de l'objet, donc de le transcender" (_p. 14). The significance of this is
Bergsonian, not Sartrian, for Defever wishes to establish the reality and
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importance of the inner witness of consciousness as a positive factor
•i n Imowing and not as a néant, as in Sartre :
L'expérience externe doit donc se doubler de l'expérience interne, qui sera de l'ordre de l'intuition intellectuelle.Celle-ci, toutefois, engagée dans la perception sensible, reste d'abord implicite (p, 1$).
The relationship between subjective consciousness and objective
reality is important, for the consciousness's ver;^ ’' adaptation to reality,
its identity with its object, points to a cause of this identity which
upholds and guarantees rationality in the world;
Constatons que cette identification intentionnelle du sujet intelligent (intellectus), à travers l'objet immanent (intelligible), à l'objet réel (res), sous l'influx final - causal de celui-ci, vérifie à la fois la définition du jugement et celle de la vérité (p. 38)*
God is-therefore .the.creator and vindicator of the intellect's grasp of
the real. As with'Maréchal and Maritain, in Defever the intuitive or
apperceptive_aspect of intelligence.furnishes the best proof of God's
existence. Chains of reasoning are prone to logical flaws. The
observing intellect also sees beyond appearances;
sous l'objet sensible immédiat se dissimule, comme sous sa participation déficiente, l'existence pure et illimitée; c'est elle qui donne à notre acte de connaître, à travers les causes finies, sa réalité 
propre (p. 57).
No single existent contains its own "raison d'être" but relates to the 
totality of Being which is infinite: "l'être fini n'existe et n'est
intelligible que dans la mesure où il participe de l'être qui existe 
infiniment par soi" (p. 68).
The difficulty with Defever's reasoning is that it is impossible 
to see how the last assertions can be proved or disproved. How could 
they be verified? The lack of a concrete reference - either in human 
psychology or in- science - lays Defever open to the charge he is eager
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to avoid « that of composing abstract proofs of God's existence.
Etienne Gilson, primarily a historian of philosophy, also a
Thomist philosopher in his ovm right, and was perhaps better placed
than most to have a comprehensive view of the developments in Thomist
thought as compared with the developments in contemporary philosophy.
His own philosophical outlook was to undergo several radical changes
in the course of his career. The influence of Bergson was pronounced
from the beginning, for Gilson was one of the few 'professionnels' in
Bergson's audinnce for the early 'conferences': "Que d'heures n'avons-
nous pas consumé^en entretiens passionnés sur la dernière leçon de
Bergson que nous venions de relire", he states in Le philosophe et la
théologie (Lib. A. Fayard, I96O, p. $l). Owing to his sympathy and
first-hand knowledge of Bergsonism, Gilson avoided the excesses of the
early Thomist critiqhe of Bergson: "Ils avaient partiellement raison,"
he says of these critics, "mais ils s'y sont mal pris" (Théologie et
Philosophie. S. Thcma,s d'Aquin et Henri Bergson, 2 Conférences^).
Bergson had his revenge, for, ironically enough, in the long term, "cette
rencontre apparaît d'ailleurs comme une redécouverte du vrai Saint Thomas
d ’Aquin, que trop de nuances avaient dissimulé (id.).
For Gilson Bergson's main virtue consisted in his providing a
stimulus to Catholic (Thomist) metaphysics:
Cette philosophic de Bergson, si impuissante à éclairer la religion, aurait pu être pour des philosophes chrétiens l'occasion d'un renouvellement de perspectives, le prélude à une nouvelle ère de fécondité doctrinale ... Il s'agissait de métamorphoser la philosophie nouvelle à la lumière du thomisme ... (Le philosophe et la théologie, pp. 125-126).
1. S.l.n.d. This newspaper report is to be found in "Le fonUfBe?gson" of la Bibliothèque Jacques Doucet, Paris, under Gilson's name, but there is no indication as to the source or date of the article.
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Bergson reinstated an empirical method in metaphysics and valued
experience as the best guide tc truth. In this he could, in Gilson's
opinion, be compared to Aristotle (p. 129). Bergson's critique of the
intellect was aimed at restoring tpue intellectual, enquiry:
Le philosophe selon le coeur de Bergson ne doit pas se contenter d'appliquer son esprit à la connaissance rationnelle des choses telles qu'elles sont, il s'emploie de tout son pouvoir à toujours mieux ajuster à la nature des choses la connaissance qu'il en a ... A cet égard, la philosophie de Bergson est une critique d'un certain mauvais usage de la raison conduite par une intelligence éprise de rigueur (p. 129).
Bergson's first major triumph (in L'Essai) was in releasing quali­
tative judgements from their reduction to quantitative ones. By removing 
the inner self from the dominion of space and the material measurement of 
time, Bergson won a great victory for-metaphysics: "pour la premiere fois
depuis des siècles fa métaphysique osait livrer une bataille décisive, 
et la gagnait"-(p.--134)-.■ By-contrast, the older scholastic definition 
of quality as an accident which completes substance in its being was still­
born and ineffective, failing to nail any target : "Ce n ’était rien dire
de faux, ce n'était rien dire d'efficace" (p. 135).
In his own domain^, Bergson did some sound work - his theory of
intuition vras of great significance, for Corate and Kant imagined that 
they had rendered the possibility of metaphysical knowledge inconceivable. 
The false conception of intelligence assumed that it could only regulate 
the relations between fixed ideas; that all its activity lay in the 
discursive area and that it had no real capacity to apprehend externals.
Secondly, Bergson restored to theology the notion of an active God, 
whereas the high Thomists had rendered him, "toute statique, d'une essence
1. That of natural theology, in Gilson's opinion (see p. 177)
— 1X6 "V ^
dont la perfection consiste seulement à rester éternellement ce qu'elle 
est" (p. 168).
Gilson's own Thomism is clearly affected by his admiration for 
Bergson. His realism has two main aspects; the assurance of ^-the exis­
tence of the external world and,in addition, this significant corollary; 
the assurance that our intellect is conformed to external reality. He 
posits 'spirituality' as the condition for human.knowledge, since the 
spirit (or mind) can become other than itself; this is the ability to 
make for oneself what something else was only in itself; "Connaître une 
chose, c'est une manière de la devenir" (Le Thomisme, J. Vrin, 1927, p. 229). 
This viewpoint, needless to say, is entirely Bergsonian, Gilson's conces­
sion to more conventional Thomism is to say that being-in-the-mind is 
"L’espèce impresse"; that is, it is external being in a certain mode 
of existence; it is\ "l'intelligible ou le sensible de l'objet lui-même,
Æeus-un-autre mode d'existence" (Le Thomisme, p. 2-54> note l). This seems 
to be equivalent to saying that it is an image or a substitute for an object, 
but "il est capital de bien comprendre que l'espèce d'’m  objet n'est pas 
un être, et l'objet d'un autre être; elle est l'objet même par mode 
d'espèce, c'est-à-dire l'objet considéré dans l'action et dans l’efficace 
qu'il exerce sur un sujet ..." (p. 234)* It is not the object as an image
in the mind but in some way the object itself in its effect on the mind.
The second type of "espèce" in the mind is the "espèce expresse", 
which is in fact more like a concept; "Le concept n'est pas la chose, 
mais l'intellect qui le conçoit est, lui, véritablement la chose dont il 
se forme un concept" (Le Thomisme, p. 238),
Does this mean, then,' that in the case of "l'espèce impresse" the
mind has a direct intuition of being as it exists? Gilson shies away 
from this. He says that the intellect 'becomes' the object while remaining
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itself and therefore does not know the object as object but through the |
Iintellect’s life and capacities; j
II y a l’objet, qui n ’est pas saisi en soi par une 1intuition; il y a la species, qui n ’est toujours quel’objet; et n'est donc pas davantage saisie par une jintuition; il y a l'intellect informé par la species,qui devient ainsi l'objet, et qui n'a non plus l'intuition j;directe de ce qu'il est par là devenu; il y a enfin le jconcept, première représentation consciente de l'objet ... |(Le Thomisme, p. 238, note 2), ]i
In short, it appears that the object only 'comes to life' and is only t
Iknown through conceptual understanding. But there is in Gilson's i;
research a very important conclusion, which highlights a new departure a
for Thomism; that "aucune representation intermédiaire ne sépare donc l'objet 
du concept qui l'exprime, et c'est ce qui confère à notre connaissance con- 4' 
ceptuelle son, objectivité" (id., italics in original). So the experience 
of existence is prio'îr to, anterior to,discursive analysis and representation 
p.f_tha object iin the. mind's, eye'. Knowledge of an object, preceded reflec­
tion upon it.
The true significance of Gilson's position rests on its faith in
the individual experience. For Gilson the individual real gives rise
to a universal notion of reality and not vice versa; something xrue gives
rise to truth, and so on;
Enquêtant sur les conditions de possibilité d'un tel fait, nous comprenons que la naissance du concept présuppose la fécondation de l'intellect par le réel qu'il appréhende. Avant la vérité, il y a le vrai; avant 1'adéquation du jugement et du réel, il y a l'adéquation vécue de l'intellect même avec le réel; c'est parce qu’il le devient que l'intellect peut ensuite en concevoir l'essence. lÆais cètte méta­physique réaliste elle-même n'est qu'une interprétation postérieure de l'évidence sensible initiale, de cette entrée de la chose en nous que nous appelons une sen­sation (Le Réalisme Méthodique, Téqui, 1936, p. 8'2')'V
Gilson thus goes further than ÏÆaréchal on two counts; he .refuses to
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move into transcendental realms to justify the sense of reality and
he is unafraid to interpret 'adaequatio rei et intellectus’ as meaning
that the intellect 'becomes' its object in an immaterial but real vray,
and he places a new emphasis on the evidence of the senses rather than
that of the intellectual 'species'. There is no veil between the inner
and outer worlds:
Chaque fois qu'il s'agit pour nous de vérifier une existence, c'est au témoignage d'un ou de plusieurs de nos sens ... que nous recourons pour en décider (p. 197)f
Gilson also moves right away from the Thomist reverence for intelligence
as such and postulates a theory of the whole mind or consciousness, taking
Maréchal's tentative reunion of will and intellect a step further:
Ce n'est pas, à proprement parler, 1'intelligence ou le sens qui connaît, c'est l'homme qui connaît par las sens et par l'intelligence (p. 507)* '
\Gilson is not even just referring to man as consciousness, but to man in
his material and concrete existence. In this he differs from-Bergson;-who
tends to identify the self with consciousness. Therefore, the objects of
sense perception (i.e. the particular existent) and of the intellect (i.e.
the 'essence', or nature of a thing) are not rigidly separated; the two
are reconciled in the awareness of the whole man:
Le fait initial de la connaissance, dont cette analyse n'est que l'approfondissement progressif, est donc la saisie directe d'une réalité intelligible, par un intellect que sert une sensibilité (Le Thomisme, 1942 revision, p. 326, italics in original).
Biaise Romeyer, the Jesuit Professor of Philosophy at Le Puy, like
Gilson underv/ent profound influence from Bergson from the time of his
youth. He had an early Bergsonian work. Le boh sens et les etudes classique!
published for the first time in 19J? (at Clermont-Ferrand, Editions de
L'Epervier). In the postscript Romeyer revealed that he had enjoyed
Bergson's close friendship between 1932 and 1939 (see pp. 55-56), visiting
- 119 -
him for lengthy discussions. He deemed Ivlatière et Mémoire to be
Bergson’s magisterial work (p. 54) and considered Plotinus to be the
major influence on L'Evolution Créatrice. This led. Bergson "à faire
des fouilles du c&té des problèmes religieux" (pp. 54-55)- Romeyer wrote
a sympathetic book on Bergson (Morale et Religion chez Bergson, Firmin-
Didot, 1929) along these very lines, and also wrote a number of articles 
1on him .
Romeyer did some important work of his ovra on intuition, and came . 
to the conclusion that, although Aquinas had restricted man's knowledge 
of individual material objects to an abstract knowledge, nevertheless 
there was room for direct forms of intuition in other realms of percep­
tion. There is a clear connection between Bergson's intuition of 'la
durée' in L'Essai (the self existing in time) and Romeyer's conclusion
\in "La doctrine de Saint Thomas sur la vérité" (Archives de Philosophie,
Vol. Ill,'Cahier II, pp. 1-54) that reflection on our ovni mental acts
allows us to perceive directly the existence of our soul. He v/rote:
L'âme atteint son existentialite concrete en ses intellections premières, cela dans la mesure même où, avant réflexion complète, elle en prend directe­ment conscience parce que actuellement présente en elles ... Cette première connaissance ou perception expérimentale de l'ùme par elle-mème est consciente, donc actuelle, mais point réflexive (pp. 24-25, italics in original).
Knowledge of the soul (or self) and of God - both outside the scope 
of Aristotle's epistemology - are intuitive forms of knowledge in Aquinas's 
system thanks to St. Augustine's teachings on the subject. Further,
1. "Spiritualité et survie d'après Bergson" (Rev, de Phil., March-April1935, pp. 117-156): "La liberté humaine d'après M. Bergson" (Rev. néo-soolastique. Vol. 35, 1955, PP- 190-219): "Autour du Bergsonisme"TÂrchives de Phil. Supp. bibliog. No. 2, 1946) and "Caractéristiques religieuses du spiritualisme de Bergson" (Archives de Phil., Vol.. 17, Cahier l).
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Aquinas gives man's intellectual knowledge of the material a 'spiritualizing*
character, according to Romeyer. In other words, the intellect makes carter
a spiritual form in the mind. This is why matter is not apprehended as
matter. However, 'spiritualizing' is not necessarily the saiûe as
'abstracting', which is merely a conceptualizing process:
Nos idées, soit de la matière, soit de l'esprit humain ne sont pas de purs abstraits, sortes d'atomes intentionnels détachés du réel, elles se rattachent, grace à ce minimum d'intuition in­tellectuelle des singuliers qui nous revient, à ces singuliers eux-mémes (id., p. 1?, italics in original).
One's representation of the material "enveloppe une perception
mentale de réalité ("St. Thomas et notre connaissance de l'esprit
humain", Arch, de Phil., Vol. VI, Cahier 2, p.-108, my underlining).
For Romeyer, the intellect actively moulds itself to the clay of
\material objects, responding to their stimulus. Romeyer's theory 
typifies the new Thomist approach, which assumes that things as 
existing in time can be integrated into the realm of the intelligible - 
end this realm includes not only physical but also mental and spiritual 
realities. There must be at least two orders of the intellect: the
ideal order (bearing no direct relation to existence) and the real order 
(existence as thought)^.
In an article, "La liberté humaine d'après Henri Bergson (Revue 
néo-scolastique de phil., Vol. 35, 1935, PP» 190-219), Romeyer defends
1, R. Jolivet, neo-Thomist philosopher, named these faculties 'discours' and 'intuition', (Maritain, like Rousselot and Maréchal, saw a dis­tinction between 'ratio' and 'intellectus'.) Jolivet wrote: "Lediscours n'aboutirait jamais à rien de certain, si, par application à ses démarches successives des normes suprêmes de .,1a.certitude, il ne venait lui-même se résoudre et s'achever dans l'intuition des principes pre.miers de la raison" ("L'intuition intellectuelle" in Revue Thomiste, 




one of Bergson’s other, major theses; that of the freedom of the will. i
Romeyer, in so doing, was facing not only positivist or determinist B
1opposition hut Catholic opposition too . 7
Romeyer's Bergsonian vocabulary is overlaid with religious ideas;
Lorsque nous sommes vaillants en face du devoir, notre liberté croit. Nous parvenons mieux à nous recueillir, à nous posséder, â nous régir, à dominer ou à faire nôtres les éléments divers de notre moi au fur et à mesure de sa dux'ée (p. 197)*
Romeyer aligns Bergson’s doctrine with the scholastic one of 'indifférence
active’ (p. 203). This does not imply that a man is pulled hither and
thither and finally decides between alternatives, but.on the contraiy -
"o'est moi qui, par l'exercice de mon vouloir, rends déterminants les
motifs et mobiles de ce vouloir. Plus ou moins riche de spontanéité
-personnelle, il en possède toujours assez pour se révéler exempt de toute
nécessité soit exten^e soit interne" (p. 200).
. Once again, with Romeyer, there is a new preoccupation with the
whole man's involvement in acting freely as against the rationalist
intellectual freedom of choice. The whole self can stand aside from a
given situation, can detach itself from any given pressures and can act 4
according to its own natural penchant and can thereby dominate the situa- i
tion, which is hardly ever one of a simple choice between alternatives anyway:
La liberté est maîtrise, domination, mais non proprement insensibilité de la volonté à l'égard des motifs et mobiles (p. 203).
Bergson himself appears to adopt this type of approach. In the Bulletin
de la Société française de philosophie (19IO, p. I64), he wrote that in
moments of real choice he considered that "la liberté consiste à être
entièrement soi-mème, à agir en conformité avec soi: ceci serait donc ...
1. E.g., Maritain had attacked it in La philosophie bergsonienno (I914).
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1 ’indépendance de la personne vis-à-vis de tout ce qui n'est pas elle .,
Like Romeyer, A.D, Sertillanges, O.P,^, commended Bergson's proof of 
the freedom of the will and saw in it a parallel -with the doctrines of 
Thomas Aquinas. Sertillanges was the neo-Thomist philosopher perhaps 
most in sympathy vrLth Bergson. He used Bergson's authority extensively 
in his OYhi writings and attempted a reappraisal of him in the light of 
newer Thomist 'rediscoveries', He was asked to vindicate his own posi­
tion with regard to Bergsonism and wrote a work on Bergson's threat to 
Catholic orthodoxy. This was published in 1943 as Lumières et Périls 
■du Bergsonisme (Flammarion). In it St. Thomas is upheld as the guardian 
of truth: "Ce qui le retient, c'est le vrai, et il n'y a pas de degrés 
dans le vrai ... Prenez donc garde aux philosophes partielles ..."
(p-. 1?)*- However, the reader is exhorted to follow "la voie médiane"
(p.19) between Bergsbn's and Aquinas's points of view:
S'il n'y.a pas de ligne médiane entre des systèmes, il peut y en avoir entre des points de vue, des notions empreintes de vérité à certains égards et que, d'autresr vérités peuvent servir à compléter, à rendre plus com­préhensives, ou plus fortes (p. 19),
Sertillanges does not accept Bergson's critique of the concept as it stands
(see p. 21), nor the strict limitations of his "empirisjme métaphysique" (p. 23)1
but, as mentioned, praises Bergson's proof of free will: "Bergson et Saint
Thomas coincident parfaitement ici, quoi qu'on ait dit ..." (pp. 28-29),
Sertillanges devoted an article to the subject entitled "Le libre arbitre
1. Sertillanges, Antonin-Gilbert (1863-1948), Born in Clermont-Ferrand. Studied at College des Frères des Ecoles chrétiennes. 1883 entered Order of Preachers. Lectured in theology I89O at Corbara, then (1893-) at Paris; Couvent du Saint Sacrement, Secrétaire de rédaction of Revue Thomiste. I9OO chair in Moral Phil. at Institut Catholique, Paris. Directed Revue des Jeunes. Moved to Couvent d*Etudes, Lyon, then Rijckholt, Holland, then Saulchoir, Belgium, Finally retired to Paris to write. August 1934 Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur.December 1935 Predicfateur général of Dominican Order.
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chez Saint Thomas et Henri Bergson" (La Vie Intellectuelle, 25*3*1937,
pp. 252-269). He quite deliberately condemned the neo-Thomists for
misinterpreting Aquinas's doctrine:
En effet, nous thomistes,nous faisons du libre arbitre un fruit de 'volonté délibérée', et si la délibération n'est qu'un jeu de concepts ... nous voilà condamnés, semble-t-il, au déterminisme
(p. 252).
It was Bergson, said Sertillanges, who reinstated the truth which Aquinas 
had discovered^, but which had been lost to sight. Firstly,free will 
has to be considered as "une donnée immédiate de la conscience" (p. 253) 
because "objectiver la conscience, qui est subjective, est la livrer aux 
liaisons nécessaires des constructions abstraites, c’est la détruire"
(p. 254)* If .a decision is a mere judgement between concepts, the one 
making the strongest impression is bound to persuade, but this would make 
the subject just "urte bascule inerte et son regard un simple spectateur"
(p. 254)* On the other han.d, "si la personne garde son activité éclairée, 
les motifs, de ce fait, par leur causalité, ne font que l'exprimer elle- 
même, et alors l'acte est libre" (p. 254)* Such an act is spontaneous 
but is not simply spontaneity as such, since "rien ne peut agir sur le 
sujet sans lui, non pas même son moi d'hier ou celui de la minute qui 
précède" (p. 255)* In short, the whole person chooses and creates the 
motive(s) and dominates the action. We do not choose because we find 
one course or reason preferable but instead we find something preferable 
because we choose it: "on trouve des raisons d'agir, parce que d'abord
on veut agir" (p. 256), For Aquinas, it is intelligence ('le conseil') 
which determines the will, but, according to Sertillanges, Aquinas is 
anti-intellectual in one sense, "puisque le conseil, ici, reste indéterminé
1. Or, rather, rediscovered in Augustine.
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en dehors de l'intervention du vouloir lui-même" (p. 262), Also, for 
Aquinas, "l'acte libre a une 'rationalité'; le libre arbitre n'est pas 
aveugle; mais l'acte libre est incommensurable à l'idée, parce que 
nulle idée n'égale en extension la capacité de notre etre" (p. 26$),
Sertillanges thus attempts to reconcile Bergson and Aquinas, seeking 
the 'voie médiane' between intellect and will# If man were dominated 
by reasons conjured by the intelligence he would be subject to a psycho­
logical determinism; if he were determined blindly by the will, he would 
be subject to instinctive or animal spontaneity.
Sertillanges thus supports the central thesis of L'Essai, that of 
the freedom of the will; elsewhere he shows his support for the main con­
tention of Ivlatière et Mémoire as well - namely, the independence (but inter­
dependence) of mind and body; "ce n'est pas un piège que vous rencontrez, 
mais un secours," he'tells the seminarists (Lumières et Périls, p. 29). 
Bergson has demonstrated through this that "l'immortalité de l'âme est 
une idee expérimentale" (p. 29). It is L'Evolution Créatrice which he 
takes to task as dangerous to orthodox Catholicism: it is "une mer de
glace" (p. 50), and for this reason:
Intégrer ... l'intelligence à 1'evolution est • grave ... puisque surtout la matière n'est ici conçue que comme une retombée de l'esprit, bien loin d'être sa cause ou bien sa substance (p. 30).
But, although Sertill&^iges attempts in this book to discount the conclusions 
of E.C., elsewhere he displays a profound admiration for the work. For 
example, he pays tribute to Bergson for destroying the over-precise dis­
tinction between nature and supernature and for seeing that God peiv/ades 
all of his creation (even while extending beyond it): reality "manifeste
une orientation, une direction de la force ayant déjà le caractère d'une 
finalité", but "les actions particulières de la nature, tout comme des
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àtres particuliers, sont quelque chose de dérivé, de second" ("L'Ordre
du monde et les causes fiiales", Vie Intellectuelle, 10,1.5?, P* 55).
This all leads to the conclusion that:
la nature est up tout étroitement solidaire, et•ses parties constituantes sont ausrsi de tout#, jusqu'à une limite qui fuit devant le regard et devant la pensée qui analyse (id.).
Thomiste should not conceive of creation as a passage between pure 
nothingness and the fullness of Being, but rather "comme une action
intermédiaire entre Dieu et le monde, entre Dieu, cause du monde, et
le monde, son effet" (Sertillanges, Les grandes thèses de la philosophie 
thomiste, Bloud et Guy, 1928, p. 85). This flies in the face of the teach-
r ning of Tonquedec and Garrigou-Lagrange, who insist on creation ex nihilo ,^
but accords with Bergson's arguments against the idea of a void in B.C.
(see pp. 728-746) artd also with his idea of creation as an effect of
'l'élan vital' pre-existing in the Universe. Matter is considered by
Sertillanges to be "un résidu d'esprit, une dégénérescence de l'esprit" (là,,
p. 30) exactly as in Bergsonism.
Perhaps most surprising of all is Sertillanges's overt idealism.
If, for Bergson, the substructure of the Universe is 'l'élan vital', for
Sertillanges it is 'la pensée':
Connaissant par l'idée, connaissant comme nousque tout communique dans la même essence (op. cit., p. 20),
we find that
l'être pense, est pensé, et se pense et en dehors de là il n'y a rien. Dans sa plénitude, en Dieu, l'être sera Pensée de la Pensée ... dans les esprits
1 .  S e e  C h a p t e r  T h r e e .  T h e  L a t e r a n  C o u n c i l  h a d  f a i l e d  t o  d e f i n e  t h i s  d o g m a  w i t h  a b s o l u t e  p r e c i s i o n  ( 1 1 1 2  A . D . ) .
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il est pensée morte; mais toujours la pensée est le dernier mot (p, 20).
The only basic difference between Bergson and Sertillanges on this
&is that Sertillanges wants to give some intellectual content to the vj
spiritual creative power in the Universe. He stresses the order in 
creation: "L*intelligence est I'oeil de la nature ... l'intelligence
nous révèle notre affinité avec tout; elle est le signe de l'unité 
profonde de la nature" (p. 22),
Having said this much about the rationality of the Universe,
Sertillanges nevertheless has little time for high Thomist logic, 
especially its use in 'proving' God's existence. Logic can only 
render at best "une construction systématique imposante et ferme de 
l'hypothèse Dieu" (p. 58). God is beyond dogmatic or conceptual 
definition - "Dieu he peut être défini, ni en tout, ni en partie, 
d'une définition positive" (pp. 67-63), Definitions only have a 
negative value - to define what God is not,
Sertillanges is far more suspicious of Les Deux Sources than of
any other of Bergson's works. He is more concerned over what is omitted 1
than what is included. For him, Bergson fails to give his opinions a 
metaphysical base or framework "dont .le rôle serait non de suppléer nos 
instincts, non de 'construire l'obligation' en son fondement psycholo­
gique, mais de justifier cette obligation afin de 1'élever au plan de 
la raison, qui est la caractéristique de l'être moral" (Bergson et le 
Catholicisme, Flammarion, 1941» PP. 52-53). "On nous laisse seul avec 
nos états, avec nos émotions" (Lumières et Périls du Bergsonisme, p, 58). 
Furthermore, the crucial problem of suffering and evil is passed over
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virtually in silence^,
Sertillanges's dissatisfaction with Les Deux Sources is echoed 
by other Catholic voices.- Gilson makes the point that in it Bergson's 
method is at fault, for it works only in the realm of nature and is incom­
petent to analyze the supernatural. For him, Bergson inevitably ends by 
examining the experience of mystics rather than the object of their 
experience, which is ostensibly the real subject of Les Deux Sources.
Bergson is left "tentant de ... comprendre le sens (de la vie) en 
1'observant du dehors comme s'il fut agi de quelque nouvel aspect de
la réalité naturelle" (Le philosophe et la théologie, p. 181), "On
peut prolonger aussi loin qu'on voudra la science de la nature, elle 
ne rejoindra jamais le surnaturel" (p. 182)^.
R. Jolivet makes an analogous criticism in "De l'Evolution Créatrice 
aux Deux Sources" (Revue Thomiste, May-June 1955) • He thinks that for 
Bergson:
La vraie religion est essentiellement le sens et le goût de l'Infini. La Révélation n'est pas la com­munication mystérieuse, faite dans le temps à l'humanité, de vérités déterminées, mais ... une intuition et un sentiment, une émotion, situés au-delà de la conscience claire ... De ce pointde vue, les concepts, meme ceux qui concernentDieu, sont assez indifférents. Dieu se manifeste en nous immédiatement par le sentiment (p. 554)»
Pierre Mesnard, in a classical dialogue style article in La Revue Apolo­
gétique of May 1933 ("Catholicisme et bergsonisme", pp. 546-55?)» is worried
1. This point is taken up in more detail later by Raymond Polin (Etudes berg. Ill, P.U.F., 1951» "H. Bergson et le mal"), and by E, Amado- Lévy-Valensi, "Bergson et le mal. Y a-t-il un pessimisme bergsonien?", Actes du Congrès de Philosophie de langue française, 1959 (Lib. A, Colin, 
pp. 7-11).
2. C.f. Etienne Borne xn La Passion de la Vérité (Lib. A, Fayard, 1962): "ïïh^  philosophie ne peut jamais coïncider avec une religion du surnaturel ccnme* le christianisme, car elle est d'un autre ordre" (p. 62),
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by Bergson’s treatment, of the historicity and divinity of Christ in
Les Deux Sources;
Le Christ n'étant pas défini expressément comme Dieu, tous 4es attributs absolus de l'Eglise s'en trouvent ébranlés, par exemple, l'unicité de sa mission, et l'infaillibilité de sa doctrine
(p. 554).
This criticism might be valid if Bergson were writing an apology
for the Christian faith, but the scant references to Christ in les Deux
Sources do not in fact say much either way - and all this is extraneous
to the central theme of the book.
Sertillanges actually did write to Bergson and had talks with him
on the subject of Les Deux Sources up to the time of his death. In I94I
he published Avec Henri Bergson (Gallimard). The, question of Christ's
divinity was ruled out of court by Bergson;
Je me suis donné pour règle de n'affirmer que ce qui résulte clairement de ma méthode de .recherche, et j'ai su surplus mes raisons de ne pas trop m'avancer dans cette voie (p. 20).
As for the church, Bergson saw it as "le prolongement du Christ. Ce
n'est au fond qu'un même fait. Mais là encore je ne voudrais pas me
trop avancer ..." (pp. 21-22).
Overall, Sertillanges was the warmest supporter of Bergson among 
neo-Thomist philosophers. The only major point of difference between
Bergson and Sertillanges is over the nature of God, who for Bergson is above 
all Creator and Mover,but for Sertillanges is 'pensée' or 'intelligence*. 
Sertillanges recognizes this fact, for, while regretting that "les attributs 
métaphysiques de Dieu échappent à l'examen" in Bergsonism, nevertheless 
"Dieu est reconnu personnel, libre créateur, d'une puissance sans bornes 
assignables, 'universel amour' ..." (Le christianisme et les philcscrhec II,
Aubier, Ed. Montaigne, 1941» p. 586). Bergson's God rises "au-dessus de la
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durée créée" (p. 590). If Bergson’s theodicy is "assez paugre", 
nonetheless it has life and vitality, while "les théodicées purement 
philosophiques... s'offrent à nous comme des palais de glace ou tout 
au plus de cristal" (p. 586).
One little knov/n and under-rated Catholic philosopher of this 
period was Emile Rideau, S.J. (Professeur de philosophie at the College 
Saint Francois d'Evreux and later at the Ecole Saint Geneviève)^.
Gilson does not mention him in his assessment of Bergson's influence on 
Catholics and yet Rideau made an original contribution, trying to high­
light the Platonic and Augustinian tendencies of Bergson's thought in Le 
Dieu de Bergson (Alcan, 1952), Les rapports de la matière et de l'esprit 
dans le bergsonisme (Alcan, 1932) and in Descartes. Pascal, Bergson 
(Boivin et Cie., 1957)*
Rideau's is a "'britique positive et ' sympathique ', sincèrement 
désireuse de repérer les contacts et les convergences" between Bergson 
and Catholicism (Le Dieu de Bergson, p. 5)* He recognized that "tout 
système philosophique est une recherche vivante, une expression imparfaite 
de la Vérité totale ..." (p. 5) &nd this must presumably include Thomism 
itself.
Rideau gently points out where Catholics have up till then misinter­
preted Bergson, He blames E.G. itself for creating various false irapres- 
sionsÿ for example, of anti-intellectualism, pragmatism and romanticism.
In it, "malgré la limpidité de son style," there is still "un certain 
manque de clarté" (pp. lO-ll). This is partly due to the imprecision of
1. The main influences on him, apart from Bergson, include Pascal, Descartes (in Descartes, Pascal et Bergson he wrote: "Le choix de ces troisauteurs a été dicté d'abord per des préférences personnelles" (p. 5)î also Plato, Rousselot and Ma-réchsi (see Le Dieu de Bergson, p. 8?) and, finally, Péguy (id., p. 108).
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"un flot d’images" (p. 11).
Notwithstanding the impression given of ’intelligence’ in B.C., 
it is indisputable that "l’intuition prend son point d’appui et son 
élan sur la pensée; elle serait inintelligible sans elle, elle la 
conserve et l’informe" (p. I4)* Intelligence has its limits and is a 
phase which leads to "un effort qui la dépasse et qui rétablisse l’unité 
de la vie dans l’amour" (p. I5). If intelligence "remonte sa pente" 
then "par son activité (elle) contribue au Retour des choses à l’Unité"
(p. 15). Intellectual effort, understood this way, is "la matière même 
de l’intuition" (p, I5), Rideau quotes from "L'Effort Intellectuel" in 
order to justify his reading this attitude into B.C. and insists that 
intelligence is required to make a "retournement" (p. I6) towards intuition 
in order to gain in perceptive power.
If this is truethen ’intuition’ is not anterior to discursive 
thought, .as. .is .so easily assumed, but is a flash of-illumination-after 
meditation. it does not usually precede thought but in fact is more %
often gained as a result of it - but not in the way of a conclusion to 
an argument, but rather as a breakthrough, a new vision.
A second major Catholic criticism of Bergson swrounded his concep­
tion of ’la durée’ as substance. Again Rideau presents a more sympathetic 
account. For him, Bergson "n’accepte pas comme une position définitive 
le réalisme des qualités: leur devenir insaisissable ... s’exprime par­
tiellement par l’intelligence humaine. La réflexion philosophique pose |
ce devenir pur comme une catégorie dialectique, mais reconnaît 
l ’insuffisance de la pensée à l’exprimer pleinement ..." (p. 18), In 
other words, the mind, in abstracting reality, loses the ’substance’ of 
being which must include movement and change to be complete. This 
explanation, adapted from Thomist thought, is quite ingenious as a
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justification of Bergson, It accepts Bergson's point that the intellect 
’atomizes' reality into concepts and adds to it the Thomist idea that con­
cepts contain or retain the 'essence' and not the concrete existence. '■I
T h u s ,  concrete existence, reached by 'intuition' in Bergsonism and by |
?the senses in Thomism, is partly movement, as Bergson said, but is also 
substance, as Aquinas said. Given this interpretation, Bergson "croit (i
à cette 'substance' infinie de la 'totalité des images' que la science 1
a  pour mission de traduire mieux" (pp. 19-20). -
1Rideau attacks the notion that faith is intellectual; a question I
of understanding or reflection: ~
VOr, aucune attitude n'est plus anti-religieuse que cet orgueil de 1 'intelligence, avec sa prétention detout régenter, de boucler sur elle-memé, sa certitude lde faire à elle seule le salut de 1 ' individu et de lacollectivité (pp. 29-30). ;
Intellectualisme leads to pride, whereas faith leads to love and is I
distinguished by "sa gratuité, .sa .liberté, .son. obscurité" (p. 3l).
- r
Intelleotualism can only prepare the ground for faith, for which a certain ■>!
degree of Bergsonian 'anti-intellectualism' is required: 1
Or, par son aspect antirationaliste, on peut dire • que le bergsonisme favorise et prépare partiellement cette mystique essentielle de la vie de foi (p. 52).
Instead of advocating the paramount importance of meditation, B e r g s o n
poses "le primat de 1'expérience et du fait" (p. 56, italics in original).
I n  Les rapports de la matd.êre et de l'esprit Rideau takes this a step
.
f u r t h e r .  He considers t h a t  Bergson, far from following other philo­
sophers in translating the evidence of the senses into concepts and l a w s ,  
instead reveals "une évidence intérieure, puisée immédiatement a u x  s o u r c e s  
d e  l'expérience", w h i c h  itself "affirme l'existence d'un fait, irréductible 
à la pensée abstraite, et où se manifestent le mystère et l'infini, de l ' e s p r i t :  
la durée ..." (p. Il),
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The reinstatement of 'la durée' asserts the primacy of time and Ï
history as well as that of change and movement: "une philosophie de la ;
durée peut se transposer en une théologie de la durée" (Le Dieu de Bergson, ?
p. 129). In other words, God's restoration and redemption of humanity is ;
supremely an event in time - "Cette histoire sainte est une histoire vivante, |
où tout le passé joue encore dans le présent" (p. 129)^.
It is through a man's whole life,and not his intellect alone, that 
that faith is justified. Rideau calls this "le primat de la vie reli­
gieuse" (p. 62), "Le principe réflexif de raison est donc inséré dans 
la trame vivante du développement total de la conscience" (p. 64). Rideau 7
even asserts that in one way Bergson was too rationalist - in that he expected ?
mystical experience to furnish a proof of God's existence. It is not capable I 
of doing this, because "l'existence de Dieu ... est en dehors de toute 1
enquête scientifique^et objective: on ne se 'renseigne' pas sur Dieu |
du dehors, comme on se documente auprès d'un explorateur" (pp. 71-72). 1
'Proof' only comes through involvement in the Christian life, "La dia- 7
lectique s'inverse: maintenant c'est la Vie qui est première, logiquement: |
'puissance de création'" (Les rapports, p. 54). Rideau considers that i
Aquinas himself evolved a philosophy of life rather than of the intellect, ?
except that,whereas he, Aquinas, used .the word 'Being' for this, Bergson used )
various terms - such as 'conscience', 'supraconscience', 'Dieu', 'l'absolu', ;
'l'Océan de la Vie', 'le Tout' and 'Exigeance de création' (see pp. 40-44: 
ail quoted from E.G.). Thus E.G. can be seen truly not as a series of I
arguments but as "la trace d'une faute mystérieuse et d'une chute dans =
l'histoire de la 'conscience' et de la Vie ..." (p. 55). Intelligence is ’
1. There are clear echoes of Péguy here, although Rideau does not acknowledge the fact at this point.
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therefore not something which simply observes life from a superior vantage 
point; it is part of life and part of man. This, Rideau suggests,is 
Bergson's real argument in E.G. - that intelligence is geared to action 
and life:
Par sa puissance d'intention, l'intelligence participe et contribue au courant créateur, et l'évolution de la Vie trouve en elle son meilleur épanouissement, sa fécondité illimitée (p. 67).
In effect, life cannot be fully understood or expressed intellectually, 
since "la réalité est inexprimable ..." (p. 67). That is why in E.G.
"tout est symbole et représentation" (p. 100,italics in original).
Intuition alone gives a necessary synthesis or world-picture, because 
by nature it is "une vision du monde, Weltanschammg" (p. II3). It is 
comprehensive: "Le premier but de l'intuition est donc une vision inté­
grale de l'univers" (p. II6, italics in original). It involves thought, 
but it is wider and deeper than this; it is "un approfondissement de 
conscience" (p. II6). It is more than apperception; it is the whole 
man's response to the Universe.
In Descartes, Pascal. Bergson. Rideau stresses the centrality of 
intuition in Bergson’s philosophy by stating that "une chose est réelle 
quand elle est perçue ou capable de l'être" (p. 186), Intuition is above 
all a faculty of perception.
Bergson's Les Deux Sources, analyzed in the same work, is not dis­
missed so summarily by Rideau as by some Catholics. He regards its 
openness as a great virtue, for it is thereby "tout préparé à comprendre 
cette primauté de la grâce, si magnifiquement pensée par Péguy ..."^ (p, ,108). 
Also, he appears to approve of Bergson's view that morality is "la réponse de
1. This time Péguy's influence on Rideau is acknowledged.
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l’homme à la prévenance de l'Amour", which implies that sin is a closed, 
self-centred view of life which eliminates "toute expansion de la personne 
vers une autre personne dans la charité" (p. 108). In other words, 
morality is based on the attraction of love rather than on the reasonable­
ness (or rationality) of right conduct or on the threat of judgement.
Even the vexed question of the absence of suffering and evil in 
Bergsonism is justified to some extent by Rideau:
L'idée de chute elle-mème n'est pas absente La spatialité du monde (et de l'intelligence) est la décadence d'un état primitif de la 'conscience'La conscience a perdu son désintéressement contem­platif ... (pp. 112-113).
Thus egoism and selfishness are counselled by the intellect. How­
ever, Bergson fails to go far enough, even in Rideau's eyes:
Toutes ces notes ... n'atteignent pas la réalité du péché personnel. Elles ne disent pas assez d'abord la violence de f.a passion, l'amour de la boue, la lourdeur de l'âme et l'impossibilité expérimentale de toucher, seuls, à l'idéal de la pureté (p. 115» italics in original).
Taken as a whole, the most significant aspect of Bergson's philo­
sophy, with which Rideau wholeheartedly concurs, is its insistence on 
the reality of 'spirit'. The 'signs' of spirit are,first,the inherent" 
movement and direction in and through matter - "la matière n'est pas une 
chose réelle, un objet statique et solidifié, mais plutôt une direction, 
un mouvement, une tendance de la Vie" (p. 193) - and then, secondly, the 
sign of creativity - "l'invention au cours de la durée" (p. 197) - and, 
thirdly, the reality of consciousness and memory in man, which give him 
liberty and moral choice: "La vie accede done enfin en l'homme à l'objet
de son désir: la lumière et la liberté" (p. 210),
Although Rideau and Sertillanges, in interpreting Bergson liberally 
and sympathetically, constantly give him the benefit of the doubt and
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reassess his doctrines in the light of their own beliefs, they do not 
constructively adapt Bergsonism to their own use in the manner of Péguy. 
Jacques Chevalier is the one Catholic philosopher who dees attempt this 
in a small way. He was not a highly influential thinker like Maritain, 
but had original insights. Like Gilson, he excelled in the writing of 
the history of philosophy.
Chevalier particularly showed his original turn of mind in "Le continu 
et le discontinu" (Annales de l'Université de Grenoble, Vol. III, No, 2,
1926, pp. II3-I27), La science et le réel (Bloud et Gay, I927) and also 
in his interpretation of the implications of Bergsonism (see last chapter 
of Henri Bergson, Plon, 1926, and Histoire de la Pensée, Vol..IV, Flammarion, 
1966 [Texte revu et mis au point par Léon Hussnnj), Chevalier also wrote 
major works on Aristotle and Pascal,
Chevalier was a'-great admirer of Bergson from the time of his youth.
He read Matière et Mémoire in 1898 as a pupil at the lycée Hoche, Versailles, 
and later attended the courses at the Collège de France from I9OI onwards 
(see Entretiens avec Bergson, Lib, Plon, 1959» P* !)• In I903 he passed 
his Agrégation de philosophie and went to England. In his OT/n words, "je 
tiens fidèlement, ainsi qu'il m'avait demandé, mon maître Bergson au courant 
de mes travaux" (p. 9)* In February I905 Chevalier had a discussion with 
Bergson and again in June 1907» when they talked about Catholicism and 
Protestantism, Chevalier thereafter remained a personal friend of Bergson, 
visiting him often in later life^. He read E.G. avidly as soon as it Y/as 
published (1907) and in October I909 Chevalier became Professeur de philo­
sophie at the lyc^e de Chateauroux and submitted a doctoral thesis to the
1, Chevalier, as a Secretary of State for Youth and Education, had the honour of sending Mme. Bergson the condolences of Pétain and the Government in a telegram the day after Bergson's death (see Entretiens, p. 299)*
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Sorbonne on religious revival in Wales. It was rejected, but he successfully I 
attempted another, on "la notion du nécessaire chez Aristote", this time 
for the Faculté de Lettres at Lyon. Chevalier eventually became Dean 
of the Faculté des Lettres at Grenoble (June 1931)•
In "le continu et le discontinu" (1926) Chevalier condemns both the 4
static (Zeno's) and the Heraclitic (or Leibniz's) views of the world;
"On s'aperçoit partout le continu et le discontinu coeiàistant" (p. II4).
There is not just one type of continuity; nor is there one type of unity.
B'or instance, there is a difference between the continuity of the funda­
mental self and "la basse continuité homogène de l'espace" (p. II5). J
After Bergson, Chevalier blames the intellect for confusing the issue.
The intellect attributes continuity to the discontinuous - "dans 
1 'évolution, par exemple, ou dans? le passage d'une forme à l'autre"
(p. 115) - and, vicé^versa, "elle met la discontinuité là où il y a 
continuité" (p, 115)î for example, between emotional states and between 
ideas in the mind. In both cases it proves to be incapable of recognizing f
quality. Another weakness of the intellect in man lies in its creation 
of an artificial opposition between categories; "à ériger les contraires 
en contradictoires excluant le milieu, et d'autre part, à étendre à 
l'univers un résultat partiel par définition" (p. 118, italics in original).
Chevalier therefore not only supports implicitly Bergson's anti-intellec- 4
1tualism ; he extends the critique into other areas of life. Far from 
being a stumbling-block to Chevalier, Bergson's critique became the gateway 
to real knowledge of the world. In his Henri Bergson (1926), Chevalier wrote ^
     ^
1. Chevalier does acknowledge Bergson’s decisive influence in this matter;"A la suite d'un entretien que j'eus avec Bergson à la fin de 1923, je %découvris que cette inversion tient à ce que l'intelligence met la -équantité à la place de la qualité" (p. 118). )
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an lappendix (l934 ed., pp. 3OI-3O7) entitled "L’Intellectualisme de Bergson", 
in which he endeavoured to interpret Bergson as a "grand défenseur de 
l ’esprit" (p. 502). If Bergson pointed out the limits and limitations 
of the discursive intellect, this was in order to break the circle of 
thesis and antithesis around which the mind moved and in which it was 
imprisoned. Only through intuitive observation of the particular could 
the vicious circle be broken.
The discussion continues in La Science et le Réel (Bloud et Gay,
1927), Again following Bergson, Chevalier distinguishes two types of 
knowledge; "II y a deux manières de connaître une chose: soit en
1 'assimilant aux autres choses, soit en s'efforçant de l'appréhender 
en elle-mème" (p. 7)» But he gives a new slant to this by blaming
Aristotle for elevating the first type, called 'scientific', into the
\position of the only possible tiue knowledge:
II n'ose affirmer 1'intelligibilité d'un discontinu individuel ... En tout ordre de connaissance ... c'est l'universel et le nécessaire, ou à défaut le général, qui est seul intelligible; seul explicatif ...(p. 10, italics in original).
Because of this, the known Universe is composed of genres, types, species,
laws and,in a word, formal essences.
Chevalier holds that Aristotle excluded knowledge of the individual
existent ('le singulier'), but this type of knowledge, he continues, "joue
un role absolument prépondérant dans la Révélation chrétienne" (p. I5).
Why, because "la science sacrée est une science de faits, donc de choses
singulières" (p. I3).
It may appear that on both counts Chevalier is contradicting St.
Thomas Aquinas. In fact, he is at pains to point out that Aquinas would
agree with him in admitting that Intelligence as such can know individuality,
but not human intelligence, which is limited to knowledge of 'essences':
- 138 - $
"C'est l'intelligence divine qui est la norme de ]'intelligence ...
3 'intellect divin ... est la mesure des choses" (p. 14). "Par là
se trouve substitué au primat de l'intelligible, le primat du réel,
c'est-à-dire de l'intelligible en soi, de l'intelligible en Dieu"
(p. 14). Therefore, "c'est seulement lorsqu'elle se perçoit comme
relatif que la pensée peut atteindre l'absolu ..." (p. 4)*
This idea, says Chevalier, is the spirit of Thomism, but the letter
of it is still Aristotelean. Descartes later emulated Aristotle in
giving pre-eminence to the mathematical science of the general law, 4
and this in turn inspired idealism and positivism (see pp. 14-15)*
The facts of the case are different, though, for tde individual is
prior to the general in real experience:
Nos sens ne nous livrent jamais que des êtres ou des événements singuliers ..." (p. I6). . .
One only perceives colour in a particular colour, so "la science 'en acte' 
porte sur l'individuel" (p. 16). Furthermore, our most immediate appre- 
hension is always of the individual self (p. I6),
Chevalier accepts the paradox that "si les principes sont universels, 
ils ne sont pas réels, et s'il sont individuels, ils ne sont pas objets de 
science" (p. I7) and in doing so accepts Aquinas's teaching that reason t
cannot know the contingent or individual. Yet Chevalier,once again drawing 
on Bergson, sees an alternative solution to the problem in "une intuition 
synthétique" in which, "au lieu de réduire les faits aux lois, on fera 
converger les lois vers le fait, afin de 1'éclairer" (p. 35)* This 
inductive method is more effective. Chevalier mentions that he used it
in his study of religious 'awakenings in Wales - "je me suis efforcé 
d'étudier à fond un fait singulier, en projetant sur lui toutes les 
lumières que peuvent fournir les sciences du général" (p. 33). However,
- 139 ~
this "intuition" is not the same as Bergson's; it is not of "la qualité 
sensible" (p. 34) but of "1'individuel-sujet ou esprit, l'idée platonicienne, 
la puissance dynamique de construction" (pp. 34-35)* Whether or not the 
individual is known in its temporal existence, it can still be studied and 
analyzed, albeit "à condition de l'introduire dans les formes de l'esprit"
(p* 55)* The "essence" of the individual is still more significant than 
the idea of a general species.
Chevalier maintains that Christian philosophy (including St. Thomas's) 
added a vital new idea to the Aristotelean formulae - that of creation, 
which brought men back to the study of real life in flux, of events taking 
place in time. For h5m, creation is "l'idée d'une source ou origine 
rationnelle de toute la réalité temporelle et contingente ..." (ha science 
et le réel, p. 12). If Aristotle's God is the prime mover of a world from 
which he remains aldpf, St, Thomas's God sustains and maintains his creation 
at every moment he is "le ï>réateur et le conservateur d'un monde qui dépend 
entièrement de lui pour son être et pour sa subsistance" (Trois Conférences 
d'Oxford, 1926, Ed. Spes 1933> No, 1 "Aristote et Saint Thoma.s ou l'Idée 
de Création", pp. 24-25). The act of creation "se renouvelle tout le 
long du temps en sorte que le 'point éternel’ se traduirait dans le temps par 
une multiplicité de 'points de durée' ..." (ibid.. No. III, "Nevraian et la 
notion de développement", p, 297)* If for Aristotle contingency is like 
a negation of reason end science, for St. Thomas "le contingent n'est qu'une 
suite et une conséquence de la création: il a sa raison d'être dans la
pensée et dans la volonté divines ..." (p. 28), This means that the con­
tingent is eminently rational and not unintelligible at all. But for
Aristotle only necessary being could have a 'raison d'etre'. This leads
to a further conclusion, bhat "la raison n'apprend et ne progresse qu'en 
assimilant l'irrationnel, qui n'est irrationnel que par nous et non en soi"
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(p. 50).
In suggesting that the contingent wasr part of the order and harmony 
of the Universe, Chevalier was echoing Bergson, who, in B.C. (pp. 66I-696), 
had argued that the idea of disorder was simply a mistaken viewpoint. 
Disorder was another' -type of order which did not fit in with the expec­
tations of the intellect.
Moreover, Aristotle’s God, after his initial creative activity "se 
repose éternellement en lui-iAme, et ... n'a nul besoin d'agir", v/hereas 
"au Dieu de Saint Thomas, par contre, la vie et l'action conviennent 
éminemment" (pp. 34-35). This implies that the goal of life is not 
attained by static meditation but (partly) by the active contemplation 
of experience. Thus, for Chevalier, St. Thomas was a great innovator, 
who restored to philosophy "la connaissance par affinité, par connaturalite, 
par compassion ou sjhnpathie, la connaissance concrete, expérimentale, 
singulière ..." (p. 36).
In creating a rift between Aristotle and St. Thomas, or between Greek 
idealism and Christian realism. Chevalier was not only criticizing most 
of the Thomist interpretations of the previous fifty years,which has 
ass'umed a near identity between thern^ , but was also following Bergson's 
lead in envisaging the Greek conception of the world as essentially static
and conceptualized. This was in fact the world picture Bergson, had set 
2out to refute .
If real time and movement were not completely eliminated from 
Aristotelean thought, they were no more than concepts, for instead of
1. See, for example, Chevalier's letter to G. Bernoville against Maritain on this subject (1st April 1920, Les Lettres,pp. &9-90) and Mferitain's reply, supporting Aristotelianism (pp. 94-109).
2. See IhC., pp. 755-773*
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being objects of perception they became objects of thought.
Once perception and the sense of the immediate vre::-2 restored to 
philosophy then so would a sense of the presence of God, according to 
Chevalier:
II faut donc, avant tout, rendre aux hommes le sentiment de la presence de Dieu ... C’est dire que toute doctrinede transcendance demande à %tre établie par une méthoded’immanence (Trois Conférences, I. p. $0, italics in original).
This means that the relationship between time and eternity must be
an intimate one. Eternity cannot be severed from real time:
Elle n ’abolit pas la durée: elle la ramasse éminemmenten elle, avec tous ses caractères essentiels d'irréver­sibilité, d'imprévisibilité, de durée. L’éternité n ’est pas la négation de la durée: elle est la duréeabsolue (Trois Conférences,III, p. 295)*
Chevalier’s attachment to Bergsonism stemmed from a strong conviction 
that Bergson’s thou^t was not only metaphysical but fundamentally religious 
in a real sense. In his book on Bergson he wrote a final chapter on the
direction and tendency of Bergson’s thought"^  and, remarkably enough, pre­
dicted some of Bergson’s own conclusions in Les Deux Sources (l932).
Chevalier realized that Bergson’s method was "la métaphysique empirique"
(p. 246) and that the clue to understanding lay in analyzing the "moi 
intérieur" in its profound grasp of life outside itself (see p. 243).
This must mean that Bergson would approach God from the point of view of 
man's consciousness and experience of him. ITot only that,but he would 
see a close identity between moral and spiritual problems, for moral 
problems are part of the divine life lived through men in the world, 
rather than pure theories of existence (see pp. 247-248). These tenets 
were in fact the starting-points for the investigations■of Les Deux Sources.





Some time later, in L’Histoire de la Pensée, Vol. IV (1966), Chevalier
saw, in retrospect, the purpose of Les Deux Sources in these terms :
II ne s’agit nullement, pour lui, de rendre compte philosophiquement lu christianisme, qui est un fait historique et donc une donnée contingente, encore moins de transformer ,lè christianisme en philosophie, mais simplement, conformément à son souci de positivité intégrale, d’inclure le fait chrétien dans son champ d’observation et de chercher quelles conclusions la réflexion sur lui apporte à la philosophie (p. 548)*
In this final chapter Chevalier attempts to absolve Bergson of the
•many accusations against him - of heraclitism, anti-intellectualism,
pantheism, evolutionism and monism. In so doing he not only demonstrates
his o'm complete admiration for Bergson’s method of enquiry' and for mar^’-
of its achievements, but he also reverses the earlier trend when these
very criticisms were coming largely from Catholic sources^. Les Deux
Sources, a work criticized even by Bergson’s supporters (like Gilson and
Sertillanges), receives great acclaim from Chevalier in an appendix to the
1954 edition of Henri Bergson (written in May 1932), and in speaking about
it he suns up what Bergson has meant to him:
II est impossible da donner en quelques pages une idée de la puissance et de la richesse de ce livre ...Oeuvre maîtresse de philosophie, il couronne son .oeuvre entier, l’illumine et l’achève, sans le clore Etonnamment significative, efficace et profonde apparaît la portée de ce livre si on le prend pour ce qu’il est; je veux dire l’immense effort d'un esprit pour serrer la vérité dans ses implications dernières ... (p. 314)»
Chevalier’s final comments in this appendix demonstrate clearly how
the wheel of Catholic reaction to Bergson had turned full circle:
Saint Thomas ressemble à Aristote par la lettre, et en diffère par l’esprit. Bergson diffère de Saint Thomas par la lettre et il lui ressemble par l’esprit (p. 327),
1. As seen in Chapter Three,
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BERGSON k m  THE FEEHCH MODERNISTS
Pope Pius X called Modernism a "synthesis of all the heresies"^,
and yet Bible critics and scholars had received encouragement for their
spirit of objective enquiry in Leo XIII’s encyclical, 'Providentissimus
Deus' in 1895, only fourteen years before the general condemnation of
modernist tendencies. The modernist episode is seen by René Marié
as "une crise qui, depuis la Réforme, fut sans doute la plus grave
2qu’ait traversée la conscience chrétienne" . Bergson’s part in Modernism 
is slight if we are to judge from the chroniclers of the movement. In 
Jean Riviere’s account, Le modernisme dans l’Eglise (Lib, Letouzey et Ané, 
1929), Bergson is mentioned just once (p. 205) iu a footnote of little 
import. Both René^Marlé and Bernard Reardon (Roman Catholic Modernism,
A, & C. Black, London, 1970) ignore Bergson entirely, while Alec Vidler 
attributes some vague influence to Bergson alongside W. James and E. 
Boutroux, without making any detailed comments .
Before examining the tenets and tendencies of the modernists and 
their relationship to Bergson, a short account of the suppression of the 
movement will allow the writings to be seen in their historical context.
In France, the elimination of Modernism began with the placing of five
1. In his consistorial allocution on 17th April I907.
2. Published in the introduction to Au coeur de la crise moderniste, Aubier, I96O, p. 9»
3. See p. 186 ff.
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books by Alfred Loisy (1857-1940) on the Index^. In Paris, Cardinal
Richard received from Rome a document dated 16th December 1903 and
signed by the Pope himself. He published this condemnation in La Croix
three days later. Not only were Loisy’s works outlawed, but there appeared |
2an attack on his expressed principles and doctrines as well ,
Soon afterwards, in, 1906, two works by Lucien Laberthonnière (l860- 
1932) were similarly placed on the Index. These were his Essais de philo­
sophie religieuse (1903) and Le réalisme chrétien et l’idéalisme grec (1904). %
The first more general condemnation of Modernism occurred in I907 with 
the proclamation of the decree Lamentibili sane exitu on 4th July. This 
effectively placed a check on the charter for independent intellectual enquiry 4 
granted by Providentissimus Deus. In Lamentibili, or, rather, in the attached- 
’syllabus of errors’, 65 propositions about the interpretation of Holy 
Scripture were condemned. These propositions were ostensibly drawn from |
Xthe writings of ’Modernists’ .
A second general condemnation followed in the Pope’s encyclical letter, '4
' iPascendi dominici gregis of 8th September 1907^. This charge amounted to I
an attempt to systematize and enumerate the philosophical principles behind
1
1. Namely, La religion d'Israël (19ÔI), Etudes évangéliques (1902), L'Evangile et l'Eglise (1902), Autour d’un petit livret1903) and- Le quatrième évangile (1903).
2. Concerning such subjects as primitive revelation, the authenticity of evangelical facts and teaching, the divinity and knowledge of Christ, his real resurrection and the divine institution of the Church.
3 . In fact, the majority of these were drawn from Loisy’s L’Evangile et l'Eglise (1902) and Autour d’un petit livre (1905).




modernist writings. For the first time, the word 'Modernism' received
official sanction, at the head of the document. Anyone found to be
tainted with modernist views was threatened with exclusion from offices
in church government and teaching and also with possible excomraunicaticn.
Alfred Loisy was fairly soon afterwards excommunicated by name - on 7th
March 19O8 - so the words proved to be no idle threat.
After this, the campaign became even more personalized, for on 1st
S-eptember I9IO an anti-modemist oath was introduced - the moto proprio,
S a c r o r u m  a n t i s t u m . A l l  c l e r i c s  p r o m o t e d  t o  m a j o r  o r d e r s  a n d  a l l  C l e r g y
exercising any ministerial function were required to declare, among other
things, that the existence of God can be certainly demonstrated by the .
light of natural reason and that the Church was directly instituted by
Christ in his earthly lifetime and to admit the fact of external proofs
\of revelation, such as miracles and prophecies.
Finally, in 1915» after a long period of threat and uncertainty for 
him, Laberthonnière's^  work in Les Annales de Philosophie chrétienne (between 
1905 and 1915)^  were placed on the Index, together with two further books,
Le témoignage des martyrs (1912) and Sur le chemin du catholicisme (1913). 
Worse than this, Laberthonnière was forbidden to publish anything else in 
his lifetime^.
The strange fact about Modernism is that it was not conceived as a
1, Both Blondel and Laberthonnière had been under scinitiny since 1899: see Correspondance philosophiquet Blondel - Laberthonnière présentée par Claude Tresmontant (Eds. du Seuil, I96I, p. 156)1
2, His entire period as Editor.
5 . He did, however, publish under friends' names, P. Sanson's L'Inquiétude humaine, for instance, was real]y written by Laberthonnière (see F, Copleston's A History of Philosophy, Vol.IX, Search Press, London, 1975» P* 257» n. 2J. This type of pro­hibition is■disciplinary and, unlike indexing, does not involve the teaching, authority of the victim,
'  \
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movement by its proponents until it had been named as ohe^. The
pF r e n c h  m o d e r n i s t s  -  L o i s y ,  L a b e r t h o n n i è r e  a n d  L e R o y " '  -  d i d  n o t  c o n ­
s p i r e  t o g e t h e r  a s  a  g i ’o u p  w i t h  c o m m o n  a i m s  o r  a  c o m m o n  p r o g r a m m e  o f  
c a m p a i g n .  In f a c t ,  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  p e r s o n a l l y  a c q u a i n t e d ,  a p a r t  f r o m  
L a b e r t h o n n i è r e  a n d  B l o n d e l .  T h e y  w e r e  u n a w a r e  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  
w e r e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in a  m o v e m e n t  u n t i l  t h e  c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  t h a t  m o v e m e n t .
Modernism was first recognized as a movement by the neo-Thomist philo­
sophers of the Catholic Church. The label 'modernist* was intended by 
them to describe someone with a certain attitude of mind to the dogma 
and philosophy of the Church. The opposition to such an attitude began 
as early as I896, when the Dominican, M-B. Schwalm (I86O-I9OS), wrote 
"L'Acte de Foi est-il raisonnable?" in the Revue Thomiste (March) directed 
against Blondel, who had said that Thomism constituted "une description 
statique des element's rationnels et des convenances du dogme" (Annales de 
Phil, chrétienne, February I896, No. 4» P« 78). Abbé H. Gayraud^ followed 
up Schwalm’s articles with attacks on Loisy in L'Univers of 1st January I903 
and on Blondel in la Crise de la Foi (published I9OI). He also attacked 
Blondel in La Revue du Clergé français of l^bh May 1904» but this time,
1. Buonauti (I88I-I946;. an Italian modernist, then adopted theterm with pride; see II programma dei modernisti of I907.
2. The justification for calling Blondel a modernist is examinedin the next chapter. Rivière states that "rien ne serait plus injuste que de mettre [Blondel] comme on le fait assez communément, au nombre des modernistes" (p. 122). Nevertheless, his L'Action (1895) and Histoire et Dogme (1905) play a central part in the crisis.
5. Gayraud, Hippolyte, O.P. (I856-I9II). Was from I884 to 1893Professeur at the Dominican College of Toulouse. From 1890 he held chair in philosophy at the Institut Catholique de Toulouse. Left Dominican order in 1895 to enter politics and in fact became député for Brest in 1897*
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rather than Blondel's Lettre Histoire et Dogme is envisaged. In
the Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique (Toulouse, January-Pebruary I9O3), 'f-; 
Mgr. P. Batiffol compared Blondel with Loisy and accused him of neo-Kantianism^:^ 
Next, the editor of La Revue du Clergé français, J. Bricout, attacked Blondel’s4 
anti-Thomism in articles entitled "Autour des fondements de la foi" (1st •
February and 1st April I904). All of these writers regarded as heretical 
Blondel*8 and Loisy * s lack of confidence in the powers of the intellect 
alone to reach firm conclusions about the truth of Christian faith and 4
the existence of God. This amounted,in their eyes, to an implicit attack I
on Thomas Aquinas's 'rational' account of faith. :
LeRoy (1870-1954) soon afterwards encountered stiff- opposition to f
his article on faith and dogma in La Quinzaine of l6th April 1905? i
"Qu’est-ce qu'un dogme?". Père Portalié, S.J., .attacked, his position J
in "L'Explication moîçale des dogmes" (Etudes, 20th July and 5th August (
1905)* A-D. Sertillanges, O.P., took issue with LeRoy.'s article in 
L'Enquête de la Quinzaine (1st June I905), and J. Wehrlé followed suit 
in the Re-vue Biblique of July I905. L. de Grandmaison, S.J., also mounted 4
an assault on LeRoy in the Bulletin de littérature écclésiastique of 
July-October 1905.
  The ground had been well prepared for the encyclical, Pascendi,
not only with regard to the names of suspected modernists,but also with 
regard to the philosophical principles behind modernist thought. It 
should be emphasized at this point, however, that the dogmatic or exegetical 
aspects of Modernism were separated from the philosophical principles used ;
1. i.e., "Lettre sur les exige|L?.ocîs de la pensée contemporaine enmatière d'apologétique et suc* la méthode de la philosophie dans l'étude du problème religieux", Annales de Philosophie chrétienne, 1896.
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i n  s u p p o r t  o f  m o d e r n i s t  a t t i t u d e s ^ ,  T h e  f i r s t  c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  M o d e r n i s m  -  
i n  L a m e n t i b i l i  -  a i m e d  a t  c h a r g i n g  c e r t a i n  p e o p l e  w i t h  f a l s e  a s s u m p t i o n s  
a b o u t  B i b l i c a l  e x e g e s i s  a n d  d o g m a t i c  d e f i n i t i o n .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
i n  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s t a t e m e n t , . P a s c e n d i , P o p e  P i u s  X  a s s u m e d  i n  g e n e r a l  
t e r m s  t h a t  t h e  m o d e r n i s t  e r r o r s  i n  a n y  f i e l d  w e r e  d i r e c t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  
t o  f a l s e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a s s u m p t i o n s .  T h e s e  w e r e  l i s t e d  u n d e r  s u c h  c a t e -
2g o r i e s  a s  ' p h e n o m e n a l i s m ' ,  ' e v o l u t i o n i s m ' ,  ' i m m a n e n b i s m '  a n d  ' a g n o s t i c i s m '  .
It is significant that Pascendi gave pride of place to the philosophical f
tenets of Modernism because, as Alfred Loisy correctly contended:
On oublie ainsi, dès l'abord, que le mouvement moderniste n'a pas commencé par la philosophie, mais par l'histoire ecclésiastique et, bientôt après, par 1'exégèse biblique.(Simples Réflexions, Nourry, I9O8, pp. 143-144)'
It is clear that the modernists were imagined to be men with common philo­
sophical premises, whatever their particular area of specialization happened 
to be. Accordingly, a number of men, including Wehrlé and Blondel, working |
_in the philosophical arena exclusively, became implicated in a movement |Iof whose existence they knew nothing. As soon as Modernism entered the 
realm of philosophy it was presumed to constitute an opposition to neo- 4
Thomism and immediately involved neo-Thomist philosophers in the dispute.
The philosophical content of Modernism is in fact a specifically French
1, This distinction has not been adequately explained by Marié,Reardon, Rivière or Vidler, the leading chroniclers of Modernism in France. Consequently, its significance has been overlooked and lost.
2. See Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morom by A ,  Schbnmetzer, S , J,, Ed. H. Benzinger (Herder, . Freiburg, 54th ed. 1967, col. 3475» 5483 ff.). E.g., part or theencyclical reads as follows: "Hie tamen agnosticismus in disciplinamodernistarum non nisi ut pars negapis habendb, est: positiva, utaiunt, in immanentia vitalé constituitur. Harum nempe ad aliam ex altera sic procédant" (column 5477). For whole Pascendi section, #see pp. 675-605, cols. 5475-5500.
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phenomenon, and, even there, is restricted to Blondel, Laberthonnière i
and LeRoy, among whom only Laberthonnière was condemned, but in fact
all of them have a claim tc be considered as orthodox,yet independent, %
Catholics. _______
In Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s influential book, Le sens commun, la 
philosophie de l'étre et les formules dogmatiques (Beauchesne, 1909),
Bergson and LeRoy are named as the leading lights behind the emergence 
of the modernist movement. This identification of Bergson with Modernism 4
is of especial importance in pointing to why early reactions to him were 
generally so unfriendly. Moreover, it served to bring Bergson's philo­
sophy to the attention cf modernist writers as a sympathetic thinker.
In the long run, it was LeRoy who popularized Bergson's ideas in moder­
nist circles through his continual use of them and through the publica­
tion of his Henri Bergson; Une philosophie nouvelle in 1912. In a short 
space- of -time,-as already-seen,-Bergson-came to be-regarded as-a heretic 
and a danger in orthodox quarters.
Pascendi must have supposed all modernists to hold largely similar 
positions. For instance, one alleged tendency of the modernists was to 
reduce dogmatic statements to statements requiring verification in ex­
perience and action. This 'pragmatic' approach was supposed to reduce
knowledge of the supernatural basis of faith to such knowledge as it
1exists in the human consciousness, or as-it is revealed in nature . This 
would assert the primacy of the attested 'fact', whether it be a historical




fact or a fact of consciousness.
It was indeed taken for granted by the modernists in view here
that a priori statements about a transcendent reality or supernatural
world would not be convincing to modem agnostics, since they could not
be experienced or verified in daily life. In the realm of exegesis
especially it was deemed essential to restrict oneself to observable
phenomena and to omit all fanciful speculation or doctrines which could
not find an explanation or echo in any man's everyday experience. This
approach would not of necessity preclude the possibility of supernatural
or transcendent realities but would itself prefer to limit its enquiries
to a narrower field of vision. Alfred Loisy claimed to know:
un nombre assez déterminé de personnes, dont le trait commun est le désir d'adapter la religion catholique aux besoins intellectuels, moraux et sociaux du temps présent (Simples Réflexions, 
p. 13).
Given these first principles, the philosophical import of Modernism 
would appear to engage Bergson with his empirical methods. The exegetical 
or dogmatic import would appear to bypass him, were it not for the fact 
that LeRoy and Blondel, implicated in 'Bergsonism', both wrote also on faitl 
and dogma^, and Loisy had close contacts with Bergson after his appointment 
to teach at the College de Prance from I909 (-1930).
Edouard LeRoy combined the two major aspects of Modernism - its 
pragmatic approach to dogma and its method of philosophical immanence - 
in his article, "Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?" (La Quinzaine. l6th April I905). 
B o m  in 187.0, LeRoy succeeded Bergson in teaching philosophy at the Collège 
de France. LeRoy began this work in 1921 (owing to Bergson's illness) and
1. E.g., Blondel's Histoire et Dogme (1903) and LeRoy's Dogme et.Critique (I907).
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was formally appointed to his.post in I924. In 1945 he became a member 
of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques and of the Académie 
française. His first work, in 1899, demonstrated his interest in both 
science and philosophy. After his Dogme et Critique (1906) and the work 
on Bergson, he developed his own philosophy in such works as Les origines 
humaines et l'Evolution de l'Intelligence (1928), Le problème de Dieu (1929) 
and La Pensée Intuitive (1929). Dogme et Critique was placed on the Index 
in 1907 and Le Problème de Dieu followed in 1950 although LeRoy submitted.
In writing the article, "Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?", LeRoy^s'aim was to 
emphasize the role of experience in the life of faith and to draw attention 
to the fact that faith is most truly a living of one's beliefs. This ap­
proach would,in his opinion, do more to convince unbelievers than a logical
demonstration of-the reasonableness of faith and would, in addition, involve t1
believers in a more devotional way of life:
-1-'obéissance-que-nous-entendons donner-n'est pas une ---simple obéissance de formules et de gestes; c'est une obéissance profonde, qui nous prenne tout entiers, coeur, volonté, intelligence; en un mot, une obéissance d'hoimnes raisonnables et d'hommes libres, non d'esclaves et de muets (in Dogme et Critique, Bloud et Cie., 1907, pp. vii-viii).
LeRoy is not content to proceed at once to the positive benefits of
such an attitude, but instead, unfortunately for him, chooses to blame
scholastics for the lifeless intellectualism prevalent in the church;
Or, on ne saurait nier qu'aujourd'hui l'emploi du langage scolastique soit moins une aide qu'un obstacle •••Va-t-on prétendre que la terminologie de l'Ecole est indissolublement liée à la raison et à la foi? (p. xi)«
On an even more personal and acrimonious note, LeRoy goes on to say that 
"il y a en effet de certain’s gens pour qui l'Eglise n'est qu'une hiérarchie, 
un gouvernement maître absolu de sujets inertes ..." (p. xiii). That LeRoy's 
criticisms derive from a lively fai bh and genuine concern for the church and
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its mission to the world is beyond dispute, but his provocative and
emotional style of writing was bound to meet with disapproval among %
Thomist philosophers as well as those in authority in the Church.
LeRoy then, employs a Bergsonian^ form of argument to justify his
scepticism towards dogmatic formulae. Dogmas are 'choses',he says,
whereas experience (which alone counts for modern men) takes account
of movement :   .   _
L'expérience elle-même n ’est point du tout une acquisition de 'choses' qui nous seraient d'abord totalement étrangères; non, mais plutôt un passage de l'implicite à l'explicite (pp. 9-10)• ?
This corresponds to Bergson's accotait of intuition and its relation to 
language in "L'Intuition philosophique" ( P . M , p. 1358)^:
, La vérité est qu'au-dessus de. la phrase il y a quelquechose de beaucoup plus simple qu'une phrase et même |qu'un mot: le àens, qui est moins une chose penséequ'un mouvement de pensée; moins un mouvement qu'une direction - _......
LeRoy's philosophy in "Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?" may seem to be a form 4
of nominalism; for, from a position which considers dogmas as being uncon­
vincing for modern man, he moves to a position which regards them as incon­
ceivable and therefore meaningless in themselves. They are not commensurable 1 
with a real existence:
Au point de vue strictement intellectuel, les dogmes n'ont, me semble-t-il, qu' [un] sens négatif et pro­hibitif ... S’ils formulaient la vérité absolue en termes adéquats (à supposer que pareille fiction ait un sens), ils seraient inintelligibles pour nous.S'ils ne donnaient qu'une vérité imparfaite, relative et changeante, ils ne pourraient pas légitimement s'imposer (p. 23).
1. LeRoy anticipates Bergson's thought, as this article first emerged in 1911 (Rev, de M.M., November, pp. 809-827).
-4 
- 155 - I■ IHowever, in fact this idea, is more akin to Bergson's comments on language
in Matière et Mémoire than to any form of nominalism. In particular, LeRoy Îiechoes Bergson's assertion that language cannot he commensurate with any real y
iexistent since it provides a fixed foncept for that which is in fact changing 3 
and in flux:
Toute division de la matière en corps indépendants Iaux contours absolument déterminées est une division artificielle (M.M., p. 552).
LeRoy's main contention is that a dogma has above all a practical 
sense. Religious aogmas can be interpreted as directives for moral |
action; for example, "Dieu est personnel" is taken to mean, "comportez- 
vous dans VOS relations avec Dieu comme dans vos relations avec une per- |
sonne humaine" (pp. 25-26). He similarly explains that the fact of Jesus's 
resurrection means in -practical terms, "soyez par rapport a Lui comme vous 
auriez été avant sa''mort, comme vous êtes vis-à-vis d'un contemporain" (p. 26),|
If this--were in fact a purely pragmatic approach to doctrine and no 
more, then LeRoy would be vulnerable to the criticism that to act as though 
something were true in no way implies that it is true. Behaving according 
to a set of beliefs does not validate their objective truth. But perhaps 
it is only by action, by living something out, that one can verify something ,4 
to one's ovm satisfaction. A logical or abstract proof is not fully con­
vincing subjectively, however valid it might be objectively. This is what § 
LeRoy is hinting at. He distinguishes between a 'pensée discursive' which 
arrives at truth through logic and reason and a 'pensée action' which tests 
a belief in practice. The certainty is then confirmed for the subject:
S'il y a une apparence de pure donnée extérieure, de mystère totalement opaque, de commandement brutal venu du dehors, c'est par rapport à l'entendement discursif, lîais la pensée-action, dont je parlais à l'instant, échappe à cette apparence. Elle dépasse infiniment la pensée purement intellectuelle (p. JO).
?
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It is vital to notice that LeRoy uses the notion of two types of
thought or two casts of içind. He does not insist on the rights of
'action* against those of 'thought' but compares 'pensée-action' with
'pensée-discursive'. He is therefore not crudely anti-intellectual but
envisages a wider capacity for the intellect than abstraction or logic.
And, while it is true to say that Bergson was sceptical about the powers
of the intellect to understand life properly, he pointed out the singular
efficacy of 'intuition' - another mode of thought - in that area;
en assignant à l'intuition la connaissance de-l'esprit-, - ■ - nous ne retirons rien à l'intelligence (P.M., p. I32O).
At the end of "Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?" LeRoy enters the debate over j
nature and the supernatural. He expresses further dissatisfaction with f
nepfThomist fixed categories and once more uses Bergsonian terms in his
own argument; \
Cette conception médiévale et scolastique de. J nature' _appliquée à l'esprit humain, est toute proche, à certains égards, de la conception kantienne. Celle- ci enveloppe le même abus des métaphores spatiales,des divisions et des coupures numériques et géomét­riques, la même attitude de logicien confiné dans le |monde intemporel et immobile dos abstractions (p. 61).
He contrasts this static idea with his own, adopted from Bergson^;
La nature humaine est plus un progrès. un devenir qu'une chose ... Elle n'est pas définissable dans l'intemporel ni dans l'abstrait ... Elle est par essence vie, durée, invention ... (p. 62).
1. Bergson actually said nothing on' this specific topic. His con­ception of nature and the supernatural is not really broached until M.R. (1932), although he was accused of the doctrine of immanence - that is, a denial of God's transcendence or independence from the world. LeRoy's writing is here along the lines of^E.C. (1907) ' 4which had not then appeared. Thus, LeRoy again anticipates the development of Bergson's thought.
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The common bond LeRoy discerns between Thomisb anq Kantian accounxs 
cf 'nature' is that of a closed system. Both parties, due to their pre­
mises, are left with equally invalid alternatives with regard to the 
supernatural;
Ou bien on pose le principe d'immanence; et alors on ne peut que nier radicalement le surnaturel; c'est ce que font les kantiens. Ou bien on admet le surnaturel; et alors on ne peut que rejeter totalement le principe d'immanence; c'est ce que font les scolastiques (p. 6l).
4 1
’The argument then concentrates on the supernatural as observed in 
nature and in man - that is, on the immanence of God# The irruption cf I
the supernatural into nature is called 'un enrichissement' or.'une importaticn';|j(p. 67) and is transcendent only "par rapport à la nature initiale" (p. 67). 4
In other words, LeRoy denies that there is a difference- of type between 4
nature and the supernatural ; only one of degree. The function of the 
supernatural is "parfaire la nature, non de l'abolir, de façon qu'il y ait 
pour nous toujours unité de la vie spirituelle" (p. 67), For LeRoy, the
notion of a 'nature séparée' is no more than "une possibilité abstraite et ... ’•
une fiction logique" (p, 67)^ . |
Ail this flies in the face of Thomas Aquinas's supporters, who were Ï
at pains to render a clear distinction of kind between the natural under­
standing of God and the teachings from revelation accepted on trust by faith. 4
For the Thomist the break between nature and supernature is clearout, net $
a progressive change.
So on two counts LeRoy confronted the neo-Thomist orthodoxy: he first
attempted to pour scorn on the idea that faith could be proved by reason 
alone, and, secondly, he attacked the idea of a supernatural realm separable
1. Henri De Lubac develops this theme in Surnaturel. (1942).
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from the world of sense experience.
Then in an article in Demain  ^ (15th August I906), entitled 
"Scolastique et philosophie moderne" ,LeRoy set out to dismiss the 
claims of unique authority for the Thomist philosophy by attempting |
yto show that all philosophies are in a process of evolution towards the %
final truth which could never be encapsulated within any linguistic frame­
work, He favours Bergsonism as the best example of a philosophy which 
is capable of development, open to new truths. It is not "un système j
clos et achevé, avec sa réponse toute prête pour toutes les questions" Sï
(p. 347)* Certain Bergsonian insights could profitably be added to îIThomism, for philosophy as a whole "s'accroît par intussusception comme
2 4un organisme, non comme un minéral par addition numérique" (p. 548) • l
-- - In a later work, Les- origines humaines et l'évolution de l'intelli­
gence (Boivin et Cie';, 1951 [1st ed. 1928]), LeRoy's ideas on evolution 
are further elucidated. He imagines evolution as a process of ascent
by stages through time. From the 'biosphere' life evolves to the
'noosphere' (consciousness) and then reaches beyond:
Des ébauches d'avenir paraissent discernables, des promesses d'ascension, au delà de la Hoosphère a son tour ... ne peut-on prévoir que déjà se prépare un avènement ultérieur; celui de l'intuition spirituelle au sens moral et religieux du mot (p, 336),
The conception of these states owes much to L'Evolution Créatrice, LeRoy's
stages differ only slightly from Bergson's; instinctive and inanimate life
existing at the first stage, intelligent awareness and interpretation of life 3
at the second level and then spiritual intuition at the third, Bergson
1. Reprinted in Do.<me et Critique.
2, Péguy'8 influence is hare apparent but not acknowledged; see Note sur Descartes ... and Note conjointe sur Bergson ...
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would agree that intelligence makes its appearance on earth at a certain 
point in time, hut he difCcrs in describing intuition in terms of a syn­
thesis of instinct and intelligence^ rather than as a new faculty emerging 
with the passing of time. Man’s spiritual growth is not a temporal pheno­
menon at all; it is an individual moral choice. This becomes crystal 
clear in Les Deux Sources (1932). There is no question of twentieth 4
century man being endowed with gifts not possessed by, for instance, the 4
Ancient Greeks or early mystics. Evolution, for Bergson, does not ultimately 4 
take place in time, but in a man’s o\m inner life, which can be deepened 
and extended spiritually.
If LeRoy does not develop his idea of evolution in as subtle a way 
as Bergson does, nevertheless he does elaborate upon Bergson's analysis 
of the mind. In his work on Bergson, subtitled Une philosophie nouvelle 
(Alcan, 1912), he expounds more limpidly than before his ideas on the relation-,'
2ship between mind and life . Much of this work is a straightforward and 
largely accurate account of Bergson's ideas,but a large section of the 
book is concerned to salvage Bergson's philosophy and his own. from the 
stigma of anti-intellectualism. LeRoy preoccupies himself with an expo­
sition of the roles of intelligence and intuition in Bergson's system and 
at last vindicates himself as an 'intellectualist' of the first order.
The theme he adopts now is that of an enlarged intelligence enlightened 
by continuing reflection on experience. . In LeRoy's explanation, not only
1. See E.G., p. 645? "... l'intuition, je veux dire l'instinct devenudésintéressé, conscient de lui-même, capable de réfléchir sur sonobjet".
2. LeRoy also pays tribute to.his own debt to Bergson; "J'ai trouvédans son oeuvre l'éclatante réalisation d'un'pressentiment et a'undésir" (p. iv). LeRoy states that he already had an affinity with such ideas before reading Bergson, however.
I
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does intuition complement intelligence, but it is seen as an extension ti
of the intelligence itself into the realm of real life. If we endeavour ^
-Ito become conscious of the intelligence's normal obsession with practical f
action, we can consciously reform and reorientate it: J
bref que, par un double effort de critique et d'élargissement, [l'esprit] dépasse le sens commun et l'entendement discursif pour revenir à l'intuition pure (p. 19).
It must be the case, argues LeRoy, that intelligence and intuition
are different aspects of mind or,in Bergson's terminology, 'conscience'.
This means, for LeRoy, that in Bergsonism:
nous avons ... le spectacle d'une pensée pure en face des choses. Mais c'est une pensée complète, non réduite à quelques fonctions partielles, une pensée assez sure de sa puissance critique pour ne sacrifier aucune de ses ressources (p. 102).
Ee describes 'intuition' in more detail in this way:
La tâche propre du philosophe serait de résorber   -l'intelligence dans l'instinct ou plutôt de réintégrer l'instinct dans l'intelligence, disons mieux: de reconquérir, du centre de l'intelligence,tout ce que celle-ci a du sacrifier des ressources 4initiales. En cela consiste le retour au primitif, .i;à l'immédiat, au réel, au vécu. En cela consiste l’intuition (p. 10?).
LeRoy also éxplains defintively how he. views 'action' as the 'verification
principle' for thought, making explicit what had been somewhat inchoate in
"Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?":
II est certain que 1'intelligence discursive et critique, laissée à ses propres forces, demeure enfermée dans un cercle infranchissable. Hais l'action dénone le cercle,... Et c'est l'action encore, sous le nom d'expérience, qui écarte le danger d'illusion ou de vertige, c'est l'action qui vérifie ... (p. 108),
For Bergson, action is normally associated with the discursive intellect 
and not with intuition. It seems to be the reverse in LeRoy's work, but,in
,1
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spite of the confusion over vocabulary, Bergson's and LeRoy's ideas
are alike. LeRoy conceived 'la pensée-discursive' as a narrow,
limited way of thinking, whereas 'la pensée-action' envisages and
interprets the continuing experiences in the mind which is constantly
face to face with existence and re-creates it ideologically. So, for
LeRoy, Bergson has contributed to a new intellectualism,because his method
of returning to the source or origin of all thought by analyzing the raw
data of consciousness is the basis for all sound philosophical method.
LeRoy explains his opinion as follows:
La pensée qui préside spontanément à la perception sensible, à l'enquête scientifique, à la création d'art, à 1'organisation morale et sociale de la vie, est une pensée directe, naive, pratique, tournée vers les choses, amie des résultats qui part de principes adoptés d'instinct (La pensée intuitive, Boivin et Cie.,1929, pp. 8-9).
For this reason, as Un Bergson's system, science or experiment is essential
to assist and guide the process of thought. For LeRoy, science is "un
fruit de l'expérience fécondée par le raisonnement ... elle procède surtout
par analyse" (pp. 11-12). This sentiment is echoed by Bergson in "La
philosophie de Claude Bernard":
Le fait, plus ou moins clairement aperçu, suggère l'idée , d'une explication; cette idée, le savant demande à l'expérience de la confirmer; mais, tout le temps que son expérience dure, il doit se tenir prêt à abandonner son hypothèse, ou à la remodeler sur les faits. la recherche scientifique est donc un dialogue entre l'esprit et la nature (P.M.. p, 1434).
In his later works, LeRoy dwells at length on the subject of intuition. 
For him, 'intuition' is a method which probes deep into the nature of exis­
tence through contemplation and action. He regards his own philosophy as 
a prolonged analysis of a primary intuition. LeRoy's simple spiritual 
insight is this: that through intuition our thought (enriched by action
or experience) is in touch with the Tnought behind all creation. ,God is
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’ l a  p e n s é e - a c t i o n '  p a r  e x c e l l e n c e . T h i s  l e a d s  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  v i e w
t h a t  m e t a p h y s i c s  i s  a  m o r e  p r o f o u n d  v i s i o n  o f  r e a l i t y ;  ' ' A i n s i  o r i e n t é e ,
l a  M é t a p h y s i q u e  r e p r é s e n t e  u n  e f f o r t  d e  v u e  d i r e c t e  o t  p r o f o n d e ,  p a r  d e l à  |
t o u s  l e s  s y m b o l e s "  ( L a  p e n s é e  i n t u i t i v e , p .  2 5 ) ,  o r  a g a i n ;
n o t r e  i d é a l  s e r a i t  d e  c o n v e r t i r  t o u t e  c o n c e p t i o n  e n  p e r c e p t i o n .  D è s  l o r s ,  n e  d o i t - o n  p a s  d é f i n i r  l a  P h i l o s o p h i e  . . .  c o m m e  u n  e f f o r t  p o u r  d i l a t e r  e t  i n t e n s i f i e r  n o t r e  p u i s s a n c e  p e r c e p t i v e  j u s q u ' à  l a  r e n d r e  c a p a b l e  d e  s a i s i r  d ’u n e  s e u l e  v u e  i m m é d i a t e  t o u t e  r i c h e s s e  e t  t o u t e  p r o f o n d e u r  d e  r é a l i t é  ( p .  27) .
A s  i n t u i t i o n  m o u l d s  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  m o v i n g  f l u x  o f  l i f e  i t  r e g a i n s
c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  b r i n g i n g  t o  l i f e  a n d  c o m i n g  t o  l i f e  -  t h a t
i s ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  c r e a t i o n .  T h i s  i n t u i t i o n  i s  p s y c h i c a l  o r  s p i r i t u a l .
L e R o y  a c c e p t s  f r o m  B e r g s o n  t h a t  s p i r i t  g i v e s  l i f e  a n d  m a t t e r  i s  t h e  d é b r i s
o f  t h a t  p r o c e s s ,  b u t  L e R o y  i d e n t i f i e s  s p i r i t  v r i t h  T h o u g h t  i n  a  w a y  t h a t  i s
f o r e i g n  t o  B e r g s o n .  \  F r o m  t h e  B e r g s o n i a n  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i n t e l l i g e n c e  m a r k s
t h e - s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  m a n ,  L e R o y  g o e s  b e y o n d  e x p l i c i t - B e r g s o n i s m  t o  s e e  l i f e
a s  " 1 ' h i s t o i r e  d ' u n e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  e t  l i b é r a t i o n  d e  p e n s é e "  ( L e s  o r i g i n e s
h u m a i n e s  e t  l ' é v o l u t i o n  d e  l ' i n t e l l i g e n c e , B o i v i n  e t  C i e . ,  1 9 5 1  [ i s t  e d .
1 9 2 8 ] ,  p .  84) .  T h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  B e r g s o n i s m  i s  t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d ,  b u t
B e r g s o n ' s  s c h e m a  i s  t r a n s c e n d e d  i n  t h i s  v i t a l  a s p e c t ;  t h a t  l i f e  i s  n o t
o n l y  a  p u r p o s i v e  p r o c e s s  b u t  i s  t h e  i n t r i c a t e  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  a  s u p e r i o r
I n t e l l i g e n c e ^ ;
L a  v i c t o i r e  d e  l a  v i e  s u r  l ' i m p r o b a b l e  s ' a c h è v e  a u  m o m e n t  o ù  l ' i n t e l l i g e n c e  é c l o t  . . .  ( p .  I O 3) .
L a  v i e  e s t  c o n s c i e n c e  d è s  l ' o r i g i n e ,  c o n s c i e n c e  d i f f u s e  q u i  p e u  à  p e u  s e  c o n c e n t r e ,  s ' i n t e n s i f i e ;  e t  t o u t e  c o n s c i e n c e  e n v e l o p p e  u n  g e r m e  d e  r é f l e x i o n  n a i s s a n t e  . . .  ( p .  2 0 l ) .
1 ,  B e r g s o n  a s s o c i a t e s  l i f e  w i t h  c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  n o t  w i t n  T h o u g h t  o r  I n t e l l i g e n c e  a s  s u c h .
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In La Pensée Intuitive, LeRoy does not outline three stages of 
thought as emerging chronologically, as he does in Les Origi^As Humaines. 
The three stages - instinct, intelligence and intuition - do recur, hut 
are now simply aspects of mind and not part of an evolutionary process. 
Instinct has become "le sens commun, qui se borne à une perception 
utilitaire du réel ..."? intelligence has become "la science, qui entre­
prend l’analyse méthodique du donné pour en dresser un inventaire à la 
fois complet et intelligible ..." and, finally, intuition is exercised 
by "la philosophie" which "s’attache à obtenir de l’univers pliysique et 
moral une intuition d'ensemble absolument vraie où soit située toute 
chose et toute action à son juste rang dans une hiérarchie de valeurs"
(ail p. 41).
The moral realm stands above the intelligent and instinctive ones -
1as outlined by Pascal in Pensées - but ail three participate in the full­
ness of "La Pensée Vivante" (p. 41). In his mature philosophy, LeRoy 
reaches beyond Bergson's conclusions to a Platonist notion of Thought 
as the principle of life. In the human consciousness this corresponds 
to 'l'idée', whereas the static intelligence artificially composes 'le
concept'. The term 'idée' corresponds to Bergson's 'schéma dynamique'
2or primary intuition :
Idée ... quand on l'oppose à Concept ... serait plutôt le mot convenable pour désigner un principe directeur, un sens et un élan de conceptualisation, bref un projet qui oriente une recherche et qu'on laisse ouvert et souple (p. 55)»
The idea of God as pure and infinite Thought - the purpose and reason behin
1. Pascal's influence on LeRoy can be traced in, e.g., Le Problèmede Dieu, pp. 157-154, 167-168.
2. Outlined by Bergson in "L'Effort intellectuel" (E.S., pp. 945-
949).
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all creation - is explored in Le Problème de Dieu (L'Artisan du Livre,
1929). LeRoy's argument, borrowed from Bergson, is that St. Thomas 
mistakes movement for states of being: "Le devenir est défini comme
transformation, c'est-à-dire passage d'une forme à une autre; mais 
les deux formes sont conçues statiquement chacune à part ..." (p, 19).
The 'unmoved mover' is a static fiction leading to "une fin également 
immobile" (p. 20), In short, ail the rational 'proofs' of God's exis­
tence have the aim of showing that "Dieu n'a pas le droit logique de 
n'exister pas" (p. 82), "Déduire Dieu équivaut à le nier" (p. 83).
To affirm God is to recognize a presence and not to admit the correctness 
of a theory:
une chose est affirmée réelle autant qu’elle se manifeste comme une présence inévitable et autant qu'elle _offre._de connexions avec le système intégral de la pensée et de la vie (p. IO4, italics in original).
In addition, to. affirm God is to affirm a moral structure to the Universe:
"affirmer Dieu, c'est essentiellement affirmer le primat de la réalité
morale" (p. IO7). The moral order of the Universe is the effect of divine
Intelligence. The connection between moral reality and God is not conceived by
the discursive intelligence which pieces together a priori concepts; it is
to be deduced from the intelligibility of experience and from the fact of
purpose in evolution. In other words, moral values and order point to a
Thought in and behind creation - 'la pensée-action'. LeRoy likens this -
on a generous interpretation - to Bergson's ‘élan vital':
La pensée dont il va être question, c'est la pensée f en tant qu'activité créatrice, la même qui se mani­feste à la fin et au commencement de son histoire dans l'invention géniale et dans l'évolution bio­logique, bref la pensée-action. L'intelligence pure, en faculté de réflexion critique, d'analyse con­ceptuelle, n'en est qu'une forme^ une fonction (p, 108).
Cet élan vital, c'est cela même que je considère ici
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sous le nom de pensée-action (p. 109).
The fundamental intellectualism of LeRoy links him with his
adversaries, Jacques Maritain and Thomas Aquinas. Paradoxically,
for all of them, facts have no existence without their 'raison d'etre',
their meaning. LeRoy argues that it is impossible "d'attribuer à la
matière une base d'existence radicalement extérieure, hétérogène,
irréductible à la pensés" (pp. 11-12). He also says that "les faits <>
n'ont de sens, ils ne sont pas saisissables que par insertion dans
un système" (p. 112). LeRoy's cosmic final!sm also demonstrates the
purpose behind life: "le devenir cosmique est orienté dans un sens
défini" (p. 115). Therefore, LeRoy regards life as the history of 'la
pensée créatrice' (p. 116) insofar as evolution is an awakening of
Intelligence and is the outworking of God's plans. This intellectualism
has nothing to do with the notion that systems of thought can be tailored
to fit reality, nor with the view that- the human mind can 'understand'
God or prove his existence. There is a Thought which life and a 4
thought which detaches itself from and reasons about life. Bearing in
mind the first, LeRoy can say:
Vivre, donc, c’est croire en Dieu; et connaître Dieu c'est prendre conscience, en l'agissant, de ce qu’enveloppe le fait de vivre une vie humaine (p. 250).
LeRoy has been considered at some length because he is the Catholic 
philosopher who comes closest to liberating Bergson from the taint of prsg- 
matism and anti-intellectualism. He also tries to adapt Bergsonism to a 
Christian world view and succeeds in creating an Idealism which is coherent 
and at many points convincing. LeRoy's originality and ingenuity are as
self-evident as his sincerity. His development of the themes of Thought 
and Ac Lion take him far beyond a mere imitation or reiteration of Bergson's 
philosophy. In attributing some of his own insights to Bergson, LeRoy
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1diverted attention from himself rather too modestly. He did not swallow 4^
Bergsonism undigested but altered and adapted it a great deal. LeRoy’s
opposition to a Thomism of a certain type led to his implication in
Modernism and largely brought about his condemnation. However, his |
criticisms, as shown, were by no means entirely unjustified.
Lucien Laberthonnière (1860-1932) is unlike LeRoy in that he admits
few debts. He is far from acknowledging Bergson's influence on himself,
even though it exists. Rather, he revels in antagonism to virtually
every philosophy but his own and proudly upholds his own independence.
The only philosophers he admits to admiring are St. Augustine, Boutroux,
Maine de Biran and the early Blondel^. Having said that, it is also
true to say that Laberthonnière developed his own ideas through dialogue
with-other-philosophers. With regard to Bergson, Laberthonnière wrote;
Je m'oppose au bergsonisme aussi radicalement que je m'oppose à 1'aristotélo-thomisme, et pour la même - - raison: parce que tout en- étant contraires, ils -comportent également une théorie de 1'individuation qui méconnaît et qui nie en fin de compte toute con­sistance, toute réalité ontologique, toute valeur aux individus que nous sommes (Esquisse d'une philo- phie personnaliste, Ille partie, p. 312).
Laberthonnière attended the Grand Séminaire de Bourges and entered 
the congrégation de l'Oratoire de France in 1886. He then taught at |
Juilly and the Ecole Massillon as Professor of philosophy (I896-I9OO).
In 1900 he was appointed Rector of the Collège de Juilly and was offered 
the editorship of Les Annales de Philosophie chrétienne,which Blondel had
1, Laberthonnière was very impressed with L'Action (1895): "Depuis sixmois, malgré uns tâche absorbante ... je puis dire que j'ai vécu de votre livre" (Corres. philosophique with Blondel, Eds. du Heuil, 1961, p. 70). He named Boukroux and Maine de Biran as influendeg according to v7. Horton (The philosophy of Abbé Bautain. p. 293) and acknowledges St. Augustine in Le réalisme chrétien, p. 36.
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b ought in 1905• Laberthonnière worked on the Annales from I905 to
1915 and was forbidden to publish anything further after that date.
His literary executor, Louis Caret, set about publishing his complete 
works after his death (from 1955 onwards). Of these. Volumes I and 11^ 
were placed on the IndeÉ in 1956 and Volume III^ follov/ed suit in 1941^* 
Laberthonnière's anti-Thomism was not only direct and uncompro­
mising - he delighted in contradicting St. Thomas - but it also took 
the form of an anti-rationalism,which should be distinguished from anti- 
intellectualism as such. As Claude Tresmontant rightly assessed:
La critique de 'l'intellectualisme' chez Laberthonnière n'est évidemment en aucune manière une dépréciation de la pensée et de l'intelligence, mais la critique du sophisme qui tente de dissocier la fonction de l'intelli­gence de la totalité humaine (Corres. phil. Blondel- Laberthonnière. Eds. du Seuil, I96I, p, I4; Tresmontant edited the correspondence and wrote the introduction).
Venturing further thAn LeRoy, Laberthonnière will not admit that Christianity
has any real influence as a logical argument:.
II n'y a pas d'erreurs opposées au Christianisme que les théologiens n'aient écrasées maintes fois de leurs arguments. Mais un triomphe logique n'est pas un triomphe réel; et, quand on se contente de triompher ainsi dans l'abstrait, on ne change rien à ce qui est (in Laberthonnière: L'homme et l'oeuvre ..,Textes et Communications présentés par Paul Beillevert,Beauchesne, 1972, p. 175).
Laberthonnière does not intend to substitute a wider 'intellectualism' for 
a narrower one, after the fashion of LeRoy. He is convinced that all
1. Etudes sur Descartes (1955)> 2 vois.
2. Etudes de philosophie cartésienne et premiers écrits philosophiques(1958).
5. There are works on Laberthonrâère by E. Castelli (Essai sur la philo­sophie du Père Laberthonnière. Milan, 1927), P. Beillevert (Laberthonnièrei L'homme et 1'oeuvre, Beauchesne, 1972) and others.
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'î’ intellectualisms’ and ail ideologies are to be rejected and surpassed* ^
In Le dogmatisme moral (written in 1898, first published by Lethielleux 
in 190$), Labeithonniere enumerates three stages of awareness. The first 
he calls 'le dogmatisme empirique', which regards sense phenomena as the 4
total reality; the second is 'le dogmatisme intellectualiste', which 
views the intelligibility of external phenomena as the primary fact 
about life (meaning that.the way to increase Imowledge is therefore 
through contemplation of Order in the world). Finally, he posits a 
third stage, which he calls 'le dogmatisme moral'. In this domain, 
truth is not attained by logic or any intellectual process,but rather 
by a purification of the will; by a moral refinement. In order to 
grasp the truth about anything profoundly: - |
on ne peut y arriver que par des procédés moraux.Toutefois ces procédés moraux n'excluent pas du tout en tant s'en faut les procédés logiques!Mais ils les dominent en les englobant. La --logique est un instrument au service de la moralité (in Le réalisme chrétien précédé d'Essais de Philo- |Sophie religieuse. Eds. du Seuil, I966, p. 50},
The only worthwhile dogmatism is moral dogmatism;, intellectual belief IIalone is dead, whereas "la vérité n'est pas dans la mort, elle est dans 4
la vie" (p. 55)* "Croire à une chose, c'est vouloir etre et vouloir 
vivre par elle" (p. 50).
This point of view clearly has certain affinities with LeRoy's, ï
such as the claim that truth is knovm in life through action and not 
purely through reason. There is nevertheless a clear difference between 
the two; in that Laberthonniere speaks of the necessity for an act of trill 
to guide the mind rightly to truth: "Pour aller à la vérité nous avons donc 
à nous mouvoir du dedans, afin de nous transformer et de nous dépasser"
(Pf %'ith LeRoy it is a transfer from contemplation of theories
to contemplation of experience that rectifies the intellect. In Laberthonniere.
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truth is seen as reality making contact with the whole person, and not
the other way round. The truth itself is making a demand, requiring
a response, providing a choice:
Par la vraie critique on est toujours dispose à douter de soi, à se défier de soi pour ne pas faire obstacle à l'avènement de la vérité (p. 54)-
This line of approach is very evidently Augustinian, and Laberthonniere 
himself acknowledges this (see p. 56). The natural and necessary con­
dition of such an approach is the assertion that Christianity is the only 
reality. It has no need of other systems of thought. Insofar as they 
are not Christian, they are false and depart from reality. In this res­
pect Laberthonniere resembles Tertullian, who likewise rejected pagan 
philosophies ih their entirety as being inimical to Christian viewpoints.
God is thus equated with reality or Truth in Laberthonniere: "Tout etre
dans son fond est affirmé par Dieu, posé par Lui; c’est un acte de Dieu"
(p. 81).
This approach puts Laberthonniere at enmity with most philosophies, 
and in particular with St. Thomas Aquinas's, which is a synthesis of many 
elements, and particularly an adaptation of Aristotle's pagan thought-forms. 
Non-Christian philosophies are considered to be mere collections of ideas; 
for example:
Les idéalistes, par une elaboration des données de l'expérience, font du monde un système d'idées; et c'est dans ce système d'idées et par.lui qu'ils cherchent à se fixer (p. 68, italics in original).
This idea of a conflict between Christianity and all other philosophies 
is proclaimed more insistently in Le réalisme chrétien et l'idéalisme grec 
(Lethielleux, I904), where Greek philosophy represents the world of ideas 
and Christian thought is earthed in and corresponds to reality. There is 
a further implication]^this; that St. Thomas is a falsifier of Christianity |
— l68 — *I
in the extent to which he models his philosophy on Aristotle rather
than on the Scriptures. The discord between Greek and Christian
thought is characterized as "le conflit de la raison et la foi, de
la science et de la religion" (p. 5)* This is not really restricted
to Greek thought but, "s’est renouvelé à travers les âges, s’est perpétué
jusqu’à nous; il continue de sévir avec plus d’acuité que jamais" (p. 5)j
80 much so that "la philosophie grecque a joué un role considérable dans
la systematization doctrinale du christianisme" (p. 6), Laberthonniere
leaves us in no doubt about his position:
••• malgré les emprunts que les docteurs chrétiens ont fait à sa terminologie et à ses concepts, nous avons hâte d'ajouter qu'elle n'en est pas moins, en tant que doctrine exprimée et replacée dans son milieu, en opposition radicale avec le christianisme (p. 93> italics in original).
This idea reverberates throughout Laberthonniere's work. To take one
further example, in Esquisse d'une philosophie personnaliste (Lib. Vrin,
1942) he wrote:
Saint Thomas, en mettant le Christianisme dans le moule de 1'aristotélisme, n'a pas baptisé Aristote comme on l'a dit: il a aristotélise le Christianisme. Dans_ la lettre de l'Evangile il a introduit la conception païenne du monde et de la vie (p. 643)»
The grounds on which Laberthonniere criticizes Greek philosophy are
very similar to Bergson's. Firstly, the Greeks are 'intellectualist' in
the sense that their thought is detached from life and coheres only in
relationships between ideas. The world of ideas is naturally opposed to
the world of experience:
Au-dessus de la réalité de l'expérience, formant avec elle un dualisme irréductible, c'est un autre monde qu'ils conçoivent, un monde d'idées où l'universel seul a droit de cité (Le Réalisme chrétien, p. 16).
Secondly, the Greeks failed, through this very 'intéllectualism', to grasp
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the flux of the real world: real time "ne peut eVtre appréhendée par
l ’esprit parce qu'elle est incessan|^nt fuyante et infiniment multipliée, |
ï:ils substituent donc par abstraction les idées des choses et des ^tres" f
(p. 19). Even worse, Greek thought actually excludes and abhors movement:
"le procédé de la philosophie grecque est un artifice pour fixer ce qui f
par nature est toujours en mouvement et pour unifier ce qui est essentielle­
ment multiple" (p. 24).
Are these ideas derived from Bergson? They make similar points to 
Bergson's in L'Evolution Créatrice (see pp. 76I-769), but then this work $
was not published until 19C7> three years after Laberthonniere's. However, 
Laberthonniere was acquainted with Bergson's work (and LeRoy’s) much earlier. 4
He discussed their work with Blondel in I909 (see Correspondance philosorhiaue,
pp. I87-I95) and it was on Laberthonniere’s recommendation that Blondel read 
Bergson for the first time in 1897 (see ^ d,, p.lio). There was some corres­
pondence between Bergson and Laberthonniere in I909. In a letter to
Blondel, Laberthonniere wrote:
J'ai repu un mot de Bergson qui me dit que l'idée qui m’a inspiré dans Le Dogmatisme Moral lui paraît devoir 3tre le point de départ de toute métaphysique positive (p. 169). -
In 1909 Laberthonniere held a long discussion with Bergson (mentioned in 
a letter to Blondel of January I909, p. 218). So it is clear that by 
1904 Laberthonniere was interested in Bergson's thought and had grasped the 
importance of time and movement in his philosophy.
There is a final criticism of Greek philosophy in Le Réalisme chrétien - 
and this idea was to bear much fruit in Laberthonniere's later personalism - 
that the individual, the particular and the exceptional proved to be an 
embarrassment to Greek philosophers, whose certain conclusions rested upon 
universals:
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Il n'a pas de science du particulier, de l'individuel.Le monde sensible est objet d'opinion ou de conjecture, mais non de certitude et d'affirmation (p.. 1$),
Christianity has an internal unity and logical coherence of its
own: "La Bible est donc essentiellement une explication: elle exprime
une conception de la vie et du monde"(Le Réalisme chrétien, p. 40),
If external ideas are imposed upon it from outside, its unity "est
alors purement abstraite" (p. 48)* The facts of Christianity are
to be understood and interpreted from the inside: "par interpretation
on les voit du dedans, dans l'acte vital d'où ils émanent et dans l'intention
qui •*. les relie les uns aux autres" (p. 48). Internai unity is 'concrete',
derived from the life of the subject. It hardly needs pointing out that
such an idea was first and best expressed by Bergson in his early works^
and especially in the article "Introduction à la Metap'nysique" (1903).
\There, the unity of the personality is understood internally in terms of 
intensity, quality and direction, whereas it is misunderstood by any 
external analysis of its component parts.
It is interesting to note that Laberthonniere admired L'Essai more 
than any of Bergson's other works. He argues in Esquisse d'une philosophie 
personnaliste that the alternative to a world of forms and things is a 
world of 'etres', beings - "considérés comme des intériorités qui 
Existent, non seulement en elles-mêmes, mais aussi’ par elles-mêmes" (p. 509). 
He considers that in L'Essai Bergson accorded with this viewpoint, but 
later departed from it (in E.C.):
... en définitive, par ses critiques et ses ai.alyses, du
1. The best expression of Bergson's theory is to be found in his lectures on "Personality" at the Collège de France in I9IO-I9II (Mélaïiges. pp. 845-847) and in the Edinburgh Gifford lectures (21st April-22nd Say 1914) (Mélanges, pp. 10$1-1086),
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reste si remarquablement pénétrantes, il [Bergson] ne tendait qu’à se débarasser du physicisme mécaniste de Taine, de ïïaekel, de opencer, etc. ... pour y substituer un biologisme d’apparence finaliste où la vie, prise comme principe d’organisation extérieure, et non comme intériorité morale et spirituelle, est mise au premier plan, et la matière brute au second comme dérivée (Esquisse d’une philosophie personnaliste, pp. 297-298? n. 2). '
Bergson's earlier attitude laberthonniere also locates in L'Energie
Spirituelle: "Je sais bien," says Laberthonnière, "que dans l'Energie
Spirituelle [Bergson] semble parfois considérer la vie de l'individu f
■jcomme ayant une fin qui déborde l'organisme qu'elle se donne" (id., p. 293,
n, 2). Bergson does not devélop his rudimentary personalism, according to
Labetthonnière,but instead relapses into a general concern with species and
universals and indifference to the plight and destiny of the individual.
Laberthonniere's own personalism involves the conviction that not
only is man the highest evolutionary form; not only is he different from
the rest of creation, but also all men differ radically from one another.
Men cannot be understood as a homogeneous block. This would amount to
treating them "abstraitement, dans ce qu’ils ont de common entre eux",
whereas they should be treated as individuals:
en les posant comme étant des êtres par leur intériorité' |.consciente elle-même, chacun dans leur unicité et dans 'la complexité de vie qui vient sourdre en eux. Il s'agit donc là d'une conception par interprétation, et non d’une conception d’abstraction . (p. 509, italics in original).
It is arguable that Bergson might have sympathized with Laberthonniere's 
ideas and that Laberthonniere's evaluation of L'Evolution Créatrice was harsh.
In L'Essai, Bergson is at pains to demonstrate the irreducibility of the self 
to number or quantity. His whole thesis is an attempt to prove the reality 
of individual liberty and self-determination. The riches of the profound 
self show the value of the individual. And later, in his writing on morality
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and religion, Bergson imequivocally portrays man not only as an end in
himself, but as worthy of participation in the godhead. Laberthonniere
read Les Deux Sources at the very end of his life, but still remained
1hostile in his reaction :
.., il semble que Dieu fabrique avec nous des dieux par le moyen d'une machine qu'il a construite exprès pour cela.Ce qui est du finalisme tout semblable à celui que Bergson a exorcisé, Wi&ls en même temps, étant donné qu'il faitappel à notre initiative, l'univers est présenté comme_________une machine qui est mise à notre disposition pour que par elle nous fassions des dieux. L'idée que nous avons à agir Dieu n 'apparatt pas plus d'une manière que de l'autre'
(p. 644).
It could well be that Laberthonniere imagined that mysticism and
Christianity were in danger of corruption by foreign elements from
Bergsonian philosophy. He makes this clear in his comments on LeRoy,
which otherwise are surprisingly favourable:
Pour LeRoy l'élân vital est l'agent de Dieu qui travaille en ce monde pour la fin que Dieu lui a imposée, qui est de faire monter la vie vers l'homme. Les individus que nous- sommes deviennent ainsi la fin dont l'élan vital est le moyen: ... ce n'est plus du bergsonisme, mais on conçoitque de cette façon le Christianisme peut être professé sincèrement. Seulement mieux vaudrait se débarrasser du bergsonisme. Le Christianisme se suffit à lui-même(p. 643).
So Laberthonniere's final attitude to Bergson is antagonistic and 
uncompromising. The use he made of L'Essai and of L'Energie Spirituelle 
in the determination of his own philosophy of personalism contrasts with
ijhis hostility towards L'Evolution Créatrice and Les Deiox Sources, He 1Iwas undoubtedly indebted to Bergson in his own critiques of Greek philo- 3
■fjsophy, rationalism, idealism, positivism and Thomas Aquinas's 'intellectualism', 1
■'I
The positive side of his thought had many original elements, such as the
1. This is inserted into Esquisse d'une uhilosophie personnaliste by the editor, Louis Canet (p. 644).
1
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concentration on the value of the individual^ and of personal relationships. 
The highest expression of this is to be found in man’s - or a man’s - re­
lationship with the supreme man, Jesus Christ, In this relationship 
Christianity itself becomes a form of personalism,. The gulf between 
man and God is bridged in the incarnation and divinity is to be found 
in life’s every-day experiences, to be achieved "par le contact toujours 
renouvelé avec Celui qui fut l’Homme" (La Notion chrétienne de l’autorité,
J. Vrin, 1955, P. 220).
The question of Laberthonniere’s orthodoxy is not germane to this 
discussion, but A. Vidler's sweepihg view that Laberthonniere and LeRoy 
"urged such a revision of dogma as would make it compatible with the con­
clusions of modem biblical and historical criticism" (The Modernist movement 
in the Roman Church, p. 187) is quite misleading. The aim was not, as he 
implies, to alter and rewrite dogma and doctrine. Rather, both saw that 
words of any kind were inadequate to express supernatural realities and 
they also stressed the importance of a reorientation of the will towards 
God in order to cleanse the mind and prepare it to grasp the truth.
The case of Alfred Loisy (1857-1940) is altogether different. His 
exegetical principles led him to take up a position of hostility not only 
to Thomism but also to traditional doctrine and dogma. In fact, his primary 
obsession was that the dogmas of the Bible and Church were unjustifiable 
additions to the primitive data cf history: "II ne s'agit plus de savoir
si la Bible contient des erreurs, mais bien de savoir ce que la Bible con­
tient de vérité" (Etudes bibliques. Nourry, 3rd Ed. 1903, p. I46). Loisy 
was essentially a man without belief in Christ's divinity and at times little
1. An idea taken up later by G. Marcel and E. Mounier, among others.
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faith in a transcendent God^.
Educated at Cnalons-sur-Marne and the Institub Catholique, Paris,
Loisy entered the priesthood in 1879 and became a countiy curé at 
Landricourt. Mgr. Louis Duchêsne, prelate of the Académie.française, 
persuaded him back to Paris to pursue historical studies. By 1886 his 
faith had undergone severe strain, yet in 1890 he accepted the post of 
Professor of Sacred Scripture_at.the Ins_titut Catholique. By 1895 his 
orthodoxy was considered suspect and he was dismissed and urged to confine 
himself to the study of oriental languages. Between 1894 and 1896 Loisy 
acted as chaplain to the Convent and School at Neuilly. He was then ap­
pointed as Professor of Assyriology and Egyptology at the Ecole Pratique des 
Hautes Etudes in 1900. In 1902 his famous L'Evangile et l'Eglise was .pub­
lished as a Catholic reply to A. Harnack's Wesen des Christenturns (19OO).
The following year Loisy expounded the philosophy behind this work in Aucour 
<i*un netit livre and -also published -Le■Quatrième Evangile. — Pius X inter­
vened and, through Cardinal Merry Del 7al, indexed all of Loisy's extant 
works (l6th December I903), Loisy's Simples Réflexions (19O8) and Les 
Evangiles Synoptiques (2 vols., I907-I9O8) brought about his excommunication 
on 7th March I9O8, From I909 until his retirement in 1950 Loisy followed
Renan by becoming Professor of the History of Religions at the College de 
Loisy's L'Evangile et l'Eglise is primarily an attack on liberal
2France •
1. He appeared to rediscover this faith later in life: see, e.g., Y a-t-il deux Sources (Nourry, 1953)*
2. Biographies on Loisy include P. Lagrange's M. Loisy et le modernisme (1932), A.'Houtin and P. Sartiaux’s Alfred Loisy; sa vie, son oeuvre (I960) and R. de Boyer de Sainte Suzanne’s Alfred Loisy entre la foi et 1'incroyance (1968). Loisy's autobiography is recounted in Mémoires [3 vols., I93O-I931) and Choses passées (1913)*
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Protestantism and argu.es in favour of the Catholic Church as the receptacle 
of the body of tradition. But,in addition, he calls for reform of exe­
getical method and of the official theology and dogma, in the Church,
He made a distinction between historical facts and the stories of the 
Gospels, most importantly limiting Christ's knowledge to the purely human. 
In other words, Christ knew nothing of his divine mission and did not 
institute a Church,
Loisy was an admirer of E. Renan and his attitude to the Church 
resembled Renan's:
La doctrine catholique .,. est un edifice régulier dont toutes les parties s'appuient mutuellement, splendide cathédrale dont le défaut essentiel, comme le disait Renan, est l'insuffisance des fondations (Choses passées,Minerva GlvIBH, 1913, p. 28).
He follov/ed Renan's lectures at the Collège de France assiduously between
\1882 and 1885 and said of him: "A aucun titre je ne prétendais etre son
successeur; mais il pouvait m'ètre un modèle utile à suivre en beaucoup
de choses" (p. 375)» Further, Loisy adopted Renan's 'idée maîtresse',
which he explains as follows:
Comme philosophe, Renan estimait que ce qu'il y a de plus consistant dans la religion est l'idéal moral qu'elle soutient, et que cet idéal, toujours perfectible, est immortel (p. 374)*
Renan’s respect for the positive sciences,and belief that all knowledge 
could be rendered by them, also influenced Loisy. His reason for doubting 
the testimonies of St. Augustine, Pascal and Bossuet was because "ces hcznes 
éminents n'avaient pas vécu au XIXe siècle,et ... on savait pas du tout 
comment aurait pu tourner un Biaise Pascal contemporain d'Ernest Renan"
(p. 37).
Loisy'8 opposition to Thomas Aquinas was a matter of temperament 
rather than reasoned logic; in his ovm words, studies in Thomism "me
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firent l’effet d’une vaste logomachie" (p. 43)* In truth, Loisy’s 
taste and capacity for abstract ideas was limited. He himself admitted 
that:
Je répugne a l’idéologie, aux spéculations creuses, à la scolastique embrouaaillée qui s’efforce à sauver de vieilles formules en l«s sondant vaille que vaille aux données de l'expérience (Mémoires, III, Nourry,
1931, pp. 366-567).
He did respect ’scientific’ reasoning, based on the experimental method,
but disliked ’metaphysical’ reasoning: .
Je goute fort les essais de philosophie scientifique, de spéculation savante (ibid.).
Loisy wrote to LeRoy about his article "Qu'est-ce qu’un dogme?" on
9th May 1907. After initial compliments, he went on:
Votre doctrine de la résurrection est un beau poème: est-ce qutre chose qu’un poème? Votre philosophie de la connaissance est d’un grand intérêt; est-ceautre chose qu'un brillant essai, peut-être un système,dont il ne faudrait pas trop faire dépendre les croyances morales? Mais défions-nous de reconstituer, en labaptisant philosophie de l’action, une métaphysique moins logiquement déduite mais plus obscure que l’anciemie (Mémoires, II, p. 52l).
Later, he simply dismisses LeRoy's philosophy as "un beau poème" (p. 62C)^. j'4
Loisy also read Laberthonniere's Le Réalisme chrétien but,here again, |
he disliked any metaphysical assertions in it:
Cela prouve que la foi est la foi et la science est la science, mais non pas que l'une soit plus vraie que l’autre, ni surtout que la foi soit autorisée à conclure ... à la réalité pliysique et matérielle de données telles que la conception virginale et la résurrection du Clirist (Mémoires, III, Nourry, 1931,
p. 307).
1, This article was recommended to Loisy by Von ïïügel, He met LeRoy and Laberthonnière (with Jacques Chevalier) just once on 12th April 1907 at LeRoy's home (see Mémoires, II, p. 517? and Quelques Lettres sur des questions actuelles, Ceffonds, Haute Marne, I9O8, pp. 75-71. Farther letters to LeRoy are reprinted in the last-named work.
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1Loisy's real affinity is with the positivists • Like them, he sees 1
an antithesis between the data of faith and science: &
Cette antithèse absolue de la science et de^la théologie Jest expressément affirmée dans l’Encyclique : *Qu’à %cette nouvelle science faussement nommée on oppose cette >(science) ontique et vraie que l’Eglise a reçue du Christ par les apôtres’, - Ainsi Jésus a transmis à ses %disciples et par eux à l'Eglise, à l'Eglise romaine, t■ une science supérieure à toute science (p. 303)• J
Loisy's attitude to Bergson is. ambivalent. He liked him for his 'positivism' 4
his scientific analysis of sense data - and also because in place of dogma j
he placed the movement and mystery of life:
J'admire très sincèrement Bergson, parce qu’il a fait 1un chef d'oeuvre, l'Evolution Créatrice, en tâchant desaisir le mouvement vital de 1'univers. Oui cela est Vtrès beau, beau de puissance et de sincérité, beau parce •que Bergson ne dogmatise pas ... Toute philosophie vraie !n'est qu’un essai (Mémoires, III, pp. 366-567? June I9I8). ^
j
Loisy came to dislike Bergson's metaphysical flights and his specific |
conclusions about the nature of the Universe. Bergson, for his part, |
* thought that Loisy lacked a sense of the divine: "ce sens manque entièrement, |
il semble, à Loisy" (Entretiens avec Bergson, J, Chevalier, Pion, 1959» - %
p. 190). Bergson's view is not really accurate, for Loisy did indeed i
have a sense of the mystery of life and the idea of a world soul in a |
process of becoming held some appeal for him; he was a thorough-going 7
progressivist in his early works and believed that human.intelligence 
would gradually become more penetrating and wide-ranging, capable of *
solving all kinds of problems: "II n'est point exact de dire que 1'homme .i
est intelligent; il le devient. L’intelligence n'est pas un absolu, f
elle se fait" (Mémoires, III, p. 419)* 'k
1. Especially Dur^kheim, Renan and Comte, to whom he often refers.
2. i.e., Pascendi.
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Loisy’s views on L'jlyolution Créatrice are also expressed in a
letter to Raymond Boyer de Sainte Suzanne on^27th Febnmry IQIS^:
Ce n'est pas Lieu, an sens chrétien du mot, qu'on -trouve dans l'Evolution Créatrice mais l'infinie poussée de l'esprit; cette poussée a son flux et son reflux ... Si le mot panthéisme a encore un sens, cela est une forme de panthéisme (p. 186).
Loisy approved of Bergson's'critique of the intelligence and liked the I
idea that its formulations were inexact representations of the real, ï;
He then returns to 'intuition' but interprets the word quite differently <
from Bergsons -■
Seulement, j'appelle foi ce qu'il appelle intuition >parce que ce dont il s'agit me semble être un pressenti­ment profond des réalités plutôt qu'une perception Idéfinie (p. 187). )
As to Bergson's cosmogony, Loisy sympathised with the notion of "1'immense •:
poussée de force qui's'épanouit en vie" (p. 187), but claimed ignorance on î
the topic of an opposition between matter and life; ”11 me semble qu'à I
ces limites, on ne sait plus, et pour ma part, je confesse mon ignorance" -f
(p. 167). i
However, Loisy did not or could not make his own faith explicit. He
claimed to be unable to conceive a personal God and refused to, or was unable "
to, expound his religion dogmatically: "pour oe qui est de l'expérience mys- %
tique, je tiens que le donné de cette expérience échappe à toute définition
(Mémoires, III, p. 344)* Bergson in fact accused Loisy of failing to support -
2his account of 'l'expérience mystique' with any proper 'fondement méta­
physique' (see Mémoires. Ill, p. 348, letter of 20th July 1917). Loisy
1* See Alfred Loisy entre la foi et 1'incroyance,eds, du Centurion, 1968, p. 186. Loisy read E.G. some time in 1917, according to R. Boyer de Sainte Suzanne.
2, In La Religion (Nourry, 1917)*
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retorted: "Bans une construction théorique et savante, je le veux bien,
mais pour le commun Usage, pas trop s'en faut" (p. 548)* This answer
of course does nothing to answer Bergson's criticism.
For Loisy, God was not knovm in himself through 'metaphysics', but
only in terms of human moral aspirations. In La Religion, written before
Loisy read l'Evolution Créatrice, religious feeling is very much mingled and
confused with moral sentiment. Loisy argues that "religion et morale sont,
pour nous, fondées sur la considération mystique du monde et de l'homme
lui-meme" (La Religion, Ed. 1924 Nourry, p. 6). Loisy makes a basic
assumption that religion and morality have the same source. To complicate
matters, he then interpolates a third, and foreign, element - that of
human sociability: "l'on a inféré avant nous que mysuicisme, religion,
esprit de sociabilité humaine sont originairement et par nature une seule
et même chose" (p. 1^ .). In this line of argument, Loisy was conscious
of following Comte and Renan, He maintained, like Comte, that what was
currently in the realm of mystery and 'religion' would later find its place
in 'science' once it had been analyzed and explained:
La mentalité dite mj'-stique et prélogique ... se perpétue chez beaucoup d'hommes instruits qui, apparemment, savent mettre une cloison étanche entre leur mysticisme et la • mentalité logique selon laquelle est conduit le travail de leur pensée dans l'ordre scientifique. Il faudra du temps pour amener en tous les hommes et sur toute l'économie des sociétés le règne de la mentalité rationnelle (pp. 16-17).
He assumed that,with progress in sociology and social science, human 
behaviour and religious feeling v/ill be explained in 'rational' terms 
complete with rules of conduct.
Of course, this point of view makes several assumptions: that the
religious and scientific spirit are incompatible; that religious experience 
can be adequately 'explained' by scientific descriptions; that the experi­
mental method can interpret the whole range of experience. In sum, this
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supposes religious feeling to be reducible either to a human feeling 
in the face of the unknown or, alternatively, to an expression of some­
thing to do with human relationships.
By the term 'mystical' Loisy seems to'mean simply something half- 
peroeived and half understood - an intimation. It is "un pressentiment 
de l'esprit en nous-mêmes et dans l'humanité, pressentiment que la raison 
nous aide à réaliser toujours d'une façon incomplète" (p. 29). Mysticism 
is reduced to a feeling of awe before the immensity of creation;
la religion est cette façon de révérence ... que l'homme a éprouvée devant les choses étalés autres hommes et sa propre personnalité (p. 61)
Such an attitude says nothing about the objective truth of religious
experience and very little about the specific experience of mystics. Now,
if the observer is trying to analyze God in terms of what he sees in man
or man's behaviour, he cannot expect a clear answer about the question of
God's objective existence.
In 1919, Loisy published De la discipline intellectuelle (Nourry)
at a time when he knew Bergson's Evolution Créatrice but had not read
L'Energie Spirituelle (which he saw in I920). In this work he expressed
even more scepticism about speculative enquiry:
Pas n'est besoin d'un long et minutieux examen pour s'apercevoir que notre faculté de connaître est loin d'être un instrument de précision, et que nos connais­sances n'ont jamais été, qu'elles ne sont pas, que probablement elles ne seront jamais l'expression adéquate des réalités qu'elles représentent (p. 7)*
But Loisy in this book separated the progress of intellectual knowledge 
from progress in the moral sphere. This vms a nevf departure for him;
1. Bergson read La Religion on its publication, in 1917 (see Loisy's letter to A, Hontin in his book Alfred Loisy; sa vie, son oeuvre[e . Poulat,1960, p. 183, letter of 22nd August 191'7j). ~
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Connaissance et moralité se tiennent; la moralité ne va pas sans un sérieux exercise de l'intelligence; mais ce n'est pas la culture de l'esprit qui, par elle-même, toute seule, institue et fait grandir le sentiment de la moralité (pp. l67-l5o).
He arrived at a position akin to LeRoy's in "Qu'est-ce qu'un dogme?";
Le bien n'est pas une chose à connaître, à réaliser par la pensée dans l'intelligence, mais la chose à faire, à réaliser par la volonté dans l'action (p. 168).
Loisy's new approach was accompanied by a revitalized faith in the 'élan 
•vital', or life force. In "La Mystique", a 1924 introduction to the second 
edition of La Religion, Loisy speaks of 'L'Esprit' as the 'dynamisme' or 
'force mystérieuse' by which, as Sartiaux puts it, "est portée, réalisée 
'la machine universelle'" (Op. cit., p. 192). Sartiaux adds : "Nous
avons déjà rencontré cette sorte d'hylozoïsme dans les écrits de jeunesse 
de M. Loisy. La lecture de l'Evolution Créatrice de Bergson l'a ranimé"
(p. 252). \
The publication of Les Beux Sources, however, caused a rift between 
Loisy and Bergson which was irreparable and final. In it Bergson des­
cribed mysticism as the contact between man's spirit and an objective, 
personal God and he accepted the framework of Christian metaphysics to ' 
analyze the relationship between God and his creation. Because of this, 
Loisy was provoked to write a refutation of Bergson in Y a-t-il deux sources 
de la morale et de la religion? (Nourry, 1933). In. it he maintained that 
there was only one source of religion, which was, at bottom, a sense of 
mystery before the vast unknovm. Loisy reproached Bergson for his 'esprit 
de système' by which he attempted to "intégrer le mysticisme comme élément 
ou partie dans une synthèse de caractère purement philosophique, dans une 
métaphysique de l'être universel" (pp. 189-190), For loisy, mysticism is 
"essentiellement autre chose que la métaphysique" (p. I90). Metaph/sico, 
on the other hand, is "une spéculation qui, s'élevant au-dessus du réel
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observé, recherche les causes premières des choses, plus exactement le
premier principe de l'univers" (p. 178). The soul of religion, of
morality and of mysticism is one;
1'intuition diffuse dans notre espèce et culminant dans les grands nystiques et les initiateurs des grands mouvements religieux, de l'esprit qui est caché et révélé dans le mystère du monde et le mystère de l'humanité (pp. 177-178).
Thus, although Loisy had a strong moral sense, he had no inclination to
accept the dogma of the Catholic Church;
c’est le caractère transcendant, métaphysique de sa théorie qui a induit Bergson à couronner cette théorie par une solution du problème religieux que nous autres [Bremond and Loisy] historiens^des religions et de la religion ne saurions admettre (p. 186).
Superficially, it woctld appear that Loisy was only prepared to consider
seriously the facts of religious behaviour in a social context. However,
he betrays his own principles, for in Y a-t-il deux sources he develops
a hypothetical and speculative theory about the histoiy of religious
2practices, attempting to prove with the flimsiest of evidence that 
Christian doctrine had been derived entirely ffom earlier religious 
mythologj'-. The central concepts of personal immortality and of the 
resurrection of Christ are supposed to have been adquired from pre­
existing tales and ideas. These in turn were originally derived from 
the observation of natural phenomena;
Dans les cultes méditerranéens, cette croyance fut surtout en connexion avec le service de dieiuc jadis morts et ressuscites, esprits de la végé^tion mués en divinités agraires, dont le renouveau printanier avait fini par être interprété pour l'immortalité.
1. The fact that Bremond wrote the two-volume La Métaphysique des Saints does not seem to effect Loisy's judgement!
2. See the refutation of this theory in Theories of primitive religion by Professor Evans-Pritchard (O.U.P,, 1965)'.'
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Le mystère chrétien du salut résulte, pour l'historien, d'une combinaison réalisée entre cette conception et le monothéisme juif (pp. 127-128).
Loisy's argument is open to the objection that his own explanation 
of religious experience and the formation of dogma is as much an unproven 
hypothesis, as much a speculative theory, as Bergson's or the Thomists'.
He leaves out of account the historical events of the Gospels in order 
to propose a continuity between Eastern cults and Christianity which is 
highly dubious. He fails to see any novelty in Christianity or its 
message. Par from being a 'scientific' or 'historical' view, Loisy's 
is prejudiced and a priori in the extreme. Loisy makes a pretence of 
disliking speculative thought and yet indulges in it.
LeRoy and Laberthonniere, by way of contrast, are most concerned 
to demonstrate their fidelity to the primitive Christian faith, and it 
is their conception bf this that places them in opposition to the contem­
porary Church hierarchy. But Loisy is both anti-clerical and heretical.
His attitude to the Church and its dogma is antipathetic;
L'Eglise fait gaspillage de nobles vies, de forces intellectuelles et morales qui lui sont offertes avec un entier dévouement ... elle étouffe, étrangle, sacrifie sans scrupule à sa chimère d'orthodoxie et aux fantaisies de sa domination tyrjfanâque (Mémoires,I, 1930, p. 47).
This leaves us in no doubt as to why he was condemned.
The condemnation of LeRoy and Laberthonniere is more difficult to 
understand. Both of them, following a monastic ideal, saw the Bible and 
Tradition as instruments in their quest to reach the source of Christianity 
as a living faith. Consequently, they were not concerned with explaining 
dogmas and drawing conclusions by means of dialectic in the manner of the 
Scholastics - they were concerned with the need for salvation, the reconciliation 
of man to God and the supernatural life. Their method in philosophy was not
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analytical, proceeding from point to point, but synthetic, having in 
mind the vfhole person and his destiny. It was characterized by an 
emphasis on experience, whereas scholastic philosophy emphasized specu­
lation and abstraction.
Loisy's ideas were not in line with either aim. He felt an 
equal distaste for both insofar as they presumed knowledge of a 
transcendent God to be possible. And yet he imagined that a respect
for science dictated his ovm attitude. This v/as not the case, for his
own position involved presuppositions requiring explanation and justifi­
cation just as much as the position of the 'dogmatists'. He intended 
to draw men away from metaphysical flights to a down-to-earth respect 
for human dignity and brotherhood and yet ended by making a religion of 
humanity comparable with, that of Auguste Comte:
A l'heure présente, société des nations et religion de l'humanité ne sont encore un idéal assez lointain.Cet accomplissement ne_ sera pas -l'oeuvre d'un j our nid'une génération, ce sera l'oeuvre d'une époque main­tenant commencée (Y a-t-il deux sources de la moralité et la religion?, p. 19l). ~
The application of a single term like 'modernist' to describe writers 
as different and diverse as LeRoy, Laberthonniere and Loisy not only 
seems to be a loose and inaccurate use of language; it also gives the 
impression that there was a movement, a unity of aim and ideal among the 
protagonists. Such a unity was quite fictitious.
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CHAPTER SIX
BERGSON AND BLONDEL; THE UNIFICATION OF LIFE IK COB
Maurice Blondel (1861-1949) was a contemporary of Bergson and
cannot rightly he considered as a disciple. His own L'Action (P.U.F,,
1895), which contains the basis of all his later approach to philosophy
and Christianity, was published four years after Bergson's L*Essai (iccp);
but at the time Blondel was not acquainted with Bergson's work. He wrote:
Quant à m'inspirer de Bergson, je l'ai pu d'autant moins que je n'avais pas lu une ligne de lui avantd'achever et de soutenir ma thèse ... (L'Itinérairephilosophique de Maurice Blondel, Sues, 1928, p. 47)• 'i
7In fact, Blondel had worked out the theme and aim of L'Action by 1889 or 
earlier, as evidenced by this statement in his Carnets Intimes :^\ ' IC'est notre nature de vouloir le bien et d'y tendre;et c'est un fait que nous n'y réussissons point par 1nos seules forces; preuve d'un trouble profond et rd'un renversement de l'économie humaine. En sorte |que vivre selon notre nature est surnaturel; et quela destinée de l'homme est vraiment surhumaine ... î(written 8.4.1889, p. 197).
The presuppositions in this statement of intent highlight the difference 7
between Blondel's and Bergson's aims. Bergson's philosophy was intended 7i2to be a process of discovery from a position of ^  presuppositions .
Blondel and Bergson never did become friends, although they met at the 
Société française de philosophie^ and the Académie des Sciences morales et
1. Ed. du Cerf, I96I, :î2. This is not to say that Blondel's philosophy assumes a priori specu- &lative ideas about the world; simply that he already regards the demands of an Absolute in one's inner life as a fact of experience.Bergson makes no such assumptions.
5, See the account of a discussion between the two men on 1st July 19f9in Mélanges, pp. 796-797* I
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p o l i t i q u e s ,  o f  w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  b o t h  m e m b e r s .
B l o n d e l  w a s  b o m  a n d  e d u c a t e d  a t  D i j o n  a n d  o b t a i n e d  h i s  l i c e n c e  
e s  l e t t r e s  i n  p h i l o s o p h y  o n  14t h  J u l y  1 8 8 0  a n d  t h e n  b e c a m e  b a c h e l i e r  
ê s  s c i e n c e s  o n  2 8 t h  J u l y  1 8 8 0 .  H e  e n t e r e d  t h e  E c o l e  N o r m a l e  j u s t  
a f t e r  B e r g s o n  h a d  l e f t  i t  b u t ,  l i k e  B e r g s o n ,  c a m e  u n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  
o f  t e a c h e r s  s u c h  a s  L ,  O l l e - L a p r u n e , E .  B o u t r o u x  a n d  V .  D e l b o s .
B l o n d e l  f a i l e d  h i s  A g r é g a t i o n  i n  N o v e m b e r  I 884 a n d  w e n t  t o  I t a l y  f o r  a  
w h i l e ,  r e t u r n i n g  t o  r e - s i t  h i s  e x a m i n a t i o n s ,  o n l y  t o  f a i l  a  s e c o n d  t i m e  
( A u g u s t  I 885) .  H e  t h e n  t a u g h t  a t  t h e  L y c é e s  d e  G h a u m o n t  a n d  M o n t a u b a n  ;>
a n d  f i n a l l y  p a s s e d  t h e  A g r é g a t i o n  i n  A u g u s t  I 896. H e  m o v e d  t o  t h e  L y c é e  
M i g n e t  i n  A i x - e n - P r o v e n c e  i n  O c t o b e r  1 8 8 6 .  B e t w e e n  I 89I  a n d -  1 8 9 2 ,  h e
spent a sabbatical year preparing his thesis, L'Action, with the accompany- |
1ing Latin work on Leibniz's idea of a 'vinculum substantiale' . Action
was considered to b^'an unfit subject for philosophical enquiry by some“, ÿ
but the thesis was completed on 28th October 1892 and was defended by
Blondel at the Sorbonne on 7th June 1895. It was published in November.
Blondel had his reward for diligence and tenacity - recognition of his Ï
original contribution to philosophy followed soon afterwards.
%Blondel married Rose Royer in December 1894 » then in 1895 became 
Maitre de Conférences at the Faculté des Lettres of Lille University.
He also took courses at Aix-Marseille University from Docember I896 onwards, |
1. The full title of the Latin thesis was De vinculo substantiali et de substantia comnosita anud Leibnitium (l895). The French version was called Une énigme historique; le 'Vinculum Substantiale' d'arris Leibniz (P.Ü.F,I950)* Blohdel's studies were conducted at the g Collège Stanislas.
2. See the aocoimt in Etudes blondéliennes I (P,U.F.,' 1951) - "Une soutenance de thèse" by J. Paliard and P. Archambuult.
5 . The Blondels had 5 children, but Mme. Blondel died on 7th March 191?.
accused of Modernism^ Kantianism, anti-intellectualism, fideism and 
2naturalism . He did not, however, deserve any of these epithets and 
refused to subscribe to any party line or movement except Catholicism 
itself. His basic aim was to answer the question which opens L'Action
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before becoming Professeur Adjoint there on 4th December 1897 and, 
finally, Professeur Titulaire in January 1899. He remained at Aix 
until his retirement in 1927, due to failing sight. Meanwhile, in 
August 1906, he had bought up the Annales de Philosophie chrétienne 
and appointed Laberthonniere as editor in chief. The Annales were 
later placed on the Index, but Blondel was never personally condemned 
in any of his writings. Blondel's definitive philosophical statement 
appeared between 1934 and 1937 in the form of a trilogy; La Pensée (2 
vols., 1954), L'Etre et les êtres (l935) and L'Action (1956, 1937).
Blondel appended two further volumes to these, entitled La Philosophie |
et l'Esprit chrétien (1944, 1946). Blondel died, aged 88,on 4th June 1949^- 
Blondel's writings were confronted by continuous and sometimes scur­
rilous opposition from inside and outside the Catholic Church. He was
i f
1. Blondel wrote copiously during his long lifetime and abibliography complete to. 1951 has been compiled by A, Hayen (Bibliographie blondelienne 1888-1951), while A.'Costa has added the years 1951-1961 to the list of published works,(Teorisi, Catania, No. 17 [1962], pp. 294-320), bringing the total number of entries to 13941 Since 1962 a considerable amount of Blondel's correspondence has been published - , with Teilhard de Chardin (Beauchesne, I965); with A. Valensin (2. vols. I899-I912, Aubier, 1957; Vol. 3 1912-1947, Aubier, I965) and with J. Wehrle (2 vols.. Aubier, I969), All these are edited by H. De Lubac. The correspondence with Laberthonnière (Corres­pondance philosophique. Ed. du Seuil, I961) is edited by C. Tresmor.tantand that with H. Bremond (5 vols., Aubier, 1970-1971) by A. Blanches,René Marié's Au Coeur de la Crise Moderniste (Aubier, I960) also Acontains a large amount of Blondel's correspondence.
2. Bouillard H. discusses these charges in detail in Blondel et leChristianisme (Ed. du Seuil, I961). %
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(1893): "Oui ou non, la vie humaine a-t-elle un sens, 1'homme a-t-il |I
une destinée?". He wished to demonstrate that intellectual and moral 
honesty demanded an affirmative response. He would then proceed to 
examine the consequences of that response and the possibility of man's 
fulfilment of his destiny. This -whole project, aimed at freethinkers 
and rationalists, had Blondel embroiled in most of the major theological 
controversies of his time.
To begin with, in 1896, Blondel entered an argument over the methods 
in apologetics with his Lettre  ^attacking M-B. Schv/alm's article, "L'Acte
jde foi est-il raisonnable?" (Revue Thomiste, March 1896). Schwalm'a ' |
reaction was swift and scathing. In "Les illusions de 1'idéalisme et %
leurs dangers pour la foi" (Revue Thomiste, September 1896) he called %I
Blondel's Lettre "l'essai hardi du jeune apologise néo-kantien" (p. 415) |%
and added: "La 'métèode de la philosophie',pour [Blondel], c'est la
méthode kantienne poussée à ses dernières conséquences phénoménistes"
(p. 413). The conclusion to Schwalm's study is that Blondel's study 
"fourmille de propositions hérétiques, erronnées ou téméraires" (p. 440)*
Sohwalm followed this article with one called "L'Apologétique contemporaine 
doit-elle adopter une méthode nouvelle?" (Revue Thomiste, March 1897) and 
the charge of 'immanence' is added to the others. He argues that for 
Blondel:
1 ' immanence inclut une pensée lÉfné ce s sainement emmurée dans le phénoménisme le plus pur de la connaissance et de l'action ... Il est donc rigoureusement légitime de dénier à la raison pure, usant de cette doctrine, l'affirmation d'une réalité quelconque, y compris son
1. Pull title; "Lettre sur les exigences de la penseé^contemporaine en matière d'apologétique et sur la méthode de la philosophie dans l'étude du problème religieux" (I896: now in Blondel: Les -premiersécrits, II, P.U.P., 1956).
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dynamisme meme, .C’est l’immanence absolue de la pensée ... (p. 37).
These articles set the tone for all subsequent criticism, but it is 
especially noteworthy that the criticisms made of Blondel were pre­
cisely those levelled at Bergson.
Blondel entered the modernist debate through writing "Histoire 
et Dogme" in La Quinzaine (1904: reprinted in Premiers Ecrits, II,
P.U.P., 1956). It was intended to be a reply to Loisy's L’Evangile 
et l’Eglise (1902). Blondel also attacked LeRoy in the article "Le 
rôle et la notion du miracle" (pseudonym Bernards de Sailly; Annales-,
July 1907, pp. 337-362)^ . He upheld the possibility of a separate 
supernatural realm which could not be incorporated into nature. On 
the contrary, nature would have to be drawn up into the realm of grace 
by God; \
MiraOle et surnaturel ne.sont-pas-simplement un 'épanouissement suprême de la nature, un retour . aux conditions parfaites de la vie spirituelle, une liberté affranchie des routines et victoires de l’automatisme matériel, une communication du Dieu transcendant, un triomphe de la puissance . métaphysique par Lui en nous et par nous dans les choses. Le surnaturel est quelque chose d’anormal, une dérogation positive ... (p. 546).
The encyclical Pascendi condemned the philosophy of ’immanence’ in
two senses but allowed a third usage which was admissible. The heresies
would be either to assimilate God’s action-to the action of nature or to
identify the two, as a pantheist might. The third usage infers that God
is more present to man then he is to himself and yet transcends him:
1. Blondel was also acquainted with the modernists P. Van Hügel (from 1895) and L. Laberthonniere (from I894). For details of Blondel's relations with the modernists, see the introduction to The Letter on ■ogetics by I. Trethowan and A. Dru (Harvill Press, N.Y., 19647*
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Sunt qui in eo collocant, quod Deus agens intime adsit in homine, magis quam ipse sibi homo; quod plane, si recte intelligitur, reprehensionem non habet (Denzinger,Freiburg, I967, col, 2087),
Blondel claimed this latter definition as his ovm and insisted that it
maintained "la presence en nous d'une grâce ou prévenante ou inhabitante
sans laquelle nous ne pouvons rien dans l'ordpe de la foi et du salut et
qu'implique toute conversion, toute vie chrétienne" (L'Itinéraire,■p. lOO)^,
Blondel's consistent use of this Augustinian concept of 'immanence' geans
that, as J. Rivière put it, "rien n'est plus injuste que de mettre [Blondel]
comme on le fait assez communément, au nombre des modernistes" (Le modernisée
dans l'Eglise, Letouzey et Ane, 1929, p. 122). For Blondel, the supernatural
is not dependent of man's feelings or attitudes - it exists independently;
moreover, it cannot be grasped fully either by reason or via moral or
spiritual intuition:'*'
Est surnaturel ... ce qui, procédant d'une correspondance gratuite de Dieu, élève la créature intelligente à un état qui ne saurait être réalisé, ni mérité, ni meme conçu expressément par aucune force naturelle: car il s'agitde la comrminioation de l'intime vie divine ... vérité impénétrable à toute vue philosophique, d'un bien supérieur à toute aspiration de la volonté (Letter to A, Valensin. of 19.12.1919, Blondel-Teilhard de Chardin: Correspondance,Beauchesne, I965, p. 4l)«
A third area of controversy surrounded the periodical L'Action Française 
run by Charles Lîaurras, Its right-wing views were supported by certain neo- 
Thoraists,such as Cardinal Billot and Humbert Clérissac, O.P. Blondel at­
tacked the atheistic management and extremist politics of the magazine in La. 
Semaine Sociale de Bordeaux et le Honophorisme (pseudonym 'Testis', Bloud et 
Gay, 1910)^ . Pedro Descoqs, S.J., then in turn defended L'Action Française
1. L'Itinéraire philosophique de Maurice Blondel, Textes présentés par F, Lefèvre (Spes, 192b),
2. Originally articles in Annales, October 1909-May I9IO.
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against Blondel in his Monophorisme et l’Action Française (Beauchesne, *•I1913). Î
In spite of his protestations of orthodoxy, the opposition to 
Blondel was unahated, but Cardinal Perraud and Père Lepidi, Maitre du 
Sacre Palais, spoke to Leo XIII on Blondel's behalf, and in .1895 the 
Pope gave an audience to Blondel, exhorting him to continue teaching #
his 'buone philosophie (sic) sans grief aucun' (L'Itinéraire, p, 99)* I
Later, Pius X also received Blondel (on 5th llaj 1924) and assured him ÿ
of his support, adding: "Que vos étudiants s'inspirent de votre esprit" i
(p. 102). This did not silence the critics,however. *IMuch of the opposition to Blondel was aroused because of his anta- |
gonism to scholasticism. He considered that the scholastics failed |
to realize the importance of psychology: '
\ Ï... 1 * idéologie'scolastique dont on reste exclusivement ;pèhetre ne comporte pas 1'étude de la psychologie reli- ïgieuse ni des faits subjectifs qui exprime à la-con- ?science l'action des réalités objectives dont la Révé- .lation nous indique la présence en nous (Blondel-Wehrlé: îCorrespondance, 22.9.07, p. 581).
The importance of the psychological approach to religion is taken to 
’^ I
its logical conclusion by Blondel in L'Action and by Bergson in Les Beux 4
Sources and consists in its emphasis on the necessity for the will to reach Ithe true object of its desire; this is explained succinctly by Blondel as J
follows:
le surnaturel ne reside pas dans une connaissance méta­physique, fût-elle la vue du role ontologique du médiateur; il réside dans une relation, dans un pacte d'amour qui crée un nouveau règne de grace, de libre intimité, de prédilection amissible et inégale (id., 8.3.03, p. 175).
According to Blondel, the lack of clear psychological explanation in
scholasticism ruins a true understanding of the role of %e dogma and of
the place of the supernatural, for in the scholastic system both are described
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in terms of externals arbitrarily imposed from the outside:
God, fixed largely in the realm of supernature, cannot be knovm except by
analogy. In neo-Thomism, says Blondel, "seule la révélation nous donne
une. connaissance positive ..." ("La notion et le rôle du miracle", Annales,
No, 4> 1907, p. 546) Scholasticism thus easily degenerates into a form
of agnosticism, or, even worse, arid intellectualism. Such neo-Thomism
is a philosophy of concepts,hard and separate like marbles:
le thomisme apparaît à beaucoup comme une description exacte, mais, si je puis dire, statique, comme une super­position d'éléments ..." (Lettre, p. 27).
Blondel did later retreat from this bold position of animosity towards 
neo-Thomism and in his trilogy attempted to synthesize the scholastic and 
Augustinian approaches. However, these early arguments were never corrected 
and did not miss their target. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind 
that Blondel envisaged the rationalist Aristotelean interpretation of 
Aquinas prevalent at the turn of the century.
The Catholic opposition to Blondel can be traced to many of the ver^ / 
people who attacked Bergson. ■ Tv;o of the protagonists were in fact 
Jacques Maritain and Joseph de Tonquedec, S.J. Tonquédec wrote a 
full-length work based on the false premise that Blondel supported a
L'obligation d'etre chrétien ne naît que du commandement édicté du dehors, transmis et présenté par des signes extérieurs. Il n'y a point de science de la prépara­tion intérieure et subjective, et la notion de 1'Ame de l'Eglise indépendante de son corns est un mystère incom­préhensible (Lettres philosophiques. Aubier, I96I, p. 155> |italics in original).
The relationship between nature and the supernatural likewise becomes ï
an unfathomable mystery: , .
Pour les scolastiques, les deux ordres ... subordonnés en une hiérarchie ascendante se superposaient en se touchant et en communiquant, mais en restant extérieurs l'un à l'autre (p. 55).
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d o c t r i n e  o f  i m a n e n c e  ( i m m a n e n c e , B e a u c h e s n e ,  2 n d  e d .  1 9 1 5 ) .  T o n q u e d e c  
c o m p l a i n s  t h a t ,  f o r  B l o n d e ] ,  " i l  n e  p e u t  ê t r e  q u e s t i o n  d e  d é m o n t r e r  
s p é c u l a t i v e m e n t  l ' e x i s t e n c e  d e  D i e u ,  l a  r é a l i t é  d u  s u r n a t u r e l ,  l e  f a i t  
d ' u n e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  d i v i n e  . . . "  ( p .  2 8 ) .  T h i s  a n t i - i n t e l l e o t u a l i s m ,  h e  
a r g u e s ,  i s  c o m m o n  t o  " l e s  s y s t è m e s  p h i l o s o p h i q u e s  q u i  c o m b i n e n t  l ' i d é a l i s m e  
a v e c  l e s  i d é e s  b e r g s o n i e n n e s  s u r  l e  ' m o r c e l a g e ' .  N o n  s e u l e m e n t  l a  p e n s é e  
e s t  l a  r é a l i t é  u n i q u e ,  m a i s  i l  n ' y  a  p a s  d e  d i v i s i o n  d a n s  l a  p e n s é e , -  p a s  
d ' é t a t s  d e  c o n s c i e n c e  a d é q u a t e m e n t  d i s t i n c t s "  ( p .  6 ) ,  A c c o r d i n g  t o  
T o n q u é d e c ,  B l o n d e l ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  ' i m m a n e n c e ' " e s t  s y n o n y m e  d e  c o n n e x i o n  
i n t r i n s è q u e ,  i n d i s s o l u b l e  . . .  u n e  c o m p é n é t r a t i o n  o ù  [ l e s  e s s e n c e s ]  
s ' e n c h a î n e n t  e t  s e  s o u t i e n n e n t  p a r  d e s  r a p p o r t s  n é c e s s a i r e s  .
( p p .  1 1 - 1 2 ) .
T h i s  i s  b y  n o  m e a n s  B l o n d e l ' s  i d e a .  T h e  m y s t i c  s t a t e  o f  u n i o n  w i t h
G o d  i s  t h e  l i f t i n g  o f ‘t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  i n t o  a  n e w  s t a t e ;
L i b é r é  d e s  p a r t i a l i t é s  d e  n o s  c o n n a i s s a n c e s  p r é s e n t e s ,  - l e  m y s t i c i s m e  e s t  é l e v é  ( p a r f o i s  j u s q u ' e n  s a  v i e  o r g a n i q u e ,  s e n s i b l e ,  i n t e l l e c t u e l l e ) ,  e n  u n  é t a t  d ' u n i t é  e t  d e  c o n f o r m i t é  d i v i n e  ( " L e  p r o b l è m e  d el a  m y s t i q u e " ,  C a h i e r s  d e  l a  N o u v e l l e  J o u r n é e , N o .  5 >
[ 1925],, p .  52) .
M a r i t a i n  a l s o  s e e m s  t o  d e s i r e  a  m a r r i a g e  o f  B l o n d e l ' s  a n d  B e r g s o n ' s
d o c t r i n e s ,  f i n d i n g  t h e  c o m m o n  g r o u n d  i n  t h e i r  ' a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m ' :
M ,  B l o n d e l  p r e n d  l e  c o n c e p t  p o u r  u n  p o r t r a i t ,  u n  d o u b l e t  a r t i f i c i e l ,  u n  s u c c é d a n é ,  u n e  é f f i g i e  . . .  E n  r é a l i t é ,  l ’ i d é e ,  l e  c o n c e p t  o u  l a  n o t i o n ,  n ' e s t , p a s  l a  c h o s e  v u e ,  c ' e s t  l e  m o y e n  d e  v o i r ,  c ' e s t  . . .  u n  s i g n e  f o r m e l  d o n t  l a  n a t u r e  e s t  d e  s i g n i f i e r  ( " L ' I n t e l l i g e n c e  d ' a p r è s  M .  B l o n d e l " ,  R e v u e  d e  n h i l o s o u h i e . V o l .  50, 1 9 2 5 ,
p p .  353- 354) .
B l o n d e l ' s  v i e w s  a r e  i n  f a c t  m o r e  c o m p l e t  t h a n  t h i s  a n d  w i l l  b e  o u t l i n e d  
s h o r t l y ,  b u t  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a n  e a r l y  t e n d e n c y  f o r  B l o n d e ]  
a n d  B e r g s o n  t o  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  t o g e t h e r  b e c a u s e  o f  c e r t a i n  s u p e r f i c i a l  
r e s e m b l a n c e s .  S u c h  a  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  t w o  m e n  f i n d s  a  g o o d  e x p r e s s i o n
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'-1r-
in the article by Jourdain Messaut, O.P., entitled "Le'rêle intellectuel 
de la 
386):
théologie dans l'apostolat" (Revue Thomiste, Vol. 18, 1935? PP* 330- £
Les trois grands penseurs contemporains qui représentent l'anti-intellectualisme et exercent à des degrés divers 
\me influence sur les esprits théo logique s sont MM, 4Bergson, BrunscLrvicg et Blondel (p. 332). ■
Messaut indeed attempts to define 'anti-intellectual' in this context as 
"une même conception méoaniste de 1'intelligence, faculté 'fabricatrice* >
de concept - et dans une même conception matérielle du concept, image 4
photographique du réel" (p. 340). The error at the root of all three 
philosophical systems consists, for him, in "la négation de la vitalité ■?
i
iI
de l'intelligence" (p. 340, italics in original).
Before proceeding further on this matter it is essential to realize
that, although Bergsbn and Blondel are placed together by others, there
was little direct influence either way. That they arrived at certain
similar conclusions is more a reaction to the rigid intellectualism of
their day than a mutual admiration or respect. Blondel*s direct influences
were from two main sources; the German idealist tradition and the patristic
tradition of the church* He particularly appreciated Spinoza, Fichte,
Kant and Hegel on the one hand and St. Paul, St. Augustine and St, Bernard
of Clairvaux on the other. The Germanic influence is explored in great
detail by J.J, HacNeill, S.J., in The Blondelian Synthesis (E.J. Brill,
Leiden, I966) and Hegel's influence alone is examined by P. Henrici in
Hegel und Blondel (Verlag Berchmauskolleg, 1958) and also by Etienne Borne
in Passion de la vérité (A. Fayard, 19&2). Of the church fathers Blondel
himself wrote:
La lecture de S, Bernard et la pratique du Nouveau Testament, ^articulièiement de S, Paul, m'ont aidé, dès le début et constamment, à me trouver dépaysé
»
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2. See Bergson et Plotin, R-LÎ. Mosse-Bastide (P.U.P., 1959)»
5* See "Bergson et Maine de Biran" by H* Gouhier, Etudes bergsoniennes I (1948)' The connection between Blondel's and Maine's thought is analyzed fey A, Biu in the introduction to The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma (Harvill Press, N.Y., I964)'.
dans notre monde intellectuel ... (L'Itinéraire, p. 42)^ .
Blondel does, however, make mention of more modern influences, including î|
Pascal, Spinoza and T. Delbos (p. 46), while Maine de Biran came to his 
notice through A. Bertrand at the Lycée de Dijon and H. Joly led him from 
legal studies "pour m'attacher d'abord à Leibniz et aux charmes secrets 
du Vinculum Substantiale (c'est même là une des cellules-mères de ma 
pensée)" (pp. 56-57),
It is worth noting that Blondel shared certaip. influences in common
with Bergson; notably neo-Platonist influences - Plotinus in Bergson's
2 3case , Augustine in Blondel's and Maine de Biran in both . Perhaps
this neo-Platonist influence emerges most clearly in Blondel's and
Bergson's re-emphasis on experience of the self and in their common
desire to find an explanation for the unity of life and of the personality
\açiidst so many heterogeneous and disparate elements.
V/hat then did Blondel think of Bergson's philosophy? He first
read Bergson in March 1897, four years after completion of L'Aotion,
He commented in the Correspondance uhllosonhiquet Blondel-Laberthonniere;
J'ai commencé à lire Bergson: c'est extrêmement neuf,
The great influence of St, Augustine on Blondel is attested to by H. Bouillard (in Blondel et le Christianisme, Bd. du Seuil,1961) and is analyzed in detail by J. Chaix-Ruy, "Maurice Blondel et saint Augustin" (in Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes, No. 11 [1965], pp. 55-84) and by Aimé Forest in "L'Augustinisme de Maurice Blondel" (Sciences Ecclésiastiques, Montréal, No. 14 [1962], pp. 175-195)* Blondel himself wrote a number of articles on Augustine and three of these appear in Blondel. I.I. Dialogues avec les philosophes.Ed. H. Gouhier (Aubier, 1966}. .
Ji
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satisfaisant; mais peut-etre ... plus anti-intellectualiste |que je ne voudrais. Car il faut tenir compte de ce fait que nous attribuons invinciblement à notre corps une |efficacité représentative; ce qui est sans doute le ressort destiné à nous faire passer par le Verbe (p. IIO).
It may seem surprising, judging from criticisms of Blondel, that
Blondel found fault with Bergson's 'anti-intellectualism'. He was $
in closer agreement with Bergson, however,over the latter's analysis
of the personality in "Introduction à la Métaphysique" (1903). Blondel
wrote to Loisy (6th February 1905) that;
la distinction de la personne métaphysique etde la personne psychologique est une de ces logomachies que Bergson, après tant d'autres, vient une fois de plus de réduire en poussière (Au coeur de la crise moderniste, H. Marié, p. 77).
Nevertheless, most of Blondel's comments on the positive teaching in
Bergson's philosophy are, in the last analysis, critical, as with this
\example from L'Itinéraire nhilosonhique;
Après-1893? c'est avec un vif plaisir que j'ai goûté la merveilleuse imagerie du philosophe-poète de l'élan vital; il me faisait songer à la, floraison printanière de la pensée ionienne, à une seconde novitas florida mundi ... Toutefois, la partie critique est souvent telle et féconde ... toute la partie positive se déroule en un plan qui me semble finalement intenable. Aussi les mots mêmes que nous employons volontiers l'un et l'autre, tels que vie, action, intelligence,etc, ... me semblent chez lui ... déracinée, désaxés et décapités, au point que 'la durée pure' et 'l'évolution créatrice' n'ont pu, après coup, que m'aider à prendre davantage conscience d'une inspiration totalement diver­gente ... (pp. 47-48, italics in original).
In his only article on Bergson^ - "La philosophie ouverte" (in
H. Bergson; Essais et Témoignages, Eds. Thévenaz & Béguin, Ed. de la
1. There are many references to Bergson's ideas elsewhere (often without a name attached) and the last part of the article "Le point de départ de la recherche philosophique" (Annales, Nos, I5I-I52 [1906], pp. 337-360, 225-230) also considers Bergson's philosophy in some detail.
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Baconnière, NeucKatel, 1943) - Blondel again praises Bergson's 
destructive work: "... sa pars destruens et purifioans [étaitJ le
premier et grand service qu'il a rendu à notre monde intellectuel", 
and had the effect of liberating it "d'un positivisme, d'un scientisme, 
d ’un rationalisme abstrait et figé, d'un formalisme emprisonnant ou d'un 
dilettantisme anarchique" (p. 75). He opened the way for metaphysical 
research. Bergson stimulated "une novation de valeurs spirituelles, un 
accès à des problèmes que la philosophie dite 'séparée' ..." (p. 75).
Obviously, Blonde], is eager to dissociate himself from the positive 
side of Bergson's work. In this respect,-his attempt to distance himself 
and retain his own independence leads him sometimes to do less than justice 
to Bergson. Thus ho argues that, whereas he [Blondel] regards the hypo­
thesis of the supernatural as all-important in his work, he considers 
Bergson to dismiss ^is idea altogether. In speaking of Bergsonism 
he comments:
s'il y a une vie religieuse et une existence supérieure, elle suppose non pas tant un prolongement qu'un change­ment d'état, non pas tant une profondeur subliminale des forces naturelles qu'une ascension spirituelle et une transfiguration morale dont aucune constatation positive des sens ou de la science ne peut déceler la réalité (itinéraire, pp. 49-50).
The criticisms Blondel makes of Bergson are normally directed at L'it.^ -olution
Créatrice,in which the concept of God is ambiguous and inchoate because
Bergson has left the religious question to one side. The common Catholic
misconception is Blondel's also; that 'l'élan vital' is commensurable with
God himself. Bergson is careful not to create an identity between the
two and adopts a similar stragey to Blondel himself,which is to distinguish
the source of action - 'l'élan vital' - from its effects in the world of
nature. Perhaps Bergson fails to make this clear in the book Itself to
the satisfaction of a theologian but in his letter to Tonquédec he describes
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God as "la source d'où sortent ... les 'courants' ou 'élans' dont 
chacun formera un monde: il en reste donc distinct" (Mélanges, p. 766, J
iLetter of 12.5.08). In Les Deux Sources he constantly implies that b
dynamic morality and religion represent something quite new, a break­
through which is initiated by an attraction from above (see Oeuvres,
pp. 1005-1004). I
?
Blondel is a more astute theologian than Bergson perhaps, and yet
he too speaks as though there were no formal incompatibility between
nature and the supernatural, even if there is no simple continuity.
Both worlds come together in action, where there is a tension between
what we will to think, desire and do and what we in fact think, desire and do -i
such that, "dans les négations factices ou les fins artificiellement voulues, i
se retrouvent encore les affirmations profondes et les besoins incoercibles
qu'elles impliquent\ (Lettre, Premiers Ecrits II, p. 606). Action in the
natural world reveals in man an exigency for the supernatural, which alone
is adequate to fulfil his deepest needs and desires;
Bref, ce que nous voulons réellement, c'est non pas ce qui est en nous, déjà réalisé, mais ce qui nous dépasse et nous commande. Quoi qu'on veuille,on veut ce qu'on 
n'est pas (L'Action,1895, pp. 155-134).
This idea is almost echoed by Bergson in "La conscience et la vie",
where he asserts that:
Visiblement une force travaille devant nous, qui cherche à se libérer de ses entraves et aussi à se dépasser elle- même, à donner d'abord tout ce qu'elle a et ensuite plus qu'elle n'a: comment définir autrement l'esprit? (pp.830-831).
However, there is a vital difference between the two ideas. A valid 
complaint about Bergson's 'élan vital' or 'esprit' is that it seems to 
imply the possibility of a self-sufficient world-order in which communion if
with God is an optional extra, a?i additional bonus, and not a necessity of i
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life. This is also the impression given in Les Deux Sources. For §
Blondel, on the other hand, man requires God and his life is not only .
unfulfilled without him, hut he is literally sub-normal: I
Pour consommer la nature et clore l'aspiration de tl'homme, l'homme et la nature ne suffisent pas ...
(L'Action,1893f p. 40l)«
... ce n'est pas seulement pour croire et pour agir, pour connaître et opérer la vérité, c'est pour remédier aux inévitables défaillances de l'action qu'un secours est essentiel à l'homme ... (p. 399).
For Blondel, it is not solely through intuitive effort, attention
or introspection that a man finds God; it is through action which unites
him as a composite whole of will and thought, body and soul. God is not
simply to be perceived, but to be chosen; it is moral action and not vision
which occupies the central position in Blondel's philosophy. Bergson 
speaks of a spiritual world which is intuited or 'perceived' as the origin 4 
of the self or of all life; but Blondel presents a largely hidden God t
* who is opted for or rejected. Once opted for, he becomes known through 
the life of faith and in the pvirification of the will. Such a choice is 
"à la fois le triomphe et le sacrifice de la volonté" (L'Action [l895]? 
p. 376). One opts either for self or for God; there is no middle v/ay:
Vouloir et ne pas pouvoir, pouvoir et ne pas vouloir, c'est l'option même qui s'offre à la liberté: 's'aimerjusqu'au mépris de Dieu, aimer Dieu jusqu'au mépris de 
soi' (p. 355).
%
This choice is presented as a necessity of experience, not of reason 
alone. The rational and scholastic arguments for God's existence are 
given little or no credence in the fourth part of L'Action (pp. 345-348) 
because "le problème est de savoir, non si cet 'unique nécessaire' est le terms# 
abstrait d'un raisonnement, mais s'il pourra,lui aussi, rentrer comme une
vivante vérité dans le développement de l'action voulue" (p. 340)« The _
■|I
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basis for knowledge is therefore real experience.
So Bergson's idea of human action may not prima facie appear to
play an important role in his philosophy. But,in fact, his proof of
ÿhe freedom of the will and his characterization of man as a creator
above all both reflect a world in which action is a primary fact of
life. Bergson understands the free act as an expression of the whole
personality in much the same way as Blondel believes that action unites the
various faculties of man's nature. Blondel summarizes this idea as follows:
II s'agit du tout de l'homme; ce n'est donc pas dans la pensée seule qu'on doit chercher [la vie]. C'est dans l'action qu'il va falloir transporter le centre de la philosophie, parce que là se trouve aussi le centre de la vie (L'Action [1893], P* xxiii).
Bergson's parallel idea is expressed in L'Essai;
C'est de I'arae entière, en effet, que la décisionlibre émane; qt l'acte sera d'autant plus libreque la série djuiamique à laquelle il se rattache tendra davantage à s'identifier avec le moi fonda­mental (p. 110).
Bergson's L'Evolution Créatrice is of course much concerned with action, 
but only in its universal application. This type of action is also 
analyzed by Blondel in the second version of L'Action, where he focuses 
attention upon 'le pur agir' - God's action in creation, rather than upon 
human action. This will be considered in detail later.
Although Blondel's and Bergson's philosophies are reputed to be 
philosophies of action, both also devote a considerable part of their
work to an analysis of the role of thought in life. Action does not
magically .throw up its own interpretation of life, but itself forms the 
raw material for interpretation. Both philosophers consider that 'mind' 
is a complex reality not reducible to sensations: Blondel makes this
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clear in Le procès de l'intelligence (Blond et Gay, 1922)^: 9
Il n'y aurait pas d'intelligence du tout, pas mêmede conscience réfléchie ni de perception proprement jdite du sensible, s'il ne se trouvait dans la con- înaissance même un élément irréductible à la sensation(p. 226).
However, in the attempt to account for and explain the relationship |
between mind and matter, their theories diverge somewhat. Whereas Æ
Bergson posits an intermediate 'image' and makes intelligence incapable
of comprehending movement, Blondel instead adopts a neo-ïhomist point of
view and reverses the conclusions of Bergson's theoiy: j
... on n'est intelligent qu'en dégageant des choses isubies une pensée qui ne se borne pas à en être une !représentation ou une image, une pensée qui n ’y est pas contenue et toute faite, mais qui les contient, les comprend, les exprime, les illumine, les domine,une pensée qui dans le réel apparent cherche et pré- .3tend trouver un réel plus réel encore (p. 227). 1
Nevertheless, bbth Bergson and Blondel do adhere to the theory that I
the human intelligence is prone to systematize and 'immobilize', to repre­
sent and juxtapose:
Dans les conditions actuelles de son exercise,1'esprit humain, pour concevoir distinctementses idées, enfante des signes, institue des jrapports et des analogies, substitue ses repré- ■ |sentations et son langage dissociateur à la voix directe des choses toutes simples ... (p. 23l).
Blondel attributes to 'ratio' - the discursive intelligence - this disposition 
to petrify reality and convert awareness into fixed and well-defined ideas.
This now familiar distinction Blondel attributes to the insight of scholastic i
philosophers:
Les principes rationnels, comme les appellent les j
Blondel's contribution to this book was originally published as articles in La Nouvelle Journée (August 1920-August 1921).
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modernes constituent ce qu’au moyen âge on appelait tplus volontiers et plus justement 1’intellectus, tandisque le mot ratio concernait plutôt l'ordre discursif de |la science, en tant qu'elle s'applique aux données con- jtingentes et relatives ... (L'Etre et les êtres, p., 416). 4
The basic problem with 'ratio' is that it is posterior to 'intellectus' »
and is apt to disfigure primordial awareness into categories of its own |
making or into preconceived prejudices. This means that thought in man |
■àhas two distinct phases: "deux modes hétérogènes, deux sortes d'esprit, |
deux phases alternatives; formes discursives oU ébauches intuitives, %
esprit de géométrie ou esprit de finesse" (La Pensée, II, P.U.F., 1934» I
ip. 17). %%The fact that 'ratio' follows a misguided method of procedure so |Ioften does not mean that it is completely incapable of being rightly ^
1guided. Blondel blames Bergson for the propagation of this misconcep-
tion: \ ’ C
A en croire certaine 'philosophie nouvelle', la pensée discursive ne serait qu'un artifice, en vue d'utilité pratique, mais sans aucune vérité intrinsèque ...Notre dessein est au contraire d'expliquer comment il sefait que la connaissance analytique et par concepts loin |d'être artificielle et simplement utilitaire ... est foncièrement naturelle et ordonnée à la solidité de l'intelligence à la distinction et à l'union des esprits (Le procès de l'intelligence, p. 2 8 8 ,  italics in original),
Blondel is therefore concerned to demonstrate the unity of mind in its
orientation towards the truth, as will be seen.
Blbndel suggests a reason why the discursive faculty has so often - J
been regarded as somehow superior to intuitive apprehension:
On se figure volontiers que, à la différence des données empiriques et des existences concrètes, nos concepts offrent une cohérence interne qui les rend définis et stables, au point qu'ils échappent au devenir et qu'ils constituent un ordre -fixe qui semble les rendre supérieurs au mouvement et à la durée (La Pensée, II, p. 46).
Needless te say, Blondel is very much in line with Bergson's thought on this
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matter. But not only does Blondel introduce the idea that concepts 
somshovr petrify real time; he also contrasts concepts with intuitions:
Jamais par elle-même, par ses méthodes, par ses ressources propres, [la raison] ne recouvre l'in- tuition première en sa fraîcheur, elle n'atteint l'intuition finale en sa plénitude (Le Procès,po.251-232).
For these reasons, then, our mind is "éprise de fixité et de sécurité,
affamée de 'présence réelle' et de possession" (p. 232). Consequently, '
Blondel, like Bergson,calls for a return to original experience:
il n'y a de science que du réel, et il n'y a de .réel que le concret, en qui le singulier et 1'uni­versel s'épousent en dehors de l'abstrait et dugénéral (La Pensée, II, p. 46).
Having outlined some startling similarities between the two doctrines,
it is vitally necessary to understand the subtle, but important differences.
For Blondel, the 'real' is not commensurate with Bergson's 'données immé­
diates' which ostensibly refers to the 'given' outside the mind or as the 
object of mind. The primary intuition.is, according to Blondel, not the
mind's grasp of externals but the mind's part in and participation in the %
sijm total of reality. îvMnd is part of 'les données immédiates'. Secondly, 
Blondel's 'intuition' means not only awareness of material reality but 
includes the moral and spiritual data of life and, more than this, an 
acknowledgement that part of the 'given' cannot be definitively knovm 
at all for it transcends human faculties. For Blondel, then, 'les données 
immédiates' are not the sum total of reality, as Bergson often seems to 
imply, but they are part of a larger whole which must be taken into account. 
Thirdly, whereas in Bergson the discursive faculty invariably operates 
separately from intuition, according to Blondel thought is already active ji
and present, in intuition itself; it is simultaneously present in the shape
of reflection and analysis:
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,,, l'acquisition’dec perceptions, plus encore que |celle des impressions, semble s'opérer automatique- 1ment; mais la réflexion peut et doit intervenir soit |pour préciser cette culture d'une sensibilité déjà #connaissante, soit surtout pour la renseigner sur ses dessous ... soit enfin et mieux encore pour l'empêcher d'arrêter le mouvement de la pensée à ce qui est perçu ou même ooncu, comme si les prétendues données objeo- |tives se suffisaient et nous suffisaient à nous-mêmes(La Pensée, II, pp. 124-125). |
It is when discursive reason operates in separation from observation and
is inattentive to experience that it is prone to become misled. By nature,
however, it is part of the wider whole called mind and is in solidarity with |
'intuition' when it is rightly guided.
Another flaw in Bergson's account of 'intuition' is, for Blondel, its 4
claim to be a defintive vision: "... il est des emplois où prédomine la
notion d'une vue instantanée et définitive qui exclut toute indigence et |
toute recherche , . . (La Pensée, II, p. 432). In immediate apprehension %:
there must be not only a presence but a simultaneous consciousness of that
presence - in other words, reflection:
Cette pensée concrète, sorte de création continuée, reste ainsi pénétrée d'une présence sans limites iassignables et dont par conséquent aucun analyse ne 9saurait épuiser le contenu réel; car il y a toujours du nouveau, ne fût-ce que par l'effort de l'analyse elle-même (La Pensée, II, p. 30).
So, although on first impressions Blondel's philosophy of mind bears 
strong resemblance to Bergson's, Blondel in fact adds something to Bergson's 
intuition, and that is the inevitable participation of a self-reflective 
consciousness in any 'intuition'. The mind is active rather than passive 
in the process of intuition. Immediately it becomes clear why Blondel 
objects that Bergson's intuition spalls the annihilation of the consciousness
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1 %in ‘'becoming the other’ - 'because this excludes the possibility of any |
reflection: " ... à sa limite une telle connadæance s'absorberait en son
¥objet; dans la perte de toute conscience personnelle" (Le Procès, p. 288). ?
There is a conversion between Bergson and Blondel at the Société â
française de Philosophie recorded in Mélanges (pp. 796-797) in which t
the two discuss the relationship between the discursive and intuitive 1
'faculties'. Bergson agreed with Blondel that intuition is a simple |
yet total vision. He also agreed that it was not always opposed to the 1
findings of the discursive intelligence and, on the contrary, is usually |
preceded by "une lente et conscienscieuse analyse ..." (p. 797). He goes ^
on to say: I
Cette préparation est particulièrement nécessaire iquand il s'agit de réalités générales et complexes,  ^ 1telles que la vie, l'instinct, l'évolution ... i
(p. 797). ;
* i
However, Bergson misses the real point here, which is that ideally intuition j
and intellect are to operate simultaneously to give a more complete and |
accurate understanding of life. Instead, Bergson creates a distinct rift i
between them, granting to each different functions and different 'directions', 
For Blondel, both modes of understanding are geared to the truth and work |
together in life situations - the act which unifies them most commonly is |
2 Ïthe judgement . ^
What is important in thought is its orientation. Intuition is a ]
primary awareness in the first instance and cannot be misled until the |
discursive intelligence has imposed some false schema upon it. If, however, j 
reason is itself directed towards the truth, then intuition and reason are
__________________________________     j
1. See Bergson's oft-quoted definition, Oeuvres, p. 1395*




At this point Blondel moves on to consider the 'moral' nature of i
truth. For him, reason can only be 'rightly guided' or guided to tiuth 
when it is guided tovrards the Good, towards God, who is Trijith. For reason 
to be rightly guided the will is of necessity involved in making choices 
about what to believe. The will,in short, is very much involved in thought.
A. Yalensin correctly comments that,in Blondel's philosophy, "le monde des 
concepts et celui des tendances ne sont pas radicalement séparés" (Regards, 
Aubier, 1955» P* 323). There is an element of choice which enters the %
picture wherever and whenever thinking is in progress:
ÿTrop volontiers on s'imagine que la pensée et le libre arbitre sont choses hétérogènes ... et beaucoup se figurent que, de ces choses, préalablement constituées, nous n'avons qu'à faire un usage extérieur, tel un ■ instrument qu'on prend ou qu'on laisse pour des besognes plus ou moins étrangères (La Pensée, II, p. 67).V fI?If thought is to approach the truth it must be by way of moral purification; i
"Purifier, c'est éclairer"; "La vérité noétique égale la vertu morale" (id., ï
P» 359)• Blondel would hold that whereas the object of intelligence is truth 7
and the object of virtue love; nevertheless, both have their object in one
and the same God. Love and truth are, in the final analysis, of the same.
essence. Blondel can confidently say that "la compassion est intelligente"
(Le Procès, p. 260). Sometimes, after Pascal, he refuses to justify this
position in entirely logical terms:
... il serait ridicule ... de vouloir exposer par ordre les raisons de l'amour, quoique les raisons n'y manquent pas; et Newman a noté combien les causes profondes de nos convictions les plus vitales et les plus certaines sont différentes des justifications abstraites que nous leur prêtons d'ordinaire ... (Le Procès, pp. 258-259)»
Occasionally, however, he does 'explain' 'les raisons de l'amour' to some
extent: a hint of this occurs in the following passage: ' Ï-
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... à mesure qu'on discerne plus d’esprits originaux #et qu’on découvre autour de soi plus de vie profonde, . |c'est qu’on a vraiment plus de pénétration, plus de iscience des hommes,plus de richesse personnelle, plus |d'étendue et d'intériorité (Le Procès, p. 26o), |
Bergson does have the idea that the will is involved in understanding,
and speaks of "le caractère essentiellement actif de l’intuition métaphysique"
(P.M,, p. 1416); but he conceives the will in terms of effort, tension ana 1
1attention and not so much in terms of love, aspiration and desire. Further, i: 
the effort and attention required for an effective intuition are in fact 
effort to avoid distraction, to concentrate on making the mind receptive |
and alert. In Blondel*s case, the mind actually interferes in intuition i
and effort is required to maintain the equation between observation and reason :s 
so that thought does not become abstract and distanced from intuition. '
However, Blondel does admit that there is never a complete equation j
between thought and Observation in man. In the human mind, 'ratio' and 4
'intellectus' are never fully reconciled: 1-Î
... nos deux modes de penser ou de connaître, tout ’accouplés qu'ils sont comme des parallèles, ne se :rencontrent jamais en une seule et même méthode, en june seule et même nature (La Pensée, II, p. 56), *|
It is only in God that reason and intuition are united, fonning a single j
'vision':
L'Intelligence en soi est sans doute faite pour voir jet capter l'être; mais l'intelligence en nous est ?présentement empêchée et captive; elle ne peut que ■:raisonner à partir de l'abstraction et des conceptsqui miment la réalité, sans que notre connaissance ;actuelle puisse acquérir une clarté intrinsèque dans l'ordre métaphysique et religieux (Le Procès, p. 308).
So for Blondel the opposition and tension between 'ratio' and 'intellectus
1. See the first part of "Introduction à la Métaphysique" (p.M.,pp. I416-I4I8).
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are overcome only by unison with God and by taking a decision to accept
the inadequacy and contingency of human thought. Human thought has to
be surpassed. God is therefore not "la pensée de la pensée" in the
Aristotelian tradition; he is beyond our thought and yet confirms its
validity, its contact with the real:
Précisément parce que Dieu n'est point seulement idée, ni même idée d’une idée, et qu'en lui l'intelligibilité ne se sépare point de la charité, nous ne serions pas . fidèles à la divine Pensée qui nous travaille si nous nous bornions à ce qu'on a appelé la 'science de notre ignorance' ou 'la philosophie de nos insuffisances'(Le Procès, p. 328).
Another of the confusions Blondel attributes to Bergson is the
alignment of intuition and instinct on certain occasions:
C'est précisément parce que nous n'avons pas seulement à développer une activité purement terrestre ou immanente qu'il ne nous suffit jamais de subir les choses telles qu'elles sont et de nous y adjuster par une sorte de plasticité organique et obscure comme le font les êtres inférieurs ... (Blondel-Wehrlé: Correspondance. p. 6l6).
• . In fact, Bergson never renders 'intuition' synomymous with instinct and
is careful to avoid such a pitfall. All he does is to assert that intuition 
is like instinct in its close attachment to reality. In one version of. "La 
conscience et la vie" he makes this explicit by arguing that intuition is 
"quelque chose comme l'instinct - un instinct conscient, raffiné, spiritualise 
... si l'instinct est encore plus près de la vie que l'intellect et la 
science ..." (Mélanges. p. 938)•
It is, however, true to say that Bergson is not systematic in defining 
different uses of the word 'intuition' and uses it in various ways. For 
instance, 'intuition' can mean a direct knowledge of 'la durée réelle' - 
this use is employed throughout L'Essai; it can also be a direct apprehension 
of an abstract principle or law; e.g. "une intuition du dedans ... nous fait 
atteindre les lois essentielles de l'être. Ces lois, en tant qu'elles tomceni
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sous la conscience, deviennent les lois mânes de la pensée" (Mélanges, p, 391). 
It can also be a vision of the uniqueness and novelty of every experience in 
an aesthetic sense;
Approfondissons ce que nous éprouvons devant un Turner îou un Corot; nous trouverons que ... c’est que nous avions déjà perçu quelque chose de ce qu'ils nous montrent.Mais, nous avions perçu sans apercevoir ... (P.M., p. 1371; c.f. p. 1268).
Intuition can further be the grasp of the 'essence' of some complex unity
such as the personality or 'l'élan vital
L'affirmation du moi par la conscience est une affir­mation irréductible ... un acte qui ne nous livre pas ... l'esprit tout entier tel qu'il est en soi, mais où nous saisissons l'esprit comme une réalité distincte de la matière, distinct aussi des phénomènes qui se succèdent (Mélanges, p. 391).
2Finally, intuition can be a kind of 'contuition' ; that is, an implicit and 
indistinct awareness''of God or 'the beyond' accompanying a clearer awareness 
of some other object; for instance, the inner self. In mystical experience, 
this type of intuition is virtually described as direct contact with the 
spirit of God. Such an intuition is developed and expounded in Les Deux 
Sources as an "intuition supra-intellectuelle" (p. 1185).
Blondel certainly seems justified in attacking Bergson for a lack of 
clarity, but this does not mean to say that Bergson was wrong in linking 
together various types of intuition under one heading rather than separating 
them rigidly from one another. All the types of intuition mentioned have two 
elements in common with one another. First, they are always a spiritual 
contact. Bergson wrote to Jacques Chevalier, "l'intuition porte sur l'esprit"
1. Intuition of the personality is described in P.M., p. 1394» and of 'l'élan vital' in E.G., p. 569»
2. A word used by St. Augustine to denote a 'sacramental' knowledge of God.
' S- 210 -
, j
(Mélanges, p. 1322, letter of 28,4«4920). Whether intuition focuses &
'îupon 'la durée' or an abstract principle or one's inner self or on God, |
it grasps the spiritual essence. Secondly, Bergson's 'intuitions' are
invariably unifying simple visions of a complex reality often composed
of many seemingly disparate and discrete elements. The process of
unification is not through abstraction, rationalization or simplification,
but a perception or vision of the inner unity of a complex reality;
Vu du dedans, un absolu est donc chose simple; mais envisagé du dehors, c'est-à-dire relativement à autre chose, il devient, par rapport à ces signes qui l'ex­priment, la pièce d'or dont on n'aura jamais fini de rendre la monnaie ("Introduction à la Métaphysique",
p.m.. p. 1395).
For Blondel too, philosophy is very much an attempt to understand the
unity of life; to achieve a total 'Weltanschauung';
... le philosophe ne se contente pas d’une création partielle et d'une vue suggestive; il est autre chose encore qu'un artiste; il tend ... à être un 'tout voyant', ... à communier, sous les espèces, non avec des mythes, mais avec le fond substantiel des êtres (itinéraire, p. 125).
This attempt to achieve a simple but comprehensive grasp Blondel always 4.
calls 'intuition'. Both Blondel's and Bergson's philosophies are con­
cerned with an ever more probing and profound penetration of the fundamental |'-1common factors between all that exists. This is not to say that either '
countenances any form of 'monism'. Both are convinced of the real hetero- i
geneity of existants and of different 'realms' of existence, but at the same ?j
time they are convinced that all existence has a common source. For
iBlondel one must discover "simultanément les méthodes d'analyse et de f
synthèse qui mettent en évidence l'hétérogénéité réelle et l'unité ulus #
profonde des fonctions de l'esprit" (itinéraire, p. 138, italics in original.. >•
Bergson speaks as though every event is entirely new and
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unpredictable^, and yet he holds that they all have the same creator and 
the same creative force running through them.
2Blondel calls the bond between every aspect of reality 'un lien'
"ce 'lien substantiel' qui constitue l'unité concrete de chaque être en tiassurant sa communion avec tous" (itinéraire, pp. 66-67). One's own 3Iindividual life demonstrates this mysterious unity: "au fond notre vie
n'est-ce pas, devant Dieu, une bigarrure de pièces et de morceaux sans 
lien, mais ... elle forme un drame unique dont les parties sont solidaires , i
(Lettres philosophiques, p. 182). Bergson similarly has it that the self 3
is not a series of states,nor a set of faculties,but is a continuing unity,
an indivisible whole: I
Si nous prenons notre vie intérieure depuis le moment où nous naissons jusqu'au' moment où nous mourons, et même au delà, tout cela, tout ce mouvement est absolu­ment comme celui de la flèche de Zénon, c'est un saut indivisible qui occupe du temps, tout le temps que l'on voudra, mais indivisible. Toutes les divisions que l'on voudra y introduire seront artificielles ... |("La personnalité". Mélanges, p. 1223). I
Psychological determinism is also dismissed in the same way by Blondel |
ias by Bergson, as in this instance:
II est ... impossible qu'au regard de la conscience ijréfléchie un motif, quel qu'il soit, paraisse unique |et total ... La liberté même n'est, pas plus que 7tout autre, un motif à part ou tout formel: elles'incarne nécessairement dans les motifs particuliers; et quand elle s'en distingue, elle ne les supprime 4pas (L'Action, 1893» p. 130).
... dans l'acte, il y a plus que l'acte même; il y a l'unité de l'agent, la conciliation systématique de ses forces, la cohésion de ses tendances ... (p. 130).
As previously considered, Bergson discusses the unifying principle in the
1. See, e.g., "Le possible et le réel", P.M., pp. 1344-1345*
2. This term is derived from Leibniz's idea of 'vinculum'.
^4
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Universe as 'l'élan vital'. This is a spiritual principle, the origin
of which is unresearched at the date of L'Evolution Créatrice (1907), cut
which is creative, active, gives purpose and direction to life and, at
the same time, reconciles its disparate elements. Even matter parti- %
cipates to a small degree in the spirituality of 'l'élan vital' and hence
opposing tendencies are reconciled in its action:
L'élan de vie ... consiste, en somme, dans ime exigence de création. Il ne peut créer absolument, parce qu'il rencontre devant lui la matière, c'est-à-dire le mouve­ment inverse du sien. liais il se saisit de cette matière, qui est la nécessité même, et il tend à y introduire la plus grande somme possible d'indétermination et de liberté (E.C., p. 7O8, italics in original).
For Bergson all beings are unified by their participation in movement,
spirit and liberty. j
In La Pensée, I, Blondel himself speaks of:
... le rythme meme du devenir, l'effort constructif ÿde la nature, le drame de ce monde dont l'histoire, |à travers tant d'échecs et de morts, ressemble toute- fois à une parturition ... (p. I7).
Blondel detects a unifying principle he calls 'la noétique' and characterizes
it as "l'immatériel dans la matérialité mime" (La Pensée, I, p. 18). The |
'noétique' is therefore "une règle d'harmonie, d'unité dans la variété, de
beauté intelligible" (p. I9). This realm of 'thought' is not simply a
reference to the human intellect; it is firmly placed in God's domain.
In fact all human schemas of thought reveal a basic inadequacy to unite
facts truly: "c'est done d'une présence, d'une assistance, d'une communion
plus intime avec Dieu que notre pensée personnelle ressent le désir et
1'obligation" (p. 281). God is not 'thought' in terms of human ideas
at all; he is the principle of human thought and its source:
Précisément parce que Dieu n'est point seulement idée, ni même idée d'une idée et qu'en lui l’intelligibilité ' no se sépare, point de la charité, nous ne serions pas
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fidèles à la divine pensée qui nous travaille si nousnous bornions à ce qu'on a appelé la 'science de notreignorance' ... (p. 328).
At this point Blondel dissociâtes himself from LeRoy, for whom the world 
is an expression or reflection of God's thought. Blondel not only dis­
tinguishes between human and divine 'thought'; he makes a further dis­
tinction between the 'noétique' and the 'pneumatique' or spiritual.
V/hereas the 'noétique' is a principle of unity following the laws of 
reason, the 'pneumatique' follows a higher principle of unity and often 
appears to be an irruption into or disruption of life, corresponding to the
intrusion of supernatural grace in miraculous events. The 'pneumatique'
"apparaît tantôt comi.iS une principe d'anarchie, de dissocation désordonnée, •I
de caprice inintelligible, tantôt comme le triomphe, ébauché ou promis, 
d'une intégration scientifique ou spirituelle de tout ce qui importe dans 
le monde, c'est-à-dire d'une pensée capable de résumer en elle tout ce 
qu'il y a d'immatériel dans les choses" (La Pensée, I, p. 19).
In L'Etre et les Etres Blondel discerns another common bond between 
all existants, and that is the fact of existence (being) itself. The 
idea of non-being, for Blondel as for Bergson, is a pseudo-idea (see 
L'Etre, p. 44). Blondel explains that non-being cannot be conceived 
because "tout ce qui est perçu, connu, imaginé, nié, même le fictif et 
l'absurde, c'est encore de l'existant; et dire que le faux, c'est ce qui 
n'est pas, c'est toujours impliquer la double affirmation du réel et d'un 
irréel qui est encore du pensé" (L'Etre, pp. 8-9).
This implies that Blondel grants real existence as much to 'ideas' 
as to 'solid' material things. Bergson also follows this procedure, S
since he maintains that the idea of 'le néant' is simply the idea of some­
thing plus the idea of its exclusion; in other words, it is the presence
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of two ideas rather than none^. Furthermore, our thoughts are composed 
from elements in the real, existing world.
Being is primordial in life, hut all individual existants, though 
heterogeneous, are dependent for their existence upon some original Being, 
Bergson does not use these neo-Thomist expressions,but in his later works 
Blondel does. If we observe closely, he argues, we see "comment tous 
ensemble, malgré leur hétérogénéité, [les êtres] ... composent un univers 
réel, à la fois absolument dépendant et absolument séparé du seul Etre en 
soi qui leur communique néanmoins une réalité propre" (L'Etre, p. 39). 
Blondel then proceeds to discuss what could properly constitute a 'being' 
and concludes that neither matter, nor persons, nor 'la durée', nor even a 
life-force could lay claim to independent, absolute existence (whatever 
that is), and, following a form of the ontological argument,he claims 
that such a form of existence is only to be found in God, the 'unique 
nécessaire*, who is alone "l'être en soi" for whom it is "impossible qu'il 
ne soit pas" (L'Etre, p. 220),
Blondel makes many concessions to the Thomists in L'Etre et les êtres; 
nevertheless, he does retain and stress the idea of a God whose being is 
active, creative and spontaneous:
i, 4L'etre n'est pas seulement ce qui est vu ou visible; il est aussi cette vie jaillissante, cette conquête ou cette perte de l'absolu, cette acceptation ou ce refus d'un don qui, gratuitement offert, engage à fond la responsabilité et la destinée des êtres spirituels ... (p. 219).
Having considered the claims of thought and existence to unite all
parts and levels of reality, Blondel moves on in the third part of his
trilogy to examine action. This brings him back full circle to his
original conviction that action not only unifies the personality, but
1. See E.C., p. 736.
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also leads inevitably to the search for a principle of total .unity and 
a total 'explanation'. Th# whole burden of Blondel's original L'Action 
is to show that a man's will inevitably wants to go be.-y'ond its immediate 
goals and desires (which are not ultimately satisfying) and to find its 
real fulfilment. To give but one example: "en posant le déterminisme, #
on en tire la liberté. En voulant la liberté, on exige le devoir" (p. 143)* 
Only one goal is adequate to reconcile the persistent yearning of the will 
with its true goal and that is the Infinite found in God himself. The 
attainment of this goal involves a step of faith (an 'option' or choice) 
vhiich is accompanied by a final transformation of a man's vision of the 
world:
... ce n'est point de la pensée que [la foi] passe au coeur, c'est de la pratique qu'elle tire une lumière divine pour l'esprit. Dieu agit dans cette action, et c'est pour cela que la pensée qui succède à l'acte est plus riche d'un infini que celle qui le précède ... (L'Action, 1893, p. 403).
Agir procède d'une branle à la diversité des mouvements ... ce qui importe, c'est de saisir l'âme invisible qui donne l'unité interne (l, p. 74).
.Human action is now more closely related to divine action, in terms of 
co-operation in a grand design. In the 1893 thesis God played a somewhat
In the later L'Action, action is described in more general terms as ?
"le contraire de l'inertie, du tout fait, de l'immobilité stagnante" (l,• • 
p. 28), and Blondel is keen to lay emphasis on the perpetual change and 
movement in creation. Blondel now regards action as the unifying prin­
ciple in creation at large, as well as the unifying principle of the 
human personality:
L'Action, fût-elle d'apparence discursive dans le temps et dans l'espace, comme une succesion ou un système de phénomènes, est cependant une réalité ontologique, c'est- à-dire qu'elle forme une unité supérieure à la, multiplicité des faits vus du dehors mais ne la constituant pas dans son originalité métaphysique (|, p, 74)»
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negative and inscrutable role as 'l’unique nécessaire'. In the later work
human action is in close contact with divine action^ we feel:
la, certitude simultanée de deux vérités qui entrent toujours dans notre sentiment d'agir: celle de noslimites, de notre contingence, de notre dépendance, §celle aussi d'une action supérieure à la notre, véritable Agir auquel nous nous tendons à participer (I, p. 109).
Our action is only felt as effective when we co-operate and assist in
the action of God: "oe que .nous avons d'action n'est qu'un passage à
l'éternel Agir" (p. 265)#
In his Deux Sources (1952) Bergson likewise has changed his line of
approach. He moves from the impersonal account of 'l'élan vital' towards
an analysis of human action, and particularly of moral action. Man's
natural state is one in which egocentric reason issues its directives
for our actions. We**'can,however, rise above the dictates of intelligence
and rejoin the creative activity of God ('l'élan créateur'):
Le cercle, voulu par la nature, a été rompu par l'homme le jour où il a pu se replacer dans l'élan créateur, poussant la nature humaine en avant au lieu de le. laisser pivoter sur place (Les Deux Sources, p. II44),
The transition from egoism to altruism; from closed to open thought and 
action is made through a series of stages. From individual egoism man f
passes to family egoism, and then to social egoism whereby he guards the 
interests of his o’wn group; neit, realizing his nation's claims on him, 
he widens his horizons. Then from chauvinism he passes on to internationalism 
and a sense of human solidarity. In a final leap, he opens himself to the 
action of God (which is universal) and begins to love all men through God.
Each new aspiration in this series is not worked out intellectually (though 
it can be intellectually justified); it is a new step, a new outlook on life - i 
which Bergson calls a new emotion: "II y a des émotions qui sont génératrices
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de pensée; et l'invention, quoique d'ordre intellectuel, peut avoir de 
la sensibilité pour substance ..." (p. lOll), Bach new departure re­
quires a ne?/ understanding of the world - an ever larger vision of unity.
At each stage a greater truth is realized and a greater whole integrated.
And yet each stage is unpredictable beforehand and cannot be contrived by 
rational thinking alone:
... ce n'est pas en élargissant la cité qu'on arrive è. l'humanité: entre une morale sociale et une moralehumaine la différence n'est pas de degré, mais de nature(p. 1004).
Ail of this finds its counterpart in Blondel's thought. The inspiration 
behind Bergson's and Blondel's philosophies is very much the same. Blondel 
describes an analagous process by which man passes, from egocentric isolation 
to social solidarity. Then he moves "du vinculum social et de l'élan 
patriotique au culte», de l'humanité" (L'Action. II, p. 286) and on to moral 
altruism,"de 1'immanence universelle à la réalisation d'un idéal éthique 
et d'une morale naturelle" (p. 295) and finally attains the highest form 
of human activity: "de l'action spécifiquement morale à l'effort de l'home
pour associer le transcendant à son propre agir"^ (p. 519), This point 
marks the intervention of grace which empowers and enlightens the man who 
has sought God as far as human action can take him. To sum up, Blondel 
argues that "en agissant, l'homme ne limite pas son élan et son rayonnement 
à la famille, à la cité, à l'humanité. Il jette son intention au delà 
encore ..." (L'Action. II, p. 294), After the cult of humanity, man is
1. H. Duméry (Raison et Religion dans la uhilosonhie de l'Action (Ed.du Seuil, 1965) thinks that Blondel posits Christian belief as the goal, but H. Bouillard (Blondel et le Christianisme. Id^ ,- I96I) argues then the transcendent is undetermined in the first instance and thar- a further step is required to open one to revelation of specific dogma. X agree with Bouillard on this matter.
-'h ?
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faced with a variety of religious alternatives,which Blondel calls 
'superstitions*. The Christian God alone can answer the desire of 
the will through the action of grace.
Thus for Blondel, as for Bergson, in expanding its field of effective­
ness, action becomes more and more involved with 'open* morality and 4|
religion. But, in addition to this, Blondel would also agree with 
Bergson in asserting that each new stage in the ascent marks a, new and 
unpredicted state of affairs: "Agir vraiment, n'est-ce pas toujours
introduire du nouveau?" (itinéraire, p. 64). The final action, an option I
for God, results in a completely new life and vision of the world:
Est surnaturel ... ce qui .., élève la créature intelligente à un état qui ne saurait être ni . . réalisé, ni mérixé, ni meme conpu expressément par aucune force naturelle: car il s'agit de lacommunication de l'intime vie divine ... vérité impénétrable à toute vue philosophique, d'un bien Isupérieur à toui^ e aspiration de la volonté (Blondel- Teilhard: Correspondance, p. 41)-
Thought and action are only reconciled and unified in opting for the 
hypothesis of the supernatural, for that part of the world which is accessible, 4 
intelligible and manageable is neither self-contained nor self-explanatory.
It is therefore apparently only a fragment of some partly inaccessible but |
greater whole. Taken by itself, the accessible fragment - whether acces­
sible to the senses or the intellect - cannot be adequately explained or 
understood; neither does it fully satisfy our desires and needs. This 
incompleteness of our world-pioture is sensed obscurely even in the most 
rudimentary form of action. The key to a fuller appreciation of life's 
complexities,and the road to greater self-fulfilment, lies in widening one's 
horizons and broadening one's vision. A world in which actions only seem 
to have pliysical effects is replaced by a world in which every action has 
moral consequences and spiritual significance. It is not enough for man to
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live instinctively or selfishly, for this amounts to living as if there
were no moral or spiritual values in life, which is false;
... Pour nous, au contraire, nous avons à résoudredes problèmes plus complexes et à déployer une activité qui ne trouve pas son équilibre dans la nature physique et ne se contente jamais de simples expédients .,.(Blonde1-Wehrlé; Correspondance. pp. 616-617).
Blondel constantly accused Bergson, in one way or another, of naturalizing 1
the supernatural realm and of limiting our vision of the world. The vrrong- !
headedness of Bergson's approach consisted in "le danger de subordonner les
fondements de la foi à l'étude d'arguments qui, bons tout au plus à justifier
une certaine crédibilité, portent sur un domaine inférieur et étranger à la |
foi véritable" (p. 642).
Blondel in the last anaJysis regards both empiricism and 'intuitionism' 4
as restrictive and limiting visions of life:
... nous ne tenons jamais, si empiristes que nous soyons, à la pure apparence sensible; ce n'est pas une chose toute faite et stable: encore une fois, c'est un passage,un stimulant, un lien de rencontre entre le cosmos et l'aspiration humaine qui ne trouve pas dans le monde son point d'appui, ni son terme d'aboutissement (p. 617).
Whereas Bergson posixs two 'types' or levels of being - matter and 
'consciousness' (which might reduce to one - life)^, Blondel posits three, 
each absolutely irreducible to any other - matter, mind and spirit^. Matter 
and mind are 'creations' and not 'emanations'; in other words, have a different
1. In which matter is as much an emanation from spiritual energy as'mind'.
2. Blondel's idea owes much to Pascal, whose three realms were like­wise placed at an infinity from one another and yet interconnected.Blondel speaks of 'mon cher Pascal' (itinéraire, p. 46) and a phraselike the following shows his indebtedness : "le moindre acte a une réalité, une importance, une dignité ... infiniment supérieure au fait de l'univers entier ..." (L'Action, 1895, p. 99),
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nature from 'spirit' and not simply a different 'rhythm'; "C'est à tort 
qu'on prétendrait établir une evolution sans novation entre la vie 
organique et la vie spirituelle" (La Pensée, I, p. 40).. The connections 
between each 'realm' thus constitute the primary difficulty of Blondel's 
philosophy and the solution he attempts is not in terms of 'intellectual 
explanation' but is an appeal to the experience of 'action* as a uniting 
and cohering power which cuts across the barriers. For this reason,
'action' is not the same as the fact of movement in the Universe: beccming
or change is only action at a rudimentary level. Human action, on the other 
hand, introduces intention and direction and implicates the physical, moral 
and intellectual realms, uniting them as the expression of a personality;
"En agissant, nous exprimons notre nature profçhde, nos aspirations 
essentiellement humaines" (L'Action, I, p. 84); not only this, but "par 
l'action nous nous restituons à l'univers et à Jésus" (Carnets Intimes,
p. 147).
Pure action, however, is not to be found in any particular human
activity but is the absolute, the perfection for which man strives. It
is "une initiative premiere et effectivement génératrice, sans que, d'auti'e
part cette prolifération: rende Dieu passif d'aucune nécessité ..." (L'Action,
I, p.1186). God's action: is extra-temporal and absolute. The limits of
'intuition' in Bergson are set at 'la durée réelle' and cannot surpass time,
but the limits of 'intuition' in Blondel are set at infinity. For him,
time is a created phenomenon as much as an^'thing else:
... le temps est l'apparence nécessaire à l'être créé qui se réalise progressivement, mais au terme qualitatif; ce qui avait paru successif se trouve intégré dans l’état définitif; ce que nous avions perçu par fragments est donné dans une intuition totale et simultanée (Lettres 
philosophiques, pp. 276-277)*
Ithough Blondel and Bergson have closer affinities than many
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realize and are, as J* Guitton puts it, 'parents d'esprit' (cited in |
Blondel-Wehrle; Correspondance, p. 12), Blondel's vision of unity is |
more far-reaching than Bergson's, for it does not stof' at the 'data' of 
human life, nor of life in the Universe,but reaches beyond to the eternal 
and infinite*
Blondel's philosophy is one of the most wide-ranging and comprehensive 
ever devised and his central idea of 'action' truly ingenious and genuinely 
valid. The fact that he is virtually upknown in England is desperately 
unfortunate^. %
1. Also the fact that he is peremptorily dismissed by as eminent a writer as ,4 A. Vidler is incredible. Vidler writes; "I find his thought obscure, his style insufferable, and his temperament uncongenial" (A Variety of HCatholic Modernists, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 78-80),Blondel's zeal for truth is conceived as "evidence of a regular ecclesias^i tical mind" (pp. 81-82) and his attitude to others "extremely censorious" .9 (p. 82). ;;I I
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CHàPTm SEVEN
was not concerned. He has written on social and political issues^,
2has evolved a philosophy of Art and aesthetics and has applied himself 
to theories of education and history * Above all, he has aimed at 
evaluating and developing Aquinas's epistemology and ontology.
For Maritain, Aquinas's is "le seul existentialisme authentique" 
(Court Traité de l'Existence et de 1'Existant, P. Hartmann, 1947» P» 9)* 
Within this very phrase lies an interpretation. Maritain's ambition was 
not "d'affubler Thomas d'Aquin d'un costume à la mode", but, in his own
JACQUES MARITAIIT AND HENRI BERGSON;THE Q.UBSTIof ~'0F INTUITION
■s
Jacques Maritain's influence on twentieth century Catholic thought I
and on philosophy in general has grown steadily since the days of his |
first major work, La philosophie bergsonienne; Essais critiques (j.
Riviere, 1914)* Ue is considered now to have been the foremost repre­
sentative of the neo-Thomist revival encouraged by successive Popes since 
Leo XIII. Consequently, his attitude to Bergson has been of vital impor­
tance with respect to Bergson's reception in the Catholic church.
Maritain's aim has not simply been to refute and repudiate the 
findings of modern philosophy by contrasting them with the eternal 
verities presant in Thomist doctrine. His method, especially with ;i
regard to Bergson, Has presumed open-mindedness and attention to detail.
In certain fields he has had no fixed Thomist criteria to refer to, since 
he extended neo-Thomist thought to areas of life with which St. Thomas &t
J
1. e.g. Humanisme Intégral# (Aubier, 1936). î
2. e.g. Art et Scolastique (Lib. de l'Art Catholique, 1920).
5. e.g. Education at the crossroads (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1943)* 3
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words, "je m'applique à rajeunir le thomisme" (id.). According to him,
Thomism offered to modern Catholic philosophers not a list of axioms, cut 
a method of philosophizing suited to the needs of modem culture, and 
a philosophy with pointers towards the demands of eternal truth. Maritain's 
open-mindedness is not often praised, hut his insights into Bergsonism, for t
example, enabled him to deepen his understanding of, and,in some instances, f
to alter his interpretation of, Aquinas in v/ays which will soon become clear.
Most of the favourable reactions to Maritain's thought have been written 
by Americans, as can be seen from a glance at the bibliography on Maritain 
in New Scholasticism (Washington, B.C., No. XLVI, 1972, pp. 118-128).
This periodical contains articles written to commemorate Maritain's 90th 
birthday (see pp. 1-128). A less recent bibliography of Maritain's own 
works was compiled by Ruth Bums in The Thomist (N,Y., January 1945» Vol. |
V) and covers the years 1910-1942. This edition of The Thomist is wholly 4
dedicated to Maritain, as is La Revue Thomiste of 1948 (Vol. 48, Nos. 1, 2), 
Maritain was born on 18th November 1882 and his early life was marked 
by Liberal Protestant influences. His grandfather was Jules Pavre (iSCy- .i
1880), the Republican leader during the second Empire. His mother was a •
Protestant and his father a nominal Catholic. He received his early educa- 4
4tion at the Lycées, Condorcet, Carnot and Henri IV. At the latter, he net 4;
1Ernest Psichari, grandson of Ernest Henan. He became a convinced Socialist j
by the age of 16 and wrote, "I shall be a socialist and live for the revolution"?: 
(Carnet de Notes, pp. 16-17). He always remained socialist, supporting the 
Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War, but later his socialism was |
democratic and he championed individual freedom and social rights. 7
_ .7Maritain gained a scholarship to read philosophy at the Sorbonne. rhere % 
he met his future wife, Ralssa Oumancoff, of whom he wrote later: "The aid
and inspiration of my beloved Raîssa have penetrated all my life and work"
...j#
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(Carnet de Notes, Deso-lée de_BrpuWer^%2nd ed. 1977» p. 11). Both dis­
covered that the influence of scientific positivism pervaded the Sorbonne 
at that time and, according to Baissa Maritain, this attitude "servait à 
condamner toute activité de l’intelligence qui veut s'élever au-dessus 
de la simple constatation empirique des faits" (Les Grandes Amitiés 
[1st pub. 1941], 4th ed. Desclée. de Brouwer, p. 54). Mathematics and 
not metaphysics were considered as the highest achievement of the intelli­
gence :
Je dus apprendre que les savants tiennent les suprêmes principes de l'intelligence en médiocre estime; en tout cas ils ne paraissent pas s'en soucier beaucoup. Les valeurs purement spéculatives les intéressent peu; les  ^mathématiques sont leur plus haut ciel intelligible (p. 74) •
Maritain met Charles Péguy early in his University career and Péguy,
■already .an ehthusiast of Bergsonism, introduced the Maritains to Bergson's
lectures at the Collège de France in I9OI. This came at the end of a
period.of intense anguish, for Baissa Maritain wrote; "Si cette expérience
n'aboutissait pas, la solution serait le suicide" (p. 91). Bergson's
philosophy provilded real release and relief. It provided Jacques Maritain ..
with an alternative to the materialism and determinism intrinsic to positivism,
Baissa Maritain goes on to say: "Nous n'étions pas les seuls sans doute à
qui Bergson rendait la joie de l'esprit en rétablissant la métaphysique
dans ses droits" (p. 96), It also led him to embark upon a search for
certain Imowledge and for God which culminated in his discovery of St.
Thomas Aquinas's philosophy in 1908.
Not only did Maritain attend Bergson's public lectures on Fridays (at
4.45 p.m.) entitled "L'Idée du Temps" but he also took notes^ from Bergson's
1. Teachers at the Sorbonne at this time included F. Le Dantec,E. Durkheim, V. Delbos, G. Séailles and L. Lévy-Bi’uhl.
2. See Les grandes amitiés, p. 97»
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course (on Saturdays at 3.15 p.m.) on the ninth book of the sixth 
Enneades of Plotinus^. The following year (1902-I9O3) Bergson lec­
tured on Aristotle's Physics (Saturdays) and on "L'Histoire de l'Idée 
du Temps" (Fridays)^, while during I903-I904 he analyzed "L'Histoire 
des théories de la mémoire" . Baissa Maritain records that Jacques 
was deemed by Bergson to be "celui de ses élèves qui comprenait et 
interprétait le mieux sa pensée" (p. 108).
Maritain never forgot these lessons. He was ever afterwards, 
along with Bergson, engaged in a struggle to the death with materialistic 
positivism and Kantianism, while a great part of his Thomism is a long 
argument to show that we can know the real world outside mind and beyond 
phenomena by the power of 'intuition'^.
- At the-time of the lectures, Maritain was certainly a thorough-going 
disciple of Bergson:''-
—  II promenait dans les salles de cours la flamme ■révolutionnaire d'un socialisme ardent et de la philosophie de l'intuition (Les Grandes Amitiés,p. 108).
Socialism was then, and has always been considered to be, revolutionary, 
but it could equally well be maintained that to uphold spiritual values 
and the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in a largely hostile atmos­
phere (in the twentieth century) was just as 'revolutionary'.
1. Information in Mélanges, p. 512. The content of the course on |"L'Idée du Temps" is summarized on pp. 513-517* 1
2. See Mélanges, pp. 614-625. In January I903 Bergson published Introduc- |tion à la Métaphysique in the Revue de Morale et de Métaphysique. - g
3. See Le Paysan de la Garonne (1st chapter) (Desclée de Brouwer, I966). 7
4. The details of this question, and the consonance and dissonance |between Bergson and Maritain, are explored later.
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Maritain's early enthusiasm for Bergson went so fsr as to shock
the young R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., who took issue with him when he
said (perhaps in jest) that, "la morale est une danse, qui se joue à
travers toutes les formes du devenir sans jamais s'arrêter à aucune"
(id,, p. 108). Maritain and Garrigou-Lagrange later became close friends
and collaborators in the Thomist revival. G. Van Riet has it that
Maritain borrovæd one of his major theses from Garrigou-Lagrange:
Comme le Père Garrigou-Lagrange, [Maritain] s'efforce sans cesse et dans tous ses écrits de garantir la valeur de notre connaissance conceptuelle et sa portée onto­logique , en faisant appel à une 'intuition abstractive’ de l'être ... (p. 351).
However,
Si M. Maritain emprunte au Père Garrigou-Lagrange l'idée centrale de son épistémologie, il l'enrichit cependantde manière considérable, tant par sa connaissance appro-........fondie du système bergsonien que par sa méditation per­sonnelle du mystère de l'être (p, 552).
The Maritains married on 26th November I904 and lived in rue de 
Jussieu. Shortly afterwards, Maritain read Léon Bley's La Femme Pauvre  ^
and, being much moved by Bloy's ovm destitution, wrote to him enclosing 
25 francs. After further correspondence, Bloy invited the Maritains 
to visit him, which they did on 25th June I905. At the same time,
J/laritain obtained his Agrégation de Philosophie from the Sorbonne. As 
Bloy led the Maritains towards Christianity, Jacques began to renounce 
Bergson's teachings. After baptism at 1'Eglise de Saint Jean in Montmartre 
on 11th June 1906, Maritain left the Sorbonne and obtained a grant to study 
biology under Hans Driesch in Heidelberg. He was somewhat disillusioned 
with philosophy as a vocation and wrote of himself:
1. Mej’oure de France, 1st ed. 1897*
2. From the Michonis Fund.
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L'auteur, après une jeunesse traversée par bien des influences, en particulier celle du bergsonisme ... avaitpensé, une fois la lumière du Christ levée dans son coeur,laisser de côté les recherches de la sagesse humaine, dont les modernes représentants lui avaient convenable­ment démontré la vanité ... (Antimoderne, Ed. Revue des 
Jeunes, 1922, p. 13).
Fortunately, Maritain's conversion did not preclude further philosophical
enquiry and, after his studies on the embiyogenetic theory of neo-vitalism',
he returned to Paris in I9O8 to work for Hachette on the project of the
Dictionnaire de Vie Pratique. His natural aptitude and appetite for
philosophy, and the desire to increase his understanding of his new faith,
led him to study St. Thomas Aquinas at Versailles under Père Humbert
Clérissac, O.P. This work marked another turning-point in Maritain's
intellectual life:
II avait retrouvé, grâce à l'Ange de l'Ecole, dont l’amplissime doctrine avait achevé de le guérir du bergsonisme, et'*venait de lui manifester sa.vocation intellectuelle (vae mihi, si non thomistizavero!) nomme, .un nouveau printemps., philosophique .... et une nouvelle ardeur de pensée ... (Antimoderne, pp. I3-I4).
However, although Bergson's influence may have been consciously rejected 
in certain particulars, it still dominated Maritain's everyday life, because I;
from 1911, when the article "L'Evolutionnisme de Bergson" appeared in la î
Revue de Philosophie (Ho. 19, pp. 4^7 ff.), up till I914, Maritain was -|
working on his first book, La Philosonhie bergsonienne. An article written 7
'J'in 1913 also dealt with the Bergsonian theme of intuition, entitled "L'Intuition 
Au sens de connaissance instinctive ou d'inclination" (Revue de Philosophie.
No. 24, pp. 601-625). Maritain adopted a largely hostile stance towards 
Bergson, in an effort to show his orthodoxy and to detach himself from
1. See Maritain's article, "Le néo-vitalisme en Allemagne et le darvfinisme" (Revue de Philosophie, No. 6, 1910, pp. 417-444)'
I
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the attraction and temptation of Bergsonism. Thus, his gratitude
to Bergson is expressed in largely negative terras;
M. Bergson a 1'immense mérite d'avoir lutté seul (seul dans l'Université) pendant longtemps, contre le matérialisme soi-disant positif et contre le relativisme kantien qui se partageaient le monde officiel, et je me rappelle encore l'accent de réprobation avec lequel un de nos maîtres en Sorbonne, mort aujourd'hui, condamnait le 'mysticisme judéo-alexandrin'et, pour tout dire, le cléricalisme de cet admirateur de Plotin (La philosophie bergsonienne, p. 98).
This attitude leads Gerald Phelan (in Jacques Maritain, Sheed and 
Ward, N.Y., 1957) to accept that Bergson's philosophy only played the 
negative role of releasing Maritain from the 'errors' of modem philo­
sophy in general: "Bergson's teaching revealed to Maritain the fallacy
at the heart of rationalism, the failure of relativist philosophy and the 
necessity of an Absolute" (p. 2). The positive influence of Bergson is 
then largely passed Wer. Maritain's interest in the field of epistemology 
is chiefly to do with intuition (or how we know-).; he is also absorbed by 
the relation of time to eternity; by freedom (individual and corporate), 
by the relation between God and the world, and by theories of Art and 
creativity. The results of his researches along these lines sometimes 
differ from Bergson's in their conclusions, but Maritain undoubtedly saw 
jblie importance to modem man of the subjects with which Bergson was wrestling^. 
It must be emphasized at this stage that Bergson exerted his greatest 
influence on Maritain in this way, Maritain adopted Bergson's subject- 
matter even in his analysis of Thomas Aquinas and, in doing so, changed 
the direction of Thomist preoccupations. This accords with G. Van Riet's
1. Henri Duméry (Philosophic Thought in France and the U.S., Ed. M. Farber, New York, 1950,p. 221) qui be wrongly supposes that Maritain is "first and foremost a logician", deducing from this that he accordingly rejected Bergson's intuitionism and refused "to give the primacy to feeling".
1
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assertion that Maritain brought back to Thomist enquiry a stress on our
apprehension of the real and disregarded many other subjects in order -i
to concentrate on this one:
On ne s'intéresse plus au problème de l'erreur; on se préoccupe très peu du scepticisme et du doute; on ne discute guère la définition de la vérité.L'attention se porte presque exclusivement sur i^ne .1seule question: l'objectivité des idées (L'Episté-mologie Thomiste, Bib. Phil., de Louvain, 1946, p. 313) •
Dom Illtyd Trethowan, in "Some tendencies in modern Thomism" (Downside
Revie?/, No, 208, Spring 1949, PP* 147-159),considers that Thomism moved,
in the early twentieth century, from 'essentialisrn' to 'existentialism'
and to a preoccupation with awareness, and that this was, in large measure, |
due to Maritain's work.
Bergson's name recurs frequently throughout Maritain's writings. The
philosophical dialogue between the two men went on in Maritain's mind all
his-life. In Le paysan de la Garonne (Desclée de Brouwer  ^ 1966), Maritain
singles out Bergson from all other philosophers of modem times. After the
rationalists and positivists :
II y a eu Bergson, qui, lui, ... ne prend pas place dans la lignée, il a voulu la briser ... Et après Bergson, tout le monde s'est remis avec entrain dans la lignée cartésienne, au fin bout de celle-ci... De tous les penseurs ... dont la lignée s'origine à Descartes, ... je ne conteste absolument qu'une seule chose ... c'est, sauf, naturellement, en ce qui regarde Bergson (et peut- etre aussi Blondel), leur droit au nom de philosophes ...Ils ne sont pas des philosophes, ils sont des idéosophes ...(pp. 152-153).
Maritain's life after 1912 is less eventful; from 1912 to 1914 be 
taught at the Collège Stanislas, Paris. He then became Professeur at. 
the Institut Catholique, where he remained until 1935, when he was 
appointed to be Professor of Philosophy at the Institute of Medieval
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Studies, Toronto^. This "be^ an a long association with America. After 
twelve years, he moved to the University of Chicago and then Notre Dame, 
Indiana. During this period (1945-1948), he was also acting as French 
Canadian Ambassador to the Vatican before becoming Professor at the 
University of Princeton (1948-1955), where he was made Professor Emeritus 
in 1956.
On his return to France, Maritain went to live with the 'petife frères 
de Jesus' at Toulouse^ (in I96I); becoming a member in October 1970 and 
remaining there until his death in 1973 &t the age of 91*
For Maritain, philosophy is formed in a hierarchy of truth and false­
hood. Some philosophers (of any age) approach the Truth; others are misled. 
Absolute truth is most nearly attained in Thomas Aquinas. From this, it
follows that Maritain believes in absolute truths and in the possibility
"s-of certain knowledge. For him, such truth is only to be gained through
the Intelligence. It follows from this that any reality outside the mind
is,first and foremost, intelligible. This is the first principle of
Iklaritain ' s phi losophy ;
L'être est l'objet propre de l'intelligence, et toute chose est intelligible dans la mesure où elle est (Antimoderne, p. I64).
And again: »
L'Intelligence a pour fin propre l'être intelligible, pour besoin essentiel 1'évidence,ou du moins la, certi­tude, et ce n'est que pour atteindre cette fin qu'elle
1. Except for 1916-1917 spent teaching at the Petit Séminaire, Versailles. jHe was invited to Toronto at the instigation of G. Phelan (President |of the Institute) and Etienne Gilson (Professor of Medieval Philosophy). |Gilson co-operated in the formation of the Institute in 1929 and acted jas its director after the Second World War. 'lJ2. An order devised by Charles de Foucauld (1858-1916), but only being jput into practice after his death from 1933* The members sought to Jwork in society at large but dwelt in community for prayer and fellowship.
- 231 -
use du moyen de la démonstration; elle a besoin de conviction bien plus que d'explication, elle a besoin de la réalité et non pas du discours (Antimoderne, p, 29).
This attitude to existence echoes throughout Maritain's career.
In 1947 be wrote:
L'existence n'est pas un simple fait empirique, mais une donnée primitive pour l'esprit lui-même et qui lui livre un champ supra-observable infini, bref la source première et surintelligible de l'intelligibilité (Court Traité de l'Existence, p. 4l)«
Later, in Le paysan de la Garonne (1966), the field of vision is narrower,
but the premise still remains the same:
L'Intuition intellectuelle ... est le bien propre et sacré de 1'intelligenêo comme telle; et c'est, avant tout, de 1,'intuition absolument première sans laquelle il n'y a pas de savoir philosophique: l'intuition de l'être (pl I64,italics in original),
The twin touchstones of rüaritain's philosophy are, first, this stress
on intelligibility abd, secondly, a stress on real existence as observed.
lîaritain calls this 'I'&trel^ and Bergson calls it 'la vie* (of which 'la
durée' is a part). Maritain rooted Thomas Aquinas's philosophy firmly
in existence. Both Maritain and Bergson accused other philosophers of
severing the mind from existence. Bergson argued that Ksnt had rrled
1out the possibility of an intuition of Being , while Maritain not only 
attacked modem philosophers but also distinguished his o?m Thomism from 
other "courants scolastiques non thomistes ou prétendument thomistes"
(Court Traité de l'Existence, p. lO), What they lack is "précisément la 
primauté que le thomisme authentique reconnaît à l'existence et à 1'intuition 
de l'être existentiel" (ibid.).
The reason why such an obsession dominates Maritain's philosophy is 
simply that modem philosophers had failed to understand our indebtedness
1, See E.C., pp. 798-802.
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to experience and to a direct apprehension of the fullness and depth of
.1Being. Even in the case of modern existentialism, awareness and experience 
are vitiated by a false conception of intelligence. In Maritain's opinion, f
it is the supreme virtue of intelligence to apprehend and to interpret |
1existence. Modem existentialism, on the other hand: 4
affirme la primauté de l'existence, mais comme détruisant ou supprimant les essences ou natures, et coirane manifes- tant une suprême défaite de l'intelligence et de l'intelli­gibilité ... supprimez l'essence, ou oe que pose l'esse, vous supprimez du même coup l'existence ou l'esse, ces deux notions sont corrélatives et inséparables ... (Td., n. 13). 41
If the essence of an existent - that is, its nature or significance - |
is suppressed, its very existence is simultaneously negated. If 'essence' 
is suppressed, "l'existence n'actue rien, ... j'existe mais ne suis rien 
1'homme existe mais ... il n'y a pas de nature humaine" (p. 18). But 
'essence' in Maritaib's philosophy can only be knov/n through existence 
-and net merely as an abstract concept. The observation of existence and 
its intelligibility are the two hinges on which the whole of Maritain's 
theory hangs. If existence were not intelligible, we could not 'know' 
at all, for we know only through intelligence. Conversely, if it were 
argued that we know by another faculty, such knowledge would be incompre­
hensible and meaningless, for it is the very nature of our knowledge to |
grasp meaning or significance - this is intelligent knowledge by definition, 
and, apart from it, we cannot 'know' in any real sense at all. Thus 
essence, or meaning, is what existence implies for the mind: "Veritas
sequitur esse rerum" (p. 23). Accordingly, Maritain's philosophy can be 
summed up in this way: "L'Ôtre est l'objet propre de l'intelligence, et
toute chose est intelligible dans la mesure où elle est" (Antimoderne, p. 164).,| 
Having established these points, it is easy to see why îÆaritain attacked % 
Bergson in La Philosonhie bergsonienne. There are two main bones of contention
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and they arise from Maritain’s two great cornerstones. First, Bergson 
had wrongly identified 'la durée réelle' with existence itself (Being).
He had done this by substituting the verb 'devenir' for the verb 'etre' 
and had undermined the substantial nature of existence, following a new 
logic: "Je me perçois durant, je suis, je suis durée" (p. 7)« Maritain
insists that Being "n'est pas à chercher dans le temps - ni dans l'instant, 
ni dans le flux, ni dans la concentration du temps - mais dans l'intemporel"
(p. LXXXV).
Secondly, Maritain points out that Bergson mounted a severe critique
of the ability of the intelligence to know real existence (in flux). In
this way, Bergson's philosophy ruins, "de fond en comblé, toute connaissance 
intellectuelle de la vérité" (p, 117). Bergson "interdit à l'intelligence '7
la connaissance de notre réalité foncière, connaissance intuitive de l'exis- |
tence, connaissance rationnelle de la nature de notre moi" (pp. 129-150). -4
As for Bergson's ovm conception of the intelligence, Maritain counters: j
"l'intelligence n'a pas pu s'adapter à notre pratique, elle ne peut s'adapter 
qu'à l'être" (p. I40).
Ail of the other faults of Bergson's philosophy spring from these two J
misconceptions. For example, Bergson's so-called 'nominalism' and 'empiricism! 
arise from the fact that "il n'y a done de différence d'ordre ou de nature :
entre la connaissance intellectuelle et la connaissance sensible, entre i
l'idée et la sensation ou l'image" (p. 157, italics in original). Our 
knowledge in that case would derive "toute entière de la seule sensibilité, 
de la faculté de sentir et d'imaginer" (p. 137)^ .
1. îüîaritain might appear to be contradicting St. Thomas's unequivocal assertion in Be Veritate, q; 10, a.5.0. (and elsewhere), that our knowledge does in fact derive from sense experience. He supports St. Thomas's view later, however (e,g. in Sept Leçons, 1954; see my account later in this chapter).
T 234 -=
Maritain’s attack had a widespread impact on the Catholic v/orld,- 
as seen in Chapter Three, hut there is a little knovm reverse-side to 
Maritain's approach in La philosophie bergsonienne. His concern is not 
only to deride and denounce. He makes a number of subtle and fine points 
about Bergson's insights. For instance, he does recognize the importance 
of Bergson's attribution of time to real existence: "Le trait de génie de
M. Bergson, 9'a été de voir que si la science des phénomènes enveloppe et 
dissimule elle-même dans son ordre propre et dans son objet formel une 
étoffe métaphysique, cette étoffe ne peut être que le temps" .(p. LXXW),
This is of course not entirely complimentary, because Maritain would say 
that the philosopher of metaphysics must reach beyond the world of pheno­
mena.
On the second point - the critique of the intelligence - Maritain 
makes a further point that "la critique bergsonienne du concept vise avant 
tout un certain usage scientifique du concept, mais de fait atteint à vif 
le concept lui-même et 1'intelligence lui-même" (p. LXXVIIl). The scientific 
use of the concept that Maritain has in mind is specified as "cette intelli­
gence mutilée des philosophes modernes" (p. 69).
Maritain does not dwell long on this vital distinction in La philoscrhie 
bergsonienne but brings out all its implications and ramifications in a con­
temporary article called "La Science Moderne et la Raison"^. In this article 
Maritain separates intelligence into 'raison' and pure 'intelligence'. 
'Intelligence' grasps reality as it presents itself to the mind; 'raison' 
then interprets this material and classifies it by its logical association 
with other ideas - in short, 'raison' conceptualizes the given data. If, in
1, Revue de Philosonhie, No, 6, I9IO, pp. 575-603; reprinted in Antimoderm (1922}, from which quotations here are taken.
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this Tfay, 'raison' conceptualizes what is knom at first hand, then, it is 7
prone to error and to subjective interpretation: only ’intelligence' can
'know' in a simple act - objectively:
Un intellect intuitif, appréhendant la réalité sans mouvement logique ni composition de concepts, ne saurait tomber dans l'erreur; mais un entendement discursif, comme est 1'entendement humain a, par cela même qu'il est discursif, la possibilité de se tromper ... (p. 56).
The use of the word 'intuitif' here is worthy of note, because it is used 
in the sense of a pure spiritual apprehension, with the addendum that this 7
is not the normal capacity or procedure of man's intelligence. Such an 
interpretation would be in keeping with Thomas Aquinas's use of the word 
'intuitus', which means God's knowledge of us {intrinsically authentic and 
full) and not our knowledge at all. However, Maritain, following Bergson, 
then proceeds to employ 'intuition' and 'intuitif' elsewhere in this article ' i; 
to mean the mind's immediate apprehension of things outside itself. This 
second use becomes increasingly commonplace in Maritain later, as will be 
seen.
However, the main point of Maritain's article is the distinction of 
mind into two faculties. He explains that modern philosophers have mis­
interpreted 'intelligence' or mind in general to mean just 'raison'. Thus, 
instead of using the intelligence to perceive things as they are - in their 
own life - they reverse the process of mind from 'intuition' to 'raison' ;
and work by first applying concepts and theories (constructed by 'raison') 
to life and in this way impose interpretations on the primordial sense data:
"les modernes ont complètement intraverti les deux termes de cette distinction" 
(p. 50). A similar confusion between the tv/o faculties is highlighted in 
Le Paysan de la Garonne (Desclée de Brouwer, I966), in which Maritain
'.Vspeaks of modern philosophers' tendency to have recourse to 'raison' for nroof 7
.J
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of the validity of experience:
Tandis que disparaît de notre univers de culture l’idée de la connaissance philosophique authentique, et que s’éclipse le régime de la vérité à contempler, l’éblouissant avènement de la science moderne avec son langage symbolique ... et de cette mathémati­sation de 1’observable ... qui ... place l'esprit sous le régime de la vérification à opérer, porte tout le monde à croire que la science - la science des phénomènes - est absolument seule à pouvoir nous apporter une connaissance rationnelle certaine 
(p. 30).
So, for Maritain, such philosophers replace meditation on experience with 
analysis of experience in rational terms alone.
Where is the origin of Maritain's distinction between discursive and 
intuitive intelligence? It is present in Thomas Aquinas, but in 1910, 
when Maritain wrote his article, it was a little Imown and less employed 
-part of his philosophy. Yet Maritain grants to this division of mind 
primary importance in his own confrontation of 'tru.e' philosophy with 'modern'
Bergson uses the words 'analyse' and 'intuition' in Introduction à la
Métaphysique (1903? p. 1595 ff*) to describe exactly the same aspects of
mind as Maritain's 'raison' and 'intelligence':
Analyser consiste ... à exprimer une chose en fonction de ce qui n'est pas elle. Toute analyse est ainsi une traduction, un développement en symboles, une représen­tation prises de points de vue successifs (pp. 1595-1596), <;<
while, on-the other hand, "il suit de là qu'un absolu ne saurait etre donné 
que dans une intuition" (p. 1595)» Bergson does rather unfortunately alter j 
his vocabulary for L'Evolution Créatrice four years later, where the conceptual 
and discursive powers of mind are called 'intelligence'^. The 'intelligence' 1ifabricates hypotheses, schemas and abstract systems of ideas: I
1. See, e.g, p. 674: this question in considered in Chapter T»vo at length.
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Toutes ces analyses tendent à résoudre les lois de la nature en autant de systèmes d'analogies. Toute inté­gration de ce genre est une illusion de l'esprit qui conclut, de ce que nous pouvons classer des termes donnés sous des rubriques de moins en moins nombreuses, qu'on pourra enfin subsumer la totalité des choses soit à un concept unique, soit à deux concepts coordonnés l'un à l'autre ("Rapport sur Le Pluralisme de J.-H. Boex-Borel",
Mélanges, p. 795)»
l'îaritain cornes to a remarkably similar conclusion himself in "la science
moderne et la raison", judging that the separation of 'raison' from the
external world can easily lead to "des grandeurs abstraites et des modèles
idéaux" (p. 48)» These then bear little relation to reality:
l'unité ne peut jamais venir de la juxtaposition et de la cimentation artificielle de ce qui nous est donné séparément; et c'est pour cette raison que toutes ces tentatives de la 'philosophie des sciences* sont inopérantes.L'unité ne peut venir que d'une vérité d'un autre ordrequi domine sans forcément les contenir, les vérités quinous sont données à part (p. 50).
Both Maritain ahd Bergson have in their sights the positivist and 
rationalist philosophies which compose systems of thought joined by logic 
alone, while remaining sceptical about our knoY^ledge of anything beyond 
'ideas'. Maritain maintains that such an approach cannot "saisir l'unité, 
ni la simplicité, ni la. continuité, ni le mouvement, ni la vie, ni la durée, 
ni l'éternité, ni l'être, ni une cause, ni une fin" (p. 57). The vocabulary i
is singularly and undeniably Bergsonian. Bergson's philosophy is the
very philosophy which speaks of the need to understand the heterogeneity 
and movement of all things in life and of the absence of movement, life and 
'durée' in conceptual systems like that of Aristotle.
Where Maritain obviously differs from Bergson is in his early use of
the word 'intelligence' in place of Bergson's 'intuition' and of 'raison' 
for Bergson's 'intelligence'. Clearly, this places their respective uses 
of the word 'intelligence* in diametrical opposition. Neither is such an 
opposition merely a matter of vocabulary alone. Whereas Bergson's 'intuiti on' ?
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is non-intellectual, Maritain claims that nothing can he known apart from 
the intellect and,in fact, we Imow what we Imow only as 'mind', 'idea' or 
'essence' and not in its separate existence at all.
To complicate the issue even more, Bergson uses the term 'connaissance' 
in two Tfays (at least); first, to indicate knowledge of a material object 
(in its existence as well as its nature). In this area, intelligence is I
efficient:
la connaissance pratique est véritablement une connaissance de la réalité en soi, de la réalité absolue, là où elle reste fdans son domaine à elle. Ainsi l'intelligence, qui a pour !rêle de maîtriser la matière inorganisée, est capable de connaître absolument (quoique incomplètement) cette matière 
(Mélanges, pp. 1147-1148» letter to H. Hëffding of 15.5.1915)#
The second type of absolute knowledge is of spiritual natures - complex 
•essences'; for example, that of a personality as a whole known in a 
simple act: in an intuition,
_le personnage me serait donné tout d'un coup dans son .intégralité, et les mille incidents qui le manifestent, au lieu de s'ajouter à l'idée et de l'enrichir, me sembleraient au contraire se détacher d'elle, sans pourtant en épuiser ou en appauvrir l'essence (p. 1594)#
The normal object of 'intuition' in Bergson's system is 'la durée' or 'la
mobilité de la durée' (Oeuvres, p. I416). This is a separation of material I
from spiritual; in other words, is knowledge of 'essence' or spiritual nature. -
This second intuition is closer to îüaritain's 'intuition abstractive'
or 'intuition intellectuelle', which is the mind's grasp of its object in
its essence. Maritain does, however, draw attention to the difference
between this intuition and Bergson's:
Oelle-ci se présente comme n'étant pas de nature intellectuelle.Or, ce que nous disons, c'est que oe qui par excellence est objet d'intuition c'est l'être, mais objet d'intuition intellec­tuelle, Nous sommes en réalité très loin du bergsonisme.L'être procure une telle intuition non pas à cette sorte de sympathie exigeant une torsion de la volonté sur elle-même dont parle M. Bergson, c'est à 1'intelligence que l'être
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procure une telle intuition, par le moyen d'un concept, d'une idée ... (Sept Leçons sur l'ètre, P. Téqui, 1934» 
pp. 54-55).
However, given that Bergson regards mind as irreducible to matter and of a
quite different nature, it must be the case that lonowledge for Bergson is
immaterial or 'metaphysical'; therefore 'idea' in some form.
The argument really appears to revolve around the fact that Bergson
introduces impure elements into 'intelligence', such as the involvement
of the will and the senses. It is true that for Bergson understanding
1stems directly from perception and insight from a real effort of will , but,
on the other hand, understanding is seen in terms of mind throughout "L'Effort |
Intellectuel", while pure attention or sense perception is only viewed as a
starting point:
II y a ici une caractéristique intellectuelle de l'effort intellectuel. Il est vrai que, si cette caractéristique existe pour les**'représentations d'ordre complexe et élevé, on doit en retrouver quelque chose dans des états plussimples. Il n'est donc pas impossible que nous en dé­couvrions des traces jusque dans l'attention sensorielle elle-même, encore que cet élément n'y joue plus qu'un role accessoire et effacé (p. 931).
It seems that Maritain is so concerned to uphold the unique qualities
of intelligence that he separates it too. rigidly from all other faculties
in the process of knowing. His intellectualism is further underlined in
Réflexions sur 1'Intelligence (Nouvelle Lib. Nat., 1926), where it is stated
2that intelligence - and not the will - moves towards "I'acte de foi sur­
naturelle" (p. 6). Knowledge, or "une identité absolue entre l'être et la 
pensée" (p. 13), is achieved by intelligence, and through abstraction: "Elle
1. See "La perception du chang'oment", pp. 1565-1592, and "L'Effort intellectuel", pp. 950-959*
2. The will does, nonetheless, play 'un rêle essentiel' (p. 6).
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travaille sur ce que sont les choses, c'est en elle un monde d'essences 4
universelles, tel le monde des nombres dans l'intelligence du mathématicien" 4
(p. 15, italics in original). This knowledge is therefore at once direct '7 
but deficient.
However, it must be understood that for Maritain, as for Bergson, |
knowledge is rooted not in a process of logic, nor in the analytical iden- 1 
tification of an experience, nor in any 'process' at all - but simply in 3
apprehension. The consequences of this discovery are signal when Maritain j 
broaches knowledge of a purely metaphysical kind, for in that domain direct i 
intuition holds the key to knowledge. In other words, in knowing God it is 
experience which is solicited, and not simply knowledge about God. Gradually C 
Maritain comes to regard all knowledge as a deepening of our observation of ;!
the real and not simply a sharpening of our analysis of what is true: "Je -<
peux savoir par la ùaison que Dieu existe, mais à condition de partir de 1
l'être que je touche et que je vois" (%d., p. 20).
Now, it coula be argued that to know something apart from its existence 
is not to know in any real sense at all, and Maritain himself admits that 
knowledge in the intelligence only yields knowledge about the mind's exis­
tence and not the existence of the object. The object exists as 'concept'.
The word 'concept' is, however, being used here in an entirely different way 3 
from Bergson's use. Maritain's 'concept' is not a 'représentation'; it 
is a sign - that which points to and takes its life and form from something 
else. It is "un signe dont tout l'essence est de signifier" (Distinguer <
pour Unir, Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1952, p. 252). It is no more and 3
no less than a 'signe': "il consiste en un pur 'faisant connaître'" (p, 771)* i
There is therefore no intelligible content to this type of concept apart 
from its object:
C'est la relation de signe elle-même, qui, pour avoir la
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purete et 1'efficacité requises dans cet univers incomparable qu'est l'univers du connaître, requiert la relation d’identité (sous le rapport du con­stitutif intelligible) (p. 77l)-
This relation of identity between a concept in the mind and its
object outside mind which Maritain simply calls 'concept' relates closely
to Bergson's 'image'; that is to say, the physica,l object in the guise of
a mental perception^*
There is also another 'image' in Bergson's philosophy. In this second
instance, 'image' means the material representation of something mental.
He explains it as follows;
On passera du plan supérieur où tout était ramassé dans une seule représentation, à des plans de moins en moins élevés, de plus en plus voisins de la sen­sation, où la représentation simple est éparpillée _ en images, où les images se. développent ..en.phrases et en mots ... ("L'Effort Intellectuel", p. 956).V
. , Maritain takes full account of the Bergsonian uses of the word 'image'
in his own treatise on 'le signe' in Quatre Essais sur l'esnrit (1st pub. 
1959, q. from Alsatia, ed. 1956). In this chapter we are only concerned 
with the philosophical uses of the word 'signe' (and not aesthetic ones) . 
Whole sections of Maritain's book are devoted to discussions of Bergson's 
theories and it is obvious that Bergson has spurred and prompted Maritain 
to define his own position.
The first function of 'le signe' for Maritain is as a 'formal cause' 
or 'objective cause' (as opposed to 'efficient cause') of the knowledge 
of 'what is'. Maritain differentiates between 'le signe' and 'l'image' 
in this way; "Toute image n'est pas signe, et tout signe n'est pas image
1. See Matière et Mémoire, p. l6l,
2. See Chapter Eight for aesthetic uses of '1'image'.
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1bien des signes ne sont pas des images (la fumée n'est pas l'image du 
feu ni le cri de la douleur)" (pp. 64-65), Maritain sees a close relation­
ship between the idea of 'le signe' and its meaning:
La naissance de l’idée ... semble liée à la découvertede la valeur de signification d’un signe. L'animaluse de signes sans percevoir la relation de significa­
tion (p. 69).
In the French, of course, the words 'signe' and 'signification' are cognate, 
and Maritain takes cognizance of this fact. The 'signe' for'Maritain has, 
above all, an intellectual content, and Maritain accuses Bergson of con­
fusion because he fails to recognize this. He muddles the distinction
between 'I'image' as exact representation of the signified and 'le signe’
as evocative symbol of the signified. His "feuilles mortes sur l'eau 
d’un étang" (L'Essai, p. 90) obviously cannot be a literal 'image' in the 
sense of 'représentation'; it is related intellectually to its object and 
is only indirectly representative of what it- describes-. - - - - -
The above type of image occurs frequently in Bergson's works, and 
nowhere more often than in L'Evolution Créatrice, where his persistent 
use of the phrase "Tout se passe ccmme si ..." preceded an image of just 
the type Maritain means.
What does Maritain's analysis reveal? Surely that, if the intellect 
can form a single concept from a complex reality, then the imagination 
intrudes or intervenes to some extent. He admits that the subconscious 
mind is dominated by the imagination (see p. 83) but, if the conscious mind 
also tends to construe reality in symbolic or poetic form, it must also 
allow some function to the imagination. Maritain does concede that the 
imagination can initiate a process leading to knowledge but clings to the 
doctrine that, in the final analysis:
, les sensations, les images, les idées sont solaires,
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engagées dans le psychisme lumineux et régulier de l'intelligence et de ses lois de gravitation (p, 84). j;
If Bergson's 'image' is an imaginative creation and no more it can bear no 
relation whatever to the truth except by analogy, by an interpretation 
through the intelligence (see pp. 85-88). The image cannot actually be 
the reality itself, and Maritain accuses Bergson of falling into the trap 
of believing this (p. 90). In other words, the important difference between 
Maritain and Bergson remains the fact that, for Bergson, an 'image' in the :
mind is inseparable from the existence of the object reflected, whereas,for i
Maritain, only the essence of the object is the same both outside and inside 
the mind: *
Ce n'est pas une image ou un portrait de la chose, ni une forme vide, c'est la chose même, c'est la nature meme, qui est à la fois dans la chose pour exister et dans le concept pour être perçue (p. 20).
- - There is a third intellectual faculty - in addition to 'ratio' and
'intellectus' - or 'raison' and 'intelligence' - which Maritain calls 'le
jugement', and this provides Maritain with something of a solution to the
impasse over existence. Maritain sees the 'jugement' as the reconciling
agency between existence and essence: its function consists in:
faire passer à l'esprit du plan de la simple essence, ou du simple objet signifié à la pensée, au plan de la hhose ou du sujet détenant l'existence (actuellement ou possiblement), et dont l'objet de pensée prédicat et l'objet de pensée sujet sont des aspects intelligibles (Distinguer pour Unir. 1952, pp. 188-189).
Therefore, whereas the concept is related to essence, "le jugement a rapport 
à l'existence (actuelle ou possible)" (Réflexions sur 1'intelligence. 1926,
p. 23).
ït could be objected here with justification that, even though 'le 
jugement', by reflection, affirms existence, it is still operating through
$1
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the process of abstraction and can only affirm the idea of existence and i
that only subjectively. Maritain himself acknowledges that 'le jugement* s
is "un mouvement logique immanent à l'esprit et progressant à partir d'un 
principe avec nécessité; en lui le connaître apparaît comme un développe­
ment de la pensée suivant les lois inflexibles de la connexion des concepts"
(ld«♦ p. 152, my underlining),
How then, if at all, is existence knovm directly? Maritain's philosophy 
does contain a second theory of intuition, which he calls 'l'intuition des 
sens' (p. 20). Sensations are simply described as "l'existence actuellement J
exercée" (p. 20). They are caused by external existence impressing itself é
upon the senses. Thus, Maritain recognizes "le 1^ ]e capital, à ce point de 
vue, de l'expérience sensible, du contact charnel avec les choses" (p. 20).
Ail the same, Maritain does not grant to the senses any capacity to know - 
such a thing would be absurd to him. The senses intuit an object in its f
action, not in its essence: i.e. "les choses en tant qu'elles sont en acte
d'existence" (p. 18).
Even 80, Maritain comes to realize that all types of knowledge and 
even judgement itself are dependent on the senses. The senses have a
i'primary role to play in the acquisition of knov/ledge, for they render to 4
the mind both the matter of any concept and the matter of any judgement:
Tout jugement doit, d'une manière ou d'une autre,se résoudre finalement en eux, [les sens], autre- ?ment dit la res sensibilis visibilis est la pierre §de touche de 1'existentialité (Sept leçons sur l'etre,1954, pp. 29-30).
This is so:
non seulement parce que les sens ... sont indis­pensables à la science, et à la science la plus dégagée et immatérielle, pour revenir sur l’exis­tence actuelle qu'elle ne peut pas ignorer ni négliger; c'est une existence corruptible: ellene 1'atteint qu'indirectement, en sortant de sa sphère propre et par le ministère des sens (p. 30)«
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In the Sept leçons sur l'être Maritain accords considerable time and. t,
space to the discussion of sensations and gives clear expression at last to |
the fact that all intellectual intuition comes via the senses. However, %
ithere are not separate intuitions so much as three stages in the apnre-
■ihension of an object - for, from existence as sense data, the object
becomes concept and is then confirmed (retrospectively) in its existence |
by the judgement.
In Distinguer pour Unir (1932) as well as in De Bergson à Thomas d'Aouln / 
(1944) (Eds. de la Liaison française, H.Y.), Maritain narrows his criticism 
of Bergson to a criticism of empirical knowledge as final and ultimate know­
ledge. Bergson's restoration of temporal existence to the object of intuition! 
was considered to be a part of this reinstatement of 'empiricism', which could 
serve metaphysics in restoring to it a greater realism, but could undermine 
it by substituting Time for Being. So Bergson paradoxically restores to
philosophy a sense of the real and yet makes of time pawsing an idol. Meta­
physical theories could not be built entirely on empirical evidence, which 
was only part of total creation and which was so dependent on the scientific 
theories of a particular age. Speaking of the findings of Les deux sources, 
Maritain says this:
Une espèce de scission manichéenne est ... la rançon d'une conception tout empiriciste, pour qui agir ne peut etre que céder à une force qui contraint ou qui attire: seule la raison, principe d'un univers moraldistinct de l'obéissance sociale de. l'élan mystique, peut reconnaître, en fonction des lois propres de cet univers, l'ordre qui subordonne le social au mystique et les concilie du même coup (Pe Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin,Ed. de la Maison française, H.Y., 1944, P* 63, italicsin original),
Maritain's argument is rather unfair, since Bergson's aim is not to construct
Ja metaphysical framework but to obsejrve moral and religious behaviour in actionf 
Although Maritain's other criticisms of Bergson have already been
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encountered in La Philosophie bergsonienne, the criticism is not unmitigated 
in the later work and there is certainly a new tone evident. For example, 
Maritain writes in general terms: "l'on ne saurait trop marquer 1'importance 
du renouvellement dont la pensée moderne est ainsi redevable à Bergson"
(p. 60), And, more significantly, Maritain actually agrees with one of 
Bergson's basic hypotheses about, the nature of life by accepting that 
reality is not: *
une réitération d'événements identiques. La réalité n'est pas cette concaténation d'immobilités et d'éléments tout faits, sans densité ontologique interne ni ten- dencialité ni puissance interne d'expansion, qu'imagine le mécanisme (p. I9).
Furthermore, at the end of the book, there is a truly remarkable attempt
at reconciliation between Bergson and St. Thomas Aquinas:
Ce maître [i.e. Bergson] qui m'avait éveillé au désir métaphysi^ ... a eu la générosité de ne pas me tenir rigueur de ces critiques, qui atteignaient pourtant ce qu'un philosophe a de plus cher, ses idées. Quelques années avant sa mort il écrivait qu'ayant peu fréquenté saint Thomas, il s'était néanmoins, chaque fois qu'il avait rencontré up texte de lui sur son chemin, trouvé d'accord avec lui, et qu'il admettait fort bien qu'on situât sa philosophie dans le prolongement de saint Thomas (p. 85).
Maritain then adds that, as for his ovm attitude to Bergson, "nous nous 
sommes retrouvés en quelque sorte au milieu de la route" (p, 85).
In some way or other, it seems likely that Maritain must have come to 
the point of reassessing his own position with regard to Bergson, and to 
have drawn closer to him. After all the hostility of the early days the 
beginnings of a change of mind on Maritain's part are apparent as early as 
1926, in Réflexions sur l'Intelligence, where he considers that Bergson 
"avait pu, lui aussi, s'il avait voulu, appeler son intuition intelligence 
et se présenter en défensuiur de l'intellect" (p. 95). Or again., in the 




En connaissant je ne deviens pas autre, je deviens l'autre, et il y a tout un monde entre ces deux formules. Hous disions tout â l'heure que l’acte immanent de connaître consiste à être ou devenir; ajoutons qu'il consiste à être ou devenir 1'autre en tant qu'autre. Voilà le mystère propre de la connaissance (pp. 52-53» italics in original).
In Maritain's theory, the intelligence, being spiritual, becomes the other 
'immaterially' (p. 53) or by 'connaturalite' (p. 89). Maritain explains 
that this is not intellectual knowledge as such, but "connaissance par mode 
d'inclination" (p. 88) or "connaissance par connaturalite amoureuse" (p. 89). 
This knowledge is akin to mystical knowledge (p. 89). According to Van 
Riet (in L'Epistemologie Thomiste) this is Maritain's main original con­
tribution to neo-Thomist epistemology. Having elucidated this, Maritain 
takes another step:
L'intelligence n'est vraiment intelligence que si 1'amour est là pour spécifier son opération. Elle n'est vrai­ment intelligence que si elle n'agit pas d'une manière purement intellectuelle (p. 93).
In giving credence to this possible alternative form of knowledge, 
Maritain rejoins the stream of thought influenced by Rousselot, Maréchal 
and Blondel, for all of whom a man knows most surely v/hen all his faculties 
combine, depending on each other for completion and fulfilment, Bergson 
calls this combination of faculties 'l'ûme' all through Matière et Mémoire, 
while in "Le bon sens et les études classiques" he characterizes 'le bon 
sens' as "le rayonnenemt intellectuel d'un foyer moral intense, la justesse 
des idées se moulant sur le sentiment de la justice,■enfin l'esprit redressé 
par le caractère" (Mélanges. p. 365). He explains that this is due to the 
fact that "1'action et la pensée me paraissent avoir une source commune, qui 
n'est ni pure volonté, ni pure intelligence, et cette source est le bon sens"
(p. 365).
Maritain took a second major step in Bergson's direction in accepting
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that the intuition of the self is not abstractive (as is the intuition of H|
external objects), but is experimental; that is, is apprehended in its
action and existence. This point is clearly made in Distinguer cour Unir
(1932) and Maritain here acknowledges his debt to Bergson:
iilst-oe que l’on doive hier l'existence de toute expérience métaphysique? Nous ne le croyons pas, du moins à bien entendre ce mot (ainsi peut-on rejoindre quelques-unes des vues de M. Bergson).Etant esprits par la meilleure partie de nous- mêmes , nous pouvons avoir une expérience des choses de l'esprit, même en restant sur le plan naturel.C'est ainsi que non seulement nous connaissons expérimentalement l'existence de notre âme et celle de notre libre arbitre, mais que nous pouvons aussi accéder à une certaine perception expérimen­tale obscure de la liberté même de l'esprit en nous, de sa transcendance par rapport à tout l'univers matériel, ou encore ... du néant immanent à tout ce qui est créé (pp. 551-552).
This corresponds to Bergson's conviction that we know our oivn 'moi 
profond', 'moi intérieur' or the'durée' of our own being. Bom I, Trethowan 
pointed out to me that 'la durée réelle' might well mean something approximate !
to 'being-in-time' or 'action in concrete existence' rather than merely 'time 
passing' or 'the substance of things', as Maritain construes Bergson's meaning 
(Conversation of 11.3.75)• Maritain himself appears to grasp something of 
this meaning in Sept leçons (1934), when he speaks of "l'exemple bergexmien |
de l'expérience de la durée" (p. 57)•. He continues; J




It is important to note that here the use of 'perception’ as 
synonymous with 'intuition' is Bergsonian, as in "La Perception du 
Changement" (pp. I565-I392). Secondly, it is crucial to see that the 
intuition of self is more than an abstractive intuition of quiddity or 
essence. Its basis is knowledge of existence in time. Maritain there­
fore accepts the Bergsonian account of intuition of self in all its full­
ness. This is not to say that Maritain abandons or rejects abstractive 
intuition - he allots to it a different object.
Towards the end of his career, Maritain wrote Le Paysan de la Garonne 
(1966) and also two articles in La Revue Thomiste dealing in detail with 
the intuition of existence per se .^ In Le Paysan de la Garonne, Maritain 
states that we intuit certain complex unities at a pre-conscious level; 
things like good and evil, moral obligation, justice and law and even 
extra-mental realities - truth; the distinction between substance and 
accident and the principle of identity. These are closely allied to 
instincts:
Intuitions primitives nées dans le préconscient de l'esprit ... obscurément perçues par l'instinct de l'esprit (pp. 28-29).
Maritain further accepts unequivocally the fact that in attaining 'la durée
réelle' Bergson actually attained existence, and not just 'time passing'.
In other words, Bergson's 'durée réelle' is not simply time, but relates
to real existence which necessarily includes and involves time:
J'ai dit que'l'intuition intellectuelle de l'être n'a rien à voir avec l'intuition bergsonienne, qui gâtait un anti-intellectualisme à vrai dire très accidentel, et que Bergson décrivait comme une sorte d'ineffable sympathie exigeant une torsion de la volonté vers elle-
Namely "Réflexions sur la nature blessée et sur 1'intuition de l'etre" (No. 68, 1968, pp. 5-40) and "Il n'y a pas de savoir sans intuitivité" (No, 70, 1970, pp. 50-71).
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Imême; et surtout, elle ne portait directement sur l'être, mais seulement sur une durée qui n'est qu'un des aspects de l'être. Cela dit, il faut ajouter qu'à trave:.*s la durée c'est l'esse que de fait, et sans se le dire,il atteignait en réalité, et qu'en tout cas le thomisme lui doit une fière chandelle, car si l'intuition de l'être n'a rien à voir avec son intuition, c'est cependant grâce à l'impact de son intuition, et de son génie métaphysique, sur la pensée moderne ... que les thomistes contemporains |ont enfin reconnu ... l'importance essentielle et absolument primordiale de l'intuition de l'être dans leur propre philo­sophie. A ce point de vue on doit considérer Bergson comme un grand libérateur (pp. 205-206).
In the 1968 article ("Réflexions sur la nature blessée et sur l'intuition i■sA \de l'etre"), Maritain sees a deficiency in Aristotle's treatment of the intui- j
%tion of Being. Aristotle implies such an intuition but it is not articulated | 
coherently: "II n'a pas été capable de la dégager pour elle-meme et d'en
faire vivre sa doctrine explicitement formulée)' (p, 17). Maritain then 
proceeds to explain the unique quality and importance of this intuition J
of existence. It ib not knowledge:
par mode d'essence, c'est-à-dire au moyen d'une idée issue de l'opération abstractive,
but rather
dans le cas unique dont je parle ... l'idée ou concept (d'existence) ne précède pas le jugement •(d'existence), elle vient après lui et provient de lui (pp. 17-18). !
The intuition remains a judgement, but "d'un autre type que tous les autres 
jugements" (p. 18). It is unique in the one way that really matters; that 
is, it attains (knows) existence as well as essence: "Par elle je plonge
dans le monde de 1'exister, en ra'évadant du monde des essences et de leurs 
relations" (p. 18). Existence is not then an attribute added (through a 
posterior intellectual judgement) to the subject; it is the subject itself, 
"dans le réel extra-mental" (p. 18), The metaphor of perception is again 
employed (as in Bergson):
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C ’ e s t  p o u r  l ’ i n t e l l i g e n c e  s a i s i r  i n t u i t i v e m e n t ,  o u  v o i r , a u  s e i n  d e  l ’ i n t i m i t é  s p i r i t u e l l e  d e  s a  p r o p r e  o p é r a t i o n ,  l ’ê t r e ,  l ’ e É i s t e r ,  l ’ e s s e  e x t r a - m e n t a l  d e  c e  s u j e t ,  v o i l à  l ’ i n t u i t i o n  d e  l ’ê t r e  " ( p T  1 8 ) .
I n t e l l i g e n c e ,  i n  t h i s  o n e  c a s e ,  c a n  p e r c e i v e  B e i n g  a s  i t  e x i s t s  i n  t i m e .
I t  t h e n  a f t e r w a r d s  r e f l e c t s  a n d  f o r m s  c o n c e p t s  a b o u t  i t s  s u b j e c t .  T h i s  t a k e s
p l a c e  i n  a  s e c o n d  a n d  s e c o n d a r y  ’ a c t e  j u d i c a t i f ’ , w h i c h  M a r i t a i n  a l s o  c a l l s  a
" s e c o n d  c o n c e p t  d ’ e x i s t e n c e "  ( p .  1 8 ) .  T h i s  i s  a b s t r a c t i v e  a n d  ’ e s s e n t i a l ' .
T h e  i n t u i t i o n  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  " d ’a u t r e  o r i g i n e  d a n s  l ' e s p r i t  q u e
l e  c o n c e p t ,  e x p r i m é  p a r  l e  m o t  ' e x i s t e n c e ' ,  q u i  p r o v i e n t  d a n s  l ' e s p r i t ,  n o n
d ’u n  j u g e m e n t ,  m a i s  d e  l ' o p é r a t i o n  a b s t r a c t i v e  . . . "  ( p ,  1 8 ) .  T h e r e  a r e
h e n c e  t w o  f o r m s  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i n  t h e  m i n d  -  t h e  f i r s t  a s  ' v i s i o n ' , t h e
s e c o n d  a s  ' a b s t r a c t i o n ' :
1 ' e x i s t e r  s a i s i  p a r  l ' i n t u i t i o n  d e  l ' ê t r e  e s t  u n  i n t e l l i g i b l e  q u i  n ' e s t  p a s  t i r é  d e s  p h a n t a s m e s  p a r  l ' o p é r a t i o n  a b s t r a c t i v e .  C ' e s t  l ' i n t e l l i g i b l e  p a r  e x c e l l e n c e  q u e  l ' i n t e l l i g e n c e  e s t  f a i t e  p o u r  v o i r ,  m a i s  q u ' e l l e  n e  v o i t  q u e  d a n s  l ' i n t u i t i o n  d e  l ' ê t r e ,  q u i  e s t  u n e  i n t u i t i o n  m é t a p h y s i q u e  ( p .  2 0 ) .
M a r i t a i n  n e x t  a n a l y z e s  t h e  m e c h a n i c s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  i n t u i t i o n  o f  b e i n g .
H e  m a k e s  a  r a d i c a l l y  n e ? f  e f f o r t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  i n t i m a t e  l i a i s o n  b e t w e e n  
t h e  s e n s e s  a n d  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  H e  c i t e s  t h e  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  e y e  g i v i n g  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  i t s  d a t a .  H e  t h e n  g o e s  o n  t o  s a y  t h a t ,  w h e n  a  r o s e  i s  s e e n ,  
i t s  c o l o u r ,  e t c . ,  a r e  g i v e n ,  b u t  s o  i s  i t s  e x i s t e n c e ,  s o  t h a t  " l ' i n t e l l i g e n c e  
p r e n d  c o n s c i e n c e ,  n o n  s e u l e m e n t  d e  l a  c o u l e u r  d e  l a  r o s e  . . .  m a i s  d u  v o i r  
c e t t e  r o s e , a u t r e m e n t  d i t  l ' a c t e  c o g n i t i f  l u i - m ê m e  d u  s e n s  e x t e r n e "  ( p .  2 l ) .  
T h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  r o s e  c a n  b e  r e n d e r e d  a s  " c e t t e  r o s e  e s t  . . . "  ( p .  2 l ) ,  
w h i l e  t h e  a b s t r a c t  i d e a  o f  e x i s t e n c e  a f f i r m s  t h a t  " l a  r o s e  e s t  l à "  ( p .  2 l ) ,
T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  l i k e  t h a t ,  b e t w e e n  t h e  G e r m a n  ' S e i n V - a n d  ' D a s e i n ' .
T h e r e  i s  e v e n  a  t h i r d  s t a g e  i n  t h e  a p p r e h e n s i o n  o f  e x i s t e n c e  a f t e r  
b o t h  i n t u i t i o n  a n d  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  a n d  i n  t h i s  t h i r d  w a y  M a r i t a i n  a g a i n  r e j o i n s
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Bergson. The third stage is a sudden realization of the nature of the |
intuition:
Alors l’éclair de l'intuition de l’être jaillit tout à coup, et 1’exister de la rose ... de dévoile comme objet explicitement saisi ... non par une species .,. mais par intentlo intelligens, je veux dire par un acte ... qui, posant dans l’esprit la rose comme posée en elle-même hors de l’esprit, porte du même coup l'exister de la rose |*à l’état de spiritualité en acte, et du même coup le faitvoir (p. 22).
Maritain has Bergson in mind as he writes this, for he adds that Bergson
indeed knew about the intuition of existence, but, like Aristotle, "d’une
manière encore incomplete et déficiente" (p. 30). Maritain reiterates his
old charge that Bergson replaces ’être’ by ’durée' and,in so doing, disguises |
the real nature of his intuition. In addition, Bergson does not expound in
a logical, formal manner the intellectual nature of intuition. So the |
original objections''to Bergson still stand, while, at the same time, all
the potential and hidden riches of his philosophy are freely acknowledged
to have had great influence on Maritain’s ovm thought.
To the very end Maritain drew sharp dividing lines (unlike Bergson)
between different types of intuition, and in "II n ’y a pas de savoir sans
intuitivité" placed them under three main headings:
Je réserverai le nom d'intuition soit à l’intuition du sens externe, soit à l’intuition créatrice propre au poète(l), soit à l’intuition purement intellectuelle 
et cognitive ... (Op. cit., p. 50).
He places the pre-conceptual intuition of existence in the bracket of 
intellectual intuition, whereas this intuition is clearly so closely 
related to sense data that it is hardly distinct from them: "’voyant’
sans composer des concepts entre eux, l'intellect est en prise directe
1. See Chapter Eight.
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du réel" (p. 50). ■ J
The title of Maritain' s 1970 article bears witness to th^ ciucial 
importance of 'intuition’ in his whole philosophy: if we are not in
touch with something real outside the intelligence we can know nothing àJ
■at all. And it is by a process of deepening our knowledge of what is that |
: Iwe arrive at knowledge of God: ;
L'aspect 'mystère' prédomine naturellement là où la ;connaissance est le plus ontologique; là où elle As'efforce de découvrir l'etre en lui-même et les 1secrets de l'être, soit intuitivement, soit par ianalogie. Les secrets de l'être, de la connaissance;-de l'amour; des réalités purement spirituelles; de . . |la cause première (et par-dessus de la vie intime de Dieu) (Sect leçons, p. 11).
The existence of God is implied in the very experience of knowing, "avant
d'entrer dans la sphère de la connaissance complètement formée et articulée,
en particulier dans la sphère de la connaissance métaphysique" (Approches
de- Dieu, Alsatia, 1955» P« 11). In the act.of apprehending existence God
himself is unconsciously apprehended by 'contuition':
Tout dépend ici de l'intuition naturelle de l'être, - de l'intuition de cet acte d'exister qui est la forme de toute forme et la perfection de toute perfection, en qui toutes les structures intelligibles de la réalité ont leur définitive actuation ... (p. 11). 7
Cette intuition primordiale est à la fois l'intuition de mon existence- et de l'existence des choses (p. 12).
The intuition of Being has three aspects: the solidity of existence
is knovm; the subject's own existence is knovm through experience of 'le 
néant' and, thirdly, "je réalise que cette existence solide et inexorable 
perçue en n'importe quelle chose, implique ... une existence absolue et 
irréfragable, complètement libre du néant et de la mort" (p, 13).
The deepening awareness of Being (implied in the term 'intuition') 
took Maritain away from concepts of God and from arguments proving his
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existence, towards an apprenension of God in immediate experience; it is I
this nystical knowledge of God which resulted largely from a deepening ï
concentration on Bergson's 'intuition*. No longer does experience have 4
■'to he validated by logic in the manner of the high Thomists (and present- g
day logical positivists), but experience itself validates logic. The |
terms are reversed. ;
For Maritain a certain knowledge of God is granted to the natural t
intelligence, but more truly to 'intellectus' than to 'ratio'. Maritain
gradually came round to this position, so that when,in 1970» he dealt with I
ithe same subject as ih 1910 - the distinction between 'intellectus' and |
'ratio' - his attention was firmly fixed on the value of 'intellectus' %
rather than on the merits of 'ratio':
Au lieu de porter d'abord son regard vers les conclusions satisfaisantes pour la pensée à tirer des chaînes deraisonnement . c'est vers le réel, vers ce qui est,que le savant porte exclusivement son regard - un regard neuf, oubliant pour le moment les explications admises (p. 33» italics in original).
It might conceivably be objected that direct knowledge of God is by 
no means a straightforward deepening of our knowledge of Being, In the 
Thomist account, direct knowledge of God is supernatural and is only granted 
by grace in revelation. Maritain does emphatically assent to the trans- |
cendence and mystery of God in various places, but from the time of
Distinguer cour ïïnir (1932) he begins to place more emphasis on the
immanence or presence of God in the world than on his separation from it.
He asserts that metaphysical knowledge is gained by the intellectual intuition I 
(pp. 280-281) and that there is nothing specifically supernatural about our 
knowledge of spiritual things, except that, at a certain point, grace inter- 
venes to push our knowledge further (and not to give it in toto), Grace 
confirms and adds to what is dimly glimpsed or suspected by the light of
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natural intelligence:
II peut arriver qu’une vérité d'ordre naturel, telle que la réalité foncière de l'être, caché sous les phénomènes sensibles, où l'existence de la Cause première, prenne, sous l'influence d'une grâce actuelle, l'intensité d'une intuition, d'une évidence immédiate; l'intelligence pourra re­cevoir comme la révélation soudaine de ce qui fait l'objet propre du troisième degré d'abstraction (Distinguer cour ïïnir,pp. 551-552).
This intuition is marked out as "une intuition puissante, dont la violence }
parfois m'effrayait et qui la première m'a donné la connaissance d'un S
iabsolu métaphysique" (ibid.. ). It follows from these quotations that ‘|
the selfsarae intuition,which 'knows' by sympathy or 'connaturalité' 
the things of the external world, can also penetrate to their first #
cause - under the guidance of grace.
This means that the worlds of grace and nature are in no way com­
pletely severed from \one another:
Entre la foi et la raison, comme entre la grâce et la nature,il n'y a pas de séparation ... pas mal de nos ancêtres étaient aussi bêtes que nous; et, une fois deux termes assis sur les chaises d'une solide distinction, trouvaient fatigant de le lever de leur chaise pourfaire ensemble un tour de valse ... la vie est comme ça:il y a distinction sans séparation (Le Paysan de la Garonne,1966, p. 209).
For Maritain, as for Bergson, metaphysical knowledge is not the same 
as supernatural knowledge. All knowledge is metaphysical in this - single 
sense - that mind attains the non-materiality of its object. 'La durée 
réelle' is Imovm according to Bergson; 'intelligibility' or 'essence' is 
knovm according to Maritain. But, if non-material essence is Imovm, then 
knowledge of God - non-material essence as existence - is not radically 
different from ordinary knowledge.
On the other hand, in the final analysis, metaphysical knowledge is 
separated from the vision of God face to face: "il n'y a d'expérience
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proprement dite des choses divines que dans l'ordre surnaturel" (Distinguer 
pour Unir, p. 555). Man'a own intuition is, nevertheless, good enough to 
approach this experience.- Here below, there are "des modes de connaître i;î>:
qui sont comme des analogies de cette expérience. Les sortes d'intuition |
ou d'expériences métaphysiques dont il vient d'être question en sont un 
exemple" (p. 555). Even more explicitly, Maritain agrees that intellectual 
intuition is the first stage towards mystical knowledge;
On peut dire que toute connaissance naturelle par inclination ou sympathie, ou par connaturalité, fournit une analogie* plus ou moins lointaine de l'expérience mystique (pp. 555-556).
Having considered all the concessions Maritain makes to the human ;f
intelligence in its search for reality, two thingS' remain to be said. I
First, there is always an element of mystery and deficiency in our know­
ledge of God. This*'-is not only natural but obvious (otherwise God would 
be as limited as our intelligence). Therefore, there is always the necessity | 
» and requirement of grace in Imowing the things of God. There is no reason, 
even so, to consider that Bergson, imagined otherwise. All the same, something^ 
of God's nature can be luiorm by the human intellect in its natural state -
and this is what Bergson assumes in Les Deux Sources. The inevitable result 1Iof any greater presumption is to distort the things of the spirit, as Maritain t 
maintains: "la philosophie, tant qu'elle croit devoir ignorer le my^ stère
de la grâce et celui de la croix, ne saurait atteindre dans leur vraie nature 4
les choses de la vie mystique, meme quand elle les honore de bonne foi"
(p. 571). The inevitable result of such an attempt is a "réduction du
spirituel au biologique" (p. 572).
Secondly, when Maritain speaks of knowing God through and only through | 
the intelligence, he is not merely following his Thomist mentor, Humbert 
Clérissac, who told Maritain: "La vie chrétienne est à base d'intelligence ,,
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Notre but n'est pas de critiquer une pensée courageuse qui, malgré son appareil philosophique, suit, à force de fidélité à la lumière intérieure, un pur trajet spirituel (Distinguer pour Unir, p. 571).
Avant tout Dieu est la Vérité; allez vers lui, aimez-le sous cet aspect"
(Les Aventures de la Grâce, RaSusa Maritain, Desclée de Brouver et Cie.,
1949» quoted p. 235). Maritain found through Bergson that there was 
another way of knowing God - not so much as Truth but as Reality. This 
is equally knowledge by intelligence, but intelligence in its intuitive 
function. The rediscovery of 'intuition' by Bergson brought to the 
philosopher's vision the profundity of the self and of life itself. (Being), 
so that Maritain's final opinion of Bergson as a philosopher is entirely i
laudatory;
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- ÇTIAPTSR EIGHT ' H
THE AESTHETIC THEORIES OF BERGSON AND MARITAIN tI
Henri Bergson wrote no works of aesthetic theory as such, hut |
exerted a considerable influence on the literary world of his time, 'f
as has already been outlined in the Introduction. It is commonplace 
to say that Bergson stood for such things as 'individualism* or 'romantic 'i
idealism' but it would be a far more useful exercise to examine whether I
f if
Bergson held precise aesthetic theories and what they consisted of. This I
is best done by referring to explicit passages on art and creativity in %
the context of the whole body of his work. In that way the different i
aspects of Bergson's aesthetic may be brought to light* In this chapter #
Bergson's thought is also brought into relief by a direct comparison with §
the rigorously exact philosophy of Jacques Maritain. This comparison will |
also have the benefit of shedding more light on Bergson's influence on |%
Maritain ' s thought. -J
Maritain wrote a number of works on aesthetics, all of which use Thomas 
Aquinas's writings as a starting point but eventually reach well beyond its S
1 jscope. They are; Art et Scolastique (Lib. de l'Art Catholique, 1920);
Réponse à Jean Cocteau (Stock, Dellamain et Boutelleau, 1926); Frontières %
de la Poésie (Rouart, 192?); Situation de la Poésie (with RaSssa Maritain,
Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1938); "De la connaissance poétique" in Revue I
Thomiste (Vol. 44» 1938, pp. 87-98); Quatre Essais sur l'esprit dans sa 
condition chamelle (Desclée de Brouwer, 1939)» Art and Poetry (Ed. Poetry, ! 
London, 1945)» and Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry  ^(Harvill, London, 1954
1, Also quoted from the English version; Sheed and Ward, London, 1938.
2. The latter two wrorks were written in English by Maritain himself.
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Works of a more general nature are Religion et Culture (Desclée de Brouwer,
1950) and Humanisme Intégral# (Aubier, 1936).
There have only been two full-length studies on î'iaritain’s aesthetic 
theory - namely, L’Esthétique de J. Maritain by Vagn L. Simonsen (Munksgaard, 
Copenhagen, 1953) and T.D, Rover’s The Poetics of Maritain: A Thomistic
Critique (The Thomist Press, Washington, B.C., U.S.A., 1965)^ . Simonsen’s 
main concern is to draw distinctions between orthodox Thomism and Maritain's
deviations from it. Few works, surprisingly enough, have appeared on Bergson'bIaesthetic theory. _ R. Arbour gives an outline account of it in Henri Bergson îg 
et les lettres françaises (Lib. J. Corti, 1956). Then there are two works - - 
on Bergson's use of imagery: Les images dans 1 'oeuvre de M. Bergson (Wadig,
Geneva, 1931) by Jeanne Hersch and La Dialectique des images chez Bergson by 
Lydie Adolphe (P.U.F., I946). Une. Hersch has also written a short article I
entitled "L'obstacle', du langage" in Henri Bergson: Essais et Témoignages î
(Eds. A. Béguin & P. Thévenaz, Ed. de la Baconnière, Neuohâtel, 1943» PP. 214- i 
226). There are other chapters in this work on the same theme^. R. Bayer 
has written a work called L'Esthétique de Bergson (P.U.F., 1943), while 
F. Delattre has compared Ruskin and Bergson in his P.uskin et Bergson; de 
l'intuition esthétique à l'intuition métaphysique (Clarendon Press, Oxford, )
1. This book ignores Art and Poetry and only considers Creative Intuition .. for its last draft. Réponse à Jean Cocteau is dated 1928; 2 years late. |
2. Articles on Maritain's aesthetic theory include: "Art & M. Maritain" by'Belgion' (Dublin Review. No. 187, 1930, pp. 201-215); "Jacques Maritain •: & his Aesthetic" by A. Little (Studies; No. 19, 1930, pp. 467-480); "Métaphysique et Poésie" by J, Madaule (Vie Intellectuelle. No. 40, 1936, pp. 322-329); "The Aesthetic of Maritain" by R, Rauch (Thought. No, 6, 41931» pp. 228-236); "The Springs of Poetry" by R. Speaight (The New 'IScholasticism, No. 46, 1972, pp. 51-69) and "Plato, Art and Mr, Maritain" i ^  J. Tate (id.. No.-2, April 1938, pp. 107-142).
3. Viz. S. Borne, "Note de poétique bergsonienne"; J. Mercanton, "La philosophie bergsonienne et le problème de l'art"; J. Paliard, "Notes sur| la poésie bergsonienne"; M. Raymond, "Bergson ex la poésie récente".
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1947). G. Riser's book, Le symbole littéraire, contains important passages 
on Bergson (Lib. J. Corti, 1941), as does A. Thibaudet’s Le bergsonisme 
(2 vols., N.R.F., 1923)1.
Both. Bergson and Maritain search for a definition of beauty which 
can at one and the same time account for the many different manifesta­
it ions of beauty and the great variety of opinions on the subject. Neither
will subscribe to the simplistic idea that "beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder". For both men beauty must have some objective validity, and 
for both beauty can. be separated in principle from the material through 
iwhich.it reveals itself. It can express itself through a work of art or 
through the physical aspect ofnature' itself. It is, however, essentially 
a spiritual or immaterial attribute, as Bergson makes clear in this passage:
- -- L'art du peintre ne consiste donc pas, pour Léonard de Vinci, à prendre par le menu chacun des traits du modèle pour les reporter sur la toile et en reproduire, portion par portion, la matérialité. Il ne consiste pas non plus à figurer je ne sais quel type impersonnel et abstrait, où le modèle qu'on voit et qu'on touche vient se dissoudre en une vague idéalité. L'art vrai vise à rendre l'individua­lité du modèle, et pour cela il va chercher derrière les lignes qu'on voit le mouvement que l'oeil ne voit pas,derrière le mouvement lui-même quelque chose de plus secretencore, l'intention originelle, l'aspiration fondamentalede la personne, pensée simple qui équivaut à la richesseindéfinie des .formes et des couleurs ("La vie et 1 'oeuvre de Ravaisson", P.M.. p. I46O).
This sequence of steps 'backwards' from the material appearance of a creation
1. Articles on Bergson's aesthetic include: E. Bréhier, "Images plotiniennesimages bergsoniennes" (Etudes berg., Vol. II, P.U.F., 1949); S. Dresden, d "Les idées esthétiques de Bergson" (Ibid., Vol. IV, 1956); J- Bourdeau, | (same title) (Journal des Débats, 24.2.1914); F. Janson, "Le sens de -j l'art d'après M. Bergson" (Le Flambeau. Brussels, January 1935); C. Ialo,S "Promesses et carences de l'esthétique bergsonienne" (Revue de meta- . J physiqué et de morale, October I941); F. Delattre, "Le bergonnisme et | la littérature" (R.E.L.V., No. 39, 1922, pp. 252-257); Abbé Delfour on % "Le style de M. Bergson" (L'Univers. Lille, 19.4*1911) and Tancrède de | Visan on "La philosophie de Bergson et le lyrisme contemporain" (Vers -| 
et Prose, No. 21, 1910, pp. 125-140)* |
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to its mental or spiritual source is paralleled by Bergson's conception of |
the world as God's creation in E.G., where 'behind' fixed matter one finds )
the invisible movement and life of 'l'élan vital' and 'behind' this one finds i
God as the source of life - giving 'l'élan vital' direction and intentional!ty.4 
Matter is a fossilized residue of spiritual activity or 'movement' and this ]
movement emanates from a principle of power. This is like the work of art 
being derived from images and ideas; these in turn emanating from.a creative 
mind :
Sif la vie est.une création, nous devons nous lareprésenter par analogie avec les créations qu'il înous est donné d'observer ... Or, dans la créationartistique, par exemple, il semble que les matériauxde l'oeuvre, paroles et images pour le poète, formeset couleurs pour le peintre, rythmes et accords pourle musicien, viennent se ranger spontanément sousl'idée qu'ils doivent exprimer, attirés en quelque ;sorte, par le charme d'une idéalité supérieure. jN'est-ce pas un mouvement analogue, n'est-ce pas :aussi un état db fascination que nous devons at tri- buer aux éléments matériels quand ils s'organisenten êtres vivants? (ibid., pp. I467--I468). 'i
The radiance of beauty therefore corresponds to the finished work of art in 
somewhat the same way as clarity of mind corresponds to the lucid expression 
of ideas. If 'movement' is evident in a work of art, then it is the 'move­
ment' of inspirations, disclosing in the finished work something of the <
original conception in the mind of the artist: ;
La beauté appartient à la forme, et toute forme a son origine dans un mouvement qui, la trace: la formen'est que du mouvement enregistré. . Or, si nous nousdemandons quels sont 3 es mouvements qui décrivent des ■formes belles, nous trouvons que ce sont les mouvements gracieux ... (Ibid., p. 1472, italics in original).
This last statement obviously begs the question as to how 'gracieux' itself
is to be defined, but Bergson does attempt an explanation:
... Dans tout ce qui est gracieux nous voyons, nous sentons, nous devinons une espèce d'abandon et comme une condescendance ... c'est la grâce qui se lit à
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travers la beauté, et c'est la bonté qui transparaît sous la grâce (ibid.).
Some might, imagine that the work of art is to be judged by one's feelings ?
about it; that appreciation of beauty depends on subjective emotions.
But Bergson maintains the opposite of this; it is 'la grâce' already
present in the work which elicits a response in the onlooker. 'La grace'
must therefore have an objective existence, and this existence is in the
creator, whose 'bonté' gives rise to beauty in his works. The moral
character of the artist or creator appears then to be supremely important,
for his works reflect his 'soul'. By analogy the works of nature as
creations of God must reflect 'la grace' through 'la bohté' of the creator: i
Toute chose manifeste, dans le mouvement que sa forme enregistre, la générosité infinie d'un principe qui se donne ... (ibid.).
This comment makes ±\ quite clear that beauty has a 'moral' content; it
is essentially a creation receiving the spiritual endov/ments of its creator.
In Les Deux Sources Bergson argues that the beauty of the created world rests
on the fact that it reflects the love the creator has for it:
Des êtres ont été appelés à l'existence qui étaient destinés à aimer et à être aimés, l'énergie créatrice devant se définir par l'amour (Les Deux Sources, p.1194, my underlining).
This idea is expressed similarly in "La conscience et la vie":
Créateur par excellence est celui dont l'action ... est capable d'intensifier aussi l'action des autres hommes et d'allumer, généreuse, des foyers de générosité (L'Energie Spirituelle, p. 834)*
Jacques Maritain shares many of these ideas on the nature and origin 
of beauty. For him, Creation itself or one particular creation seeks to |
express something of the divine radiance permeating the Universe. In 
other words, in having beauty a work simply shows - dimly perhaps - something
263 -
of God’s nature. Poetry "est done une image de la divine grace ... parce 
que la nature est une allusion au royaume de Dieu, elle nous donne, sans le 
savoir, un pressentiment, un désir obscur de la vie surnaturelle" (Réponse |
à Jean Cocteau, p. 25).
Part of God’s essence for Maritain is beauty and so once again the I
reality of beauty has an objective existence,not as a Platonic form, however, !
but in the mind or ’personality’ of the godhead. The forms of beauty, 
apprehended through the material arrangement of a work of art, themselves 
relate to something.tianscending them , as well as to something transcending 
man’s perception and understanding. In seeing something as beautiful "on. 
touche à l’être lui-même, à une ressemblance de Dieu, à un absolu, à la 
noblesse et à la joie de notre vie; on entre dans le domaine de l’esprit" i
(Art et Scolastique. p, 25).
Maritain even has a counterpart for Bergson's idea of 'movement' as 4
displaying the intention and inspiration of the creator. Maritain employs |
the image of musical rhythm and melody to illustrate his theory: fc;
Where, if not in musical creation, could be found a better image of the creation of a world?,.. Like the world and like motion, song has its countenance only in memory; si non esset anima non es set tempus.And no more than the flow of time is music itself |limited and closed (Art and Poetry, p. 57).
It is worth remembering that Bergson himself also used this image of music
to portray the movement of ."la durée": Bergson speaks of the movement of
"la vie intérieure" as a musical score or melody:
Pouvez-vous, sans la dénaturer, raccourcir la durée d'une mélodie? La vie intérieure est cette mélodie même ... (P.M. Introduction, p. 1261; G.f. Essai,pp. 67-68}.




L'ensemble (des sensations) nous fait l'effet d'une phrase musicale qui serait toujours sur le point de finir et sans cesse sa modifierait dans sa totalité par l'addition de quelque note nouvelle ... (Essai,
p. 71).
Maritain does not lay the primary stress on the morally edifying quality 
in a work of beauty, but instead has a lot to say about the intelligent organi­
zation, evident in creation (or in a particular work of creation). For Maritain 
the nature of God is first and foremost intellectual - he orders and arranges 
in a rational manner. In grtistic terms, a creation should therefore dis- 4 
play a high degree of intellectual activity;
The whole of the painter is the world of the eye before being and while being the world of the intellect (Creative Intuition, p. 129).
If a work of art is simply a random arrangement, it will nevertheless have | 
meaning and significance attributed to it by an observer, and will rever­
berate even more in 'the mind as the onlooker struggles to find meaning
for what he sees and to categorize it;
If I do not know exactly what a given sign signifies, well,it is then free to signify everything for me.In a sense,poetical joy and affective exaltation will then only become vaster in becoming more indeterminate (Creative Intuition, p. 267).
Man's power to apprehend and to know are at one and the same time move­
ments towards seeing meaning and significance. Maritain believed that a 
work of art will have a significance whether or not it is intended by the 
onlooker. Now, if beauty is so much part and parcel of truth and reality 
(or 'being'), it can only be Imown as beauty through the intellect and 
through thought:
[L'Etre] répond à l'esprit connaissant,il lui parle, il surabonde en diction, il exprime, il manifeste une consistance pour la pensée, une intelligibilité telle ou telle qui est lui-même; une chose est vraie, - c'est-à-dire consonants à ce qu'elle dit ainsi d'elle-même à la pensée, à ce qu'elle annonce d'intelligibilité, - pour autant qu'elle est (Sept leçons sur l'être, p. 76).
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'IHowever, although-Maritain maintains that beauty is appreciated |
through meditation upon rfc and "delights the mind", nonetheless it is I
■Ï"intuited through the senses". This aesthetic intuition is not the same ;
as the intellectual intuition to be found in lÆaritain’s epistemology.
Poetic intuition is "ime connaissance bien différente de ce qu'on appelle 
couramment connaissance; une connaissance qui n'est pas exprimable en 
idées et en jugements, mais qui est plutôt expérience que connaissance, 
et expérience créatrice, car elle veut s'exprimer, et elle n'est exprimable 
que dans une oeuvre" (Situation de la Poésie, p. 102). Poetic intuition 
"est aneidétique, alogique, existentielle" (p. 144)*
Maritain also introduces a new poetic or aesthetic faculty he calls |
"the preconscious intellect". This is not:;identical with a Freudian 
subconscious of instincts and images of repressed emotions: "o'est pourtant
un inconscient plus vital et plus profond, l'inconscient de l’esprit en source 4 
caché à l'intelligence raisonneuse dans cette épaisseur de l'âme ou tous les I
pouvoirs de celle-ci ont commune origine" (Situation de la poésie, p.117).
It has much in common with Bergson's ’moi intérieur' of L'Essai: the real
self existing outside the control of the organizing and analyzing intellect.
The preconscious intellect is nevertheless a latent conscious self, having 
the potential power to enrich consciousness. Poetic understanding, being 
'preconscious', is a form of 'intuition'; it is not explicit or articulated 
In Art and Poetry, Maritain explains that "the creative idea expresses itself |
finally in matter, as the speculative intuition of the philosopher does in, 
the concept or mental word" (pp. 55-56).
All of this has remarkable affinity with what Bergson called "le 
schéma dynamique" in "L'Effort Intellectuel" (P.M., pp. 946-953) - a tension 
of the spirit which can hold in embryo the whole inspiration of a work of 
art or philosophy:
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L*écrivain qui fait un roman, l’auteur dramatique qui crée des personnages et des situations, le musicien qui compose une symphonie et le poète qui compose une ode, tous ont d’abord dans l’esprit quelque chose de simple et d’abstrait, je veux dire d’incorporel ... On travaille sur un schéma du tout, et le résultat est obtenu quand on arrive à une image distincte des éléments (Energie Spiri­tuelle, p. 947).
To judge from the title of the chapter, the "schéma dynamique" is formed
in the mind as a result of an intellectual effort:
On passera, du plan supérieur où tout était ramassé dans une seule représentation, à des plans de moins en moins élevés ... où la représentation simple est éparpillée en images, où les images se développent en phrases et en mots. Il est vrai que le rappel ne sera plus immédiat et facile. Il s’accompagnera d’effort (P.M.,p. 936).
Maritain concurs with the idea that effort and attention are indis­
pensable to creativity:
Inspiration requires of necessity the steady attentive­ness of a purified mind ... Having only the power of a source, inspiration also requires of necessity the rational toil of the virtue of art and all the logic and shrewdness,self-restraint and self-possession of working intelligence (Creative Intuition, p. 246).
For Maritain the vision of beauty is prior to tand, of course, inferior
to, but very much a preliminary to the beatific vision of God. If the
appreciation of beauty is primarily intellectual it nevertheless initially
involves all the senses, the imagination and the wider consciousness - all
these together are "the preconscious intellect":
Poetry obliges us to consider the intellect both in its secret wellsprings inside the human soul and as functioning in a non-rational (rather than anti-rational) way or non-logical way (Creative Intuition, p. 4).
How, if aesthetic intuition is non-discursive and non-logical, how is 
it "intellectual" in any commonly accepted sense of the word? Is Maritain 
here outside the. bounds of Thomist orthodoxy? Surely the word "mental" or
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"psychical" or even "spiritual" should be used, for Maritain is speaking |
of an area of mind not concerned with concepts. In Maritain’s analysis ?
in Creative Intuition the conceptualizing intellect is only instrumental I
as a safeguard and as a regulator, ensuring that the completed work of art |
is faithful to the original inspiration. It is therefore not involved in -
the intuition but in the rendering, through artistic skills, of that intuition |
into a work of art. ;
■£
Maritain even goes so far as to say that artistic vision (or intuition)
longs to be free not only from discursive reason and the forms of language ^
but from the logical sense itself, from intelligibility. But he then points
out the dangers inherent in this freedom: "automatism brings not freedom,
but dispersion" (Creative Intuition, p. 96). This danger is not explicitly <
mentioned by Bergson, but his emphasis in P.M. on concentration and attentive- I
ness does not favour'' the surrealist aesthetic of free association and relaxa- Ï
tion of the consciousness.
For Bergson, as for Maritain, intuition is a perception of unity which f
is only later scattered Into images:
A mesure que nous cherchons davantage à nous installer dans la pensée du philosophe .«. nous voyons sa doctrine se transfigurer. D'abord la . complication diminue. Puis les parties entrent les unes dans les autres. Enfin tout se ramasse en un point unique, dont nous sentons qu'on pourrait se rapprocher de plus en plus quoiqu’il faille désespérer d’y atteindre. . En ce point est quelque chose de si simple, d’infiniment simple, de si extraordinairement simple que le philosophe n'a jamais réussi à le dire. Et c'est pourquoi il a parlé toute sa vie (L’Intuition philosophique. P«M.. pp. 1546-1347).
Therefore, both Bergson and Maritain posit a spiritual intuition which is
abstract but which is not a clear-cut idea or concept. In Le Hire Bergson
says of intuition that "elle apercevrait toutes choses dans leur pureté
originelle" (p. 157). They are also both agreed that the creation of a
ri
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work of art is largely the rational, intellectual articulation of that 
intuition. They differ, however,over the exact content of what is 
intuited. „ For. Maritain the intuition of beauty is a glimpse of some­
thing of God’s essence; for Bergson the emphasis is usually on a clear 
vision of the real,which consists of mèvement and change in life. But both 
are wary of the misleading and deceptive nature of material reality, which 
seems to them to present an opaque and apparently immutable facade to the |
senses. -
Maritain’8 "preconscious intellect", like Bergson’s aesthetic intuition, f 
is creative in the sense that it eschews old habits and observes naively 
and purely. Bergson asked: "A quoi vise I’art, sinon à nous montrer,
dans la nature et dans l’esprit, hors de nous et en nous, des choses qui 
ne--frappaient-pas explicitement nos sens et-notre conscience?" (P.M., p. 1570). | 
The artist brings in^o focus nuances of emotion and perception which had only 
previously-existed-in-the subconscious mind: ^
Au fur et à mesure qu’ils nous parlent, des nuances d’émotion et de pensée nous apparaissent qui pouvaient |etre représentées en nous depuis longtemps mais qui Idemeuraient invisibles (P.M., p. 1571).
Maritain’s "preconscious intellect" can also convey new visionary
qualities to art:
It is enough to think of the ordinary and everyday functioning of the intelligence •.. and of the way in which ideas arise in our minds and every genuine intellectual grasping, or every new discovery, is brought about; it is enough to think of the way in which our free decisions, when they are really free, are made, especially those decisions which commit our entire life to realise that there exists a deep nonconscious world of activity, for the intellect and the will, from which the acts and fruits of human consciousness and the clear perceptions of the mind emerge, and that the Universe of concepts, logical^- . connections, rational discursus and rational deliberation ... is preceded by the hidden workings of an immense and primeval preconscious life (Creative Intuitinn, pp. 93-94).
.3
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When an artist is able to highlight a new aspect of life through his art, 
one acknowledges that this vision is true to life and to one’s own experience, |
although one has never realized it consciously before. Bergson makes very i
much this point about Corot’s and Turner's painting:
Un Corot, un Turner ,..ont aperçu dans la nature biendes aspects que nous ne remarquions pas ... Approfondissons 4ce que nous éprouvons devant un Turner ou un Corot: nous jtrouverons que, si nous acceptons et les admirons, c'estque nous avions déjà perçu quelque chose de ce qu’ils |nous montrent. Mais nous avions perçu sans apercevoir. J- C'était, pour nous, une vision brillante et évanouissante, perdue dans la foule de ces visions également brillantes, Jégalement évanouissantes,qui se recouvrent dans notre - expérience usuelle comme des 'dissolving views' et qui -constituent®, par leur interférence réciproque, la vision ;pàle et décolorée que nous avons habituellement des choses ;(p.m., p . 1571).
Bergson appears not to distinguish in this passage between the conscious and 1
ithe subconscious mind. Rather, he implies a distinction between the habitual
and the uncommon. Maritain's distinction is rather between awareness (conscioù
understanding) and the data of. the subconscious mind fed by the senses but ;
not brought to the notice of the observer. All the same, the views ex- •_ S
pressed are substantially similar; that an artist's creative perception
extends ordinary human perception and heightens human sensibility: M
L'art suffirait donc à nous montrer qu'une extension ides facultés de percevoir est possible (P.M., p. 1571)* :i
Maritain's ’’preconscious intellect" is, on his own confession, the 
mind, but "empty in itself of any concept or idea", yet "full of images, S
full of emotional movements and in which all the past experiences and 
treasures of memory acquired by the soul are present^in a state of vir- |
tuality" (Creative Intuition, p. 246). 1
Bergson also considers that the artist draws on his whole past ex- |
perience of life. The aesthetic emotion, while being single and simple, 1




La plupart des émotions sont gi’osses de mille sensations, sentiments ou idées qui les pénètrent: chacune d’elles est donc un état unique en son genre, indéfinissable, et il semble qu’il faudrait revivre la vie de celui qui 1’éprouve pour l’embrasser dans sa complexe originalité (Essai, p. 15).
Artistic creation is a movement from emotional response and sensory aware­
ness to the formation of images in the mind and then the linguistic expres­
sion of those images: or, to put it another way, the artist moves from the
inchoate to the explicit, from impression to expression. The purpose of 
this is to bring to a wider audience one's private discoveries and to 
evoke sensitivity ana awareness in the other:
L’objet de l’art est d’endormir les puissances activés ou plutôt résistantes de notre personnalité,- et de nous amener à un état de docilité parfaite oùnous réalisons l’idée qu’on nous suggère,où nous sympathisons avéc le sentiment exprimé ... (Essai, p. 15).
 -Etît voyant repasser devant nos yeux ces images nouséprouverons à notre tour le sentiment qui en était pour ainsi dire 1’équivalent émotionnel ... (p. I4).
ÎÆaritain takes Bergson’s ideas a step further. For him, the artist
does not simply have sensations or emotions,but is in receipt of an inspira- I
tion which possesses him and drives him to create. This inspiration is
derived ultimately from God, but it can be misunderstood or misused:
Dans l’ordre naturel ... il y a une inspiration spéciale, qui, elle aussi, est au-dessus de la délibération de la raison, et qui procède, comme tîle notait Aristote, de Dieu présent en nous. Telle est l’inspiration du poète. C’est pourquoi il est bien un homme divin. Comme le saint? Non.Comme le héros (Réponse à Jean Cocteau, p. 24).
Lîaritain also insists in Art & Scholasticism that the aim of art is to
’’rejoice the spirit" (p. 54) as well as "to delight the mind" (p. 49).
For Maritain it is not only emotional movements which are converted into
art; it is also truth and grace. This discovery of truth and grace has
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the effect of arousing emotion and not the other way round^. Knowledge 
of the truth is for Maritain in some way knowledge of God and this know­
ledge, when described, brings joy in its wake, first in the artist and then 
in his audience:
Art teaches men the pleasure of the s p i r i t , N o  man can live without pleasure. Therefore a man deprived of the pleasures of the spirit goes over to the pleasures of the flesh (Art & Scholasticism, p. 80).
Art at its best is inevitably ennobling and uplifting and morally elevating, 
Maritain and Bergson both share the conviction that art is dependent 
upon and seeks to represent the truth. When Bergson speaks of an artist 
conveying his feelings or experiences he presupposes art to be the communi­
cation of objective truth. Intuition attains an absolute. Art is not 
pure imagination, nor is it pursued for its own sake. Rather, it feeds 
. on close observation''and interpretation of the real world. Maritain talks 
of this in.terms of "being" and "ontology!', whereas Bergson uses expressions 
like "la durée" and "le moi intérieur". However, Maritain’s statement - 
"Art does not proceed from itself but from being" (Art & Scholasticism, 
p. 96) - very much parallels Bergson’s statement that "cette intuition 
atteint un absolu" (P.M., p. 1424). So, although Maritain’s conclusions 
go beyond Bergson’s, he nevertheless remains faithful to the direction of 
Bergson’s thought:
Art, in describing Truth and portraying its Spirit, must show that spiritual values are the most real things (being) in the world (Art & Scholasticism, p. 118).
2Bergson’s use of the word spirit is not normally like Maritain’a , but there
1. See Art & Scholasticism, pp. 65-65.
2. e.g. Intuition is described as "la vision directe de l’esprit par l’esprit" (P.M.,p. 1275).
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are occasions when intuition relates to a supernatural realm - e.g. 
"(L'intuition) voudrait saisir dans les choses, meme matérielles, 
leur participation à la spiritualité, nous dirions à la divinité"
(P.M., p. 1274).
According to Maritain, man as a creator not only puts himself in 
touch with God through his participation in the world of inspiration and 
grace - he also makes himself like God when he creates beautiful works.
He is a co-operator in God's activity as creator; "artistic creation 
does not copy God's creation, but continues it" (Art & Scholasticism, 
p. 65). Man's creativity is like God's; it aims at intelligent organi­
sation and brings something quite new into being: "to produce something
intellectually, to manufacture an object rationally constructed, is a very 
considerable achievement in the world: in itself, for man, a way of imitating
God" (p. 125). It demonstrates the "ontological resemblance of our soul to 
God" {id.). For Maritain, only God can create matter ex nihilo, but man’s 
creative power is like God’s in that he can create new patterns and perceive 
new relationships before they actually exist.
Bergson attempts to shed further light on the.genesis of the creative 
process in Les Deux Sources and reaches strikingly similar conclusions to 
lîaritain. He argues that, whereas men often adapt and build on previous 
thoughts and ideas, occasionally they create in the true sense of the word.
He lucidly explains the way in which man participates in God's creativity: 
"comment 1’amour où les mystiques voient l’essence meme de la divinité 
peut être, en même temps qu'une personne, une puissance de création" (Les 
Deux Sources, p. II90). He expounds this in some detail:
(L'artiste) se tient.d'ordinaire, quand il écrit, dans la région des concepts et des mots. La société lui fournit ... des idées qu’il combine d'une manière nouvelle ... Cette méthode donnera un résultat plus ou moins satisfaisant, mais elle aboutira toujoui's
- 273 -
à un résultat, et dans un temps restreint. L’oeuvre produite pourra d’ailleurs être originale et forte ...ÎÆais ce ne sera qu’un accroissement du revenu de l’année; l’intelligence sociale continuera à vivre sur le même fonds, sur les m^mes valeurs. Maintenant il y a une autre méthode de composition •.. Elle consiste à remonter, du plan intellectuel et social, jusqu’en un point de l'âme d'où part une exigence de création.Cette exigence ... est toujours là, émotion unique, ébranlement ou élan reçu du fond meme des choses.Pour lui obéir tout à fait, il faudrait forger des mots, créer des idées ... L’écrivain tentera de réaliser l'irréalisable. Il ira chercher l’émotion simple, forme qui voudrait créer sa matière ...- (pp. 1190-1191).
The opposition to creation comes from the material world - not only
from matter as such but from ideas already articulated, from works of art
already completed and from social and personal habits which form the ’matter’
of daily life. All these things are obstacles to novelty and originality,
to true creation. Bergson says a good deal about the stultifying, restricting
nature of the material in H.C. .but what is more surprising is that Maritain
himself shares something of this view:
Art ... ought tô be on the look-out for what is easy.It must have opposition and constraint, the constraint of rules and the cnposition of matter (Art & Scholasticism,p. 130),
And, just as Bergson regards intuition as a creative perception - a purifi­
cation of the vision - Maritain also sees creativity in terms of new insight
into Being and the nature of life:
Eh assimilant tout ce qu’il y a de vrai dans ces systèmes partiels, (le progrès de la philosophie)dilatera sa propre substance et fera jaillir d'elledes éclairs de plus en plus profonds, révélant les énergies cachées dans les vérités qu’il contient.La nouveauté qu'il manifeste ainsi ...est avant tout une nouveauté dans la manière d'aborder les mêmes rivages de l’être et de distribuer les mêmes richesses du mystère des choses. Ce sont de nouvelles perspec­tives constamment ouvertes sur le même univers intel­ligible, le même paysage immatériel (Sept leçons, p. I9).
The image or symbol is also equally important in both Bergson's and
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Maritain’s aesthetic theory. For Bergson the material world itself is a
collection of ’images’ - in other words, it appears as ’images’ to the human
c ons ci ousne s s:
J’appelle matière l’ensemble des images, et •perception de la matière ces mêmes images rapportées à l’action possible d'une certaineimage déterminée, mon corps (M.M« , p, 175).
The brain can, in a sense, select which, 'images’_ of, the_ material world it
wishes to take in and then can use that information as it likes - re-arranging
and ’re-presenting’ at will^. Thus the image retains something of its
’immutable’ objective existence as matter, and nevertheless has something
of the idea or the concept about it:
Par.image, nous entendons une certaine existence qui est plus que ce que l’idéaliste appelle une-- représentation, mais moins que ce que le réaliste................ - - -appelle une chose - une existence située à mi-cheminentre ’la chose^ ’ et ’la représentation’ (M.M. , p. l6l).
Bergson’s understanding of the word ’image’ thus implies far more than a
poetic symbol and describes our intuition of reality as a whole. The
’image’ is reality-as-mental or reality in the consciousness. This
perhaps explains why Bergson employs so many metaphors of life as a
whole and metaphors of different aspects of life; 'la durée réelle’ is
-like a musical score (Essai. pp. 70-7-1)> the brain is like a telegraph
operator (Matière et Mémoire, p. 247); the ’élan vital’ passes through
matter like an invisible hand passing 'bhrough iron filings (E.G., pp. 575-576)s
’l’élan’ has explosive energy like a shell exploding into fragments (E.G.,
p. 578); the freation of the material world is likened to a boiling kettle
(e.g., p. 705) aud to an exploding shell again (E.G.,p. 706), All of these
are symbols rather than images in the strict sense. And such verbs as
1. See Matière et Mémoire, pp. 180-181.
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’resserrer', ’viser’, ’creuser’, ’éteindre’ are repeatedly used meta­
phorically, as symbols, and not as ’images’ in the sense just discussed, 
Maritain is more meticulous about language. He calls the symbol 
’le signe’ and subdivides it into a number of types. He distinguishes 
’le signe naturel’ from ’le signe conventionnel’. The latter points to 
but differs radically from what it indicates, but the former takes its 
reali_ty_jaore directly from what it refers to - "relativement à autre 
chose rendue par là connaissable aussi - c'est une propriété réelle, ce 
n ’est pas une relation purement idéale, n'existant comme telle que dans 
la pensée" (Quatre Essais, p. 62). He gives the example of the concept of 
a horse relating to a real horse.
Maritain is careful not to equate the sigji with the image (which Bergson 
often-does by use of metaphor);
Toute image n ’ebt pas signe; et tout signe n ’estpas image. Car l’image (qui ’procède d'un autre comme.de son principe, et à la ressemblance de cetautre’) peut être de même nature et de même degré ontologique que celui-ci (le fils est l’image du père, il n ’en est pas le signe). Et bien des signes ne sont pas des images (la fumée n ’est pas l'imagedu feu, ni le cri de la douleur) (Quatre Essais,pp. 64-1.65).
Here again one encounters the difficulty of a change of vocabulary from 
Bergson to Maritain. For Bergson the best images are "representations 
souples, mobiles, presque fluides, toujours prêtes à se mouler sur les 
formes fuyantes de l'intuition" (P.M., p. I4O2). The image is an evocation
in material symbols of spiritual insight, îiîaritain's theory is not at all
straightforward. He is given to logical sub-divisions and categories.
For example, when speaking of the ’signe-image’ he says that it gives 
’bedeutung' and ’bild’ simultaneously - 'bedeutung' being intellectual 
content and 'bild’ a picture image in the imagination. In keeping with
the general bias of his philosophy he considers ’bedeutung’ to be uppermost -
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in fact, the whole of creation is at the outset intellectually grasped.
For instance, the statue or image of a god suggests to the intellect 
"toutes les forces cosmiques et psychiques, les attraits, les passions 
qui prenaient en lui figure ... tout cela était présent dans la statue, 
non par mode physique, mais in alio esse, et selon la présence de cog- 
noscihilité ..." (Quatre Essais, p. 6$l). In the same way, a picture 
of a unicorn can be interpreted not as the representation (image) of an 
animal, but as containing elements and attributes existing in various animals 
in the real world. Bergson’s statue image (Essai, p. 84 ff.) of the fixity 
of the external self is more of a literal image showing how man makes a 
statue of himself in resisting the ’élan vital’. Thus the machine-like 
man is portrayed throughout Le Rire to great effect in explaining humour.
The more complex approach of Maritain does, however, drav/ attention 
to the sometimes difficult relations between pictorial images and abstract 
thoughts. He attempts to explain more oblique and subtle uses of imagery 
. than Bergson does, but he often tends towards a rather rigid account of the 
connection between sign and meaning, starting from the assumption that "la 
naissance de l’idée ... semble liée à la découverte de la valeur de significa­
tion d’un signe" (Quatre Essais, p. 69). It is surely true that thinking 
in image can often precede the ascribing of meaning tm the images,
Maritain and Bergson coincide in one other partiuular in this area - they 
both attribute active power to the image. It can be a vehicle which enlightens 
the mind, stimulating a change in the consciousness and becoming the giver of 
new knowledge. The ’signe’ par excellence for Maritain is the Eucharist and 
this becomes not just an image but "une cause instrumentale dont la Cause 
même de l’être use pour produire la grâce dans l’âme comme l’artiste use du 
violon ou de la flûte pour produire de la beauté" (Quatre Essais, p. 76).
The d-mamiGm or potency of a sign does not come from itself, but from the
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reality with which it is in touch. The importance of the 'signe* or image
lies in its power to evoke something beyond itself. Bergson is in agreement
with Maritain over this, and in writing to P. Delattre drew attention to the
capacity of the image to evoke the real;
Bans un livre comme Evolution Créatrice ou Les Deux Sources, l'image intervient le plus souvent parce qu'elle est indispensable, aucun des concepts existants ne pouvant exprimer la pensée de l'auteur, et l'auteur étant obligé alors de la suggérer. Cette suggestion ne pourra se faire que par une image, mais par une image que %  philosophe n'a pas choisie, qui se présente d'elle-même comme seul moyen de communication, et qui s'impose ayec une absolue nécessité (Mélanges, p. 1526} my underlining except italics in original for 'exprimer' and 'suggérer').
There is some agreement then between Maritain and Bergson, but there is also 
the possibility of disagreement over the ontological basis of the image.
For Bergson, the image can have existential value - it is itself what 
it points to - light can be described as 'waves', for instance. But, 
for Maritain, the image, can only ever have a functional value - it is 
always separate from what it points to. Having said this, however, it 
is difficult to know just how much Bergson intended to be taken literally 
in his assessment of material reality as "un ensemble d''images'" (M.M., 
p. 161) and, further, it is quite obvious that his normal use of images 
does not presuppose an equivalence between image and reality in existential 
terms. It would be far-fetched to imagine that Bergson considered creation 
literally to be an exploding shell!
It is important to realize, though, that Maritain always expected 
the intelligence to keep things in perspective - to prevent a confusion 
between 'le signe' and what it represents. It is primitive man who 
subordinates intelligence to imagination: "L'intelligence est tcrite liée
et subordonnée à l'imagination et à son univers sauvage" (Quatre Essais,
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p. 83). When intelligence dominates then "les sensations, les images,
les idées sont solaires, engagées dans le psychisme lumineux et régulier
de l'intelligence et de ses lois de gravitation" (p. 84). . V/hen imagination
ruled, the ideas "étaient nocturnes, engagées dans, le psychisme fluide et
crépusculaire de l'imagination, et d'une expérience étonnamment puissante
mais toute vécue et - pour autant qu'objet de réflexion - rêvée" (p. 84).
Surprisingly enough, however, on close examination it appears that
Bergson here again holds views similar to Maritain's, for he too is aware
of the dangers when imagination rules the mind and places it out of touch
with the truth. Bergson refers to the fact that primitive peoples invest
an image with magical powers instead of ascribing those powers to something
else. Instead of finding rational explanations for everyday occurrences
they see the appearance - the image itself - as the reality:
Si l'intelligence menace ... de rompre sur certains points la cohésion sociale ... il faut •' que, sur-ces points, il ait à l'intelligence uncontrepoids. Si le contrepoids ne peut pas etrel'instinct lui-même ... il faut qu'une virtualité d'instinct ... produise le même effet: il ne peut agir directement, mais puisque l'intelligence tra­vaille sur des représentations, il en suscitera d''imaginaires' qui tiendront tête à la représen­tation du réel et qui réussiront ... à contre­carrer le travail intellectuel. Ainsi s'expli­querait la fonction fabulatrice ... (Les Deux Sources. p. IO76).
So the primitive might regard the image as being the real. "Il vit dans le 
pays de la vraisemblance," says Maritain (Quatre Essais, p. 88), Bergson 
does not state categorically that magic uses signs as presences, but this 
can be deduced. Maritain is more explicit. In primitive man's mind 
there is "une interchangeabilité physique, une fusion physique et une 
équivalence physique du signe et du signifié (invocation des noms mythiques ; 
objets magiques; envoûtements; idolâtrie). Le primitif est ivre de l'excellenc 
du signe" (Quatre Essais, p. 88). In the final analysis it appears that,
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for Bergson as well as for Maritain, "le signe, malgré tout, reste signe"
(p. 90) and that a grave mistake is made when man does not look beyond 
the image or sign for reality.
 Early in the formation of language, words themselves,were signs with
clearly defined and simple meanings - gestures primarily indicating physical 
objects or feelings like thirst or fear. At a later stage a sound had no 
visible or: immediate connection with what it described. Therefore, Maritain.. 
argues, the character of language is "de procurer un substitut de l'expérience 
apte à être transmis sans fin dans le temps et l'espace, ce qui est le propre 
de notre symbolisme et le fondement de la tradition linguistique" (Quatre 
Essais, p. 117).
As language becomes more flexible it has paradoxically become more 
fixed.^ in social-intercourse language has come to have standardized mean­
ings and inevitably to lack individual nuance. It is oriented towards 
the communication of ideas and - experiences common to all men. A private 
* language can be more flexible but tends to be hermetic - meaningful only 
to 'a happy few' or communicating a 'moi collectif (Q.uatre Essais, p. 123).
Both Bergson and Maritain view the highest and subtlest form of com­
munication as non-linguistic - a direct transferal of emotions, thoughts and' 
experiences from consciousness to consciousness. The mediation of language 
is an unfortunate obstacle, a blunt instrument to be used as precisely, 
delicately and wisely as possible. Hence, Maritain thinks that "c'est 
seulement dans la langue des Anges que le langage pourrait atteindre la 
complète liberté et l'excellence même de sa propre nature ... Mais les
Anges ne se servent pas de mots ..." (Quatre Essais, p. I24). The restric­
tions of language have led to generality, inaccuracy and banality by 
oscillating between the over-definite and the over-vague. This has 
detracted from the vividness and clarity of spontaneous thought and feeling
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and has reduced communication to a lowest common denominator of experience 
and meaning.
In the body of Bergson’s work the imprecision and bluntness of words
is a recurring theme:
b’art de l’écrivain consiste surtout à nous faire oublier qu’il emploie des mots. l’harmonie qu’il cherche est une correspondance entre les allées et les venues de l’esprit et celle de son discours ... le rythme de la parole n ’a donc autre objet que de reproduire le rythme de la pensée (Energie Spirituelle, p. 849).
So, for Bergson, language is composed of mutually exclusive terms, united by 
their external relations. Language breaks up and obscures an intuition, 
which, as has been seen, takes in the totality of a perception in an indi­
visible whole and in a non-logical way. He calls language "un découpage 
de la réalité" (P.M.. p. 1277) ard, like intelligence, with which it has 
affinities and by which it is organized, it follows :
les lignes qu'il faut suivre pour agir commodément sur elle. Le plus souvent, elles distribuent les 
objets et les faits d'après l’avantage que nous en pouvons tirer, jetant pêle-mêle dans le même com­
partiment intellectuel tout ce qui intéresse le même 
besoin (P.M., p. 1277).
Maritain’s attitude is not quite the same as Bergson's. Bergson 
regards language as an obstacle because it fails to capture the indi­
viduality and novelty of perception (intuition), but Maÿitain believes 
that language and perception both fail to capture the beauty of Being 
which transcends them both. Hot merely speech and language, but also 
observation and experience,fail to do justice to the intensity and 
luminosity of Being which emanates from and is part of God's nature.
The very word 'God' carries far more meaning and means far more in terms 
of experience for a mystic than ?t does for an atheist or agnostic. The 
man who sees God face to face is acutely aware of the ina^dequacy of human
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expressions, but,more than this, he is aware of body and mind’s incapacity 
to experience the infinitely intense.
Because language can be a blockage to the expression and the under­
standing of truth, and because even experience is incapable of taking it 
in, the best way to convey reality is through pointers or symbols which 
direct one away from immanent experience and from literal translation.
Art shows forth its joy, harmony and beauty best, according to Maritain, 
in symbols which are not hieroglyphs, each standing for an object, but 
"spontaneous symbolism intuitively apprehended" (Creative Intuition, p. 57).
He goes on to say that reproduction "relates, along with manual dexterity, 
to the artistic activity, but no more constitutes it" (ibid., p. 58).
Bergson’s ideas also favour the implied, the suggested, the incantatory, 
the symbolic and the metaphoric; for at its best language can attempt to 
follow the mobility,''the interplay and the interpenetration of all reality 
and can describe the true self with its stream of intermingled memories,
' emotions and thoughts. Many of Bergson’s images are of movement - as 
illustrated by verbs such as ’briser le cercle', ’élargir’, ’creuser’, 
’aiguiser', 'palper' and ’ausculter’. His other main method of expressing 
change and motion is through the use of rhythm, which serves to recapture 
the progress of ’la durée’.
Although Maritain acknowledges with Bergson the difficulty and necessity 
of expressing the immaterial in fixed material ways, he does not accept the 
concomitant truth of Bergsonism that the spiritual is in a state of perpetual 
flux. Thus, in Maritain there is more concentration on classical style - the 
use of the ’mot juste’ and the observance of discipline.and rule.in order 
to achieve the highest degree of clarity possible. Maritain does indeed 
liken artistic creation to musical rh^ j'thm, but for a different reason from 
Bergson. Music is not to serve to imitate ’la durée’ of real life, but
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"music, like tragedy, -purifies the passions, by developing them within the 
limits and in the order of beauty, harmonising them with the intelligence, 
in a harmony fallen naturs experiences novfhere else" (Art & Scholasticism, 
p. 65). The function of art for Maritain, then, is to harmonize the 
mind and personality with Being, to make conditions favourable for rational 
and clear thought, pure and unmixed feelings and an elevated spirit.
Naturally Maritain is caught up in a world of ethical problems because of his 
desire to dogmatize about the nature of Being and truth. He is involved 
in a debate over spiritual values if the ultimate goal of art is the know­
ledge and vision of God. But in this realm he moves beyond Bergson's 
world of movement and change for, although Bergson's aesthetic does 
occasionally have moral and spiritual overtones, it does not place great 
emphasis on these. They are not central to his doctrines. On the other 
hand, Maritain considers such overtones to be paramount and all-important:
Truth and morality are One in the last analysis and Art, in describing Truth and portraying its spirit,must show that, spiritual values are the most real things (being) in the world: 'And allthat is most real escapes the notice of the darkened soul' (Art & Scholasticism, p. 118).
Art 'must be converted to find God again' (id.).
Bergson's main concern is not with life,as pointing to the forms of
truth and goodness, but with life as 'durée' and for this reason he is
eager to communicate the movement of 'la- durée' through language. His
ideal style would therefore be, as Jeanne Hersoh puts it: "un entraînement
musical" where "1'esprit goûte au mouvement suggéré, et en le mimant le trans­
forme en réalité d'expérience" ("L'obstacle du langage" in Henri Bergson;
Essais et Témoignages, p. 217).
For Maritain, the task of following the movement of real time or of the 
'stream of consciousness' is secondary and belongs to a philosophy of time
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rather than a philosophy of Being. In his own philosophy words are not 
merely static obstacles, but can be conductors of a truth lying beyond 
both the form and meaning of words as well as beyond the appearances of 
experience and intuition.
The central difference between Bergson's and Maritain's aesthetic 
theories is not so much one of doctrine as such, but one of emphasis.
While both accept that experience is an open door to hidden depths in 
the consciousness and the external world - in short, to reality - they 
stress different aspects of that experience. Bergson lays stress on the 
immanent life of the consciousness,while Maritain turns his sight to a world 
beyond the senses where earthly truths and values are vindicated, purified 
and eternalized^.
1. The Platonic influence on Maritain's thought is explored to some extent by J. Tate in "Plato, Art and Mr, Maritain" (New Scholasticism. No. 2, 1958, pp. IO7-I42), where he baldly states that "Plato manages to say what Maritain considers St. Thomas to have meant" (p. IIO). "Plato's remarks ... might have served Maritain as a useful support and illus­tration" (p. 110), Needless bo say, this flies in the face of much interpretation of Maritain as a strict Aristotelean.
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CmPTER WINE 
PEGUY A m  BERGSON - LITERARY STYLE
Péguy's first acquaintance with Bergson was through the lectures
at the Collège de France during the academic year 1897-1898, when
Bergson replaced M, Charles Leveque for the first term and lectured
on "La psychologie de Plotin" and "La quatrième Ennéade"^. After
attending one of these lectures Péguy, in his usual direct and dramatic
way, stopped Bergson in his tracks and exclaimed:
Monsieur, je sais que vous avez suspendu vos travaux personnels pour vous occuper uniquement de nous.Vous avez tort. Vous avez une oeuvre à écrire et vous ne devez la subordonner à rien (Cahiers de la Quinzaine. 5.7.I9OO, pp. 47-48),
After this, Péguy and Bergson must have become personal friends, for in
1899 Boivin recorded in a letter: "dans l'après-midi, visite de Bergson
lui-même amené par Péguy" (Feuillets de l'Amitié Charles Péguy. Orléans,
' 60, 21).
Péguy's enthusiasm for Bergson's philosophy was instantaneous. He 
had read L'Essai and Matière et Mémoire before the end of 1897, because , 
he offered his bride-to-be a copy of Matière et Mémoire as a wedding present , 
which, coupled with the fact that he possessed a first edition of the work, 
indicates that he knew the book before October 1897»
Bergson, is not quoted directly, however, until the article entitled 
"Les récentes oeuvres de Zola" in the Mouvement Socialiste of Ist-i^th
1. Notes on these lectures are to be found in Bergson et Plotin by R.-M. Mossé-Bastide (p.U.F., 1959)*
2. See A, Robinet (Péguy entre Jaurès. Bergson et l'Eglise. Seghers,1968, p. 152).
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November 1899^• Péguy admiringly comments on Bergson’s ideas about genius.
André Robinet (Péguy entre Jaurès. Bergson et l'Eglise, Seghers, I968, p. I50)
considers these ideas, together with those on quantity and quality in general
2in L’Essai, to have been especially influential on Péguy .
In his Cahier of 1st October I9OI Péguy speaks of his exceptional
interest in Bergson’s philosophy:
J'ai lu attentivement les rares livres de ce véritable philosophe et je suis assidûment son cours au Collège de France ... le vendredi à 4 heures et les trois quarts ; et je suis assuré que c'est l'heure le mieux employée de ma semaine (Oeuvres I. p. 584)*
In April of the following year Péguy again praises Bergson's courses and
is struck by the number of people attending (Oeuvres I. p. 468).
On 14th March 1902 Péguy visited Bergson with Boivin (see Feuillet 64,
19). He wrote his first letter to Bergson on the 25th July 1902 asking for
a copy of the Palmarès du Lycée Voltaire where Bergson gave his discourse
"Be l’Intelligence" on 51st July^.
Péguy followed Bergson’s lectures for a number of years; quite regularly
up till I9O8 at least. They dealt with the idea of time and its history
(19OI-I905), Aristotle’s Physics II (1902-I905), and his Metaphysics IX
(1905-I904), Plotinus's Enneades VI (19OI-I902), Spencer's First Principles
(I904-I905)» the development of theories of memory (1905-I904) and the problem
of free will (1904-I905)' Bergson took a sabbatical year from I9O5 to I906
in order to write L'Evolution Créatrice, This book met with a cool reception
1. See Oeuvres en Prose I (I898-I9O8), Bib. de la Pléiade, p. 555*
2. Robinet actually lists all the references Péguy made to Bergson's early works, noting the significant fact that he ignored or was ignorant of Le Rire (19OO) (see pp. I5I-I52),
5. Texi, in Mélanges. pp. 555-560.
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from Péguy, as is outlined later, although he made use of many of its ideas.
By 1905 Bergson’s star is completely dominant over Jaurès’s in Pégjy’s
life, for he wrote contemptuously of Jaurès: "il m ’eût fait tout un discours
de la philosophie de Bergson, dont il ne savait pas, et dont il n'eût pas
compris le premier mot" (Oeuvres I, pp. 857-858). Péguy and Jaurès met
for the last time on 19th November I905.
Shortly before this episode, Péguy had published part of Bergson's
Introduction à la Métaphysique in his Cahier IV-12 (17.2.O5) without any
concern over the copyright and without asking permission. Bergson wrote
(22.2.05) complaining mildly of this fact^. Bergson feared having his
philosophy used in a partisan way or as propaganda, but there, was no
lasting ill-feeling. Nevertheless, some time later, Bergson refused to
allow Péguy to publish "I’Arae et le Corps" in the Cahiers.
Bergson read Péguy’s Cahiers and subscribed to them regularly, and,
in a period of financial difficulty for Péguy, Bergson even increased his
subscription to ’un abonnement de sous.criptiorf (9*5*06)^.
By I9O8 Péguy’s attendance at Bergson’s courses had become sporadic
(see Boivin’s letter in Feuillets 64, 28)-, and this can be explained partly
by Péguy’s distaste for certain elements in L’Evolution Créatrice and partly
by his leaning towards Catholicism. He wrote to Maritain on 24th May 1907:
A certains égards et dans certaines parties, notamment sur le livre de Bergson, je suis dans votre sens non seulement beaucoup plus que vous ne le croyez, mais
1. See Etudes Bergsoniennes VIII (P.U.F., I968, p. I4): article, "Ledossier Bergson-Péguy" by A. Martin.
2. Letter reproduced in' Mélanges. pp. 680-681.
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beaucoup plus que vous n ’y êtes vous-même (Feuillets.176, 55).
Péguy sent Bergson a copy of his first Jeanne a’Arc on 5rd June 1510
(see Etudes bergsoniennes VIII, p. 25) and later Bergson tried to help
Péguy with his Le mystère de la charité de Jeanne d’Arc by recommending
it to Xavier Léon for inclusion in La Revue de métaohysique et de morale.
It was turned down as unphilosophical. Bergson also tried to help Péguy
with subscriptions to the Cahiers and asked A. Kahn and Baron Rothschild
for support. Bergson increased his own subscription by 100 francs in
June-July 1940. He wrote congratulating Péguy on his article, "La
mystique et la politique", in Cahier XI-12 of 12th July 1910^ ,.
So Bergson and Péguy were on excellent terms again by early I9II.
Péguy wrote a letter of gratitude to Bergson in March and then sent a
copy of his own Oeuvres choisies. Bergson asked him to enter it for the
Grand Prix de Littérature at the Académie Française, Unfortunately, Bergson
2' forgot to support the entry with a speech and Remain Rolland took first prize 
(8.6.1912). From then on relations deteriorated again for some time. . 
Bergson and Péguy were both overworked and Péguy faced failure and penury 
as well. In a depressed frame of mind he wrote to Bergson (27.2.14) 
accusing him of having no time to read his work any more. Bergson denied 
this, but after Bergson's entry into the Académie Française (12.2.14) Péguy 
wrote to Joseph Lotte (Feuillets 155, 46; 18,2,14): "mon petit, Bergson
est entré à l’Académie parce qu’il a fait la paix avec la Sorbonne et j’ai 
été le prix de cette paix".
Then, at about this time, Bergson himself suddenly lost popularity and
1. See Etudes bergsoniennes VIII, p. 5I.
2. Note of apèlogy reprinted in Etudes berhsoniennes VIII. p. 46.
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found himself beset by opposition on all fronts. He faced attack from 
left-wing critics for his supposed Catholic leanings, attack from Catholics 
for his heretical tendencies and attack from the extreme right Action française
La Grandg.Revue pronounced on Bergson's popularity and decided that it had 
caused a decline in cultural life and literary style! In 1914 Bergson 
was placed on the Papal Index. . Because of this, Péguy saw himself as .1
Bergson's sole champion and he and Bergson were once again in a battle 
together against the arbiters of taste and intellectual life in France.
Péguy rallied to Bergson's support, hoping not to repeat Lanson’s infi- &
delity to his master, Brunetiere: "tout disparaît devant ces recroisements
d'ingratitude et devant cette renégation d'un maître et d'un père devenu 
malheureux" ("L'Argent Suite", II, p. 1127). In heroic style, Péguy :
defended Bergson through his Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie berg- 
sonienne (il, p. 15Ï3 ff.) and his Note conjointe sur M. Descartes et la 
philosophie cartésienne (il, p, 1557 ff.).
He located the fundamental problem as a confusion over the meaning of 
the word 'intellect':
On a feint de croire que la querelle faite à l'intellectualisme ' 'était une querelle faite à la raison, à la sagesse, à la logique.Et à l'intelligence (il, p. 1515, italics in original).
This had created a false dispute over- certain argument which Bergson had 
not in fact advocated. Péguy considers that Bergson is not concerned to 
overthrow all previous philosophies but has instead added a significant 
insight to them: that intellect in the sense of 'detached, objective
analysis' is not the only possible guide to knowledge; there is also "une 
philosophie de l'intérieur" (p. I5I5), a movement of the subject towards 
the object, a deepening sense of reality which goes beyond the application 
of thought alone. Nevertheless, this is no mere philosophy of 'feeling' - "II 
ne faut donc pas dire que le bergsonisme soit une philosophie pathétique ni
- 289 -
une philosophie du pathétique" (p. 1514) - it is a philosophy which takes 
account of feelings as well as ideas and which has a seiise of closeness 
to living realities. It is the depth of apprehension end interpretation 
which matters more than the type or the method. Thefefore, "le bergsonisme 
n ’a jamais été ni un irrationalisme ni un antirationalisme. Il a été un 
nouveau rationalisme" (p. 154l)«
Of course Péguy is attempting in this article not to write a critical 
point-by-point appraisal of Bergson’s ideas; he is attempting to grasp the 
motivation and essence of Bergson's approach. His distinction between 
'le tout fait' and the 'se faisant' (p. 1521 ff.) is not only an inter­
pretation of the time element in Bergsonism; it also says something profound 
about any philosophy - namely, that it cannot describe reality definitively 
or exhaustively, neither should it impose a schema of ideas upon reality 
prior to examination''and investigation: "II y a des idées qui sont toutes
faites ... avant qu'on les fasse" (p. I525).
He takes up this theme again in Note conjointe sur M. Descartes ... :
"une'idée fausse toute faite est infiniment plus fausse comme toute faite 
que comme fausse" (p. I585). Most of the rest of his essay is an account 
of the Bergsonian lifestyle; living without assumptions, without false 
securities, without mechanical behaviour, in a lively awareness of one's 
own contingency. He calls this variously 'grace' or 'liberté' or 'précarité'. 
It is a quality of life akin to the Christian living by faith, trusting God 
at each moment and opening the soul to new experiences; the opposite is 
spiritual death:
I'un est la liberté de l'homme, dans l'ordre de la vie; l'autre est la force de l'habitude, dans l'ordre de l'amortis s'ornent et de la mort (p. I415).
Having said this much of Péguy's opinion of Bergson's philosophy in
general teims, it is not my intention here to give an account of the affinities
.J
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between Péguy*s and Bex'gson's philosophy of life. This has already been i
attempted by a number of writers. The intricacies of the relationship 4
between the philosophies of the two men has been analyzed in great detail 
by A. Henry in Bergson, Maître de Péguy (Ed. Elzévir, 1948), by S.V/. Tayloï*
in a thesis, Péguy and contemporary idealism (Bristol Ph.D., 1957) and more
recently by A. Robinet in his Péguy entre Jaurès, Bergson et l'Eglise (Seghers,f 
1968). The research of the latter is very thorough, although the. conclusions f
he reaches are often deliberately controversial. La pensée de Charles 4
Péguy (Oeuvres, E. Mounier, Ed. du Seuil, I96I), written jointly by 
E. Mounier, G. Izard and M. Péguy, also considers the influence of Bergson 
in such areas.
The similarities between Péguy's ideas and Bergson's are numerous.
What makes such a study very complicated is the fact that Péguy unfailingly
transformed Bergson*^ ideas and related them to his own preoccupations in I
>other fields; for instance, those of sociology, theology, history and |1
t political action. Very few of Bergson's ideas are straightforwardly *
reiterated in Péguy's work. As E. Mounier rightly argued:
II ne fait jamais appel aux parties les plus systématiques de l'oeuvre de Bergson. Il la saisit à la fois en deçà et au-delà d'elle-même; en deçà, en laissant tomber ce qui peut-être caduc; au-delà, en explorant ses sources du côté de l'héritage classique et de la pensée chrétienne où il la voit directement insérée, et à l'autre bout en allant, parmi l'expérience de chaque jour, à la rencontre de prolongements inattendus ...(La Pensée de Charles Péguy,
p. 27).
For this reason it is difficult to be precise about the areas of Bergson's
philosophy which Péguy took to heart. It is always necessary to explain
just how he adopted them. Sometimes critics have contented themselves
with general comments, like these of Jean Onimus:
Bergson ... avait révélé à Péguy la fécondité cosmique .., (introduction aux trois Mystères, p. 72);
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I’esperance est un pur élan ... Cette espérance prise à json point de jaillissement le plus humble est, tout 1simplement, l'élan Ti'ital (id.);
l’espérance de Pégu^ r ce n’est d'abord rien d’autre quela durée bergsonienne (id.). |1
Certain of Péguy’s ideas relate to the whole of Bergson’s thought and not 
to one aspect only, as is clearly the case in Péguy’s two articles on 
Bergson, Therefore, any one-to-one correspondence between their ideas 
is inevitably superficial. To read Devaux's summary of their agreements 
is to lose the flavour of both philosophies and to reduce their ideas to 
caricatures :
accord sur la définition même de la philosophie comme effort pour étreindre la réalité, accord sur la primauté de l’intuition par rapport au concept, accord sur l'opposition de la durée vécue à la spécialité, accord sur l’idée que l’unité est derrière nous et non devant nous,accord sur la relation entre l’éternité vivante, ’concrétion de toute durée’ (P.M.. p. 1419) et la temporalité successive;accord sur la subordination du langage à la pensée, accord sur la distinction entre le ’se-faisant’ et le ’tout fait’,accord pour se méfier de toute dialectique("D’un malentendu entre Péguy et Bergson", Revue d’Histoire littéraire de France, March-June 1973> p. 28^".
This might not be incorrect but it is too simplistic. It would be a 
better policy to show where Péguy and Bergson were in disagreement. For ;
the most part, Péguy adopted Bergson’s philosophy as his own, although, 
whereas Péguy was a committed man of action, Bergson was a detached, tech­
nical philosopher. A-A. Devaux is far more convincing when he keeps to a 
narrower range; for instance,in demonstrating that Péguy was not enthusiastic 
over the publication of L’Evolution Créatrice and that he had serious reser­
vations about it, speaking of it as a good philosophy "qui est venue au monde 
parmi les modernes, dans le temps moderne", but one which: "de ce qu’elle est
contemporaine des modernes vient précisément de recevoir ... quelques atteintes,
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quelques commencements de contamination" (ün poète l’a dit, Gallimard,
1953, p. 60).
Péguy evinced a profound mistrust of progress in any form and in 
his eyes "l’évolution est, finalement, vue beaucoup plus comme décréatrice 
que comme créatrice" (Devaux, Op. oit., p. 282). Bergson’s optimism and 
belief in the future greatness of man^ clashed with Péguy's sense of 
original sin and his belief in the ’dégradation’, ’déperdition’ and 
’vieillissement’ of the material world. This is well discussed in A. 
Pilkington’s Bergson and his influence (C.U.P., 1976). It is clear that 
Péguy thought that ’la durée réelle’ implied ageing and decomposition: "la
durée réelle;, mon ami, celle qui sera toujours nommée là durée bergsonienne, 
la durée organique, la durée de 1’événement et de la réalité implique essen­
tiellement le vieillissement" (Oeuvres en Prose II, 1909-1914» Bib. de la 
Pléiade, I96I, p. 15t>). Péguy goes further still:
Il y a une déperdition, une perte perpétuelle, une usure, un frottement inévitable ... un irréversible qui est dans la nature même, dans l’essence et dans 1’événement, au coeur même de 1’événement (Oeuvres II. pp. 127-128).
Besides his disbelief in progress, Péguy also disbelieved in the 
intellectual unification of life. He opposed Jaurès’s monist conception 
of reality and attacked any sign of it in L’Evolution Créatrice. Péguy 
is sure that Bergson's earlier works are on the right track, emphasizing 
pluralism, variety and individuality. In his attack on Jaurès, Réponse
1, E.g., see E.G., p. 725» "l'humanité entière, dans l’espace et dansle temps, est une immense armée qui galope à Coté de chacun de nous,... dans une charge entraînante capable de culbuter toutes les résistances et de franchir bien des obstacles, meme peut-être la mort". This is repudiated by and large in Les Deux Sources (see pp. 1226-1227). There, the ’élan vital’ is a ’vertical' inspiration drawing men to God and not a temporal force giving nope for future perfection; there, progress requires moral advancement as a necessity.
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brève à Jaurès, he wrote:
Ce classement symétrique et facile des hommes et desévénements, ce rude classement clair et faux des simples '■idées me rappelle un peu les articulations de M.Brunetière (Oeuvres I, p. 242).
The reduction of individuals to the mass, of life to a single principle,
is always false and oversimplified, according to Péguy. Thus, a third
possible error of judgement in L’Evolution Créatrice is that Bergson is
giv^ Q. to too much generalization and too much detachment from the particular,
the specific, which is in fact complex and multifarious:
... la destination du philosophe n ’est pas même de mener, elle est de se mener, non pas à vrai, ce que nous laissons aux logiciens et aux juges d’instruction, mais à réel (Deuxième Elégie. XXX, Gallimard, 1955, PP» 75-76)*
And being more precise in his criticism, Péguy says in Un poète l’a dit:
"Hous aurons à nous 'demander s'il n ’y a point des parties de l’E.C. qui 
•sont seulement vraies. Qui ne sont malheureusement que vraies" (p. 171).
For Péguy, Bergson has almost constructed an intellectual system (like 
the positivists) instead of earthing all his conclusions in an analysis 
of the specific. The phrase "tout se passe comme si ..." (E.G., pp. 704, 721, 
et al.) typifies this new approach.
A fourth area of disagreement centres on the relationship between 
science and metaphysics. In "Introduction à la métaphysique" (P.M.. 
p. 1424), Bergson expresses the hope that "une philosophie véritablement 
intuitive réaliserait l'union tant désirée de la métapt^rsique et la science". 
For Péguy, such a coincidence is virtually impossible, because, for him, 
metaphysics relies on direct intuitive knowledge from the inside of life 
(involvement in action) while physics is indirect knowledge, ’objectively’ 
ministered by the senses from the external world. This distinction is 
itself derived from the early Bergson and so, in Péguy's opinion, this must
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be more a case of Bergson’s betraying his ov/n principles rather than a 
fundamental disagreement.
However much Péguy may have been disappointed by L’Evolution Créatrice. 
he nonetheless made extensive use of it. It is difficult to pinpoint exact g 
quotations, but Onimus points out Péguy's indebtedness to the idea of |
’l’élan vital’ in interpreting Péguy’s conception of ’hope’:
Elle [l’espérance] ne tire pas vers un but prévu d’avance mais elle pousse devant elle les déchets de la vie, la lourde masse inerte de la matière morte, des habitudes, des mécanismes toufe faits; elle filtre à travers malheurs, déceptions, apathies. Elle soulève le poids colossal de nos lassitudes. Brusquement elle jaillit, venue de sources oubliées de notre enfance, de notre race, de nos traditions: c’est, en un mot, la vie qui nous travaille("Introduction aux trois Mystères ".Cahiers de l’AmitiéCharles Péguy, p. 72). i
This illustrates perfectly the way in which Péguy adopts and then adapts 
Bergson’s philosophy' to suit his own purposes. IPeguy’s disillusionment with Bergsonism coincided with his own 
» spiritual crisis and subsequent adoption of Christianity, but later he g
Reconciled the two in a remarkable synthesis, coming to realize at the 4;
end of his life that, just as Bergson, his master, had provided insights 
into every area of life before his conversion, so he could continue to I
provide insights in the world of the spirit. '/
Overall, Péguy cannot be considered as a philosopher in the strict 
sense of the word; his writings lack technical precision and he does not 
accord to any subject a systematic, objective analysis of its nature and 
aspects. Rather, Péguy is a writer who gives a general expression to his 
personal preoccupations. Sometimes there is a more self-conscious concen- , -,
tration on the literary devices and techniques necessary to a particular genre;I 
sometimes there is more concentration on the abstract ideas and philosophy 
behind a subject. But, whether he is concerned with the style or the ideas,
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Péguy’s main aim is to oommunioate something real to his experience, 
something true to life, in the most effective way possible. Sometimes 
Péguy tries th evoke or conjure up the richness of an experience; some­
times he is concerned to show the inner significance, the importance or 
the meaning of that experience. Greater stress on the one results in poetic 
expression; greater emphasis on the other in philosophical expression.
But both are forms of insight or vision,
Jean Onimus all too often treats the poetry as embellished thought, 
as thinly-disguised philosophy. Chapter IV of his work Incarnation  ^is 
typically entitled "La Pensée incarnée" and this seems to be his assessment 
of Péguy’s poetry in general. Instead of drawing comparisons with other 
contemporary poets, he finishes by placing Péguy rather incongruously side 
by side with the Catholic modernist philosophers and theologians:
II y a bien dessrapports entre l’attitude de Péguy en face de l'Eglise et celle des modernistes. Tous deux ont les mêmes adversaires et luttent contre les mêmes ^âbûs“ ,T."tp'. *209) .--  ------------ “  -------
Onimus ignores the fact that Péguy was an opponent of ’modernists' of all
kinds - the word itself was anathema to him. But more important, Onimus
seems to assume that Péguy’s main raison d'être is to be an abstract thinker.
André Robinet similarly aligns Péguy with the philosophers and thinkers
in his Péguy entre Jaurès. Bergson et l’Eglise (Seghers, I968), Here again
the leading question appears to be the ideology to which Péguy adhered most -
the Socialist, Bergsonian or the orthodox Christian. Péguy also receives
a rather abstract analysis from E. Mounier, M, Péguy and G. Izard in La Pensée 
2de Charles Péguy , and a^ain the very title itself betrays the intention of
1, Incarnation: Essai sur la censée de Péguy (C.A.C.P,, 1952).
2. In E. Mounier: Oeuvres 1931-1939, Ed. du Seuil, I96I,
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the writers to extract from the undergrowth of stylistic repetition and 
decoration some clear and distinct ideas. The basic assumption is that 
Péguy is really a philosopher who rather spoils his arguments with diver­
sions,poetry and general verbosity.
On the other hand, there has recently been a strong tendency to regard 
Péguy as primarily a political activist and theorist. Such an approach is 
adopted by N. Jussem-Wilson (Charles Péguy. Bowes & Bowes, London, 1965);
Hans Schmidt (Charles Péguy; the decline of an idealist. Louisiana State 
University Press, 196?); Roger Secrétain (Péguy, soldat de la vérité.
Lib. Acad. Perrin, 197%); and M. Villiers (Charles Péguy; a, study in 
integrity. Collins, London, 1965)* The emphasis of these works is upon 
Péguy the man of action and therefore Péguy’s political ideals and moral 
convictions become all-important.
The prevailing trend is thus to treat Péguy as a man of ideas - whether 
they be philosophical, political or religious - and this was in evidence at 
' the Péguy symposium of December 1973 held at Reading. The titles of several 
lectures will make this clear: "Péguy et la crise de la liberté" (P. Field, 
Keele); "Péguy, Bergson et le concept du héros" (S. Taylor, Bristol); "La
cité harmonieuse; une cité anarchiste" (U. Wilson, Bristol); and "Péguy 
and the rhetoric of populism" (J, Coombes, Essex).
The smaller number of critics who have set out to redress the balance - 
to consider Péguy as a poet first and foremost - have often flown to the 
other extreme, concentrating on style in technical terms above all else.
In L’Art de Péguy (C.A.C.P., 1948), Bernard Guyon explains that Péguy had 
not up till then been discussed as a poet of merit, let alone one of genius. 
He adds that, in his opinion, "juger Péguy exclusivement comme écrivain, 
c'est de toute fa^on le trahir" (p. 5)* Guyon does, however, mention 
Albert Béguin’s La Prière de Pégîjy (Cahiers du Rhone, 1942), which is the
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earliest full-length account of Péguy as a poet. Unfortunately, Guyon 
makes no mention of A. Chahanon’s La Poétique de Péguy (R. Laffont, 6th 
ed. 1947 [first pub. 1942]). This is possibly the best work on Péguy's 
style and literary theory, avoiding much of the analytical dissecting pro­
cedures of later writings. After Guyon there were a number of works on 
specific poems by Péguy, analyzed to the last syllable. Jean Onimus con­
tributed to these with his L'Image dans I'Eve de Péguy (1952), Introductici 
aux quatrains de Péguy (1954) and Introduction aux trois mystères de Péguy 
(1962) (C.A.C.P.).
R.J. Nelson's broader-based study, Péguy, poète du sacré (c.A.C.P., 
i960), summarizes the discoveries of Péguy's critics in this field, but 
does not depart from the method of scientific analysis used by his pre­
decessors. He draws up long catalogues of words and phrases used to 
illustrate this or t'hat idea in Péguy. The signal danger of such an 
approach is clearly that it can assume a one-to-one relationship between 
‘ images and abstract ideas. In turn, this can tend to subordinate the 
imagery and style to the philosophy. The following phrase illustrates 
this point:
Le mal comme le bien est liquide chez Péguy. L'eau est donc la grâce, mais elle est encore davantage. Elle est l'esprit de Dieu qui travaille les hommes et l'esprit de Satan qui les met à 1'épreuve. Nous l'appelons donc ESPRIT dans un sens absolu (p. 29).
An obsession with finding 'correspondences' leads Nelson to this rather
inane conclusion:
L'emploi d'un nombre d'images relativement réduit exige que le poète se serve de chacune pour désigner plusieurs choses. Ainsi le bourgeon qui représente la naissance de l’enfant sert aussi à désigner l'espérance (p. 46),
The point about poetry is not to find synonyms for abstract words. Such 




-ÿaexpression. The philosophy should not dominate the poetry or form of 'f
expression too much, otherwise this becomes artificial and forced - a 
mere vehicle for ideas. In Péguy's own mind,the mode of expression is 
very much part of the idea itself. If expressed in a different way, 
the ideas themselves become different. What if the writer clothes the 
boring truth in interesting language or embellishes the plain truth with 
complex niceties, instead of, as Péguy puts it, "dire bêtement la vérité 
bête, ennuyeusement la vérité ennuyeuse, tristement la vérité triste ..." 
(Oeuvres I. p. 94» "Lettre du provincial"). |
The separation of Péguy's work into poetry and prose is attacked by <
Père Pie Duployé, O.P.5 in La Religion de Péguy (Eds. Klinksieck, I965): #
III n'y a pas un Péguy qui fait de la prose et un Péguyqui fait des vers, - et c'est pourtant sur cette basemalheureuse que s'est faite l'édition dite de la Pléiade(p. xxii).
\ ,'t
He takes Albert Béguin to task for attempting to detach the intellectual
V framework of Eve from the poetry, arguing that Béguin "s'est cru obligé
de se substituer à Péguy pour établir dans Eve un ordre que Péguy n ’a
nulle part déclaré" (p. )09), and insisting on "l'irréductibilité de
1'expérience poétique" (p. 509).
Duployé'8 point is in fact supported by Péguy himself in the brief
article he called "Le Duiel": $
C'est le propre d'un poème comme Éve qu'il est absolument impossible d'y desceller les plus grandes considérations philosophiques de la construction générale. La pensée est si serrée qu'elle se refuse aux fragmentations de l'analyse, et ce n'est qu'en s'imposant de considérer le poème comme un immense traité qu'on pourrait essayer d'en établir le sommaire (Quoted from L'Eve de Péguy by ,A. Béguin, Labergerie, 1948» P* 2l6).
1. This article first appeared in Lettres et Entretiens (Ed. M. Pégjy, £;ds, de Paris, 1954) and is reprinted in Béguin's work, pp. 2 0 8 - 2 2 1 .
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Duployé, almost alone among critics, proposes in his hook to "procéder
à la rectification des frontières qui, dans la mentalité contemporaine,
séparent le domaine de la théologie et celui de la littérature" (p. l).
He also regards the image as of prime importance, not just as a vehicle
for ideas, hut as a necessary and indivisible part of the communication;
Dans la démarche de Péguy, on n'aura donc besoin de plaquer l'idée sur l'image, de demander à l'idée une intelligibilité qui serait radicalement distincte de l'intelligibilité latente de l'image (p. 335)•
He calls the image "la matière esthétique de l'idée" (p. vii). Part of 
the function of an image is to encourage patterns of thought by allusion - 
"Eve est un livre qui ne parle que par allusion" (p. 318) - and by liturgy - 
"Plus on étudie Eve ... plus on y reconnaît cette inspiration de la liturgie 
catholique latine, dont Péguy était un familier" (pp. 3 2 7 - 3 2 8 ) .
Nevertheless, Péguy's literary style is not simply poetic techniques 
self-consciously employed for special effects; there is a sense in which 
» it is always the spontaneous and natural means of communication for a man 
of his temperament and attitudes; it is the result of a desire to produce 
something not only true to life but true to himself.
Clearly, Péguy's style cannot always easily.be separated into wha-^  
constitutes 'poetry' and what constitutes 'philosophy'; there are elements 
of both in either. The 'style' of the philosophy has a poetic content, 
just as the poetic writings have a philosophical content. Roméo Arbour 
(H. Bergson et les lettres françaises. Corti, 1956), rightly argues that 
"le style de Péguy est celui d'un poète, sa prose tend à la poésie" (p. 299)« 
It is equally true to say, without wishing to confuse the genres, that his 
poetry tends towards prose. For example, words like 'l'argent', 'politique' 
and 'le monde moderne' possess much poetic symbolism, while certain long 
diatribes in the- poetry are certainly prosaic, if not pedestrian. It is
- 300 -
the general inspiration behind Péguy's literary style as a whole which 
is to be briefly examined here.
The style and literary techniques arise naturally,not only from Péguy's 
articulated conception of life, but also from his instincts and intuitions 
about the nature of things. Sometimes he writes in order to elucidate to 
himself the exact significance of a certain topic or event. Whether he 
is writing at the level of self-conscious expression or at the level of 
sensation and intuition, the same elements can be detected in his style.
This is because Péguy does not consider the prime function of ' language to ,4*
lie in the communication of ideas in the sense of intellectual stimulation . 1
and argument. Instead, he considers that its aim is to evoke, to conjure K
1up, to 're-produce' in oneself or another person,a certain experience of
Ûlife. In other words, Péguy is intending to communicate an experience 4
either from his own store of memories or from someone else's. This is why
'   ^ syhe lays such stress on memory - the most vivid apprehension of the past, %
Speaking of a Christian friend who endured great suffering, Péguy writes
of that man's feelings:
Je pourrais les analyser, docteur, mais non pas sans faire des recherches longues et difficiles parmi les souvenirs de ma mémoire. Et quand dans les connaissances de ma mémoire je me serais représenté les images des sentiments de mon ami, j'aurais à vous les présenter. Comment vous présenter ces nuances parfaitement délicates? ... (Oeuvres I, pp. 159-160, "Encore de la grippe", c.f. p. 189).
This gives an excellent due as to the inspiration behind Péguy's
literary style - and one of utmost importance: for Péguy it is the flux
of life which determines the style and not the style which manipulates our
sensibility: "I'art n'est rien s'il n'est point une étreinte ajustée de quelque
réalité" (Oeuvres II. p. 891, "Les suppliants parallèles").
This also explains why Péguy laid such stress on vision, awareness. I




Le réel est le grand maître et quand on fait de l’histoire il est le seul maître; et quand on conte un événement, ,?|fut-il récent de cinq minutes, on fait de l'histoire ... M(Oeuvres I, p. 446, "Personnalités"). |
Conversely, this fact explains why Péguy was so violently opposed to 
the dessication and division of real life effected by academic scholarship 
which tries to replace events and history by lists of facts, accounts, 
summaries and collections of card-indices ('fiches'): "La réalité est
ce qu'elle est, non, nullement ce qu'elle rend à l'enregistrement" (Oeuvres II. 
p. 55)* Péguy's Clio, the goddess of history, exclaims: "avec ce système 
de fiches mes histoires ne font jamais que commencer" (Oeuvres II. p. 258) 
and then asks of the historian, "Qu'eùt-ce été s'il ne se fut point agi
d'un texte mais d'un mouvement même, d'une idée, de réalité, de vie?" |
(p* - 241)• - -
So, if words relate to an experence fuller and richer than the content
of a. single word or of a factual description, then Péguy's style will bear
V this out by the use of repetition, synonym and by an embellishment and
elaboration of the simple facts. Here is an example of this technique, |
where Péguy illustrates vividly the mental agonies required in making a
commitment, becoming involved:
... s'il ne veut pas choisir, dans son fol orgueil de savant moderne, s'il refuse formellement de choisir, il choisit quand même, car il choisit l'écrasement, l'inexistence et la stérilité; s'il refuse formelle­ment de choisir, dans ses matériaux, s'il ne veut en laisser tomber aucun, c'est lui qui tombe, et il choisit de n'être plus.
Au contraire, s'il choisit,par lassitude, par consente­ment, par méthode, par faiblesse', par accommodation, par humanité, s'il consent à choisir, quelle effrayante ;responsabilité; choisir parmi les hommes et les événe- 'jments, choisir parmi tous les éléments de la réalité, |de la même réalité ... condamner à mort totale des'élé­ments de la réalité que la réalité n'avaient point rejetés (Oeuvres I. p. 741, "Dn essai de monopole").
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The philosophy and poetry are clearly seen here going together :l
cheek by jowl. There is no artificial division in Péguy's mind. As 
he himself states:
C'est le propre d'un poète ... de saisir d'un mot,... de ramasser en un mot toute la réalité profondé- iment essentielle d'une histoire, d'un mouvement, d'un geste individuel ou collectif ... (Oeuvres I. p. 902,"Les suppliants parallèles").
This desire to represent the tapestry of life as a whole, all of a 
piece, is something Péguy derives from Bergson's philosophy of intuition 
and intelligence. Bergson asserts that it is the function of intelligence g
to segregate, separate and divide into parts. If one attempts the "recon- Istruction de toutes choses, même la vie", one achieves only "une image I
symbolique" (L'Evolution Créatrice, p. 490). The conclusion that follows
is this: "Notre pensée, sous sa forme purement logique, est incapable de |
. se représenter la vrhie nature de la vie" (p. 489)* In particular, the J
analytical historian fails to grasp the life of the past and "ne retient 
% des choses que l'aspect répétition. Si le tout est original elle s'arrange 
pour 1'analyser en éléments ou en aspects qui soient à peu près la reproduc­
tion du passé" (p, 519, italics in original).
By the use of repetition and the insistent march of a regular rhythm 
(and sometimes an irregular one), Péguy, imitating the process of musical 
incantation, calls into being the elusive sense of real life. He breathes 
life into the inert words by stimulating the imagination and awakening the 
memory to bring back the ghosts of the past as real presences. As Jean 
Onimus says:
La vision de Péguy est poétique parce qu'elle va bien au-delà des fictions abstraites et qu'elle s'efforce de saisir le concret par le concret. Les images de l’espérance ne sont pas des métaphores ou des allégories avec tout ce que cela suppose de littéraire et de gratuit,Ce sont des intuitions et boute la 'musique' des Mystères n'a d'autre but que de rendre sensibles ces intuitions
t
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(introduction aux trois Mystères, p, 59)-
Péguy's use of the image of a child does more than simply to symbolize #
hope: it brings home the vital, life-like feeling of hope. The child
has all the qualities of hope; but there is no need to list these in f
abstract terms such as joy, innocence, ingenuousness, trust and the like.
It is enough to awaken the sense of hope in the reader by placing before
his imagination the image of the child:
Ce qui m'étonne, dit Dieu, c'est 1'espérance.Et je n'en reviens pas.Cette petite espérance qui n'a l'air de rien du tout. ICette petite fille espérance. ?Immortelle j(Oeuvres Poétiques, p. 535» "Be Porche de la deuxième vertu").
î
In shorb, Péguy's use of imagery, far from being a picture-substitute
for an idea, actually stimulates and creates ideas as a by-product of its
powerful effect on the imagination.
Péguy's images are similar to Bergson's 'image médiatrice' (P.M.. p. 1347);l
V and his concept of the image is like Bergson's idea of the 'schéma dynamique' 4
(Energie Spirituelle, p. 946). The 'image médiatrice' is, like Péguy's
image, an attempt to pin down and capture accurately something fleetingly 4
intuited, be it an abstract or a concrete perception:
L'effort intellectuel pour interpréter, comprendre, faire attention, est donc un mouvement du 'schéma dynamique' dans la direction de l'image qui le développe. C'est une transformation continue de relations abstraites, suggérées par les objets perçus, en images concrètes, capables de recouvrir ces objets (ibid., "L'Effort intellectuel").
Poetic expression lies mid-way between insight and explanation, mid-way
between vision and description. Something of the freshness of the original
vision or insight is retained:
Ce que nous arriverons à ressaisir eb à fixer, c'est une certaine image intermédiaire entre ja simplicité de l'intuition concrète et la complexité des abstractions
■«
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qui la traduisent, image fuyante et évanouissante ...qui, ... si elle n'est pas l'intuition même, s'en |rapproche beaucoup plus que l'expression conceptuelle ... à laquelle l'intuition doit recourir pour fournir des 'explications' (P.M.. p. 1347» "L'Intuition philo­sophique").
The repetition of a single image with slightly different nuances of 
meaning each time serves to render a memoiy or experience so vivid in the %
mind-that it seems to take on all the radiance and reality of a present
perception. It creates in the consciousness the sense of presence and 
the flavour of real life.
For Bergson, the image has a mediating role bettwen life inside and 
outside the mind. He examines the relationship between them .in "L'Effort 
intellectuel" (p. 946) as follows:
-La-perception-brute ... suggère une representation -schématique de l'ensemble et, par là, des relations des parties ent^e elles. Développant ce schéma en images-souvenirs, nous cherchons à faire coïncider oes-dmages—souvenirs-avec-les images perçues- Et toujours la partie positive, utile, de ce travail consiste à marcher du schéma à l'image perçue ...
In a real sense, material reality is an image as well, so the hope remains 
for Bergson to form a unity and harmony between life and thought (the ex­
pression of which is language). The natural direction of intelligence is 
away from life, either towards action (manipulation of the environment) or ?
towards speculation (the forming of abstract relations), but this trend has 
to be reversed in the interests of true representation.
Péguy similarly tried to achieve a coincidence between life and thought 
through language; hence the paramount importance of style - the use of words 
and images to reflect and match up to reality.
Bergson's idea affect's not only present perception but past history as 
well. The conventional historian does not apprehend past time as a once 
living reality experienced by real people, but compresses it into an analysis
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of states and situations. This compression of history and real life by 
language is vehemently opposed by Péguy, whose aim is not to eliminate the 
soul - 'la durée réelle' - from the event, but rather to restore it.
The historian betrays real life because "il manquerait le lent travail, 
l'irréversible, l'incompressible, 1 'irreconmengable, 1 'élaboration de |
l'histoire propre, l'élaboration, la vieille, 1'antique élaboration de 
l'histoire qu'on ne peut pas hâter. Non seulement que l'on ne refait 
pas, mais que l'on ne hâte pas" (Oeuvres II, p. 666), The style here 
is as important as the meaning, for the two complement one another.
The idea explains; the expression demonstrates.
History is not just a series of facts about a dead world; it com­
prises other people's experience of life. It is Péguy's contention that 
life goes on and men's basic experiences do not change, although their 
attitude to events might do so. Comparing Christ's time with our own,
Péguy, writes : "c'était le m&ae. monde. / et c'était pourtant le même homme”
(Oeuvres poétiques, n. 472, "î^stère de la Charité"), And elsewhere Péguy 
writes: "Vous aussi clirétiens, vous ne connaissez pas aussi votre bonheur /
votre bonheur présent, qui est le même bonheur ..." (id.. p. 413)* The 
upshot of this fact is that,if God once came to man's everyday experience . - 4
vividly, then he is always potentially present to any man at any time in «
the same way.
Furthermore, history literally lives on in the collective memory of any- 
given society: "L'histcire est parallèle à 1'événement; la mémoire lui
est centrale et axiale" (Oeuvres II. p. 270, "Clio"). Mchelet is Péguy's 
best-loved historian since he poetically attempts to recreate the atmosphere 
of past events,
Péguy often refers to Bergson's 'mémoire pure' to justify his ^iews on
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history, and this is to be distinguished from 'mémoire habitude'^. 7/hereas 
the historians all too often make use of an intellectual memory of facts, 
the poet lives close to sensation, Bergson writes: "Be ces deux mémoires,
dont l'une imagine et l’autre répète, la seconde peut suppléer la première 
et souvent même en donnai* l'illusion" (Matière et Mémoire, p. 228), The 
faculty of imagination is close to that of recognition - the past as 
relived - whereas any repetition of the past relies on an intellectual 
faculty which recalls the idea of a past, event. The latter requires a 
mechanical remembering of facts, the former an evocation of events: "pour
évoquer le passé sous forme d'image,il faut pouvoir s'abstraire de l'action 
présente ... il faut vouloir rêver" (id., p. 228).
The common Bergsonian word to describe reality as ongoing is 'la durée'. 
Péguy makes reference to it in this way: "Quand on dit que le temps passe,
on a tout dit" (Oeuvies II, p. I65, "Clio"). If historians and philosophers 
write as though time has no meaning, for Péguy it is the very vehicle, the 
t container, the context of real life. For him, the real world is characterized ; 
by "un rythme de durée, réelle, qu'il faut bien nommer la durée bergsonienne" 
(Oeuvres II, p. 132). The mistake of most writers is to compress or expand 
or extend real time as though it were a quantity of elastic. Péguy, by 
way of contrast, maintains that events are lived according to a rhythm of 
their own:
... il est presque impossible de ne. pas se demander si le monde même n'a pas une durée qui ne serait que sous- entendue et enregistrée par le temps du monde; mais concordant tout de même avec le temps du monde; s'il n'y a pas un rythme et une vitesse propre de 1'événement du monde; et des ventres et des noeuds (Oeuvres II, p. 298,"Clio").
Clearly, Bergson's theories about time had for Péguy the impact of revelations
1, This distinction is outlined in Matière et Mémoire, Chapters 2 and 3*
....
■'î




Cette éternelle nouveauté qu'il y a dans l'enfance,Et qui est le grand secret de ma grâce.Cette renaissante, cette perpétuellement renaissante,Cette éternellement renaissante nouveauté(Oeuvres poétiques, p. 808, "Le mystère des saints innocents").
There is an essential creativity and dynamism at the heart of all life.
In "Le mystère des saints innocents" Péguy's 'God' says that man's liberty 
of thought and action "est un reflet de ma Liberté / qui est le secret même 
et le mystère / et le centre et le coeur et le germe de ma Création" (id.,
p. 719).
Because 'la durée réelle' is the vehicle of change in the world, then 
Péguy's vision of life is necessarily dynamic, hopeful and expectant.
He is always waiting for some unexpected word or idea to make itself known.
New ideas and new images are constantly emerging from the main body of the 
text in Péguy's writings. No one idea is hermetic, no one thought excludes 
another; in fact, in Péguy one idea gives rise to or provokes another: "une
or disclosures abuut the nature of reality and had a far more profound ieffect than a theory with which one agrees or disagrees.
The use of rhythm and metre in Peguy's writing becomes in effect <
an imitation of the process of life itself. Rhythm instils life and «?vigour and transforms a series of 'still photographs' into a drama where v
movement and change have an essential place. Jean Onimus brings out this |
aspect of Péguy's writing very well:
Péguy s'attache avant tout à ralentir la lecture, tantêt Ipar l'usage du verset, les blancs, les jeux de scène, les ;phrases en suspens, tantôt par le volume verbal ou la simplerépétition. C'est un art qui vise à la contemplation:favoriser par la stagnation relative de la pensée et le .4bruitage des mots une imprégnation de la conscience, une 1pénétration intime de l'émotion (introduction aux trois mystères, p. 31).
Péguy's concentration on 'la durée' leads him often to employ images 
of growth and creation - the 'jaillissement' of real life:
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idée toute faite ... est totalement étrangère à la germination, à la 4
j;fécondité, à la conception*' (Oeuvres II, p. 1320). Péguy's creativity |
somehow tries to reflect the self-renewing novelty of creation itself. |
Jean Onimus relates this aspect of Péguy's style directly to Bergson's %
philosophy:
En face du lourd et désespérant déterminisme hérité de Comte, aggravé par Taine, Bergson proposait à l'homme l'exaltante intuition de la vie qui est profusion, spontanéité pure, hasard et liberté. Le monde redevenait respirable. Aux grossièretés du mécanisme se substituaient les délicates poétiques intuitions de la qualité (introduction aux trois Mystères, p. 66).
Bernard Guyon recognizes the creative energy displayed by Péguy's t?
scattering of a profusion of images: "nous somme éblouis par 1'abondance,
l'originalité, la perpétuelle nouveauté des images" (L'Art de Péguy, p. 57)*
This reflects the energy in creation at large, as Péguy describes it at |
the beginning of "La présentation de la Beauce":
Etoile de la mer, voici la lourde nappe Et la profonde houle et l'océan de blés Et la mouvante écume et nos greniers comblés.Voici votre regard sur cette immense chape ... |(Oeuvres poétiques, p. 896).
The energy and teeming abundance of life conjured up by Péguy's use of 
imagery also recalls the multifarious and creative energy of 'l'élan 
vital' in Bergson's L'Evolution Créatrice and Péguy himself states: "Je
vois partout dans Bergson le souci de la considération du réel pur" (Oeuvres 
II, p. 1324), 1
Péguy's vision of creation precludes any artificial unification of life 
according to a system or set of principles. Life is essentially multifarious:.]
Je n'éprouve aucun besoin d'unifier le monde. Plus je vais, iplus je découvre que les hommes libres et que les événements 4libres sont variés (l, Casse-Cou, p. 321).
Péguy returns to this idea in a slightly altered form in Note sur M. Bergson, t
where he speaks of different 'royaumes' in life (II, p. I314). For Péguy j
..2
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t h e r e  a r e  a s  m a n y  ' r o y a u m e s *  -  r e a l m s  o f  l i f e  -  a s  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  
' q u a l i t i e s '  o r  n u a n c e s  o f  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  l i f e .  L i f e  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  h e t e r o ­
g e n e o u s .  O n e  a r e a  c a n n o t  b e  r e d u c e d  t o  a n o t h e r ,  n o r  c a n  o n e  t h i n g  b e  7r
e x p l a i n e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  s o m e t h i n g  e l s e .  T h e  c r a s s n e s s  o f  m o d e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  J
a c c o r d i n g  t o  P é g u y ,  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h i s ,  t h a t  e v e r y t h i n g  i s  r e d u c e d  t o  t h e
t e r m s  o f  f i n a n c e  o r  e c o n o m i c s :
P o u r  l a  p r e m i è r e  f o i s  d a n s  l ' h i s t o i r e  d u  m o n d e  t o u t e s  l e s  p u i s s a n c e s  s p i r i t u e l l e s  e n s e m b l e  . . .  o n t  é t é  r e f o u l é e s  p a r  u n e  s e u l e  p u i s s a n c e  m a t é r i e l l e  q u i  e s t  l a  p u i s s a n c e  d e  l ' a r g e n t  ( O e u v r e s  I I . p .  1 5 3 0 ," N o t e  c o n j o i n t e " ) .
I n  t h e  r e a l m  o f  p o e t r y  t h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  a  p r o f u s i o n ,  e v e n  a  c o n f u s i o n ,  
o f  i m a g e s  b e s t  e x p r e s s e s  l i f e ,  w h i c h  c a n  n e v e r  b e  f u l l y  ' e x p l a i n e d '  o r  
' d e s c r i b e d ' .  I t  i s  t o o  d i v e r s e ,  t o o  p r o f o u n d  a n d  t o o  c o m p l e x  t o  b e  u n d e r ­
s t o o d  p r o p e r l y  b y  a  f i n i t e  i n t e l l e c t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w o r d s  c a n n o t  b e  c o m ­
m e n s u r a t e  w i t h  t h e  r e a l i t y  t h e y  d e s c r i b e .  I t  w i l l  a l w a y s  p r e s e n t  n e w  a s p e c t s  
w h i c h  i n  t u r n  r e q u i r e  d e s c r i p t i o n .  A s  C h a b a n o n  s a y s  o f  P é g u y :  |
I I  l u i  e n  f a u t  d e s  f o u l e s ,  d e s  s u c c e s s i o n s  i n f i n i e s ,  d e s  s é r i e s  i n t e r m i n a b l e s ;  c a r  l ' o b j e t  d e  l a  p o é s i e ,  4l e  r é e l  c o m p l e x e  e t  s u b t i l  e s t  u n  o b j e t  i m m e n s e ,  i n e x h a u s t i b l e  ( L a  P o é t i q u e  d e  P é g u y . p p .  1 7 - 1 8 ) .
T h i s  a l s o  g o e s  s o m e  w a y  t o  i n d i c a t i n g  w h y  P é g u y  n e v e r  c o r r e c t s  o r
e r a s e s  a n y  o f  h i s  o w n  w r i t i n g s ,  a s  h i s  s o n  r e m a r k e d :
J a m a i s  i l  n e  s e  c o r r i g e a i t .  I l  n ' y  a  p a s  p l u s  d e  d i x  m o t s  r a t u r é s  d a n s  l a  p l u p a r t  d e  s e s  o u v r a g e s .  P a r  c o n t r e  i l  l u i  a r r i v a i t  d e  c o m p l é t e r  s e s  t e x t e s ,  s o i t  e n  r e l i s a n t  s o n  m a n u s c r i t ,  s o i t  l o r s  d e  l a  c o r r e c t i o n  d e s  é p r e u v e s  ( L ' A n t h o l o g i e  d e s  é c r i v a i n s  m o r t s  à  l a  ^ e r r e  1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 8 .M .  P é g u y ,  î i a ï f è r e ,  A m i e n s ,  1 9 2 5 ,  p *  5 2 5 ) •
P é g u y ' s  f i r s t  i m p r e s s i o n s  a r e  c o n s t a n t l y  d e e p e n e d  a n d  m a d e  m o r e  s p e c i f i c  b y  
l a t e r  i n s e r t i o n s  a n d  a d d i t i o n s  b u t  t h e y  r e m a i n  v a l i d  i n  t h e i r  o w n  r i g h t  
s i m p l y  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  f i r s t  i m p r e s s i o n s ,  c l o s e s t  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  i n s p i r a t i o n .  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  P é g u y  i s  a l s o  s c r u p u l o u s  a n d  m e t i c u l o u s  i n  h i s  c h o i c e
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of words, in the determination of detail and in the subtle expression 
of nuance. To attain some degree of order and discipline in the writing 
he makes repeated use of certain key words and phrases. R.J, Nelson, in 
Péguy, poète du sacré, detects "une vingtaine de symboles importants".
These include "la terre, l'eau, la pierre, les plantes, le jour et la 
nuit, les saisons, les routes, les tissus et les vêtements" (pp. 13-14}»
From this list it is conspicuous that all the images are taken from the 
natural world, from a life lived in the open air and at liberty. But what 
is not so frequently realized is that Péguy also used a good many abstract 
words as symbols too. These include 'la rigidité et la souplesse'
(e.g. Oeuvres poétique^, pp. I76, 384, 1235), 'le droit et le courbe'
(pp. 420, 650, 1360), 'le plat et l'ondulé' (pp. 538, 648, 65O), 'l'ordre 
et le désordre (p. 317), ’le carré et le rond' (pp. 420, 421, 1199) and 'la 
contrainte et la liberté' (pp. 205, 217, 554-555)» One abstract expression 
could be replaced by another, 'La rigidité et la souplesse' could be thought 
V to represent 'life' as opposed to 'mechanism', or it could represent the life 
of 'précarité' as opposed to the life of habit; or it could stand for grace 
as opposed to sin. Similarly, 'le droit et le courbe’ could 'mean' moral 
virtue and moral decline, or alternatively discipline and indiscipline, or 
again, true growth and sickly growth. But there really are no equivalents 
in words alone: the image relates to something true about life; it only
relates in a secondary'- way to other ideas and words.
Returning to 'la durée', in Péguy's writing it is true to say that his 
verses are mostly constructed according to a set rhythm, although this is
prarely consistently regular , Péguy loathes hierarchical immobility, 
artificial or static arrangements. Péguy's idea of real order is very
1. But note the alexandrines of Eve and the various regular quatrains in Péguy's poetry.
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much that of a process like growth - hence his taste for the word 'organique*.
Such a process may seem to be chaotic but all the while follows a pattern
and rhythm which is inexorable:
Toute la fécondité et toute la discipline; tout lejaillissement et tout l'ordre, tout le jaillissementdans le germe et tout l’ordre dans l'épi, elle estégalement opposée aux fécondités de désordre et auxstérilités d'ordre (Writing on Eve. 4.1*14, Lettres et Entretiens. Cahiers XVIII-I, p. 174)*
To reproduce reality, to describe accurately what is truly seen or known,
is for Péguy a moral discipline which requires "exactitude, ponctualité,
géométrie, probité, honnêteté, dureté, nudité, pauvreté dans l'initial"
(id., pp. 177-178). VJhat Péguy hates are mannerigns, affectation, falsity
and frivolity. All these become symbols of detachment from life, which is
a serious erring from the truth. His descriptions, if verbose, are invariably!
sincere. His ideal*-is to "refaire un public ami de la vérité sincère, de
la beauté ..." (Oeuvres I. p. 467). He is consequently an admirer of
* classical precision rather than romantic effusiveness. The classical
writer can be closer to reality - he is objective - whereas the romantic
writer indulges his own taste for excess in the realm of feelings and ideas.
For Péguy, classicism has a certain moral discipline which is to strip all
embellishment from the truth. This may sometimes - and particularly in
Péguy's case - demand elaboration in order to come to a closer and closer
approximation to the truth,but sometimes it suffices to use a single word.
Péguy's wordiness is therefore an attempt at exactitude and precision rather
than its opposite:
Vingt ans de prose ont enseigné à Péguy cette sorte deprobité dure qu'il a transportée dans ses vers ... D'oùle mot est constamment juste, d'une justesse technique, non point que l'auteur ait fait des vers de prosateur,mais il a fait de vers de poète avec une sorte de marbre
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de prose (Lettres et Entretiens. Cahiers XVIII-I, p. 195)^»
Péguy does not intend to dispel and diffuse the pungen'; and concentrated
sense of life, hut rather to intensify it with more and more additions
and qualifications.
This desire to convey all the aspects and nuances of a subject owes
something to Bergson’s comments on words in L’Essait
Nous nous exprimons nécessairement par des mots, et nous pensons le plus souvent dans l’espace. En d'autres termes, le langage exige que nous établissons entre nos idées les mêmes distinctions nettes et précises, la même discontinuité qu’entre les objets matériels (p, 3)»
Therefore, Péguy uses tvfo seemingly contradictory stylistic methods. 
First, he uses a great many words in order to create a broad general impres­
sion without the limitations of one or two Y/ords. In this case, the words 
tend to merge and lose their separate identity. The words are like the notes 
• of a musical score.^ They are separated physically but are united at a 
deeper level,forming an indivisible whole.
But, using the opposite technique, Péguy might employ one word which
nevertheless becomes stretched and expanded to cover a multitude of meanings.
2A single word can then have many and varied connotations . Such words are 
'la mer', 'l'argent' and 'politique' and 'mystique', used in many places 
and different contexts. This technique can again be compared to a musical 
score. This time the rhythm is not complex; it is incantatory and repeti­
tive, The one repeated word is like the recurring theme of the work.
Bergson conceived linguistic expression in terms of a musical movement 
as well;
1, Péguy wrote this and'persuaded Lotte to give his name to it.
2. See Micheline Tison-Braun's "L'évolution de quelques images-mères chez Péguy" (Revue littéraire de la France. January-February 1974, pp. 56-68). She considers childhood images like school, home, work and others like 'la huit' and 'l'argent'.
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Force est donc bien d’admettre qu'il y a une synthèse pour ainsi dire qualitative, une organisation graduelle de nos sensations successives les unes avec les autres, une unité analogue à celle d'une phrase mélodique (L'Essai, p, 74).
Emmanuel Mounier also noticed Péguy's penchant for musical rhythm and 
for incantation, but commented that it v/as "une disposition d'autant 
plus curieuse que Péguy était sourd à la musique ..." (Op. cit., p. 16, 
n, 2).
Péguy's use of many words to elucidate a single sensation - the "piétine- « 
ment routinier" - could be seen as resembling the imprisonment of the dis­
cursive intellect searching in ever-increasing circles for a flash of 
illumination from outside itself; while the use of a single recurring 
word is the intuition grasped in a memorable lapidary formula. An 
example of this occurs in Eve, where Péguy, laboriously analyzing the 
relations between nature and the supernatural, finally alights upon a 
conclusion which lights up the whole:
Et l'un ne périra que l'autre aussi ne meure.Et l’un ne survivra que l'autre aussi ne vive.Et l'un ne restera que l'autre ne demeure (Oeuvres-poétiques, p. IO42).
The continuai earthing of these two ideas in imagery from nature leads
Péguy to the central theme - that Jesus, the incarnation, the divine
word, was himself physical, a real man, and thus brings together in
himself nature and supernature. Jesus becomes the supreme image:
Et Jésus est le fruit d'un ventre maternel,Fructus ventris tui, le jeune nourisson s'endormit dans la paille et la balle et le son, ses deux genoux pliés sous son ventre charnel
(p. 1043).
Once the central intuition has been envisaged, then all its inspirational 
power is tapped to extract new meanings and connotations from it. In this 
example, Péguy's physical description of the incarnate baby lasts fourteen
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verses before he then uncovers or discovers another inner significance
of the subject:
Le réseau qui tremblait sous la lèvre lactée Battait comme les noeuds d’une souple dentelle*Car la vie éternelle et la sacramentelle n'est point une entreprise aride et contractée(p, 1044).
In the rhythms of Péguy's poetry and prose there may be varying tempo 
but there is always a progression - a progression both of images and of 
ideas - as the inexorable march forward clears a pathway through the 
jungle of words and thoughts to a new breakthrough. There is a progres­
sion from the abstract to the concrete, from the general to the specific, 
from the vague to the pointed and the movement to enlightenment follows 
the pattern of its own rhythm; sometimes marking time, sometimes shifting 
only slightly in emphasis, sometimes breaking through into a new realization.
The rhythms and'*-movement are also evident in Péguy's 'prose' passages, 
such as this one from L'Argent Suite, which again deals with the subject of 
incarnation:
Et jamais l'argent n'a été à ce point le seul maître et le Dieu. Et jamais le riche n'a été aussi couvert contre le pauvre et le pauvre aussi découvert contre le riche ...Et jamais le temporel n'a été aussi couvert contre lespirituel, et jamais le spirituel n'a été aussi découvert contre le temporel (Oeuvres III. p. I265).
This time a sense of movement is summoned both by the refrain ' jamais ...'
and by the use of repeated words and similar phrases. When Péguy comes
to the point of definitive statement, the writing suddenly loses its rhythm 
and the thought suddenly becomes both abstract and yet fixed at the same 
time:
C'est le mystère même- du charnel et du temporel, mon jeune camarade, et de l'insertion du spirituel dans le charnel, et de l'insertion de l'éternel dans le temporel, et pour tout dire c'est le mystère même de l'incarnation (id., p. I269).
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1Péguy's ramblings.in a realistic way imitate and follow the sinuosities |&
of real thought - in short, he 'materializes' in words and phrases the stream | 
of consciousness. And yet, as A. Valensin points out, there is always |
movement towards incarnation - towards clearer definition:
... il y a la parole intérieure, celle de la pensée qui se cherche elle-^même en même temps que son expression, et cette parole-là tâtonne avec des mots; elle a des reprises, des hésitations. Elle ne va pas au bout des phrases, elle se comprend à demi-mot, ne s'inquiète pas de choisir, mais accueille toutes les expressions qui lui viennent, quitte à les faire suivre d'autres expres­sions qui corrigent ou annulent les premières (Regards II,Aubier-Montaigne, 1955» PP* I68-I69).
Péguy's thought is a straining, a reaching-out towards understanding. It 
is like the physical grasping of an object. For this reason, André Gide's |
concrete image for Peguy's thought - that of pebbles - is an excellent com­
parison:
Le style de Péguy est semblable aux cailloux du désert qui se suivent et se ressemblent, où chacun est pareil à l'autre, mais un tout petit peu différent; d'une %différence qui se reprend, se ressaisit, se répète, semble se répéter, s'accentue, s'affirme, et toujours plus nettement; on avance! ... (Nouveaux Prétextes,Mercure de France, 1951, P* 212).
The conventional, social meanings of words must be effaced to some 
extent, so that words can take on new significance - become more personal, 
more flexible, moulded to the author's intention. Chabanon considers this 
process to be a "métamorphose miraculeuse que nous découvrons à toutes 
les pages de Pégoy. Les termes les plus prosaïques, les plus vulgaires 
sont poétisés par lui" (La Poétique de Péguy, p. 189). One can thinlc 
of the word 'poteau' in Note conjointe ... ,which changes its meaning or 
significance from 'post' to 'landmark' to 'pointer' and finally takes on 
such importance that it renders to the mind the image of the pillar of j
fire leading the Jews across the desert in Exodus and it becomes a magisterial 
symbol of the whole difference between Catholicism,with its signposted way,
— $l6 —
and Protestantism, with its stress on individual conscience.
An image is not an exact clothing for a single idea or representation;
it is the tool for new discoveries, new insights, new creation. The word
becomes the conductor for new powers of evocation and association:
L'inspiration a pour effet de transfigurer le reel.Son rayonnement donne, aux plus pauvres choses, unemerveilleuse grandeur (incarnation, Jean Onimus, p. 87)*
The deepening of awareness and sensitivity before the infinite mystery and 
variety of life are assisted by Peguy's use of language. One should not
stop at the literal meanings of words, nor even at their connotations.
The probing of life cannot cease, for there is no 'neant'; as Bergson 
demonstrated in L'Evolution Créatrice (pp. 728-746). A deeper examination 
of the world of the senses only leads on to a deeper awareness and under­
standing of the immaterial world beyond, which in turn leads to the infinity 
of God's being. It\is in fact through the physical that the spiritual is 
grasped - and this is a primary belief for Peguy. The converse is equally 
, valid: the spiritual, the immaterial, must in this life always imply the
material, the earthly. The idea of incarnation works both ways: Christians
are not working in an abstract place for an abstract ideal. Rather:
Cette boue et ce sable.C'est là leurs pieds d'argile et leur pauvre couronne (Oeuvres Poétiques, p. 1041? "Eve").
Le surnaturel est lui-m'&me charnelEt l'arbre de la grâce est racine profondEt plonge dans le sol et cherche jusqu'au fond ...(Ibid.)
This two-way communion and rapport is Peguy's major obsession, and 
this can also be seen on the level of style in terms of the tension between 
thought and language. An abstract idea is almost always immediately spelt 
out in concrete terms in Peguy's imagery:
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Les armes de Jésus c'est le sang de sa (peuple de Dieu) veine Et le sang de son coeur, les sanglots de sa peine Et l'immense sanglot de toutekrace humaine(Oeuvres poétiques, p. 856, "La tapisserie de sainte Geneviève").
The abstract idea is made even more homespun and down-to-earth further on:
Les armes de Jésus, c'est le bon voisinage Entre les pauvres gens, c'est le pauvre village Et l'Eglise au milieu, c'est le compagnonnage (p. 868).
The very word 'tapisserie' in the titles, of two poems is itself a material
image of the abstradt idea of life, in just the same way as is 'la mer'
(Oeuvres poétiques, p. 494 et al.).
Peguy's concept of incarnation has a good deal in common with Bergson's
writing in L'Evolution Créatrice. Both writers presuppose a radical dualism
in creation: Bergson between 'l'élan vital' (the spiritual principle) and
matter; Péguy between the spiritual and the temporal. The latter term
is taken to mean anything dying or dead, anything fixed, anything routine,
conventionalized or fossilized. Some ideas and theories are habitual
forms of thought with no life in them, no power to convict or to elevate.
Some words are like dead obstacles to c ommuni cat inn, reduced to habitual
meaning, conventional categories with very little impact, Peguy's idea
is to 'spiritualize' language and thought; that is, to infuse it with
life and power. Words and thoughts should then be active principles,
capable of arousing emotion, new insight and of stimulating action.
The similarity between Bergson's ideas and Peguy's is envisaged by
Jean Onimus in Incarnation:
Avec Bergson, Péguy reconnaît dans les pensées abstraites, les formules, les mots, ces déchets qui retombent autour de la fusée de vie, pareils aux habitudes mortes - et finale­ment de la même venue que la matière brute (p. 68).
The word 'matter' is not to be taken in Péguy sim.ply to mean anything
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devoid of life, as in Bergson. However, the materialist philosophy, 
according to Péguy, does end by limiting life and placing man in bondage,
A single-minded concentration on the material side of life produces a 
man who has no memory - who ignores his country’s heritage and fails to 
see the significance of history - a man who is in bondage to his immediate 
past and to the demands of the present - acting from expediency alone - a 
man who reduces the value of life to the value of money. This attitude 
reduces the variety of creation to uniformity, while spiritual and moral 
values are reduced to pragmatic ones pertaining to economic gain and self- 
interest, In short, everything detracting from bhe plenitude and hetero­
geneity of life inevitably leads to 'la politique' and thence to death.
It is not only the materialist philosophy which is condemned by 
Péguy. There is also a 'politique' of the spirit. A concentration 
on the abstract or ''spiritual' at the expense of the material side of 
creation is equally misguided:
... la grande erreur des doctrines spiritualistes a été de croire qu'en isolant la vie spirituelle de tout le reste, en la suspendant dans l'espace aussi haut que possible au-dessus de la terre, elles la mettaient à l'abri de toute atteinte, comme si elles ne l’exposaient pas simplement ainsi à être prise pour un effet.de mirage (Quoted from Péguy s.l.n.d. in Incarnation, Jean Onimus, p. 213),
For this reason Péguy always 'earths' his poetry and prose in the 
concrete and the natural creation: "Au fade idéalisme il fallait s'opposer,
fut-ce brutalement, la familiarité d'une présence charnelle ..." (Onimus, 
Introduction aux trois Mystères, p. 59), Thus Péguy gives the reader 
not simply '1'àme' but 'le jardin de l'âme' (various) and uses, in Le 
Porche de la deuxième vertu, images of 'la terre' which render it even 
more 'earthy' and solid, such as 'la boue', 'la poussière' and 'la cendre’. 
In the same poem, the idea of hope is 'earthed' in images of new growth:
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Gomiiie on voit, comme on sent la sève au mois de mai Poindre sous la dure écorce,Ainsi on sent, ainsi on voit au mois de Pâques Un sang nouveau monter et poindre Sous la dure écorce du coeur,Soûs 1’écorce de la colère, sous 1*écorce du désespoir,Sous la dure écorce du péché ...(Oeuvres poétiques, p, 565)*
Péguy makes it abundantly clear in passages like this that it is the 
material which can give rise to and display aspects of the spiritual,
The whole created world of matter becomes, through Péguy's use of v
language, an image or reflection of supernatural values and attributes.
One of his methods for achieving this realization is to juxtapose abstract
and concrete nouns in startling and seemingly incongruous ways: for instance, |)
"Bien n'est grand comme l'ordre / et rien n'est profond comme le labour" 4
(Oeuvres -poétiques, p. 654)* Mary is 'infiniment céleste' not in spite |
of her carnal nature^ but because of it: "Car, étant charnelle, elle est .
pure, Mais, étant pure, elle est aussi charnelle" (p. 566).
The physical does not take anything away from the divine or the'super­
natural, but adds something to it. In this way the created Universe becomes 
part of God's domain instead of something separate from it. So the angels 
lack something ip. failing to comprehend incarnation:
[les anges] ne savent point ce que c'est que d'avoir un corps, que d'être un corps ••• Ils ne connaissent point cette liaison mystérieuse, cette liaison créée ... de l'ame et du corps 
(p. 577).
In Peguy's writing there is then a dialectical movement between spirit 
and matter, concept and image, abstract and concrete: "Tous les développe­
ments de la phrase poétique consistent à donner des équivalences sensibles 
à des idées" (Chabanon, Op. cit., p. 194)*
This fact has two main consequences. First, the whole of life is 
reunited in Peguy’s writings - but never fused: "La vie est l’union de
.z
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l’âme et du corps" (Oeuvres poétiques, p, 726), Life is not just logic, 
nor is it just empirical data - it is both and more. In Péguy’s writings 
all kinds of languages intersect and jostle one another; Sorbonnard theo­
logy mingles with peasant speech, medieval scholasticism with journalese, 
archaisms7fith neologisms, intellectual formulae with dialect and slang.
Secondly, the movement from spirit to matter or from matter to spirit 
illuminates both and the one gives the other its true meaning. Mere words 
take on the radiance of what they point to;
Leur signification ordinaire, sociale, intellectuelle ou empirique, doit s’effacer devant une nouvelle signification plus vague, plus sentimentale, plus intime. Métamorphose miraculeuse que nous découvrons à toutes les pages de Péguy.Les termes les plus prosaïques, les plus vulgaires sont poétisés par lui (Chabanon, p. 189),
The merely physical is enhanced by the presence of mysterious spiritual 
significance and, conversely, the merely intellectual is given new weight 
and relevance through having a real-life embodiment. The words Péguy 
t uses are intended to be conductors of the full mystery of life and signs 
or pointers to its source. V^ords are transmuted into living realities; 
"Jésus-Christ, mon enfant, ne nous a point donné des conserves de paroles à 
garder, / mais il nous a donné des paroles vivantes / pour nourrir" (Oeuvres 
poétiques, p. 588).
Péguy uses images which are 'voisines de 1'intuition’"“î "Toute vie 
vient de ce tendre, de ce fin bourgeon d.’avril, de cette sève qui pleure 
en mai ..." (Oeuvres poétiques, p. 677, "Bïystère des saints innocents").
Another example gives new insight into the nature of man's relationship
with God: "Celui qui est dans ma main comme le bâton dans la main du voyageur /
1. Tenu used by E. Bréhier in "Images bergsoniennes" (Etudes ber&eonienfes II, P.U.P., 1949, p. 126).
%
- 321 - ' 4
Celui-là m'est agréable, dit Dieu" (p* 685). In the same poem, faith
is compared to 'la lampe du sanctuaire', love to 'cw grand beau feu de
bois' and hope to 'la fleur et le fruit et la feuille et la branche
(p, 746). Grace is "cette éternelle nouveauté qu'il y a dans l'enfance
cette renaissante, cette perpétuellement renaissante, cette éternellement
renaissante nouveauté" (p. 808).
Péguy's attempt to recreate through words a personal, living vision
of the.real world puts into practice Bergson's own views about the function
of artists in society;
Au fur et à mesure qu'ils nous parlent, des nuancesd'émotion et de pensée nous apparaissent qui pouvaientêtre représentées en nous depuis longtemps, mais qui |demeuraient invisibles ... Le poète est ce révé­
lateur (p.m., pp. 1370- 1371) •
Art for Péguy is a transmission of experience and an awakening of 4;
. awareness, an appeal''to observe everything as for the first time, all
things in their original freshness and spontaneity, and through their
«• changes eind metamorphoses. What Bergson said of Corot and Turner, the
artists, is equally true of Péguy, the writer, and it Is this immediate |
awareness of things that Péguy aimed at conveying;
Approfondissons ce que nous éprouvons devant un Turner ou un Corot; nous trouverons que, si nous les acceptons et les admirons, c'est que nous avons déjà perçu quelque chose de ce qu'ils nous montrent. Mais nous avions perçu sans apercevoir. C'était, pour nous, une vision brillante et évanouissante, perdue dans la foule de ces visions également brillantes, également évanouissantes, qui se recouvrent dans notre expérience usuelle (id.,
p. 1371).
This vision applies as much to intellectual insight as to observation in Ithe material world. The overall importance of Bergson's philosophy for |
Péguy consists in this, that his apprehension of the totality of things - •.!
every realm of experience - is marked by immediate observation and not by |
dependence on past ideas or systems. This gives force to Péguy's contention i
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in Note Conjointe ... that great philosophies do not disprove and contradict |
one another (ll, p. I562); they each add something novel to our understanding |
and appreciation of life, reflecting insights peculiar to their time. Thus, ü
a true revolution is not one which rejects all the past; "ce n'est pas la con- i
trariété ,., c'est de la nouveauté, la totale nouveauté de l'instant qui est 4
venue à l'instant qui l'avait imprudemment précédé ,., Du nouveau réel" |
(Par ce demi-clair matin, pp. 14-15)» iï
Thus Péguy's final word on Bergson is this; 4
Le bergsonisme a été dans son principle un effort pour ■’conduire la raison à l'étreinte de la réalité ... sLe bergsonisme n'a jamais été ni un irrationalisme ni |un antirationalisme. Il a été un nouveau rationalisme j(il, Note sur M. Bergson, p. 1341)» . %
And Bergson's final word on Péguy is equally perspicacious: I
Beaucoup m'ont fait 1'honneur d'écrire sur moi - personne 4en dehors des éloges immérités qu'il m'a décernés, ne 4l'a fait comme Péguy, Il avait un don merveilleux poior ifranchir la matérialité des êtres, la dépasser et pénétrer 4jusqu'à leur âme. C'est ainsi qu'il a connu ma pensée essentielle telle que je voudrais l'exprimer 15.4.1938, p. 488).
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CHAPTER TEH 
BERGSON AND DÏÏ BOS; LITERARY CRITICISM
Da Bos attributed to Bergson first and foremost his discovery of
his ovm true self, a true liberation after seventeen years' bondage
under the regime of 'le non-moi'; that is to say, under the prevailing
influence of scientific materialism: "Je suis né à dix-sept ans" (Cahiers
Charles Du Bos I, Corrêa, 1956, p. 22), he exclaimed and went on:
lÆa vraie naissance n'eut lieu qu'en cette fin d'octobre 1899 ou je rencontrai Joseph Baruzi, nouai avec lui la première de mes amitiés véritables et où aussitôt il me fit lire l'Essai sur les données immédiates de la con­science d'Henri Bergson. C'est à mon intimité avec Joseph Baruzi et à la lecture de Bergson qu'à la lettre je dois la naissance de ce qui en moi est moi .,. (id.),
Du Bos spent the remainder of his life delving ever more deeply into himself
as a means,not only ''of unravelling the mystery of the human personality, but
also of understanding life in general.
It was also in 1899 that Du Bos first read Bergson's "Introduction à
la Métaphysique", and the influence of these two works together remained
preeminent for the rest of his life. In his correspondence with Baruzi
at the turn of the century, Du Bos's speculations on the nature of energy
bear out his new interest in philosophy and demonstrate his close affinity -
avant la lettre - with Bergson's world picture in L'Evolution Créatrice of
1907:
II n'y a pas deux substances: il y a les éternellesmodifications d'une même puissance cosmique. Rien n'est en dehors de lui; tout est en lui (Cahiers CDB V,p. 22).
C. Dédéyan relates the story of Du Bos's and Baruzi's attempt to 
produce a philosophical inteÿpreüatjcn of the History of Art in Volume I
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of Le Cosmopolitisme littéraire de Charles Du Bos ,^ This reveals two
facts: first, Du Bos's early interest in philosophy - an interest which
Tfaned when he discovered that Bergson's philosophy was not typical of philo- 
2sophy in general - and, secondly, Du Bos's capacity for generalizations - a 
paradoxical persistence in him of the positivist love for systems and schemas, 
Du Bos and Baruzi intended to synthesize all the arts into a general cate­
gory of manifestations of the scientific principle of individual creative 
energy: "faire prévaloir l'Esprit Individuel sur l'Esprit de la Nature,
opposer le Moi au Monde, assurer par une lutte générale le triomphe du 
Moi" (Cahiers CDB V , p. 29). A. Bertocci's daim that, after reading 
Bergson, Du Bos was delivered from "Nietzschean naturalism and the chains 
of determinism" is not really substantiated by the evidence of the time.
Du Bos only realized the full impact of Bergson's teaching on him over a 
long period of time.'' It is true to say also that, although Du Bos became 
interested in the particular individual at this time, he never lost his 
penchant for generalizing and categorizing - as will be seen. That Du Eos 
found Bergson's thought a continuing source of inspiration and new insights 
is evidenced by the fact that he re-read and returned to the works through­
out his life.
1. Société d'Edition d'Enseignement Supérieur, I965, pp. 18-84.
2 .  S e e  C a h i e r s  C D B  X , p .  4 1 -  " B e r g s o n  m e  d i t  q u e  c ' e s t  p a r m i  l e s  p h i l o s o p h e s  d e  p r o f e s s i o n  . . .  q u e  s e s  i d é e s  p h i l o s o p h i q u e s  r e n ­c o n t r e n t  l e  p l u s  d ' o p p o s i t i o n .  ' C ' e s t  q u e  p o u r  l a  p l u p a r t  d ' e n t r e  e u x ,  l u i  d i s - j e ,  l a  p h i l o s o p h i e  e s t  q u e l q u e  c h o s e  d e  t o u t  à  f a i t  s é p a r é e  d e  l a  v i e ,  u n  j e u ,  l e  j e u  d e s  c o n c e p t s ,  u n  p u z z l e  i n t e l ­l e c t u e l ' " ,  F o r  t w o  a n d  a  h a l f  y e a r s  a f t e r  1 3 9 9  h e  h a d  c o n s i d e r e d  h i s  v o c a t i o n  t o  b e  i n  p h i l o s o p h y  a n d  w r o t e  o n  2 0 t h  O c t o b e r  1 9 5 0  ( j o u r n a l  V I , p .  8 8 ) :  " I I  m e  f a l l u t  d e s  a n n é e s  p o u r  m ' e n  r e n d r e  t o u t  à  f a i t  c o m p t e  q u e  j ' e n t r a i s  e n  B e r g s o n  b i e n  p l u t ô t  q u e  j e  n ' e n t r a i  e n  p h i l o s o p h i e " ,
5. I n  M o d e r n  F r e n c h  C r i t i c i s m  ( e d .  J ,  S i m o n ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C h i c a g o  P r e s s ,  1972) ;  C h a p t e r :  " D u  B o s  a n d  t h e  c r i t i q u e  o f  g e n i u s " .
- 325 -
I n  t h e  J o u r n a l  o f  , 1 7 t h  J u n e  1 9 1 0  ( E x t r a i t s , E d .  d e  l a  P l é i a d e ,  1 9 2 8 ,  
p p *  1 5 - 1 6 )  D u  B o s  r e a l i z e s  d e f i n i t i v e l y  t h a t  B e r g s o n  i s  t h e  o p p o n e n t  o f  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  a b s t r a c t i o n  a n d  t h e  c h a m p i o n  o f  t h e  i n t r o s p e c t i v e  m e t h o d :
p a r f o i s  d a n s  d e s  o e u v r e s  q u i  p a s s e n t  p o u r  g r a n d e s ,  l ' i n t e l l i g e n c e  n ' a  f o n c t i o n n é  q u e  t o u t  a u  d é b u t ,  a u  m o m e n t  d e  l a  c o n c e p t i o n  . . .  u n  c e r t a i n  n o m b r e  d e  c a d r e s  . . •  s e r o n t  r e m p l i s  p a r  l a  v o l o n t é .  D e s  e s p r i t s  q u e  l ' o n  p o u r r a i t  a p p e l e r  d e s  e n c a d r e u r s  : Y .  e t  p r e s q u e  t o u s  l e s  c r i t i q u e sc o n t e m p o r a i n s ;  à  l ' e x c e p t i o n  d e  B e r g s o n ,  l a  p l u p a r t  d e s  p h i l o s o p h e s  c o n t e m p o r a i n s ,  m e  p a r a i s s e n t ,  e u x  a u s s i ,  d a n s  c e  c a s :  i l s  t r a c e n t  a u t o u r  d e  l e u r  s u j e t ,  a v e c  u n  s o i nm i n u t i e u x ,  u n e  l i g n e  c o m p a r a b l e  à  c e l l e s  q u i  s é p a r e n t  l e s  p a y s  s u r  l e s  c a r t e s  d e  g é o g r a p h i e ,  e t  u n e  f o i s  q u ' i l s  o n t  m a r q u é ,  r e p é r é  l e s  d é l i m i t a t i o n s , i l s  s e  g a r d e n t  b i e n  d e  s ' a v e n t u r e r  à  1 ' i n t é r i e u r  ( i t a l i c s  i n  o r i g i n a l )
T h i s  p a s s a g e  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  p r a i s e  o f  B e r g s o n ' s  m e t h o d , w h i c h  i s  d i r e c t
a n d  p e n e t r a t i n g ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  s u p e r f i c i a l  a n d  s p e c i o u s l y  l o g i c a l .  T h e
t e c h n i q u e  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  t h e  i d e a s :
L e  m o u v e m e n t  v é r i t a b l e ,  q u e l  q u ' i l  s o i t ,  n e  s ' o b t i e n t  j a m a i s  q u ' e n  s e  m e t t a n t  s o i - m ê m e  à  1 ' i n t é r i e u r  d u  m o b i l e ;  e t  c ' e s t  p o u r q u o i ,  q u a n d  i l  e s t  v é r i t a b l e , l u i  a u s s i ,  l ' é c r i v a i n  s u i t  l e  p a s  d e  s a  p r o p r e  p e n s é e  a u  l i e u  d e  p r é t e n d r e  à  l a  r é g l e r  d u  d e h o r s  ( i b i d . , p .  17) .
D u  B o s  a c t u a l l y  m e t  B e r g s o n  o n  2 9 t h  N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 0 ,  a s  i s  r e c o r d e d
i n  t h e  J o u r n a l  o f  2 9 . 1 1 . 1 0  ( C a h i e r s  C D B  X ) a n d  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  i m a g e r y
e n s u e d .  T h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o n c e  a g a i n  h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n
t h e  e x t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l  i d e a s  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  d e e p e n i n g
o f  o n e ' s  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o m e t h i n g  s p e c i f i c .  T h e  g r e a t
a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  i m a g e , a c c o r d i n g  t o  B e r g s o n ,  i s  t o :
D u  B o s ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  c o n v e n t i o n a l  p h i l o s o p h y  l a t e r  h a r d e n e d .  H e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  t y p i c a l  p h i l o s o p h e r  t o  b e  l i k e  C o m t e  o r  T a i n e ,  a b s t r a c t  a n d  r i g i d :  " l e  g é n é r a l  e t  l ' h o m m e  e n  g é n é r a l  a v a i t  t a n t  f o u r n i  à  l ' e s p r i t  f r a n ç a i s  q u ' i l s  n ' a v a i e n t  p l u s  r i e n  à  l u i  a p p o r t e r  q u e  r e d i t e s ,  a u t o m a t i s m e  e t  m é c a n i s a t i o n .  I l  f a l l a i t  b r i s e r  c e t t e  s t a t u e  a n i m é e  à  l a  C o n d i l l a c ,  e t  p a r - d e s s o u s  l a  n o t i o n  d u  g é n é r a l  a p p l i q u é e  à  l ' h o m m e ;  p a r t i r  à  l a  c h a s s e  e t  d e  l ' i n d i v i d u e l  p u r ,  e t  d e  l ' i r r a t i o n n e l  e t  d e  1 ' i n c o n s c i e n t . T r a v a i l  q u e  c h e z  n o u s ,  « v c n -  e t  p a r - d e s s u s  t o u t  u n  B e r g s o n ,  p u i s  u n  G i d e  e t  u n  P r o u s t  o n t  a c c o m p l i "  ( J o u r n a l  I I I , p p .  1 1 - 1 2 ) .
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rendre d'une pensée ce qu'elle a de spécifique, au lieu que le mot abstrait traduit plutôt la vie de relations de la pensée, ses rapports avec d'autres pensées, la place qu'elle occupe dans le monde des concepts. Il faut ... multiplier les images afin de rétrécir grâce à leur diversité le cercle qui nous sépare de l'idée elle- même (ibid., p. 40).
The two ideas here which made a profound impression on Du Bos, and which
recur in his later writings,are, first, that the image is the ideal
vehicle to convey reality, and, secondly, that the mind has a natural
and unfortunate tendency to relate one idea to others rather than to
concentrate on the unique or original in anything.
The next step for Du Bos was to move from concentration on particular
phenomena to an even narrower concentration of the self and the inner self.
This became the prism through which all of life's experiences had to pass
in order for them to be analyzed and interpreted with meticulous care:
Toute l'action''de Bergson sur moi s'est exercée par son génie introspectif, psychologique, d'obser­vation intérieure (Journal VI, 21.4.50, p. 52).
Introspection forms the basis of Du Bos's literary method. His
discovery of and meditation upon Bergsonisra led him to his vocation.
In particular, it was Bergson's aptitude for close psychological analysis
that Du Bos admired so much:
La psychologie d'un Bergson est fonction constante de la profondeur de sa spiritualité: et toutes deux(profondeur et spiritualité) lui sont à ce point innées que jamais à ses yeux elles ne prennent rien de mystérieux: c'est en toute sincérité qu'il répugneà l'idée de mystère et répudie toute application qu'on en voudrait faire à sa doctrine ... (Journal I,p. 66, 22.2.22).
However, it must be said that Bergson was always interested in the 
general phenomena of life such as time, sense perception and memory; but 
Do Bos's interest is in 'le plan humain' (Journal VI, p. 56, IO.6.5O), 
taking himself as an absolutely typical example. That is wtiy Du Bos is
- I
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rinspired to make extensive researches and 'sondages' into his own i
feelings, moods, thoughts, intuitions and 'sensations', on the assump­
tion that "tout dire de soi équivaudrait à dire beaucoup, sinon tout, 
des autres" (Anna de Noailles, p. 80), On the other hand. Du Bos is 
also interested in the untypical man - the individualist like Benjamin 
Constant or André Gide, or the genius,like Tolstoy or Shelley. The 
last two live less on the 'plan humain' than on 'le plan spirituel' 
in the sense that their work is an expression of their spirit and the 
aspirations of the soul. Du Bos therefore developed a two-fold interest: 
first, in the human personality and its permutations; secondly, in the 
realm of the 'spiritual', a realm in which he became increasingly interested.
Du Bos's first full-length discussion of Bergson occurs in the Journal 
of 22nd June 1914 (Extraits, pp. 63-65), when Bergson's method of writing 
is compared with thé painting technique of Corot:
Tous deux, pleins à la fois de respect et de précaution, épousent leur matière, loin de la contraindre ou de la tordre en quoi que ce soit ... (p. 63).
Du Bos always excelled in comparing people working in different genres^.
The range and flexibility of his method induces him to concentrate on the
person over and against the particular subject-matter, which, for him,
is incidental. It is as men and not. as artists that Corot and Bergson
can be compared. This point becomes clear in a comment Du Bos made
after embarking upon a re-reading of Bergson's entire works in September
1917:
Je voudrais prendre deux séries de notes bien distinctes: les unes consisteraient dans un 'extrait des vérités capi­tales contenues dans l'ouvrage, les autres monteraient le
1. One of the earliest references to Bergson compares the ideas ofL'Essai with Elizabeth Barrett Browning's ideas in Sonnets from 3the Portuguese (see Cahiers CDB X).
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long des pensées exprimées jusqu'à la personnalité unique qui en est la source ('Extraits. p, 86).
Du Bos's method, hy which he attempted to seize in a simple intuition
the nature of the man behind the v/ritings - a method he owed indirectly
to B e r g s o n  -  w a s  e v e n  t u r n e d  b a c k  o n  B e r g s o n  h i m s e l f :
... il est très rare qu'une vérité m'apparaisse comme distincte de celui qui l'a créée, et se suffisait à elle-même ... le rapport entre la pensée exprimée et le génie qui tient derrière elle devient à mes yeux comme un rapport d'identité; et plus la pensée est puissante, plus elle me rejette et me replonge dans l'esprit qui lui a donné naissance (id.).
This idea can be traced back to Bergson's L'Essai;
C'est donc une psychologie grossière, dupe du langage, que celle qui nous montre l'âme déterminée par une sympathie, une aversion ou une haine, comme par autant de forces qui pèsent sur elle. Ces sentiments, pourvu qu'ils aient atteint une profondeur suffisante, repré­sentent chacun l'àme entière, en ce sens que tout le contenu de l'ame se reflète en chacun d'eux (L'Essai, 
p. 109).
T h i s  interest in the writer would also explain why Du Bos recorded
in great detail his impressions on meeting Bergson face to face (22nd
February I9I8) in the rue Vital:
11 est, non pas du tout inhumain, mais pour ainsi dire ■ahumain: petit magicien secret, furtif, qui dévidedevant vous comme afin de pouvoir se retirer bien vite ..• impossibilité de rencontrer son regard; ce regard entièrement tourné en dedans vous demeure pour ainsi dire parallèle (Journal I, p. 62).
Du Bos was struck with the fact that Bergson appeared incapable of true 
dialogue: ."Bergson pense tout haut devant vous, approuve votre répartie, 
puis reprend le fil de sa pensée sans qu'ilyait jamais à proprement parler 
échange" (id.).
The emotional effect of Bergson's writings on Du Bos is also worth 
noting in detail. After examining L'Essai on 14th February 1922 he said
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that "les dernières pages [of 2nd chapter] sur les deux mol m'avaient
versé un bonheur, presqu'une allégresse particulière" (Journal I,' p. 54)*
Again on this matter. Du Bos's reaction confirms Bergson's comments on
the subject, for life always warns us;
par un signe précis que notre destination est atteinte.Ce signe est la joie ... la joie annonce toujours quela vie a réussi, qu'elle a gagné du terrain, qu'elle aremporté une victoire ... (L'Energie Spirituelle, p. 852).
Du Bos is Bergsonian in temperament as well as in ideology.
In 1922 Du Bos intended to prepare some lectures on Bergson, scheduled 
for 22nd February at the home of a Mme. Chandler, He also mentions
"l'étude que j'ai l'intention de lui consacrer" (Journal I, p. 56)
intended for the Approximations volume. But the intention of finishing 
a work on Bergson was never actually realized. On 27th July 1922 Du Bos 
was still hoping to submit an article to Le Grix or J. Rivière - "ceci 
très important" (Journal I, p. 5l)* Later still, this study on Bergson 
was to be called "Bergson et le style de la Vie Spirituelle" (Journal II, 
p. 261) and two days later Du Bos wrote to Bergson with the renewed intention 
of preparing a course on him. By June 1925 a course was planned on Bergson, 
Shelley, George, Hofmannsthal and Rosetti (p. $81), but somehow Bergson 
came to be overlooked in favour of other writers. By 13th April Du Bos 
was intending to write an 'hommage' to Bergson for the publishers 'Morhanges' 
(p. 344)* This was never realized either, even though by 1930 Du Bos saw 
the situation as urgent. His considerations were then prompted by a sense 
of gratitude and debt, by the fact that Bergson had expressed an interest 
in Extraits (published 1929) and also by the fact that Bergson's health 
was rapidly faltering.
T h e  e v e n t  o f  c r u c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h i s  m a t t e r  w a s  D u  B o s ' s  
c o n v e r s i o n  o f  J u l y  1 9 2 7  t o  C a t h o l i c i s m ,  w h i c h  m a d e  h i s  a t t i t u d e  t o  B e r g s o n i s m
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equivocal. From October I927 Du Bos had become increasingly friendly
with Jacques Maritain, Bergson's chief opponent in the Catholic church.
The tension between Bergsonism and Catholicism in Du Bos's ovm mind was
intensified after the new edition of La Philosophe bergsonienne, which Du
Bos received from the author on 11th May 1929* Du Bos was at this time
qalso preoccupied with Thomas Aquinas . At first he saw no real opposition 
between Bergsonism and neo-Thomism. Neo-Thomism was conceived as comple­
mentary to Bergson's work:
Ce que j'ai fait 30 ans pour Bergson, je sois bien commencer à le faire pour S. Thomas d'Aquin. Il ne s'agit en rien de renier Bergson: moi-même, ne luiécrivais-je pas le 12 mars en lui transcrivant mon fragment de Journal de 1927 qu'il m'avait conduit jusqu'au seuil ... mais ce seuil, c'est sans lui que j'eus à le franchir, et maintenant qu'il est franchi ne puis-je penser que S. Augustin à son tour me confie aux soins de S, Thomas d'Aquin qui le vénérait '...?(journal V. p. ^ Il6, 11.3,29).
Bu Bos thou^t that Bergson and St. Thomas were working in different areas 
of life and thought and their findings were therefore not incompatible.
However, Du Bos did eventually take Maritain to task for his rejection 
of the psychological method in his apistemology: "J'avoue ne pas voir à 
ce jour la part dévolue par la pensée de Jacques à l'observation intérieure ...*î 
(p. 122, 14.5-29). Du Bos went on to insist that "cette observation inté­
rieure est un instrument qui nous conduit, ou tout au moins nous oriente 
sans cesse dans la direction de la vérité" (pp. 122-125). So, as far as
possible Du Bos remained loyal to Bergson, but, on the other hand, retained
2a fraternal affection for Maritain's thought , except on this matter where 
the two conflicted. The fact that Du Bos did contradict Bergson on one or
1, See Journal V of 13.3*29.
2. See Journal IV, p. 4O.
'If
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two points of doctrine can be detected in such a comment as this:
Le tort fondamental de Bergson ... c'est d'avoir débarqué explicitement la notion de l'être, de %l'avoir débarqué implicitement ou du moins de ne s'être jamais exprimé clairement à son sujet ...
(p. 129, 14.5.29).
Bu Bos acknowledged a debt to Maritain on this point and added: "Je
lui sais plus grand gré encore de me marquer à moi-même le point précis 
où je quitte Bergson pour me joindre à lui" (id.).
Bu Bos in fact tried to make a distinction between 'la spiritualité 
naturelle' and 'la spiritualité chrétienne', attributing to Bergson exper­
tise in the former realm, while Maritain was the authority in the latter:
Sans doute l'abbé X. ... a mille fois raison de dire qu'au psychologique doit être superposé un théologique qui absolument le transcende; mais l'observation inté­rieure est à la fois une faculté et un fait ... (pp. 122-
125, 14.5.29).
Du Bos asked Maritain if the church had a doctrine of 'la spiritualité 
naturelle' and found that there was such a notion,but that 'la spiritualité 
naturelle' was insufficient of itself to know God. Ihi Bos accordingly 
assigned a humbler role to Bergson's discoveries:
J
tCe que la spiritualité naturelle commande et oriente, 1c'est la démarche vitale: au lieu de l'oeuvre del'artiste, c'est l'acte vital que fait naître chez moi l'intervention du spirituel (p. I67, 29.7*29).
Du Bos also placed all non-Christian spirituality in tnis category of 'la
spiritualité naturelle'; that of Chekhov, Nietzsche and the early Shelley.
The ideal master for Du Bos was, however, not Maritain with his technical
methods but St. Augustine, the lover of introspection. He had studied him as
early as I912-I913 (see Extraits) and said in 1950:
Depuis 50 ans tous les mouvements de ma pensée, sesbesoins et ses conclusions, ses intuitions et ses prises de conscience, ont été spontanément, et sans que je m'en doutasse le moins du monde, des mouvements aagustiniens (Journal VI, p. 48).
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In Augustine he recognized his own searching, his method - the combination
of emotional and intellectual probing - and his need to experience the
divine in a real way through the senses as an 'onction spirituelle'
(pp. 50-51) and as 'une donnée immédiate' (pp. 176-177)» Du Bos's
remarkable precision in dating his religious experiences demonstrates
clearly that he lived the Christian life as an experience:
Chez moi, la naissance de la charité ... coïncida avec la première accession aux prémises de la contemplation le soir du 7 juin - vigile de la Pentecôte, 1950; la deuxième, toute tributaire du mois d'aout 1952 à Chartres - celle qui se poursuit aujourd'hui - commença pour moi ici-même le soir du samedi I5 septembre, 1954 (Journal IX. p. 83, 18.9.55)»
This is in marked contrast to Du Bos's habitual vagueness about dates
generally. His secretary, Madge (Mime. J. Mouton), was always responsible
herself for the dating and timing of every Journal - Du Bos was incapable
of remembering^.
Thus, in later life, Du Bos's beloved mentor, Bergson, gives way, not, 
as Maritain hoped, to Thomas Aquinas, but to Augustine, the man best fitted 
to extend and elaborate upon Bergson's findings. After reading Bergson's 
views on body and soul in Le Matérialisme contemuorain by Paul Janet, Du Bos
drew a comparison between him and Augustine, making clear his ovm. relation­
ship with both:
J'avais été très frappé ... de la manière donb cette conférence vous conduit au seuil du temple de la survie et de la religion.... Bergson, lui-même si scnmpuleux, si honnete, si désireux dene rien avancer où il ne sente toute sa pensée derrière lui pour étayer et soutenir sa démarche, n'ira pas plus loin mais peut-être son point d'arrêt lui-même marquera-t-il mieux que rien ne l'avait fait auparavant, où commence le domaine de la foi. Il s'agit de saisir le fil qu'il nous a tendu et de ne plus lâcher qu'il ne nous ait conduit à cet observatoire. Une fois là,nous sommes face à face avec le nuage lumineux et c'est là que S, Augustin devient le compagnon; c'est là, Bergson nous
1. Revealed to me by letter.
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ayant généreusement épargné le travail de la route, c'est là que l'effort personnel de dilation s'impose (Cahiers CDB XVI,
pp. 26-27, 10I9.17).
This work of 'dilat«6ion' - the widening of one's experiences and horizons -
took Du Bos beyond the common experiences of all men and into a realm where
the positive, experimental method could not yield certain results. In short,
Du Bos then went beyond the scope of Bergson's philosophy and into the realm
of faith. But Bergson's.findings in the world of everyday experience always
held firm for Du Bos and were not belied by later beliefs. Bergson is still
"1'homme qui a réfuté toute doctrine tendant à voir dans la pensée une simple
fonction du cerveau. C'est le spiritualisme bergsonien ... qui dès l'origine
m'orienta" (Journal III, p. 154> 29.1.2?).
Now, if Bergson were largely responsible for Du Bos’s spiritual awakening,
it would be wise to define exactly what Du Bos meant by 'le spirituel' and
see how it relates to Bergson's oto interpretation.
In Matière et Mémoire Bergson in fact separated the mind and the body
in terms of their nature - they not only have different functions but are
part of different realities. The dividing point lies between perception
and memoiy - "entre cette perception de la matière et la matière même il
n'y a qu'une différence de degré, et non de nature, la perception pure
étant à la matière dans le rapport de la partie au tout ..." (Matière et
Mémoire. p. 218) - whereas, on the other hand, "la mémoire pure, en nous
ouvrant une perspective sur ce qu'on appelle l'esprit, devra de son côté
départager ces deux doctrines, matérialisme et spiritualisme" (p. 218).
If for the.materialist all is matter, and for the idealist all is spirit
or idea, a synthesis of both is desirable. Materialism can be refuted .
if it is upheld in its own domain but no further:
la vérité est qu'il y aurait un moyen et un seul, de réfuter le matérialisme; ce serait d'établir que la matière est absolument comme elle paraît être. Par là
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on éliminerait de la matière toute virtualité, route puissance cachée, et les phénomènes de l'esprit auraient une réalité indépendante (p, 219).
Clearly, Bergson has placed a great deal in the z-eaJn of the spiritual.
The life of the spirit is first and foremost in the mind and memory of man.
It is this identification of spirit with mind and memory which interested Du
Eos at an early stage. He supported Bergson in radically distinguishing
spirit and matter:
II n'est que trop clair que guérir est hors de question et qu'il s'agit au contraire de me maintenir au maximum de moi-même, fût-ce sur une absence de base physique --(Journal II. p. 508).
Du Bos's attitude indicates that what he considers to be most himself has
little to do with his bodily life. He reaches his true life through
memories, thoughts and feelings more than through the examination of
present perceptions.'' For this reason, the body and mind are not only
distinct in fact, but also to some extent in terms of time. Du Bos
V concentrates heavily on the richness of memories. A true realization
and expression of the self must take into account all of one's past states
and judgements. If present events become too demanding in Du Boa's life,
he feels that he has lost possession of his soul since he has lost an
awareness of his past and therefore of his total self:
Toujours il s'agit de parer au jour le jour à la diffi­culté nouvelle, et, par suite, d'être envahi par la viematérielle au degré de n'avoir pas littéralement le temps(sans même parler de liberté d'esprit) de faire face à rien d'autre (Journal II, p. 92).
Often it is from the unconscious self (where a large part of memory is 
lodged)^ that,unexpectedly and unforeseen,new feelings and sensations emerg< 
"La vérité c'est qu'il y a en moi un jaillissement de forces vitales que
1. See Matière- et Mémoire, p. 285 ff.
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-sans cesse je crois brisées, que quelqu'un en moi veut brisées♦ mais 
qui rééclatent ..." (journal II, p. 92, italics in original). When Du I
Bos speaks in horror of the people who are totally occupied with the Î
material life, he means above all that they have an. obsession with things 
of the moment:
Je suis frappé de plus en plus de voir combien ... sont innombrables les gens qui se baignent complètement, tout en s'en plaignant toujours, dans la vie matérielle (p. 168).
Such people deny their real individuality because they live as if they have
no past experiences of their own to guide their actions,no continuity of
self, no character, no soul.
For this very reason, time for meditation and recollection becomes a
necessity for Du Bos - a treasure to be cherished and guarded: "L'expérience
n'est significative que dans les rares moments où, rendu au repos, il me
. serait loisible d'avbir des sensations" (Journal I. pp. $19-520). Leisure-
time is a necessity not simply for the dilettante pleasure of analyzing one's
own moods and feelings - it is not narcissistic - it is vital to encourage the
creative process itself:
Produire, ce n'est pas penser, c'est avoir pensé, en sorte que l'acte par lequel la pensée se manifeste implique au .moment même où il a lieu la cessation de cette pensée même. qui lui donna naissance (journal I, p. 20).
So the reality of the spiritual life in the memory is of the utmost
importance to Du Bos; but,since so much of the memory and so many indi­
vidual memories lie outside the control of the will in the subconscious 
mind, Du Bos takes time to relax his mind to present activity and attempts 
to allow the past to filter into consciousness^. Du Bos considered that
C.f, Bergson's assertion that intelligence is focussed on present activity rather than on memories, which lead to distraction rather than action (E.G.. p. 6l6 ff,).
  ......
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the subconscious part of memory held many clues to the nature of the self;
Je ne connais plus la détresse qui me prenait si fort naguère, le sentiment des choses précieuses perdues. wJ'éprouve au contraire que si les choses ont l'air en effet d'être perdues, elles continuent à vivre en moi et se retrouvent (Extraits, p. 149» 28.4.22).
M.-A. Gouhier also stresses the connection between Bergson's idea of memory 
and Du Bos's concentration on past experiences: "Pour Du Bos le plus fécond
instrument de la connaissance de soi est la mémoire" (Charles Du Bos, J. Yrin, |
1951, p. 57). However, Mme. Gouhier does not dwell very much on the impor­
tance of the past and so misses the point that the past actually sheds light 
on present perceptions.
The role of memory in present attention is also vital to Du Bos: Bergson I
says this on the matter;
Notre mémoire dirige sur la perception reçue les anciennes images qui y ressemblent et dont nos mouvements ont déjàtracé 1'esquissé. Elle crée ainsi à nouveau la percep- 4tion présente, ou plutôt elle double cette perception enlui renvoyant soit sa propre image, soit quelque image- 4souvenir du meme genre. Si l'image retenue ou remémorée n'arrive pas à couvrir tous les détails de l'image perçue, un appel est lancé aux régions plus profondes et pluséloignées de la mémoire, jusqu'à ce que d'autres détailsconnus viennent se projeter sur ceux qu'on ignore ...(m.m. . p. 247).
Bergson goes so far as to say that "plus puissant est cet effort de concen­
tration, plus profonde et plus complète l'intelligence" ("De l'Intelligence". 
Mélanges, p. 558)* Attention and concentration thus contribute to bringing 
the whole personality to bear on a subject. The richness and depth of under­
standing would then be directly proportionate to the amount of attention 
granted to the perception. As Du Bos puts it,memory acts as "en nous 
1'appanage tout ensemble métaphysique et musical" (Approximations VI, Fayard,
1965» p. 141). Memory confers personal identity and provides a thread for
the jewels of experience: "cette mémoire à laquelle Pater de Marius aboutit
à accorder une place centrale, privilégiée, celle du sanctuaire du temple"
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(Dialogue avec André Gide, Correa, 1929> p. 102).
An emphasis on attention and concentration does not therefore require 
an emptying of the mind of distractions. Rather, it involves calling up 
past memories to assist the understanding. It requires an openness to 
the reaction of the whole self so that it is not just a fixed or shallow 
reaction. This means that Du Bos’s use of memory involves a rejection of 
what Bergson termed ’intelligence’ - that is, the ability to decide quickly 
and decisively on a course of action, the ability to eliminate alternative 
possibilities. Du Bos's method is 'intuitive' in the Bergsonian sense 
because it involves preparation and consideration, attention and concen­
tration, a weighing of all possibilities and eventualities. But, more than
this, it is intuitive because it finally goes to the heart of the matter and
comes to a positive recognition of the truth. Although apparently long 
and devious, it is in fact paradoxically direct;
I am always at the heart of things and situations; je brûle les étapes, je ne m'attarde à nul préliminaire.Ceci peut sembler contradictoire avec mes circonlocu­tions, mes parenthèses, mon mode indirect d'approcher des êtres; mais en réalité ne l'est en rien, car pré­cisément c'est parce que je vais droit au coeur des situations qu'ime fois que j'y suis j'use de ces pré­cautions infinies; elles se produisent dans la zone brûlante bien plutôt qu'elles n'ont pour objet d'y arriver (Journal II, p. 509). (Du Bos did sometimes write in English in the Journal.)
If the first and main aim of Du Bos's method is to attain a vision 
of the truth about his subject through intuition, then the prerequisite 
for this is to subjugate the natural desire of the intelligence to jump 
to conclusions, malce associations and prematurely form relationships.
Georges Poulet (in La Conscience Critique, José Corti, 1971) argues 
that "le poète est celui qui reçoit, disons mieux, qui subit" and concludes 
from this that "entre la pensée de Charles Du Bos et la pensée reçus par 
Charles Du Bos, il n'y a pas véritable réciprocité. L'une est toute active.
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l'autre est toute passive" (p. 77)» This needs clarification* The 
verh 'subir' does not denote a. state of inactivity, but rather suggests 
that the mental and emotional activity involved is not of one's own making 
or creation* Du Bos's real approach is not just passive; it has more to 
do with living the life of the subject; seeing things from the other's 
point of view, thinking at his pace, vibrating in sympathy with his moods 
and sensing the sensations he has received. Spiritual interpretation is 
therefore "un acte total auquel contribuent toutes les ressources de l'in­
telligence, toutes les antennes de la sensibilité, la capacité de dilatation 
de l'âme" (Approximations, p. 582). It is probable that the thought that 
influenced Du Bos in this direction came from Bergson's "Introduction à la 
Métaphysique"; "Seule la coincidence avec la personne même me donnerait 
l'absolu" (p. 1594):
Nous appelons ibi intuition la sympathie par laquelle on se transporte â l'intérieur d'un objet pour coïncider avec ce qu'il a d'unique et par conséquent d’inexprimable (Id.).
Du Bos also often expresses a desire to retain the freshness of an
experience; "cette nausée of words, words ... my manie [sic] of not
wanting not only to say twice the same thing, but almost - deepest of
all follies - I would never, if I could, use twice the same word in my
life ..." (journal I. pp. 109-110), The reverse of spontaneity and
freshness is dullness. Not only is banality of expression dull in
itself; it is also unfaithful to perception;
En matière de paysage, la banalité dans l'expression saute immédiatement aux yeux de celui qui écrit, et aussitôt il est obligé en face d'elle de s'avouer qu'il n'a pas vu ni même vraiment regardé ... (Journal I.p.8).
Of course Bergson wrote of the unpredictability and novelty in creation.
Life is "création continuelle, jaillissement ininterrompu de nouveauté"
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(P.M.4 p. 1259). There are two sides to this constant renewal in creation; 
on the one hand, each experience is absolutely new and preceding experiences 
do not have the same quality - intermediate events hove altered one's out­
look and appreciation. On the other hand, the whole of one's past ex­
periences intermingle with anything new, so that the difference is one of 
nuance ;
La plupart des emotions sont grosses de mille sensations, sentiments ou idées qui les pénètrent; chacune d'elles est donc un état unique en son genre, indéfinisable ...Pourtant l'artiste vise à nous introduire dans cette émotion si riche, si personnelle, si nouvelle, et à nous •faire éprouver ce qu'il ne saurait nous faire comprendre (L'Essai, p. 15).
One's own experiences are never the same as someone else's' but can nonetheless
have pointers or guidelines to the nature of those experiences.
The process of making an original and personal experience communal
. and objective presents obvious pitfalls; it is achieved through language
which usually aims at the understanding and not at the emotions. It is
V with a twinge of regret that Du Dos acknowledges this fact;
Ajoutons que 1'objectivation, la généralisation de 1'événement intérieur est presque inévitable, puisque nous voyons un Nietzsche lui-même, non seulement-n'y pas échapper, mais la vouloir et la clamer. Mais posséder à ce degré cette faculté de 1'événement intérieur, c'est la chose la plus rare qui soit ...(Journal II. pp. 512-515, 25.2.25).
Du Bos's use of language and the development of his style are exercises in
subtlety and nuance. His long, tortuous expressions are a precaution against
oversimplification and overstatement. He sometimes states a bald fact and
then spends a good length of time qualifying or explaining his comment.
For example, he calls Gide "un spirituel qui trahit" (Journal IV, p. 71).,
but the word 'spirituel' here has a significance not easily or readily
grasped and its significance becomes clear only after reading other v/ritings
of Du Bos. Similarly, he calls Tolstoy "le plus splendide animal humain"
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(Approximations IV, p, 771), but again the words 'animal' and 'humain' 
are technical shorthand invented by Du Bos.
The most precise and simple linguistic clothing for an intuition 
is an: image, Mme, Gouhier sees Du Bos's imagery as a form of incarnation: 
"De la pensée au langage comme de l'âme au corps, c'est la même expression 
saoramentale de l'esprit par la matière transubstantiée" (Charles Du Bos, 
p, 164). This Catholic interpretation was the one Du Bos came round to 
eventually, as can be seen in Q,u'est-ce que la littérature? (1945): past
time can be recreated in eternity - "l'heure est morte en fait, et le senti­
ment qui a communiqué à l'heure sa signification peut-être mort lui aussi, 
mais si l'incarnation a eu lieu, si l'émotion a été faite chair dans les 
mots, alors l'heure morte est immortelle" (p, 92),
This religious interpretation is not, however, evident early.in his 
career and his thought on imagery is largely determined by Bergson's obser­
vations, Du Bos discussed Bergson's own style in 1921- (Journal I, p. 59) 
and came to the conclusion that "il s'efforce de combler par l'image le 
maximum possible du vide qui subsiste entre l'expression première et 
l'intuition vers laquelle elle doit s'orienter". In other words, Bergson's 
style evinces a progression from the inaccurate and vague to the precise 
and clear-out, Bergson himself views the material world as'"1'ensemble 
des images" (Matière et Mémoire, p. 173). An image should retain the 
fluidity and fleeting nature of a living presence, while it also has enough 
form and shape to make a clear picture in the mind. An image has a power 
of connotation and suggestion, but at the same time it can be virtually 
seized and understood as something firm and stable. It moves between the
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unformed ’spiritual’ abstraction and the hard-and-fast ’material’ expression .
The same ’va-et-vient’ between the material (concrete) and spiritual 
(abstract) is evident in Du Bos’s use of imagery. His idea of ’sondage’ 
is attributed to Bergson’s insight (see Journal I, pp. 257-250) and corres­
ponds to Bergson’s idea of ’auscultation spirituelle’ (P.M., p. I4O8). This 
is a means to ’sentir palpiter l’âme’ - in short, to realize the movement of
life. "Get empirisme vrai,” .Bergson goes on, ”#st la vraie métaphysique”
(id,). The image, far from oversimplifying thought, actually combines the 
force of many ideas in a vivid picture, as Du Bos makes clear in Du Spirituel 
dans l’ordre littéraire (j. Corti, I967):
Au génie poétique de première grandeur, les idées sont données en images, et il n ’y a pas à les recevoir sous uiie forme différente. Si ttne. de Staël prétend qu’il est rare qu’un sentiment ou une idée soient dans toute leur force quand on peut les exprimer par une image, elle prouve qu’elle ignore tout de la constitution d’un grand poète chez qui c’est précisément quand il sont dans toute leur force, qu’un sentiment et une idée ne peuvent s’exprimer qua nar une image (pp. 85-83, italics in original),
In a second use of imagery Du Bos departs from the conclusions of
Bergson. According to Du Bos, whereas an image refracts an intuition,
the converse is possible; discursive thoughts give rise to images, which
in turn lead to fresh insights:
L’image, c’est la chair même du verbe d'un grand poète: mais dans l’oeuvre d’un prosateur c'est la pensée qui doit tenir la toile: les objets qui y sont représentés,ce sont les multiples aspects de cette pensée elle-même et le role de l’image se borne ici à établir une juste hiérarchie entre les objets par la répartition savante de la lumière (Extraits, p. 80, 22.9.1?).
The prose-writer moves from ideas to imagery rather than from perception
1. Bergson puts it in this way: ”Ce que nous arriverons à ressaisiret à fixer, c’est une certaine image intermédiaire entre la simplicité de l'intuition concrète et la complexibé des abstractions qui la traduisent (P.M., p. 1347).
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to image. For Bergson, an idea is artificial and unlife-like, but for 
Du Bos even ideas might have a living quality and can stimulate a thinker’s 
researches.
Du Bos further maintains that language can limit and determine an 
intuition. The very expression can determine or create a more accurate 
insight:
Ma pensée a trop tendance à s’offrir comme une possibilité, comme une argile docile, à l’expression - en sorte que la direction ultérieure est donnée par l’expression plus que par la pensée même (Extraits, p. 79, 22.9.17)-
Language is even granted an existential value of its own; it can modify
the original intuition and bring into play forces uiiconceived- at the moment
of writing: ’’Suis dans une période où décidément le Journal qui a précédé
m ’apparaît toujours plus vrai que je ne le savais moi-même au moment où je
le dictais" (Journal" II, p. 174).
Nevertheless, the ideal is reached when the words and intended meaning
’■ are in perfect harmony in the writer’s mind - then they articulate the
intentions of the writer and lay bare his whole inner self:
Toute parole du Christ a quelque chose de si direct et de si plein que non seulement rierÇfs’interpose entre le sens et le mot, mais qu’il devient même impossible d’admirer à quel point le mot rend le sens, tant mot et sens ne font qu’un (Extraits, p. 89, 26.2.18),
Normally, however, there is a distinct rift between internal sensations 
and lipguistic expression, or between intention and words. Bergson draws 
attention to this (notably in M.M., pp. 201-205) and Du Bos develops a more 
complex theory around it.
For Du Bos a ’sensation’ is something physical which can nevertheless 
yield spiritual insight, ' The highest form of ’sensation’ is that which 
brings "un accord parfait de toutes les facultés de mon être" (Extraits, 
pp. 98-99). For him, intellectual detachment is a kind of infirmity. It
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is described as "l’état, où la vie est perçue comme un fleuve qui coule
à côté de vous et dans lequel, mystérieusement retenu sur la rive, il
est impossible de se jeter ..." (Journal IV, p. 155, 1.8.28),
’Sensations’ arrive of their own accord, and must not be artificially
stimulated; "La sensation plénière suppose en l’ûtre chez qui elle se
produit cette part de bien heureuse passivité" (Journal I, p. 519). If
this rule is not observed, then ’sensations’ reveal nothing about reality,
but rather display the type of forced emotion engendered by an actor:
II y a des sensations qui ferment au lieu d’ouvrir, mais ce sont les sensations intéressées, celles à la recherche desquelles nous sommes partis, non point celles qui fondent sur nous (Journal III, p. 115).
The stimuli of ’sensations’ are not only emotional or sensuous. 
Intellectual stimuli could give Du Bos an equally strong physical ’sen- 
. sation’. Even so, Du Bos always regards the end product of a ’sensation’ 
as emotional. In conversation with M.-A, Gcuhier, Du Bos confessed: "Je
‘ suis une émotion morale. Le pouvoir d’émotion est, chez moi, pouvoir 
premier. Et plus l’émotion entre en jeu, plus l’émotion meut en même 
temps les forces morales ..." (in Charles Du Bos, p. 47, 12.12.55). So 
there is a strong connection in Du Bos’s mind between the emotional and • 
moral life. In Gu’est-oe que la littérature? (Plon, 1945)* Du Bos quotes 
Bergson: "Création signifie, avant tout, émotion" (p. 15; c.f. Les Deux
Sources, p. IOI3). He proceeds to say that "l’émotion est la soupape de 
sûreté de ces ’affections du coeur’ à la ’sainteté’ desquelles Keats 
croyait, c’est le premier stimulant de l’âme, grâce auquel l’âme prend le 
large pour ses merveilleux voyages et elle est aussi, comme l’a démontré 
la magistrale analyse de Bergson 'génératrice de la pensée’: l’invention
elle-même, bien qu’appartenant à l’ordre intellectuel, tire sa substance 
de la sensibilité" (p. 14).
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It is typical of Du Bos that the theory is 'earthed* by a concrete *
example. Throughout his life he considered, the state of 'exaltation*
to be especially valuable in conveying meaning and reality to all things,
since it is the natural state of the soul at its source and goal:
A 1*origine de toute vie spirituelle - disons même de toute vie dès qu'elle s'élève au-dessus du simple réflexe - on trouve une source unique. identique; l'exaltation ^(Approximations I, p. 89).
'Exaltation' is also called 'la réalité seconde' and is: '
superposée à la vie qui lui est parallèle, mais libérée semble-t-il de toutes ses lois et qui surtout parait avoir des dimensions \^ellement autres où la notion de temps mesurable, d'espace circonscrit, a l'air de choir et d'être aperçue dans sa chute à travers je ne sais quelle brusque déchirure ... (Journal I, p. 264).
Du Bos said that in the state of 'exaltation' he had "le sentiment de 
vivre dans une intimité serrée et comme étreinte avec certains des grands 
morts les plus miens" (Journal II, p. I60). In the same condition, Baudelaire, 
* according to Du Bos, "atteint à toucher Dieu par le seul effet de sa sensi­
bilité, pour des motifs abstraits et sans intervention du monde extérieur"
(p. 214). The completely physical feeling of the expression 'toucher Dieu' 
justifies P. Richardson's assertion that, for Du Bos, "physical sensation 
is as valid an access to the soul as any other" (The Aesthetic Approach of 
Charles Du Bos, Ph.D. Thesis, Bristol, 1970, P* 191)* Du Bos shows a 
penchant for 'physical* imagery very often. For instance, he compares 
illness to 'eau tiède' (Journal IV, p. 147) and the state of misery to
1. C.f. Bergson's L'Energie Spirituelle: "Les philosophes qui ontspéculé sur la signification de la vie et sur la destinée de l'homme n'ont pas assez remarqué que la nature a pris la peine de nous renseigner là-dessus elle-même. Elle nous avertit par un signe précis que notre destinacion est atteinte. Ce signe est la joie" (p. 852).
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'dregs' (Journal I, p. 247)*
Bergson believed somevfhat similarly that the impaot of a work - even
its aesthetic value - could be judged by its effect on our emotional and
moral life and by the quality of the emotion aroused in us:
Le mérite d'une oeuvre d'art ne se mesure pas tant à la puissance avec laquelle le sentiment suggéré s'empare de nous qu'à la richesse de ce sentiment lui-même: en d'autres termes, à côté des degrés d'intensité, nous distinguons instinctivement des.degrés de profondeur et d'élévation.En analysant ce dernier concept,on verra que les sentiments et les pensées que l'artiste nous suggère expriment et résument une partie plus ou moins considérable de son histoire. Si l'art qui ne donne que des sensations est un art inférieur, c'est que l'analyse ne démile pas souvent dans une sensation autre chose que cette sensation même.Mais la plupart des émotions sont grosses de mille sensations,sentiments ou idées qui les pénètrent ... (L'Essai, p. 15).
It is in this sense and for this reason that Du Bos too claims:
Je ne suis pas un intellectuel; je suis un émotif, mais dont l'émotion est susceptible d'être à tel point déclenchée par des sujets intellectuels, qu'à ceux qui me connaissent mal, j'apparais intellectuel avant tout ... (Journal III,p. 106, 29.2.26).
The only kind of thinking that is really worthwhile for Du Bos is thinking
based on a solid residue of 'sensations':
If a thought does not deepen my apprehension both of self and of things in general, I do not care any longer for the thought ... that kind of thought is left with one as the solid residue of lived experience ... ).
The genius, according to Du Bos, is the man most in touch with his 
own driving emotion, his heartfelt convictions. The genius is the man
most true to himself and most fully himself. In a discussion with Du Bos,
Bergson defined genius in this way: "le génie consiste peut-être essentielleaen
à prendre et à garder le contact avec un certain courant intérieur", to.which 
Du Bos himself added: "et en tout cas, le génie de Bergson lui-même est
essentiellement cela, et cette définition profonde me paraît expliquer en quoi 
consiste la perfection de ce style et pourquoi il n'a guère de rapport avec
%
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ce que nous entendons habituellement par ce mot" (Journal I, p. $8).
IVhen a genius gives voice to his preoccupations he makes knovm. some­
thing about himself. ]>i Bos describes this as 'objectivité en person­
nalité' (Journal I, p. 6l). An individual style is achieved because, 
not only does the genius express his thoughts, feelings and 'sensations', 
but also the very expression takes on the colour or 'tempo' of that person's 
very self, his character:
Tout style digne de ce nom se pourrait définir comme le sceau qu'impose la personnalité à la pensée ... le plus beau cas serait celui où la pensée émane de l'être tout ■ entier mais où la passion qui la meut est tellement forte qu'elle passe pour ainsi dire dans l'expression d'une autorité sur laquelle celui-là même qui lui donna naissance ne peut rien: vous avez alors ce que l'on a admirablementnommé la géométrie enflammée de Pascal (Journal I, p. 57).
The essence of genius then lies in the creation, or, rather, recreation of
self by self. The genius recreates his personal reactions - emotions and
thoughts - loyally and accurately:
La création du romancier consistant à conduire jusqu'à l'être, à donner l'être successivement à toutes les possibilités qu'il porte en lui-même, à s'incarner en quelque sorte autant de fois qu'il amène des personnages au jour ... (Journal II, p. 375).
Henri Bergson, as has been seen, asserted that a genius is a man
who retains close contact with all that lies most deep-seated within,
but he is also able to bring out into the open things that remain obscure
and unarticulated for most, but which are nevertheless tiue for all:
L'intelligence vraie est ce qui nous fait pénétrer à l'intérieur de ce que nous étudions, en toucher le fond, en aspirer à nous l'esprit et en sentir palpiter l'âme toujours l'intelligence est ce courant de sympathie qui s'établit entre l'homme et la chose, comme entre deux amis qui s'entendent à demi-mot et qui n'ont pas de secrets l'un- pour l'autre (Mélanges, p. 55&).
1. From the 'discours' at Lycée Volt aire,1902, "De l'Intelligence".
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Du Bos distinguishes between three types of genius: the animal, the
human and the spiritual or angelic. They are separated not by superiority 
but by the area of life in which they move and to which they give expres­
sion. Flaubert is an animal genius because he seizes by intuition the 
full sense and feel of the material world and has the power to "pénétrer 
chaque atome, descendre jusqu’au fond de la matière ..." (Approximations. 
p. 187). The animal genius coincides with life, but his expression 
remains largely prior to reflection, moral consideration or any detached 
form of insight.
The human genius, as characterized by Chekhov, has "the gift of 
moral sympathy" (Journal VI. p. 59) and has intuitive powers not so much 
vis-à-vis the material world, but for other people’s feelings and reactions 
to life. This retains something of Bergson's idea of 'coincidence' with 
another personality^^ Chekhov's gift is "toujours se mettre à la place 
de l'autre et essayer non seulement de voir, mais dans la mesure du 
 ^ possible, de penser et de sentir comme lui" (id. ).
The third category of genius is the spiritual "for whom physical 
and social existence were mere shadows' obscuring the path of life"
(p. Richardson, op. cit., p. 68). This overall view summarizes the 
whole of life or of a man's life and sees in a nutshell its essence, 
purpose, meaning and destipy. Shelley is Du Bos's prime example; he 
is called 'le génie ange' who explores the "borderland qui sépare la vie 
de l'au delà" (Journal I, p. 80). In Du spirituel dans l'ordre littéraire 
Du Bos writes about him at length: his writing 'coincides' with the spiritual
inspiration at its source: "le swiftness est son tempo meme - et un tempo
qui semble ici ne pas relever seulement de 1'individualité du génie, mais
1. See P.M., p. 1394.
- - - - -... - ' 9^
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"bien coïncider avec lé tempo de l'inspiration en soi" (p. 30, italics in 
original). The notion of coinciding with inspiration itself must be a 
spiritual concept which presupposes a kind of objective existence for 
the muse. Du Bos goes on to explain that Shelley is like "un miroir 
dont la surface ne reflète que les formes de la pureté et de l'éclat" f
(id.).
The genius, and in particular the 'human' or 'spiritual' genius,
brings to bear moral considerations about life. For Du Bos, true
genius always must be moral in nature because a person living life at a
deep level is constantly confronted by moral dilemmas and is forced to
make moral judgements. This is reminiscent of Bergson's concept of
the 'hero' in Les Deux Sources. For Bergson, the hero is above all a
moral hero of 'la religion dynamique'. Du Bos also connects the inherently
moral nature of genius or heroism with religion:
Dans mon cas la méditation sur le génie est au centre de la conversion elle-même, et ... avec ma nature, renier, abandonner ou simplement se désintéresser d'un des génies sur lesquels j'ai médité de la sorte, n'équivaudrait à rien de moins qu'à renier un des échelons de ma conversion même (Journal VIII, p, 52,12.4.55).
Bergson wrote of the 'santé intellectuelle' of the Cliristian mystic in 
these terms:
Elle se manifeste par le gout de l'action, la faculté de s'adapter et de se réadapter aux circonstances, la fermeté jointe à la souplesse, le discernement prophé­tique du possible et de l'impossible, un esprit de simplicité qui triomphe des complications, enfin un bon sens supérieur (Les Deux Sources, p. II69).
In other words, the Christian mystic is well adapted to life and hence
is aware of the truth about life.
From an analysis of Du Bos's ideas about genius, one can see that
any truth is to be felt and experienced through the whole personality, and
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not simply analyzed intellectually from a detached viewpoint. According
to Bergson, the intellect alone is intrinsically detached from its object
but Du Bos seems to differ from Bergson by insisting that the presence of
the intellect is necessary to make sense of an intuition. One of André
Gide's alleged faults is to "agir sans réflexion", which "peut être
psychologiquement très fécond, à cause du solide résidu d'expérience
qui en découle", but "agir sans réflexion occasionne des désastres non
seulement pour soi-même mais pour les autres" (Journal III, p. 106).
Thus, thought without 'sensations' is very unlikely to grasp the whole
truth; but, equally, a pursuit of experiences for their own sake is
dangerous in the sphere of moral truth. It is the element of thought -
considered reflection - which introduces the element of judgement and
discrimination. Thinking which follows the flux of real life e#*
"serpente comme ces teintes délicates dont certains marbres sont
veinés" (Extraits, p. 69, 12.4.1?).
Bergson in fact bears out the same thesis - not so much in L'Evolution
Créatrice as elsewhere. In a conference given in 1895 called "Le bon sens
et les études classiques" he draws an analogy between possessing 'le bon
sens' and having the intellectual power to think flexibly:
Je vois donc dans le bon sens l'énergie intérieure d'une intelligence qui se reconquiert à tout moment sur elle- même, éliminant les idées faites pour laisser la place aux idées qui se font ... (p. 29),
Du Bos also uses Bergson's analysis of 'intelligence' in the detrimental 
sense. In a discussion of Bepjamin Constant, he calls Constant "un des 
hommes les plus intelligents qui furent jamais" (Grandeur et Misère de 
Benjamin Constant, Corrêa, 194^, p. 180). But Constant's wealaiess is 
that he does not engage the emotions in his reflections: "une intelligence
lumineuse, mais sans rayonnement ni chaleur, c'est l'intelligence même de
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Constant" (p. 174)» While his intellect detaches itself from his inner
life, "au dedans l'être est alors aussi étale, aussi immobile, aussi
inanimé qu'un étang" (id.). Constant's intellect is like that which
Bergson describes in L'Evolution Créatrice  ^- it acts upon a dead, static
world of its own composition like a player in a chess game. This accounts
for Constant's need for passion:
C'est à cause de la mort intérieure que Constant a un tel besoin de la passion, et c'est à cause de cela que lui-même se met en état de passion, qu'il la provoqueavant de la subir (p. I85).
The book by Du Bos on Constant shows above all else how closely he
adheres to Bergson's thought patterns - even with respect to the contro­
versial critique of the concept. However, Du Bos sees further into 
Bergson's mind than most other critics of his time, because he understands 
that the intelligence can also be turned away from its preoccupation with 
matter to the analysis of the inner life - the 'durée' of 'le moi intérieur'. 
If the intellect does retain contact with 'la durée réelle' it then has 
what Du Bos calls "l'épaisseur de l'intelligence même, la multiplicité 
des timbres, des instruments qui entrent simultanément en jeu,même dans 
une formulation en son essence intellectuelle" (journal II. p. lO).
In Du Bos'e estimation che intellect should take its place as one 
aspect of consciousness which in its completeness also comprises moods, 
memories, emotions, thoughts, desires and all 'sensations'. Du Bos may 
have this in mind when he speaks of his 'house of thought' or 'espace 
psychique ' :
Cette sensation de 'l'espace psychique', du 'temple du dedans' que j'ai étudiée dans mon George. m'habite depuis plusieurs semaines à un degré que je n'ai jamais comblé, et selon un
1. See E.C,. p. 609 ff.
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mode qui me prouve après coup combien j’avais raison de tenir ici aux images spatiales : vis-à-vis de moi-mêmeje suis dans la situation de quelqu'un qui rend tour-à- tour visite à divers étages, à divers paliers de son être ...(Journal V , p. 55» IO.6.30).
However, Georges Poulet in building his whole thesis (La Conscience Critique,
Chapter VI) on a theory of the person as a place and on Du Bos's 'spatial'
conception of the mind, overstresses the case and misses the point that a
person is 'le lieu de ses états' - a locus rather than a place. Du Bos's
definition of 'le spirituel' in Du spirituel dans l'ordre littéraire is
also revealing;
Le spirituel est la spiritualité saisie à son surgisse­ment dans l'être, avant qu'elle ne devienne plus tarden lui une manière pour ainsi dire régulière et ininterrompuede penser et de sentir (p. 8),
The 'spirituel' itself does not change, as regards its nature, but it is 
less a state than a mbvement. If a man becomes 'spirituel' he becomes 
the locus where the spiritual can reside, but this does not mean that the
' whole person is a place in any normal sense; "Le spirituel est un élément
insaisissable en lui-même, qui n'est jamais identifié, appréhendé que dans 
ses manifestations" (p. 16),
The idea of the mind as a house with many different areas and levels
may give the impression of a static consciousness, but Du Bos, staying close
to Bergson (and 'la durée réelle') retains the element of movement by pro­
posing that each man has his own 'tempo':
II faudrait partir de la notion que quand on veut vraiment approcher un auteur, ses idées importent peu, ses sentiments même ... moins qu'on ne le pense communé­ment ... Ce qui souverainement importe, c'est le pasle pouls. le battement qui sont les siens ... (Journal II,p. 230)7
The 'pace' of a writer varies according to his approach to life; it is to 
do with the consciousness rather than specific ideas or feelings. The speed
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of a writer's 'tempo' is partly dependent upon the time' he spends reflecting
on a subject. Keats's l.crtuous meditations make his 'tempo' very slow (see
Extraits, p. 152). Shelley goes straight to the heart of the matter and
retains only the essence - his 'tempo' is very rapid. The 'tempo' is
the length of time a 'sensation' takes to reverberate throughout all the
faculties. A, Bertocci suggests in Charles Du Bos and English Literature"
that "real movement requires the writer to be on the inside of motion and
not to regulate the pace of thought from the outside" (p. 48)» Du Bos
himself also clarifies the relationship between thought and time or 'tempo':
"Entre 1 'instantanéité de la compréhension et l'entrée en jeu de la réflexion,
ce qui se place c'est l'expérience même de la vie" (Journal VI, p. $8).
This long reflection on the psyche leads to the conclusion that for
Du Bos, as for Bergson, man contains within himself and his nature the two
aspects of reality -v matter and spirit:
•Nous sommes au point de jonction de la nature et de l'esprit, et c'est à cause du lieu d'union qui si tôt s'était établi entre la vie et la joie, que Wordsworth nous offre, en sa personne et en son oeuvre, un admirable exemple de l'équilibre qui peut régner dans l'être humain entre les deux hémisphères: nature et esprit (Le Spirituel dans l'Ordre littéraire, p. IJl).
The spirit in man can alone comprehend and recompose the material world or 
'nature'. The spiritual is therefore for Du Bos the primary reality and 
not vice versa: man is seen as "le lieu par où le courant spirituel élit
de passer" (Journal V , p. 44)»
Bergson's exposition of 'l'élan vital' as both movement and conscious­
ness obvièusly has something in common with Du Bos's 'spirituel', and the 
more personalized view of 'l'élan' occurs in L'Energie Spirituelle:
Visiblement une force travaille devant nous, qui cherche
1. King's Crown Press, Columbia, New York, 1949»
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à se libérer de ses entraves et aussi à se dépasser elle- même, à donner d'abord tout oe qu'elle a et ensuite plus qu'elle n'a: comment définir autrement l'esprit (p. 831).
However, it is not until Les Deux Sources (1952) that Bergson specifically
analyzes man's spiritual life in detail.
Like Bergson, Du Bos sees the spiritial as the source (rather than
goal) of life:
A mes yeux, la spiritualité se place au départ, à l'origine: ce n'est point vers elle que nous allons, c'est d'elle que nous découlons: courant ou source, nous lui livrons passage(Journal V , p. I48, 22.5.29).
Later he adds the idea that the spiritual is a goal as well as a source, 
and, secondly, that the source and goal of life is personal, transcending 
the world and yet present in it. Creation and evolution become simply 
aspects of the work of God, in whom the totality of 'le spirituel' has its 
being. Even mentals phenomena partake of this spiritual realm: "Où vont
nos idées? Elles vont dans la mémoire de Dieu" (Journal IX. p. 145? 18.7*37) 
. At this later stage. Du Bos develops a virtually physical sense of the 
invisible, which is not just the reality of the inner life, the memory or 
the mind or even 'l'élan de la vie', but the presence of a spiritual world 
distinct from all these things and yet infiltrating them. A short while
after his conversion (on 14th December 1927) Du Bos wrote: "Je me sentais 
comme enveloppé d'une épaisseur invisible" (Extraits. p. 420) and at the 
same time he makes other references to an invisible reality - e.g. "ceux 
qui ont le sens de l'invisible ... c'est dans la solitude ... que leur 
vie s'accélère, s'intensifie" (Journal III. p. 362, 14.12.27). It is 
clear that Du Bos imagined spiritual realities to be present to conscious­
ness and to the feelings and yet to be distinct from them. In fact, he 
goes out of his way to preserve and uphold Bergson's conception of 'la 
mystique profane' nearly two years after his conversion (22nd I5ay I929).
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For Du Bos all spirituality is something available to psychological and
emotional experience. And, if such is the case, then God is to be
reached in the same way as is the self, the mind and the memory - through
introspection:
Quand je dis que je sens Dieu en moi, ce qui équivaut simplement à ceci que dans mes meilleurs moments ces moments s'inscrivent d'eux-mêmes dans la zone religieuse (journal III, p. 92, 12,8.26).
Only a few weeks after this Du Bos squarely faced the problem about his
ovm experience: "... s'agit-il d'un dieu ou d'une simple projection du
moi le plus intime?" (p, 98, 24.9.26).
What can be asserted with conviction is that Du Eos's method probes
profound psychological states and by introspection he moves from the fact
of memory and of the subconscious to a new and deeper awareness. The
more superficial selï* is fragmented into faculties, whereas the deeper
self is single, unique and charged with latent potential.
Du Bos felt the separation between the tvfo levels of the awareness
virtually as a schism within himself:
J'ai la sensation qu'à l'intérieur de moi-même nous sommes toujours au moins deux ... l'être temporel et comme de hasard que l'on se trouve constituer, et la conscience de cet être l'on prend (Journal II, p. 376).
The former is "la fausse continuité de l'être humain, sa continuité 
d'apparence" (Journal II, p. 376, 2.6,25). This is reminiscent of 
Bergson's division between 'le moi superficiel' and 'le moi profond' 
in L'Essai:
Au-dessous du moi aux états bien définis, un moi où succession implique fusion et organisation ..• nos perceptions, sensations, émotions et idées se présentent sous un double aspect: l'un net, précis, mais impersonnel;l'autre confus, infiniment mobile, et inexprimable, parce que le langage ne saurait le saisir sans en fixer la mobilité'ni l'adapter à sa forme banale sans le faire tomber dans le domaine commun (pp. 85-86),
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However, Du Bos posibs a soul transcending the temporal self, whereas
Bergson only admits the possibility of this. In Approximatjnns I (p. 67)
Du Bos refers to 'le moi profond' but in Journal I (p. 267) it becomes 'la
réalité seconde' and elsewhere 'le moi du deus' and even 'deus in nobis'
(pp. 292-302). If 'le moi profond' is a neutral term, 'deus in nobis'
certainly implies that something,other than the self lies embedded within
it. The religious implications of this were not fully faced by Du Bos
for some years and yet they were not lost on him at this time (I92I-I923):
Jean [Baruzi] tenait sur ce point à se retracter - que la substitution du mot âme au mot dieu ne fait que reculer le problème, et pas plus que celui dedieu le mot d'âme ne devrait être employé. Maislà je me sens on much more solid ground - d'abord parce que pour m'interdire je commencerai par attendre qu'on ait réfuté le spiritualisme bergsonien .•. puis parce que ,♦, la valeur esthétique et bien plus encore affective du mot âme est trop immense et trop indispensable à la fois pour qu'on s'en puisse passer (Extraità, p. 300)*
It is the creative power of the 'moi profond' or 'deus in nobis' which
» leads Du Bos to a belief in God, for he becomes convinced that man's creative
gifts and powers derive from and are part of a greater creative energy.
The 'moi profond' is a positive creativity present in the personality.
It is especially in times of illness or relaxation that Du Bos comes to
realize this:
Journée d'une plénitude singulière et où, tout le temps, j'ai eu la sensation de vivre en contact con­stant avec le centre de la sensibilité de mon activité créatrice (Journal II. pp. 25I-252, I7.I.25).
The 'moi profond' gives life to or brings to life the specific ideas, 
sensations and memories which jostle one another into consciousness.
Du Bos mentions a number of occasions on which he experienced the creative 
outpouring of the self; Cor example, on 22nd November I926:
Ma plénitude intérieure atteint depuis quelques jours
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à son comble «.. tant de richesses tout ensemble entrent et sortent en vertu de cette luxueuse dépense perpé­tuellement jaillissante , , (journal III, p. 136),
Du Bos maintains that, if we dwell only in the realm of 'le moi superficiel'
then "nous sommes sortis de ce bain personnel dans lequel obscurément nous
sentons que nous devons demeurer plongés, - et ... nous grelottons sur le
rivage". The writer who creates from such shallow experience "pourra
s'approuver du dehors,il ne pourra pas ne pas se désapprouver du dedans"
(both Extraits, pp. 259-260). Such a writer can use neat turns of phrase and
second-hand formulae but he cannot create for he is out of touch with life
at its source.
However closely connected Bergson's ideas on the creative process are 
to Du Bos's own, all the same Du Bos brings a change in emphasis; pro­
gressing from a simple delving into the unconscious to the recognition 
of a 'deus in nobis leads him from an analysis of the technical nature 
of the creative process to an interest in God as creator and his relation 
to the observing self. Paradoxically, the very process of creativity 
eventually proves to be a stumbling-block in the furtherance of research 
into this new field of enquiry. The conflict between his old introspec­
tive relationship with inner self and the new relationship with God is felt 
acutely by Du Bos:
Chez moi le retour à Dieu a coupé la relation avec mon ame sans m'assurer la relation avec Dieu (Journal III, p. 345),
The active concentration on the soul as an object was replaced by his res­
ponse and reaction to a separate individual within himself placing demands 
upon him. Du Bos no longer faces his ovm inner creative self but his 
creator as such. This new orientation inevitably has repercussions in 
the Joumal :
La vision intérieure est toute transformée. Mais ici
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la seconde naissance ne s'accompagne pas tant d’une joie véritable que d'un accroissement de poids et de prix, et comme de la gestation du monde des valeurs 
(Journal III, p. 345, 15.9.27).
Du Bos's religion is clearly personal and emotional above all else.
He is not satisfied with second-hand religion based on doctrine and reve­
lation,but prefers the lived experience of God's grace: "Je quittai
l'Evangile lui-même pour appartenir tout entier à la marée montante de 
l'émotion" (Journal IV, p. 44, 30.1.28), The desire for fifst-hand ex­
perience i-s more than a rejection of complacent belief; more even than 
a rejection of arid intellectual speculation: personal experience is for
him the sole authority or groimd for conviction and commitment and it alone 
can carry him along "jusqu'au rivage final" (p. 72, 2.4.28),
Du Bos’s use of the term 'émotion' still has Bergsonian undercurrents
long after conversioh: "peut-être j'inscris trop toute ma vie religieuse
sous la catégorie de l'élan ..." (Journal VIII, p. 15, 5.8.31). He makes 
. explicit the paramount importance of 'emotions' in his own preoccupations: 
"La littérature n'est rien d'autre que la gamme entière de toutes les 
émotions humaines dont chacune, grâce à tel ou tel génie, a trouvé son 
impérissable expression" (Approximations VII, p. I419).
As he grew old, Du Bos became more and more subject to this 'émotion', 
and particularly to his 'sensation' of God's presence. He records many 
occasions on which he broke into tears in services. He attributed the 
lack of the sense of God to the Fall of man - "le quasi incurable sentiment 
que nous nous séparons de Lui" (Approximations VI, p. 1118). In the end, 
he confirms that he is "tout émotion" and values everything "par l'émotion", 
once again noting his "joie à rencontrer chez mon maître Bergson ... la 
formule: 'Création signifie avant tout émotion'" (journal IX, p. 110,
3.9.36).
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Having said all this, it should he stressed, however, that one of
Du Bos’s reiterated mi.sgivings about the step of faith was his fear of
sacrificing the intellect to the will, which was to him like a betrayal
of integrity and a rejection of truth. Nevertheless he took solace in
the realization that:
les vrais croyants semblent unanimes à dire que non seulement leur foi ne gêne en rien l’exercice de leur pensée, mais que ce n ’est qu’à partir d’elle qu’ils ont connu la liberté même de la pensée (Journal III, p. 238, 23.4.27).
Even more dangerous than sacrificing the intellect is the sacrifice of 
the world of lived experience to a world of fixed concepts. Du Bos 
insists that "la foi comme solution, comme confort spiritual, comme 
cessation de pensées, me repousse complètement" (p. 46, 20.3.26), The 
fixed position and unjustified self-assurance of the agnostic is as dan­
gerous as that of the ultra-dogmatic Christian. \Vhilst reading Meredith, 
Du Bos wonders if Meredith ever put this question to himself: "si cependant
k ce n ’était que mon ingéniosité qui avait construit ce bel échafaudage?"
(p. 77, 9.6.26).
In the event. Du Bos’s conversion required the assent of the whole
self - his desires, thoughts, inclinations and moral judgements were all
involved: "There is no other solution than to ... closet myself with the
unravelling of all that lies most deeply seated in me," he said five
mànths after his conversion (p. 367, 9.12.27). So the final role of
the intellect is not to undergo experiences nor to replace them but to
interpret them:
Condamner.1’analyse équivaut à condamner 1’instrument même dont l'intelligence ne peut se passer, non point tant pour comprendre (car à mes yeux et en tout cas chez moi c'est l'intuition qui comprend), mais pour expliciter ce qu'elle comprend, pour l'exprimer et pour le rendre tout à fait clair à elle-même (-Journal VIII, p. 90, 13.6.33).
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The Christian world which Du Bos had decided to enter differed from 
an irreligious world in that it was no longer the original idea v/hich had 
pride of place; neither were all experiences deemed to have equal value.
It was a world where moral considerations were of the utmost importance, 
and these took a pre-eminent position in his literary criticism. He was 
not concerned to stand in judgement, but was concerned to seek the truth; 
and the truth, for him, bore a relation to moral questions by its very 
nature. Behind this view is the idea that ideas matter but choice between 
ideas matters vitally: "II faut vivre comme on pense, sinon, tÔt ou tard,
on finit par penser comme on a vécu" (journal V , p. 64, 26.2,29). As 
always. Du Bos's ideas find an echo in Bergson: "Ce que nous faisons,"
writes Bergson, "dépend de ce que nous sommes; nous sommes, dans une cer­
taine mesure, ce que nous faisons, et nous nous créons continuellement nous- 
mêmes. Cette création de soi par soi est d'autant plus complète, d'ailleurs 
qu'on raisonne mieux sur ce qu'on fait" (E.C., p. 500).
The moral sense of life is engendered by a sense of identification - 
the imaginative ability to put oneself into someone else's place - to partake 
of his joys and sufferings. This leads to compassion, and is clearly assisted 
by Bergson's intuitive method. As he himself explains in L'Essai:
Considérons la pitié par exemple.. Elle consiste d'abord à se mettre par la pensée à la place des autres, à souffrir de leur souffrance. Ivlais si elle n'était rien de plus ...elle nous inspirerait l'idée de fuir les misérables plutôt |que de leur porter secours, car la souffrance nous fait }naturellement horreur. Il est possible que ce sentiment |d'horreur se trouve à l'origine de la pitié, mais un élément Inouveau ne tarde pas à y joindre, un besoin d'aider nos )semblables et de soulager leur souffrance (p, 16). îiThe moral action is stimulated not only by the sense of identification, how- I
ever, but also by a distinct choice - a determination of the will. This Jichoice can be avoided, even by a, sensitive person, but for Bergson and Du i!Bos such avoidance is a shedding of responsibility with regard to life itself; |
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tîcro±ng a blind eye to. the truth*
In fact it is only through sympathy that reality is really grasped
fully: "I'art a pour objet d'écarter ce qui nous masque cette réalité
et de nous permettre d'en prendre une vue plus directe et plus sensible ..."
(Journal I, p. 29). The artist, like Du Bos himself, is: "un être moral
et non un être intellectuel, - un être moral qui applique toutes ses forces -
et même les morales - à des objets et des préoccupations intellectuelles"
{Extraits.pu* 114-113, 17.3.20). Because the intellect is normally detached,
it lacks sympathy and normally counsels self-interest. This is one of
^rgson's theses in Les Deux Sources:
Que va donc faire l'intelligence? C’est une faculté que l'individu emploie naturellement à le tirer des difficultés de la vie; elle ne suivra pas la, directiond^ 'une force qui travaille au contraire par l'espèce etqui, si elle prend en considération l'individu, le fait dans l'intérêt de l'espèce. Elle ira tout droit à des solutions égoïstes (Les Deux Sources, p. 1053).
Bergson concludes that true morality stems largely from emotional sympathy
and not from intellectual understanding:
X"obligation qui s'attache $, l'ordre est, dans ce qu'elle a d'original et de fondamental, infra-intellectuelle, f'efficacité de l'appel tient à la puissance de l'émotion qui fut jadis provoquée, qui l'est ou pourrait l'être ...(Xes Deux Sources, p. IO48).
Du Dos, in Le Dialogue avec André Gide, accuses Gide of playing out
fhe moral and emotional life on the level of a capricious intellect - "il
la] été conduit à voir dans la morale une dépendance de l'esthétique"
.(■p. 21), and, to prove the point. Du Bos quotes from Si le grain ne meurt;
•"l''art et la religion en moi dévotieusement s'épousaient, et je goûtais ma
pluB parfaite extase au plus fondu de leur accord", (quoted on p. 44). Gice
"consequently has everything in the moral realm out of perspective: .
Ce qui rend la situation de Gide humainement insoluble ... c'est qu'entre bien et mal il a renversé les termes, considérant le mal comme bien et le bien comme mal, et
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surtout voyant dans le bien la tentation majeure à laquelle par-dessus tout il importe de ne pas céder (Journal IV, p. 147).
Gide wants to keep his options open, remaining 'disponsible',but Du Bos 
sees this merely as a failure to understand the moral world and, worse, 
as a failure to know oneself. The self, as Bergson made clear in L'Essai ,^ 
is true to itself through its very choices and not when it suspends decisions 
in the hope of retaining its freedom. That kind of freedom is empty. There ■ 
is no real development of or deepening of the self with Gide; it is simply 
"une suite d'instantanés" (pp. 259-260).
Thus, moral choice and moral commitment are an integral part of the 
personality - they radiate from the true self and are not a spurious addi­
tion. Sincerity therefore takes on a vital role for Du Bos. A man must 
be true to himself - his feelings, experiences and thoughts. For this very 
quality Du Bos praisbs Charles Péguy: he had "oe besoin de confession
qu'éprouvait si fortement Péguy, et par où il m’apparaît si nouveau et 
si important dans notre littérature ..." (Journal I, p. I84). On the other 
hand, in Byron Du Bos sees all the faults of a play-actor; a man who con­
ceives himself as having to live out a destiny; a man remaining true not ''
2to himself but to some intellectual idea of himself . It is only when 
real emotions are brought into play,rather than forced or self-induced ones, 
that one is able to find oneself and to come face to face with reality.
There are of course pitfalls and difficulties when a particular moral 
outlook is brought to bear in literary criticism and the dangers of Du Bos's 
method highlight this difficulty. Sometimes he can be so overcome emotionally
1. L'Essai, pp. IO9-II4.
2. See Byron et lé besoin de la fatalité, Correa, 1929 (Quoted later from the 1946 edition).
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by the impact of a book that his moral judgement is clouded. He says of
Huskin's Life of Cook: "I have plunged deep and I must, alas, stop read­
ing, otherwise I will be swallowed and drovmed" (Journal I, p. 386). Another i
problem is that Du Bos can hold a moral position based on flimsy evidence ^
and insufficient research because of his reliance on his intuitive method ;
with its emphasis on his emotional reaction. This is the case with regard 
to his assessment of Byron's wife, Annabella, whose alleged moral virtue 
is not grounded in fact at all: ;
With the exception of Astarte, in my characterization of Lady Byron I had to rely entirely upon what may be termed intuitive guess-work (Byron and the need for fatality,p. vii). . -
In his judgement of Byron himself, Du Bos relied on only six books from 
which to write his own work. Another problem is that there is not a great 
step between having a personal sympathy and affection for someone to esteem­
ing their work too highly. This was the case with Anna de Noailles, whom
Du Bos considered to be an artistic genius, but she is not highly rated by 
1most critics .
To return to the question of the intellect and faith, Du Bos took the
trouble to discuss his intellectual difficulties with Maritain, as is evidenced Î
2by later volumes of the Journal . He basically agreed with Augustine, however, 
in regarding faith as the prerequisite and placing it logically prior to î
understanding:
Le christianisme est tout entier dans la relation au
1, See Du Bos's La comtesse de Noailles et le climat du génie (La Table Ronde, 1949)•
2. See, for example,.Journal III, p. 226, Journal IV, pp. I63-I63,According to the Journal Du Bos read Maritain's Antimodeme (22,4.27)? Réflexions sur l'Intelligence (23.4.27)? Grandeur et Misère de le. Méta­physique (22.9.27) and Religion et Culture (August 1934)*
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surnaturel, et ne peut meme pas se passer de 1*adhésion à un ordre transcendant ... d'une part le vrai Christian- ismm n'est pas concevable sans la foi, et de l'autre le christianisme ne saurait se réduire à la morale chrétienne (Journal III, p. G8, 10,8.26).
The psychological or emotional approach to God lays itself open to 
the charge of believing in an immanent rather than transcendant creator, 
but Du Bos's God is not restricted to 'le moi du deus' or even to the 
world as 'l'élan vital': on the contrary, Du Bos in his turn accused
Nietzsche and Proust of the doctrine of immanence. Of Nietzsche he claimed: 
"il déifie quelque élément supra-individuel ou meme supra-humain" (Journal III, 
p. 578) and he calls Proust's technique "l'effort ... pour équivaloir à Dieu 
en dehors de lui par la mystique apperception de l'essence du Temps" (Id.). 
Significantly, he adds: "Tel est pour l'homme le besoin de Dieu s'il
refuse le Mystère de l'incarnation" (Id.). Du Bos attacked the doctrine- 
of immanence on the Rounds that it "aboutit bon gré mal gré à la suppres­
sion d'un Dieu-personne" (Journal IV, p, 78). But, by way of contrast, 
he equally strongly attacked the doctrine of pure transcendence, since its 
proponents:
paraissent toujours impliquer que transcendance exclue immanence - alors qu'en fait ces deux attributs non seulement se complètent, mais ... ne peuvent se passer .l'un de l'autre (id.).
It is through the doctrine of the incarnation of Christ that Du Bos
overcomes the problem: "Le mot de vérité n'a de sens qu'incarné en Dieu
précisément" (id. ). This fits in with Bergson’s love of the individual
truth or the personal experience as opposed to systems of abstractions.
The incarnation is a stumbling-block to schematizers, as Du Bos asserts:
Le Verbe né d'une femme, le Verbe né dans une crèche, pour en venir enfin à la dernière humiliation du Verbe expirant sur une croix: c'est ce qui a révoltéces esprits superbes. Car ils ne voulaient point comprendre que la première vérité qu'il y eût à
  - -  ' ' .
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apprendre à l'homme, que son orgueil avait perdu, était de s'humilier (Extraits, p. 416),
So, in the final analysisj the truth is approached most nearly, for Du
Bos as for Augustine, through love for a person and not through the
intellectual harmonizing and ordering of the Universe:
Autant que [les homme] s'approchaient de Dieu par leur intelligence, autant s'en éloignaient-ils par leur orgueil (Extraits, p. 4I6).
Il faut que chaque exaltation ait pour résultat l'approfondissement en moi d'une conscience proprement religieuse (Extraits, p. 56O),
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C H A P T E R  E L E V E N  
C O N C L U S I O N
The brevity of this Conclusion should not be taken as evidence that 
Bergson's influence on French Catholic thought was sLriotly limited, for 
the opposite is true; his influence was so widespread and far-reaching 
that it is better seen in the.details of each indJ.vidual chapter than in 
the broad lines of a Conclusion. There are, however, certain aspscrs 
of Bergson's philosophy which had an especially noteworthy and marked 
impact•
The first aim of this work was to reassess Bergson’s own. philcsophy
in terras of its natural development and direction, which was towards
a religious outlook on life. In the past, and even now, far too many
critics of Bergson have either ignored completely the religious impli.-
cations of his work or have viewed them as a somewhat fanciful addition
" to the more technical and logical analyses in the areas of psychology
end epistemology. I shall quote from one recent example:
To infer from the existence of life in various forois and at various points of the surface of things, to some absolute creative force or current lying behind it,“ and of which these forms are only fragments or paz'tialexpressions, appears perfectly gratuitous (A.E. Pilkington,Bergson & his influence; a reassessment. C.U.P., 1976,pp. 19-20).
It is true to say that any theory can be considered to be gratuitous 
until the evidence for it is properly examined. Anybody criticising 
a philosophy should be prepared to review the details of its arguments 
even if he does not share the conclusions of the arguments. If Bergson 
cannot substantiate his claims for the 'élan vital' it,-is fair to say 
thab his assertions are 'gratuitous'; • they can be accepted only on 
faith and rejected for lack of proof. However, Bergson's case does not
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rest on his positing the leligious world-view as an addendum or leap 
of faith hut as the result of his observation of the real world,
Pilkington’s lack of sympathy with Bergson’s religious outlook 
results in the conclusion that "if the conceptions contained germinally 
in L’Evolution Créatrice and fully developed in Les Deuz Sources are com­
pared, it must become clear that, fa.r from the latter being a necessary 
completion of the former, it is not even a natural one" (p. 21),
Pilkington then goes on to say that the term ’God’ in L’Evolution Créatrice 
is "nothing but a semantic superfluity" (p. 25) because it is equivalent 
to "life, action and liberty". In actual fact, what Bergson means by 
this is that God is the source of life, action and liberty or that this 
is how his action is seen in the world; this is his kind of activity.
It is very much analagous to St. John's saying that "God is love" (I John 
• 4» V. 8). The terms are not reversible. It means simply that from the 
human point of view God’s activity is like that of a loving father. Dr. 
Pilkington moves rapidly to his conclusion: "If statements about God can
without loss be translated into statements about life or human activity, 
then theological language is dispensable" (p. 23). This argument looks 
suspiciously like a positivist backlash and is made without taking any 
account of the fact that it is in the very data of experience that God’s 
activity must be seen. Moreover, the facts of life can point beyond them­
selves and raise the possibility, even necessity, of a creator who is both 
within and beyond human life. A light in a room should lead one to wonder 
where the source of light is and, even if the light bulb is hidden by a 
shade, its existence can be vouched for with some confidence. Similarly,, 
the remarkable blueprint for a plant’s growth, shape and colour, etc., that 
pre-exist in a seed might lead the careful investigator to s u g g ' ^ ^ s p o s ­
sibility of a full-gro7rn plant sprouting at some future date even though
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the sense-evidence of this is not before his eyes.
In just the same way, eveiy detail of Bergson’s research bears 
upon his religious conclusions, and it is in this sense that a proper 
account should be given of his religious philosophy. As P.O. Copleston 
rightly says: "the convictions which Bergson has already formed cer- .
tainly (and naturally) influence his reflections on the data relevant 
to man’s moral and religious life" (A History of Philosophy: Ivlaine de
Biran to Sartre, Search Press, London, 1975* P* 205), Bergson makes it 
quite clear that there are many aspects of his philosophy which lead him 
to the hypothesis of God. The positing of an 'elan vital’ is only one 
of these. I have attempted to show earlier that the problems relating 
to free will and determinism, to man's mental and physical make-up, to 
the unity and continuity of the personality, to the harmony of nature, to 
■ man’s rationality and others are all ’religious’ questions of the first 
order and contribute to persuading Bergson to accept and later assume a 
" religious view of life as a whole. He does not come to his conclusions 
arbitrarily or make 'gratuitous’ (unfounded) assertions and generalizations; 
his conclusions are supported by the groundwork of his earlier researches 
which proceeded without presuppositions. The religious view of the world 
is not something which Bergson imposed,like a schema or system into which 
every aspect of life must fit; on the contrary, he examined the individual 
components through diverse pieces of evidence and then discerned a pattern 
in the whole.
At the time of its inception, Bergson’s philosophy had a strongly 
destructive element and set out to expose the flaws in the positivist 
systems, in rationalist Greek thought and in the phenomenalism of Kant.. 
According to Bergson, all three of these displayed two similar features' 
they did not grasp the significance of the fact that time is an integral
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part of real life (just as much as life as we know it is inconceivable 
without three-dimensional space), and, secondly, as a result, tuey arti­
ficially attempted to unify life under scientific or abstract principles.
The interesting fact to emerge from this magisterial ’pars destruens’ 
is that Bergson made positive use of certain of the tenets of contemporary 
philosophy. He placed a high premium on the value of experiment and ob­
servation and in any conclusion reached he tried to keep close to the evi­
dence of sense experience. His philosophy was indeed metaptiysical - but 
it was also empirical.
Where Bergson added something to contemporary methods was in the realm 
of the inner life. The mind can turn-outwards, reflecting and reflecting 
upon the external world, but it can also analyze the self and its states.
This is an undisputed truth of experience^. In a real sense one can be 
'self-conscious'. This technique led Bergson to see himan consciousness 
as, on the one hand, mechanical and partaking of the physical world of 
cause and' effect - the consciousness has automatic and reflex reactions - 
but at a deeper level consciousness is free from the laws of cause and effect, 
from the laws of space and matter. The real personality enjoys a unity 
and consistency which is independent of mechanical time passing and exists
often in a potential, latent form occasionally rising to the surface in i
the form of memoiy or decisive choice. The deeper self,’le moi profond’, 1Ihas an identity separate from the acts of the body and the thoughts of the 
conscious mind.
The discovery oi the ’moi profond’ unites the person to the world 
of ’spirit’, the world of spontaneity and freedom from the fixed and
1, Jean-Paul Sartre built his whole philosophical system around this fact.
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Tegular flcy?r of clock time,. The mechanical behaviour of matter Is
■1.
quite different from the life and movement of the deep consciousness. |
The mind unders tan.ds the world of fixed relations and rs.gular,
predictable movement by the faculty Bergson called ' intelligence ', 
but when the mind turns inward and looks at the reality of the real 
self (’I’ame’) it seas there a unity beneath apparent diversity and 
continuity beneath an apparently disjointed and fragmentary personality.
If this type of vision can be Carried outwards into the real world, the 
unity of life outside can be glimpsed and the continuity of life is seen 
in the movement of ’ la duree réelle ’. True relations can be grasped 3
between certain elsmencs in life by this process he called ’intuition’.
It is not the same as constructing an abstract plan from certain component 
parts and relating them to each other by logical or abstract similarities.
The discovery of these two aspects of knowledge gave a new impetus 
tc Catholic epistemology and led to the rediscovery of Aquinas’s distinc­
tion between ’intellectus' (apprehension) and ’ratio’ (the discursive 
analysis of reality). Once the confusion and discrepancy between Bergson’s 
•intelligence’ and Aquinas's ’intellectus’ had been clarified (especially 
by P. Eousselot and J. Maréchal), the v;ay was cleared for e, new approach to 
Christian doctrine and practice and also a ne\i approach to God.
Edouard LeEoy and Lucien Laberthonnière led the way, claiming that 
knowing about God and making statements about God followed the guidance 
of the logical faculty, ’ratio’. However, there existed a second and 
better way of approaching God, which was more direct but unfortunate!;/- 
less susceptible to proof or verification. This was to know the reality 
of God’s existence and activity through daily experience and action,
’To know’ is obviously more direct than 'to know about’ but the former 
is notoriously problematic: what does ’knowing’ involve or mean? This
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has been a central problem for philosophers ever since,
LeEoy attempted to resolve the problem by arguing that the 'proof 
of such knowledge is first and foremost subjective; that is, the Icnower 
alone can test his conclusions, but it is nonetheless real. One puts 
into practice one's theories, one tests out 7/hat one purports to know 
by living it out as though it were true. If the facts of life do not 
contradict or militate against one's experience of 'knowing', one can 
remain confident that one's knowledge is based on firm foundations,
Joseph Maréchal tried a different line of approach. His main 
contention in Essai sur la psychologie des mystiques (1925) was that 
'knowing' in the case of religious truths is closely connected to the 
sensation of presence. Knowing a person has a great deal to do with
reacting to the reality of that person confronting oneself. In a similar 
way, to knovf God is very largely reacting to the reality of his living 
presence within and outside oneself. Such a sensation is clearly ante­
cedent to analysis and any discursive understanding, but forms the raw 
material for this.
A number of Catholic thinkers then implicitly accepted the new approach 
to knowledge by admitting the reality of self-consciousness. In so doing 
they had to allow that knowledge of the self could not possibly be discur­
sive - one did not have to 'prove' or 'analyze' one's ovra. feelings and 
thoughts in order to Icnow what they were. Thus, Maritain and Holand- 
Gosselin among others opened up the realm of the inner self to philo­
sophical enquiry. This renewed a school of philosophical thought dating 
in particular from Maine de Biran (but ultimately from St. Augustine) an.d 
could quite possibly follow in the same direction as he. did - towards the 
discovery of the God who was clc-csx than one is to oneself - the God 7/ho 
lives within. This discovery was also very much the starting-point and
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motivation of Du Bos's method of literary criticism.
The real significance of this ne?/ means to knowledge initiated
by Bergson was in opening up a new path for metaphysical research^.
In a late article on Bergson, Blondel acknowledged this fact:
[Bergson] a tendu à libérer la pensée de l’illusion archaïque qui opposait infini et parfait pour mieux comprendre que la fixité et le repos, loin d’être l'absolu et la perfection, sont exclus de l'étemello vérité et de la supreme bonté auxquelles aspire l'inépuisable exigence de notre inquiétude ("La philo­sophie ouverte" in Henri Bergson; Essais et Témoignages,
Ed. de la Baoonnière, Heuchatel, 1945, P» 77)*
In short, Bergson had placed God back in the flux of real life instead 
of pushing him back to act as the conclusion of a chain of logical reason­
ing or, alternatively, forcing him into a heaven of eternal and fixed veri­
ties beyond the changing and largely ephemeral movements of the real world. 
The false God of Aristotelean Thomism was soon under fierce attack from 
within the ranks of the French Catholic church, and later even Thomists 
themselves took up the cudgels and from their own philosophy drew the 
tools with Y/hich to destroy the imposter.
The new approach to God by means of 'intuition' involved paying 
attention to the particulars of life - real events, unique features and 
special happenings. It marked a movement away from blanket explanations 
and general interpretations. The individual fact, the private experience, 
had to be taken into account, Blondel understood Bergson's method to mean: 
"la saisie profonde et totale d'une vérité unique. L'intuition bergsonienne 
consiste à discerner, à disjoindre des connexions hybrides, des oppositions 
trop facilement insoupçonnées ..." (p. 77)•
1. The new approach can be seen clearly in Defever's La ureuve réelle de Dieu (Desclée de ErouY/er, 1953) and in Maritain's Approches de Dieu (Alsatia, also 1955)►
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Philosophers and critics have been so concerned to explain Bergson's
philosophy in terms of its conclusions and assertions that far too little
attention has been paid to its methodology. It is in this area that its
influence has been most vital and most considerable.
There were also, of course, differences of opinion between Catholic
thinkers and Bergson, but here again the influence of Bergson can be
detected - this time as a catalyst and stimulant. It is no exaggeration |
to say tlmt Maritain spent a great deal of time forming his response to |
Bergsonism and sharpening his own philosophy on the steel of Bergson's J
philosophical thrusts: :
C*est en méditant [sur l'intelligencej qu'un fervent ■ |bergsonien a commence à s'apercevoir des faiblesses idu critique du concept sur laquelle Bergson insistait Jtant, et qu’après tout il démentait lui-meme ... J(Le •paysan de la Garonne « Desclée de Brouwer, I966, |
p. 135). ■ I1Maurice Blondel also reacted to Bergs onism by defining more precisely 14his own positions. He, like Maritain, concluded that Bergson could help I
■1him in certain ways, but in the end a Catholic philosophy had to go further |j1than Bergson was prepared to; I
Le point de vue psychologique ne peut en effet se suffire, pas plus qu'aucune des perspectives scien­tifiques (Qt3« cit., p. 92).
Bergson had a philosophy of nature which amounted to a promising natural 
theology but his analyses had also revealed, according to Blondel, insuf­
ficiencies and a contingence which could only be resolved by an even 
wider view, of life.
The overall impact of Bergson's new theory of knowledge was literally 
immense with regard to French Catholic thought. Maritain had this to say 
about it, looking back over many years of involvement and first-hand 
acquaintance with it:
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J'ai dit que l'intuition intellectuelle de l'atre n'a rien à voir avec l'intuition bergsonienne et que Bergson décrivait comme une sorte d'ineffable sympathie exigeant une torsion de la volonté sur elle-même; et surtout, elle ne portait pas directe­ment sur l'être, mais seulement sur une durée qui n'est qu'un des aspects de l'être. Cela dit, il faut ajouter qu'à travers la durée c'est l'esse que de fait ... il atteignait en réalité et qu'en tout cas, lethomisme lui doit une fière chandelle, car si l'intui­tion de l'être n'a rien à voir avec son intuition, c'est cependant grace à l'impact de son intuition, et de son génie métaphysique sur la pensée moderne .•, que les thomistes contemporains ont enfin reconnu .. l'importance essentielle et absolument primordiale de l'intuition de l'être dans leur propre philosophie (Le paysan de la Garonne, pp. 205-206),
It is worth pointing out that the most important works of Bergson 
in influencing the French Catholics were without a doubt, first, L'Essai 
sur les données immédiates de la conscience (I889), in which Bergson upheld 
the reality of free will and made significant use of the faculty of intuitive 
‘ self-analysis. He also maintained the indivisible and consistent unity of 
the real self and opened the route to a new concept of the soul and indirectly 1 
of the spiritual life. Secondly, twè articles were of utmost importance with i 
regard to the idea of an 'intuitive' means to knowledge: these were |
"Introduction à la Métaphysique" (1903) and "L'Intuitlon philosophique"
(1911), both reprinted in La Pensée et le Mouvant (1954)• Paradoxically, 
the best-known work of Bergson - L'Evolution Créatrice (1907) - was undoubtedly 
the least influential among Catholics and,in fact, irom the time of its pub- ; 
lication, sustained long and bitter attacks and criticism from across the 
whole spectrum of Catholic thought, from Garrigou-Lagrange to Charles i
Péguy. ]
It has been well beyond the scope of this v/ork to examine the long­
term effects of the change in attitude among Catholics-wrought by Bergson 
above all, but one cannot help wondering whether it was in large measure i
owing to Bergson that, whereas in Britain logical positivism was able to •. J
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m a i n t a i n  a l m o s t  u n c h a l l e n g e d  t h a t  m e t a p h y s i c a l  s t a t e m e n t s  w e r e  v i r t u a l l y  
m e a n i n g l e s s ,  i n  F r a n c e  t h x s  t y p e  o f  a p p r o a c h  h a s  m e t  w i t h  m o : ; s  r o b u s t  
o p p o s i t i o n ;  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  F r e n c h  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  t h e  m i d - t w e n t i e t h  
c e n t u r y  h a s  h a d  v e r y  l a r g e l y  d i f f e r e n t  p r e o c c u p a t i o n s  f r o m  i t s  c o u n t e r p a r t  
i n  B r i t a i n ,  a n d ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  C h r i s t i a n  m e t a p h y s i c a l  p h i l o s o p h y  h a s  a l w a y s  
m a n a g e d  t o  r e t a i n  s o m e  g e n e r a l  i n f l u e n c e  i n  F r a n c e  t h r o u g h  t h e  w o r k s  o f  
s u c h  a s  T e i l h a r d  d e  C h a r d i n  a n d  G a b r i e l  M a r c e l .
T h e  w o r k  o f  C h a r l e s  P é g u y ,  w h i l e  n o t  p h i l o s o p h y  i n  t h e  s t r i c t  s e n s e ,  
n o n e t h e l e s s  b e a r s  t e s t i m o n y  t o  t h e  w i d t h  o f  v i s i o n  o f  B e r g s o n ' s  p r e o c c u p a ­
t i o n s .  I n  P é g u y ' s  m e d i t a t i o n s  a n d  d i a t r i b e s  w e  f i n d  E o r g s o n i s m  a p p l i e d  
t o  s u c h  d i v e r s e  s u b j e c t s  a s  t h e  i n n e r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e  s e n s e  
o f  r a c i a l  i d e n t i t y  a n d  t h e  d o m i n a t i o n  o f  m o d e m  l i f e  b y  e c o n o m i c  c o n s i d e r a ­
t i o n s .  T h i s  s e e m s  a  f a r  c r y  f r o m  t h e  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  m y o p i c  o b s e s s i o n  o f  
• m a n y  B r i t i s h  p h i l o s o p h e r s  w i t h  t h e  i n s o l u b l e  p r o b l e m s  o f  h o w  w e  I m o w  a n y ­
t h i n g '  a n d  w h a t ,  i f  a n y t h i n g ,  w e  d o  k n o w ,  a n d  t h e n  t h e  f i n a l  ’ r e d u c t i o  a d  
' a b s u r d u m ' , Y / h a t  d o e s  i t  m e a n  t o  k n o w  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ?  P e r h a p s  B e r g s o n ’ s 
a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  w o u l d  e c h o  S o c r a t e s  -  " k n o w  t h y s e l f "  -  f o r  t h i s  w a s  t h e  
s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  a n d  h i g h w a y  t o  h i s  w h o l e  v i s i o n  o f  l i f e .
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_ Most of the details about works on Bergson and by Bergson up to 195? can readily be obtained from R.-M. Hosse-Bastide's Bergson, Educateur ,...195-5) [see sections called "Oeuvres de Bergson" and -"Travaux sur Bergson", pp. 559-450]• Works before 1915 are to be found inA contribution towards a bibliography of Henri Bergson (Columbia University. New York, 1915Tsmd for the period after 1952 the best, but incomplete, -bibliography on Bergson's religious philosophy is in R. Violette's La Spiritualité de Bergson (E, Privât, Toulouse, I968), The best later general bibliography is in Bergson, adversaire de Kant (P.U.F., I966) by M. Barthélémy-Madaule,
- - - - -  B E R G S O N ' S  W O R K S  ‘ '
O E U V R E S  ( E d .  d u  c e n t e n a i r e ,  T e x t e s  a n n o t é s  p a r  A .  R o b i n e t ;I n t r o d u c t i o n  H. G o u h i e r ,  P . U . F . , 1959)
T h i s  c o m p r i s e s  f o u r  f u l l - l e n g t h  w o r k s  :
1* Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (I889) (pp. 1-157)*f TTrans.-Time and Free Will by F. Podgson, Sonnenschein.—London;IvIacIÆLllan, New York, 1910].
2. Matière et Mémoire: Essai sur la relatièn du corps à 1'esprit (I896)
j^ pp. --159""579 / *— - —  - — — —  — —Trans. Matter and Memory by N. Paul & W. Palmer, Sonnenschein, London; MacMillan, New York, I9II].
5. L'Evolution Créatrice (1907) (pp. 487-809).ITrans.Greative Evolution by A. Mitchell, Holt, New York, 19II].
4* Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1952) (ppr 979-1247). —  ITrans. The two sources of morality and religion by R, Audra &C. Brereton, MacMillan, London; Holt, New York, 1955]. "
There are a number of.articles included (in collections):
1. Le Rire: Essai sur la signification du comique (19OO) (pp. 38I-485).First appeared as a series in La Revue de Paris, 1st February I9OO, pp. 512-544; 15th February, pp. 759-790 and 1st March, pp. I46-I79. [Trans. Laughter: Essay on the significance of the comic by C. Brereton& F. Rothwell, ifecMillan, New York, I9IIJ.
2. L'Energie Spirituelle (1919) (pp* 811-977)*I Trans . lïïnd-Snerg:/-' by H. Wildon-Carr, London, 1920].
a. "Le Reve" - Lecture to Institut psychologique,. Paris, 26.5*01.Published in Bulletin de l'Institut général psychologique « No. 3, May 1901 (pp. 97-122).
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b# "L'Effort Intellectuel" in La Revue Philosophique, Vol. LIII,January 1902 (pp. 1-27).
0. "Le Cerveaix et la Pensée", published as "Le paralogisme psycho-physiologique" in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. XII, November 1904 (pp. 895-908).
d. "Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance" in La Revus philosophique, Vol. LXVI, No. 12, December 1908 (pp. 561-595).
e. "La Conscience et la Vie", published as "Life & Consciousness" in Eibbert Journal, London, Vol. X, No, 1, October 1911 (pp. 24-^4).
f. "L'Ame et le Corps", Conférence to Foi et Vie, 4*8.12, in Le lÆatérialisme actuel (C. Le Bon, Flammarion, 1914)
g. "Fantômes de vivants et recherche psychique" - Lecture to Society for Psychical Research, London, 28.5.1915* In Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (Glasgow), Vol. ](XVI, 1915> pp. 462-4795 and in French, Annales de sciences psychiques. Nos.11, 12, November, December I915, pp. 521-529»
All the articles were slightly revised for L'Energie Spirituelie.
5. La Pensée et le Mouvant (1954) (PP* I25I-I482).1Trans. The Creative Mind by M. Andison, Philosophical Library,New York, 1946J.
a. "Introduction à la Métaphysique" in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. No. XXIX, I.I.I9O5, pp. 1-56.[Trans. T.E. Hulme, MacMillan, London, 1915J*
b. "La Vie et l’Oeuvre de Ravaisson" in Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Vol. I, I904, pp.(675-708),
c. "L'Intuition philosophique". Conférence at Congres de Philosophie, Bologne, 10.4.11. Published in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, No. XIX, 6.11.11 (pp. 809-827).
d. "La perception du changement" - two Lectures at Oxford, 26 and 27.5.1911 (Fi'owde, Oxford, I9II).
e. "Sur le pragmatisme de William' James; Vérité et Réalité".Published as preface to James's Le Pragmatisme. Flammarion,1911.[ T r a n s .  E ,  L e b r u n ] .
f. "La philosophie de Claude Bernard" - Discourse on centenary of Bernard's birth at College de France, 50.12.15; Leroux, 1914*
g. "Le possible et le réel" - Lecture at Philosophy Society, Oxford, 24.9.20, in Swedish, Nordisk Tidskrift. Stockholm, November 1950, pp. 441-456 ("Ska paudet och det nya.")
Only (b) and (f) remained unrevised for P.M.
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MELANGES (P.U.F., 1972) '1
Full-length works :
1, L'Idée de Lieu chez Aristote (pp. 1-56).[Trans. from Latin thesis in University of Paris - Quod Aristoteles de loco senserit, Alcan, 1889; French, trans. first published in Etudes bergsoniennes.11 » P.U.F., 1948, PP* 29-104].
2. D u r é e  e t  S i m u l t a n é i t é ;  A p r o p o s  d e  l a  t h é o r i e  d ' E i n s t e i n  (Alcan, ’
1922, pp. 57-244).
Important articles;
1. "Commentaire de Lucrèce" (pp. 265-510) (First published Delagrave, 188$). :
2. "La Spécialité" (Distribution des prix, lycée d'Angers, 5,6.1862,pp. 257-264).
3. "La Politesse" (Distribution-des prix, Clermônt-Ferrand, $0.7.1892,
pp. 517-552).
4. "Le bon sens et les études classiques" (Palmarès général, Sorbonne;first published Ed. de l'Epervier, Clermont-Ferrand, 1947* Intro­duction: B. Romeyer).
5. "L'Immortalité de l'Ame" - Pour lectures at University of London 
(paraphrased pp. 944-959).
6. "On the personality" - Gifford Lectures, University of Edinburgh 
(summarized pp. IO5I-IO71).
7. "De l'Intelligence" - Address at lycée Voltaire, July 1902; first published in Bulletin pour la Vérité. Vol. XXI, No. 6, 15.4*14, - pp. 424-436 (pp. 555-560).
8. "Les temps fictifs et le temps réel" (pp. 33-41); first published in•Revue de philosophie. Vol. XXIV, November 1886, pp. 525-551*
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